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I. INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish
Republic was founded in 1923, and went through a process of total
modernization, westernization, secularization and democratization,
with the reform efforts resting solely on import from major
continental jurisdictions both as to form and content: the Civil
Code of Switzerland, the Commercial Code of Germany, and the
Criminal Code of Italy. The French administrative law was already
put in place during the time of the Ottoman Empire. This meant
that the legal framework was synthetically constructed through
voluntary and imposed receptions, imitations, adaptations and
adjustments. The outcome, therefore, was “an eclectic” and
∗ Professor Emerita of Comparative Law and Honorary Senior Research
Fellow University of Glasgow; Professor Emerita of Comparative Law Erasmus
University, Rotterdam; Dr.h.c. (Uppsala).
esin.orucu@glasgow.ac.uk. An earlier version of this work was presented as a
paper at the Annual Conference of Irish Society of Comparative Law in Cork on
March 3, 2012. A portion of this paper related to several of the court cases
discussed was previously used in part 6.3.2.1.b of ESIN ÖRÜCÜ, CRITICAL
COMPARATIVE LAW CONSIDERING PARADOXES FOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
TRANSITION (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelijking, no: 59, Kluwer
1999), and other publications of mine.
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“synthetic” legal system, directly borrowed and translated from,
and significantly replicating, foreign models. 1
Reception—and translation as its vehicle—was used as the sole
method of law reform when the ideological and technological
decision was made in 1924 to move outside the framework of the
endogenous system of laws rather than to integrate and modernize
the existing systems; that is, to receive foreign codes. To achieve
this end and for the modernization of the civil law, the Swiss Civil
Code was chosen. This Code was preferred over the French or the
German codes because it was regarded as adapted to the multitude
of cantonal customs; it did not use a technical language and
therefore would be more easily translatable; it was set out as
briefly as possible; it avoided judicial conceptualism; and it
favored democratic equality by allowing freedom of contract,
freedom of testation, equal rights in intestacy and equality of the
sexes. This Code was deemed to be less ambiguous and more
practical than the others. In addition, certain leading personalities
in the Turkish legal world, such as the then Minister of Justice,
were educated in Switzerland. 2
A commission of twenty-six members was set the task of
translating the trilingual Swiss Civil Code from its French version.
Subsequently, a number of special commissions translated most of
the important commentaries on various branches of law into
Turkish. Within the year 1926, Turkish legal experts translated and
produced three entirely new codes (civil, criminal and
commercial), and there were more to follow. 3
The main aim of this “purposive use of law” was to demolish
the foundations of the old legal system by creating completely new
laws. Not only that, but the intention was to regulate, by means of
1. Esin Örücü, A Synthetic and Hyphenated Legal System: The Turkish
Experience, 1:2 J. COMP. L. 261-81 (2006).
2. See ERHAN ADAL, FUNDAMENTALS OF TURKISH PRIVATE LAW 44, 48
(5th ed., Beta 1998).
3. Code of Civil Procedure (1927), Code of Criminal Procedure (1929),
Bankruptcy Code (1929) and Maritime Code (1930).
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legislation, the relationships of the people, not according to
existing customs, usages, and religious mores, but to what it was
thought these relationships ought to be. To this end, the received
codes were accompanied by radical social reform: eight reform
laws (İnkilap Kanunları) established secular education and civil
marriage, adopted the Latin alphabet and international numerals,
introduced the hat, closed the Dervish convents, abolished certain
titles and prohibited the wearing of certain garments. 4 These
radical reforms were aimed at the basics: a language reform, a new
western system of law, a new sense of national identity based on a
newly created culture and an exclusion of the unwanted Islamic
and Arabic elements of the Ottoman heritage. This whole episode
was revolutionary and radically reformist, fulfilling the vision of
the founding fathers.
The present reconstituted legal framework of Turkey is the
product of law being moved across frontiers from societies and
laws that are socially and culturally diverse from its own. Legal
evolution, through a succession of imports, has relied solely on
major translation work. 5 So, it can easily be said that the initial
Turkish legal system is one based on large-scale translations alone.
It is not surprising then that there were problems created as a
result of the translations, considering that the Turkish translators
were not all professional translators but relied instead upon their
knowledge of the specific foreign language necessary for
translating a code; for instance, knowledge of the French language
when translating the Swiss Civil Code from its French version.
One feature the translators had in common was proficiency in
4. The constitutionality of these laws cannot be challenged even today
(Art. 174 of the 1982 Constitution), nor can their amendment be proposed.
However, change is in the air as a new Constitution is being prepared.
5. The Turkish Constitutions, though not translations, have also been
influenced by foreign models. For instance, the 1924 Constitution of the young
Republic was inspired by the 1875 Constitution of the Third French Republic
and the 1921 Constitution of Poland; the 1961 Constitution made wide use of
the Italian and West German Constitutions, with the provisions on economic
development being inspired by the Indian Constitution of 1949; the present 1982
Constitution was inspired by the 1958 French and the American Constitutions.
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French, though their knowledge of legal French differed. It is
possible that none had any training in legal translation, but only in
the law.
First, by considering the French version as “the source-law,”
the translators failed to follow the rules applicable to the
interpretation of the Swiss Civil Code as a trilingual text. If they
were to provide a faithful translation of it as a legal text, the
translators of such multilingual texts should not have ignored the
legal authority of each of the languages. Translating a trilingual
code into a fourth language as such creates a serious problem in
itself, let alone when only one version is used. As Jimena Andino
Dorato points out, it is a requirement to use all of the texts.6
Translation cannot come exclusively from one official version; all
texts (three, in our case) should have been taken into account. 7 In
Switzerland all the versions have equal value and the judges, in
case of doubt, have to resort to all versions. We know that the
French, German and Italian versions of the Swiss Civil Code do
not always agree. As an example we can cite article 1, section 1, of
that Code, which in its German version states that the law applies
to all questions for which it contains provisions “nach Wortlaut
oder Auslegung.” 8 The French text says, “la lettre ou l’esprit,” 9
and the Italian one, “la lettera od il senso.” 10 The Turkish Code
adopted the French version, “which itself may be, an inadequate
expression of the correct meaning.” 11 Again, later on in the same
article, section 3, we read that the judge should follow “established
doctrine and case law.” 12 However, the German version refers to
6. For problems encountered when the bilingual Quebec Civil Code was
translated into a third language (Spanish), see Jimena Andina Dorato, A
Jurilinguistic Study of the Trilingual Civil Code of Quebec, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD.
591-630 (2011).
7. Id. at 602.
8. http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19070042/19120101
0000/comparison.html
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. ADAL, supra note 2, at 44.
12. http://www.scribd.com/doc/59331459/Swiss-Civil-Code.
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“bewährter Lehre und Überlieferung,” 13 but the French version to
“des solutions consacrées par la doctrine et la jurisprudence,” 14
thereby giving undue emphasis to case law to the detriment of
customary law, and this is the version that entered the Turkish
Code. This, nevertheless, may have turned out to be suitable since
it was decided that ancient customary law cannot be resorted to in
the Turkish case.
Second, the translators did not have a basic knowledge of the
legal system of the language that they were translating from, which
is a prerequisite “to properly translate at a scholarly level.” 15 Many
Turkish academics thereafter had most of their training at
universities in the countries from whence the receptions came.
Being so trained, they undertook the “fitting” of the models to the
Turkish situation and the “tuning” of them. Language training and
translations were extensive. Fortunately, as a consequence of a
historical accident, in the early years of the Republic, Swiss,
Austrian and German academics also contributed to the new legal
system, thus greatly helping the imported system to take root. 16
Professors such as Schwartz, König, Neumark and Hirsch were
given sanctuary in Turkey before the Second World War, and held
posts at the Turkish universities of İstanbul and Ankara. The
presence of such professors in Turkey at the time of reception
fuelled the spread of legal ideas in support of the concepts
received. With time, many of their Turkish assistant lecturers

13. Supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S
COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 159 (7th ed., Foundation Press
2009).
16. On an extensive history and the importance of this event, see HORST
WIDMANN, EXIL UND BILDUNGSHILFE: DIE DEUTSCHSPRACHIGE AKADEMISCHE
EMIGRATION IN DIE TURKEI NACH 1933. MIT EINER BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHIE DER
EMIGRIERTEN HOCHSCHULLEHRER IM ANHANG (Peter Lang Int’l Academic
Pubs. 1973).
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themselves became professors and so helped the “internal
diffusion” and subsequent “infusion” of the law. 17
Courts and academics still refer to “the source-laws” from time
to time, and Turkish civil law is referred to as “İsviçre-Türk
Hukuku” (Swiss-Turkish law). In the areas of criminal law and
criminal procedure, there are also references to the source-law: the
Italian (Criminal Code) and German (Code of Criminal Procedure)
laws. We can thus speak of Italian-Turkish and German-Turkish
laws as other “hyphenated” designations. As would be expected,
over the years a Turkish civil law, a Turkish commercial law, a
Turkish criminal law, a Turkish civil procedure and other laws
have developed, slowly diverging from the source-laws. However,
even today the higher courts, as the interpreters of the law, make
use of the models when reaching decisions, though never basing a
decision solely on the source-law. The models are still seen as aids
to further modernization, as stimuli and correctors, aiding in the
interpretation of the translated texts.
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS RELEVANT TO THE TURKISH
EXPERIENCE
To illustrate the vastness of the task involved in the Turkish
endeavor, it is vital at the outset to note three factors. The first
factor to be considered is the peculiarity of the Turkish language
and its total difference to the source languages from whence the
laws were borrowed and translated:
Turkish is a member of the south-western or Oghuz group
of the Turkic languages, the other members being: the
Turkic dialects of the Balkans; Azeri or Azerbaijani,
spoken in north-west Persia and Soviet Azerbaijan; the
Qashqai of south Persia; the Turkmen or Turcoman of
Soviet Turkmenistan. 18
17. Esin Örücü, The Infusion of the Diffused: Four Circles of Diffusion
Infusing the Turkish Legal System in DIFFUSION: THE MOVEMENT OF LAWS AND
NORMS (Sue Farran et al. eds.) (forthcoming).
18. GEOFFREY LEWIS, TURKISH GRAMMAR ix (Clarendon Press 1967).
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From the 10th century onwards, the Turks were converted to
Islam and adopted the Arabic alphabet; a vast number of Arabic
terms related to theology, thought and civilization entered the
language. In the 11th century, when the Seljuk dynasty was
overrun by Persia, Persian became the language of Turkish
administration and literary culture. Thus the “educated Turk’s
vocabulary” was formed by “thousands of Persian words [which]
joined the thousands of Arabic words.” 19 By the end of the 13th
century, this hybrid language became the official language of the
Ottoman dynasty. The speech of the majority of ordinary Turks,
however, was Turkish.
Following the birth of the Republic, first, the Arabo-Persian
alphabet was replaced by the Latin one in 1928; however, as a
result of the nationalist element in the change, the new letters were
not called Latin, but in contrast to the old Arabic script, “Turkish.”
Since the codes had been translated and promulgated in 1926 into
Ottoman Turkish and published in the old script, they had to be
rewritten after the change to the new alphabet. 20 The new versions
appeared in 1934. Then, a substantial language reform movement
began to eliminate the Ottoman Turkish and to use Turkish words
to replace Persian and Arabic words. Where no exact translations
were to be found, they searched for words from other Turkic
languages, and even sometimes invented new ones: new words
were coined from Turkish roots, or from western words. 21 This
movement also impacted the codes, but, although the script was
19. Id. at xx.
20. The script was changed in 1928, but the terminology remained, which
meant that for students of law, to study these texts became more of a problem as
years went by (one such student was myself, 1961-1965). The texts became in
time virtually incomprehensible; however, there was later an edition of the Civil
Code, where the 1934 text was on the left hand page and a translation into the
Turkish of 1970s on the right. The new 2002 Code is more accessible to
lawyers, though not necessarily to laymen.
21. Today the conservative section of society wants to revitalize the old
words; the young do not know or understand these words; and first French, and
recently English, words inundated Turkish and are being used even when there
are Turkish equivalents.
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changed and an effort was made to keep the language simple, the
terminology remained mostly unchanged for a long time.
We know that one should not translate from the legal language
of the source language into the ordinary words of the target
language; the translation must be made into the legal terminology
of the target language. It is said that “the language of law is bound
to the inner grammar of legal systems, cultures and mentalities,
which in turn impede communication in words that are borrowed
from another legal system, culture and mentality.” 22 However, the
existing Ottoman legal language was totally different than the new
source languages. French, German and Italian had no connection
with Arabic, Persian and the legal target language, Turkish—be it
Ottoman Turkish or modern Turkish. 23
The second factor to be noted is that this difference was not
only due to the fact that the languages were not related in any way,
but also that “most” of the existing legal institutions and mentality
from the Ottoman times originated from Islamic law—a different
culture. 24 In addition, the potential users of the translations, judges
and lawyers, were not familiar with the source languages or the
source-laws either. “The fundamental difficulty in translation of

22. Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative Law and Language in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 675, 678 (Mathias Reimann &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
23. For example, the Dutch unilingual Code has been translated into two
languages, French and English, and became a trilingual Code with considerable
challenges. See Ejan Mackaay, La traduction du nouveau Code civil neérlandais
en anglais et en français in JURILINGUISTIQUE: ENTRE LANGUES ET DROITS—
JURILINGUISTICS: BETWEEN LAW AND LANGUAGE 537 (Jean-Claude Gemar &
Nicholas Kasirer eds., Bruylant 2005).
24. I say “most” here advisedly, since following the Reformation movement
(Tanzimat) in 1839, the Ottoman Empire moved from being an Islamic State to
becoming a mixed legal system, by borrowing a number of Codes from France
in order to appease the western powers: in 1850, the Commercial Code; in 1861,
the Commercial Court Procedure; in 1863, the Maritime Code (also influenced
by the Belgian and the Prussian Codes); and in 1879, the Code of Criminal
Procedure. These were also translations. The first ever Ottoman Constitution of
1876 was inspired by the Belgian Constitution of 1831 and the Prussian one of
1850.
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any kind is how to overcome conceptual difference.” 25 A concept
or institution peculiar to the culture of the source language is said
to be “more or less untranslatable,” all else being “more or less
translatable.” 26 Then the translator can opt for equivalence looking
for equivalents in the target language for terms of the source
language legal systems. 27 This was not possible in all cases in the
Turkish situation, as certain terms of art in the source legal
traditions did not exist in the Turkish one.
When the legal systems concerned are nearly the same or
very similar, equivalents work well since legal terminology has
system-specificity. However, even then, “two or more languages
cannot signify identically,” given the fact that “each national
language continues to signify according to its own structures and
continues to express its legal thought by means of a particular
vocabulary . . . .” 28 In addition, there are “vast networks of
associations of a word in one language that cannot all be
transposed into the other, such that there must be a loss of
connotative significance in the process.” 29 In the Turkish case, as
indicated, since the source and target languages related to different
legal systems, socio-cultures and different vocabulary, equivalents
would have been rare, in any case. In addition, some of these
equivalents already had other meanings and additional
connotations. Although René de Groot seems to think that in cases
of reception (and he does give the example of Turkey and
Switzerland), there would not be such problems, since the concepts
of one legal system have been adopted by the other and function in
that system in the same way, he overlooks the factors discussed
25. MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER’S GUIDE TO THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (Berg Publishers 1991); Gerard-Rene de Groot, Legal
Translation in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed., Jan Smits
ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2012).
26. Weston, supra note 25, at 9.
27. de Groot, supra note 25, at 539-40.
28. Simone Glanert, Speaking Language to Law: The Case of Europe,
1/2010 ROMANIAN J. COMP. L. 197, 202 (2010).
29. Curran, supra note 22, at 679.
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above. 30 This conclusion is reached in spite of the fact that he
accepts that “where the source language and the target language
relate to different legal systems . . . virtual full equivalence proves
to be a problem.” 31 This would be the case for the ensuing
receptions from the same sources, such as the 2002 Turkish Civil
Code, but does not apply to the initial receptions. If one were to go
for “functional equivalence,” then, similarly, in the Turkish case,
one would also come across problems arising from the above
differences while looking for “the nearest situationally equivalent
concept.” 32 So, “how should translations be elaborated when a
legal phenomenon has no exact equivalent in two languages?”33
This has been a significant problem in Turkey.
The third factor is that the Turkish language is phonetic in the
sense that in the system of writing and pronunciation there is a
direct correspondence between symbols and sounds. 34 Foreign
words borrowed either in terms of loan-borrowing or calque must
be converted into Turkish symbols to be pronounced correctly.
Previously, the spellings were changed when words were borrowed
from French, German, Italian and English to fit the phonetic
Turkish language. For example, French “station” has become
“istasyon;” Italian “scala,” “iskele;” German “schlep,” “şilep;”
30. de Groot, supra note 25, at 539.
31. Id.
32. WESTON, supra note 25, at 21.
33. Curran, supra note 22, at 678.
34. In this piece, all translations from Turkish are mine. For readers
unfamiliar with the Turkish alphabet: it contains the letters ç, ş, ğ, ö, ü and ı
(undotted i) both in the lower case and the upper case, in addition to twentythree letters from the Latin alphabet (i.e. not q, w or x). Most Turkish
consonants are pronounced as in English, most of the vowels as in Italian, but
there are some variations. The Turkish ö and ü are like the German, or like the
vowels in French peu and tu, dotted Turkish i like i in ‘sit’, the undotted i (ı)
something between i as in ‘will’ and u as in ‘radium’. Among the consonants ç
and ş are like sh and ch, as they are pronounced. C is pronounced like the j in
‘jet’. The ğ, after e and i – roughly as y in ‘saying’, after o, ö, u, ö – roughly as
‘sowing’, after a and ı, hardly sounded, but has the effect of lengthening the
vowel. In this piece when I use Turkish words, I use official modern Turkish
orthography and not transcription. On the new alphabet, see GEOFFREY LEWIS,
THE TURKISH LANGUAGE REFORM: A CATASTROPHIC SUCCESS 27-39 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1999).
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English “steam,” “istim,” and so on. 35 Today, this does not seem to
happen. Not only that, but English seems to enter the Turkish
language at an enormous speed; Geoffrey Lewis calls this “the new
yoke.” 36 In this context, I look later at a new entrant into the
Turkish legal system—the word “mortgage”—and discuss arising
problems, both those related to “loan-words” and to the phonetic
nature of the Turkish language.
Now, turning to other issues, it is true that legal language (legal
register) may be regarded as having a system-specific nature, and
yet intra-linguistic translations deal with a source language and a
target language. In addition, problems that may exist when
translating, for instance, frozen metaphors and idioms of one
language to another, do not exist in legal language, since such
terminology is not used. Obviously one would expect problems
when culture-specific institutions, procedures or official bodies are
involved. In such cases, the untranslatable can be transcribed or
explained, as no two languages are sufficiently similar to be
considered as representing precisely the same social reality. In
many legal systems, especially those that portray socio-cultural
and legal-cultural affinity, the “legal register” may have become
naturalized as a result of sufficient similarity. Yet, to translate
technical words used by lawyers in France, Germany, or elsewhere
on the European continent into Turkish would have been in many
cases a nearly impossible task. The best approach may have been
to keep the original word and provide an explanation as suggested
by Martin Weston, a former translator at the Secretariat of the
Council of Europe in Strasbourg and Senior Translator at the
Registry of the European Court of Human Rights. 37 In a case of
impossibility of translation, it can be said that a translator’s note
may be required. This method, however, could not be considered
with ease when translating codes, where there are mostly instances
35. For more examples, see LEWIS, supra note 18, at 9.
36. LEWIS, supra note 34, at 133-39.
37. WESTON, supra note 25, at 17.
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of word-for-word translation and, occasionally, of neologism. We
know that code translations are particularly difficult, are full of
hazards and create specific problems, 38 and that to obtain accurate
results, resorting to the original text might become necessary. 39
Transcription or borrowing is not translation, but “an
alternative way of dealing with culture-specific terms when
translation in the narrower sense is not possible.” 40 It may be
assumed that between European languages the difficulties may be
less pronounced than between European languages and a nonEuropean language such as Turkish, based on the presence or
absence of common cultural denominators. 41
Although it is true that words are an essential vehicle of
cultural influence, cultures are not necessarily co-terminous with
38. Here four instances could be noted: The first consists of the three
authentic versions of the trilingual Swiss Civil Code. The German, French
(remember this is the version used by Turkish translators) and Italian texts,
prepared with great care, are all equally authoritative. However, there are
various discrepancies between the three texts and the courts in practice have to
make a choice between versions. For the second instance, the Spanish Civil
Code, see Franklin R. Capistrano, Mistakes and Inaccuracies in Fisher’s
Translation of the Spanish Civil Code, 9 PHILIPPINE L. J. 89-141 (1929). The
third instance is the case of the translation of the bilingual Quebec Code into
Spanish and its accompanying problems. For this, see Dorato, supra note 6. The
fourth instance, which has already been mentioned, is the monolingual Dutch
Code being converted into a trilingual Code (Dutch, French, and English). For
this, see MacKaay, supra note 23. Further, the nine contributions that appear in
THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRANSLATION IN LEGAL HARMONIZATION (C. J. W. Baaij
ed., Kluwer Law Int’l 2012) indicate the crucial role of translation in
multilingual law-making and alert us to problems to be encountered in
developing not a single but a multilingual legal language through the example of
EU harmonization. The connection to comparative law becomes more than
evident in all the works above.
39. As opposed to the translation of the Quebec Civil Code into Spanish, the
Turkish translators did not indicate “with a dagger symbol and notes ‘infelicities
in language’ with an asterisk,” in this way outlining difficult or controversial
choices in translation. See Dorato, supra note 6, at 595. In fact, in our case, there
are no translators’ notes, but following each article in the Turkish Civil Code,
the number of the corresponding Swiss article appears, with the aim that
scholars and judges may like to consult the original text.
40. WESTON, supra note 25, at 30.
41. However, for the problem of seemingly similar words with different
connotations between French and English, see Curran, supra note 22, at 678 and
MATTEI ET AL., supra note 15, at 154-62. The same problem exists between
Dutch and German, and Austrian and German.
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languages, though the language of a particular society is an integral
part of its culture. The lexical distinctions drawn by each language
reflect the culturally important institutions and activities of that
society. In the process of legal translation, therefore, what is
sought is functional equivalents. It can also be assumed that there
is much “cultural overlap.” There may be no synonymy between
words of different languages, but a greater or lesser degree of
equivalence can be found in the “application” of the word.
However, these can only be intuitive judgments of equivalence in
the areas of cultural overlap. The general assumption is that exact
equivalence cannot be obtained and that validity can be achieved
only through control of factors that affect equivalence. Weston,
however, suggests five possible options open to translators facing a
culture-bound source language: use of a target language expression
denoting the nearest equivalent concept (functional equivalence);
word-for-word translation, making adjustments of syntax and
function words if necessary; borrowing of the foreign expression
and adding a target language explanation if the concept is unlikely
to be familiar to the target language readership; creation of a
neologism, in the form of a literal translation, a naturalization or a
wholly non-formal translation; or, lastly, use of an existing
naturalization. 42 In order of precedence, the rules to be followed
then are: a word-for-word translation if “this yields a functional
equivalent;” “a non-literal translation representing a functional
equivalent in the target language;” “a word-for-word or non-literal
translation that represents a semantic equivalent, but is not the
label of a functionally equivalent referent in the target language
culture (because there is none);” “transcription;” and, finally,
“neologism.” 43
Neologism is a subsidiary solution and the last resort in any
translation activity in law, and translators generally refrain from
creating neologisms. The mandatory test would be that of
42. WESTON, supra note 25, at 19-21.
43. Id. at 31.
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necessity. However, a translator choosing his or her own
neologism must be aware that this could lead to confusion. As
Weston says, “it is no business of the translator’s to create a new
word or expression if the source language expression can be
adequately and conveniently translated by one of the methods
already described.” 44 Old words may be combined to form new
compounds or phrases. Neologisms, if any, are naturalized, and
foreign words are either given a word-for-word translation or
borrowed and naturalized. Any neologism created must satisfy the
requirements of conformity with standard target language
grammatical, morphological and phonological patterns; that is,
naturalness as well as economy and succinctness.
Now, it could be said that loan-words, borrowed from other
languages and being recognizable from their language of origin,
may be regarded in Turkey as indications of cultural
transformation and therefore less desirable. Although preserving
the source term can be an option when languages are related, as
underlined by de Groot, “using an untranslated term from the
source language in the target language must be avoided in
particular where there is little or no etymological correspondence
between the two languages.” 45 Nonetheless, if we look at the
example of the word “mortgage,” already mentioned above, this is
exactly what happened. In 2007, Law No: 5582, 46 called the
“Mortgage Yasası” (Mortgage Statute), was passed by the Turkish
legislator introducing a new possibility for home-buyers. In the
body of the statute the word “mortgage” (kept in English) is then
explained as “ipotekli konut kredisi” 47 and a neologism—used here
in a very broad sense—also appears: “tutulu satış kredisi.” 48 None
44. Id. at 28.
45. de Groot, supra note 25, at 541.
46. Resmi Gazete no 26454; 21/02/2007.
47. “Housing loan with mortgage.” Mortgage has also been translated at
times as “Tutsat” (in English “hold and sell”), again meaningless to a Turkish
home-buyer.
48. “Enslaved or apprehended sales loan.”
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of these concepts mean anything to a Turkish home-buyer. In
addition, Turkish being a phonetic language, the word “mortgage”
is pronounced by Turks as it is written, in a very amusing fashion!
We must remember that Vivian Grosswald Curran notes: “the
appearance of a word or phrase in a foreign language and in italics
will alert the reader to the irremediable foreign nature of the
underlying concept.” 49 The fact that an untranslated word is not
accessible to the reader without explanatory references is the
obvious disadvantage of this technique. As de Groot explains:
If the translator suspects [in our case knows] that the
substance of the legal system from which he or she wishes
to borrow a term to serve as a neologism—and
consequently also its legal terminology—is unknown to the
users of the target text, a reassessment is in order or an
explanatory footnote must be added to the neologism. 50
In our case, the English word “mortgage” is in the name of the
statute, it is not in italics, and the explanation is by way of creating
new neologisms, meaningless to the reader. As Simone Glanert
states, “the recourse to the descriptive method does not offer a way
out of the problem of untranslatability, because a legal language is
not only the medium of a legal culture but also part of a standard
language” and “the concocted sequence of . . . words becomes a
vicious circle . . . .” 51
Coincidentally, the example de Groot gives in his work is also
that of the word “mortgage,” illustrating the translation of the
Spanish word “hipoteca” into English as “hypothec” rather than
“mortgage,” and he asks the question: “[w]ould this term not look
very odd to an English reader of the target text if no explanation is
provided?” 52 In the Turkish case, though some kind of an
explanation is provided in the text, the institution still does not
49. Curran, supra note 22, at 678.
50. de Groot, supra note 25, at 542.
51. Glanert, supra note 28, at 203.
52. de Groot, supra note 25, at 544. Obviously the word “hypothec” would
work well with a Scottish audience!
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seem to have taken root and the “fit” did not materialize, since the
1926 Civil Code, based on civilian institutions and terminology
translated from the French (and the 2002 Civil Code is no more
different), is totally alien to the English language (the new source
language in the case of this statute) and contains other concepts.
Would this new law also mean that, given time, the English source
would affect the style, form and tone of Turkish law? Here a
calque—loan translation—using an original word (“konut kredisi,”
in our case, though the word “kredi” is also from French, but at
least well-established), but giving it a new meaning, may have
been more acceptable, as this would only reflect a similar parallel
pattern of semantic evolution.
It must be remembered that the reading is related to
“conceptual content,” and it is often impossible to give the
meaning of a word without “putting it in context.” Therefore, a
word-for-word translation—that is, a “literal translation” (formal
lexical equivalence)—can be criticized. It is true that if there are
source language expressions that defy translation in the narrow
sense, literal translation makes no sense, in which case,
transcribing or paraphrasing (glossing) can be recommended. Here,
the source language term will be given in italics or between
inverted commas, and followed in brackets by the target language
gloss. This may be a workable method in general, but one cannot
clarify the original term by adding a literal translation in
parentheses in a code, either.
In a legal text, a word forms part of a sentence and, “sentences
are unlimited in their variety of the arrangement of words.”53
Language is connected to context and dictionaries cannot be
regarded as solving problems of interpretation. “Dictionaries, a
grammar book, and precepts of syntax, will not by themselves
53. Johan Steyn, Interpretation: Legal Texts and Their Landscape in THE
CLIFFORD CHANCE MILLENNIUM LECTURES: THE COMING TOGETHER OF THE
COMMON LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW 79, 81 (Basil S. Markesinis ed., Hart Publ’g
2000); and Esin Örücü, Interpretation of Multilingual Texts in the UK, 10.3
ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. (2006), http://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-9.pdf.
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yield the contextual meaning of words and sentences.” 54 In the
translation of the various codes into Turkish, though, dictionaries
were used and some mistranslations occurred, as will be seen
below. However, it is said that, since in the context of statutory
interpretation, the instrument is considered “an always speaking
statute,” 55 and the words are given their “natural and ordinary
meaning” that reflects the “common sense” proposition, it is
difficult “to accept easily that people have made linguistic
mistakes in formal documents.” 56 As will be seen, however, this
cannot be always assumed in the Turkish situation.
Many Latin phrases such as lis alibi pendens, forum non
conveniens, ejusdem generis, negotiorum gestio, status de
manerio, sine die, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas that could
have been retained in Latin, had the basis of the Turkish language
been Latin, were not, in spite of the fact that Roman law was
taught in law schools in Turkey. Nevertheless, many jurists in
Turkey know no Latin, so although Roman law terms may be
attractive as neologisms, one cannot assume that lawyers have any
such knowledge.
Now to another concept: ambiguity, or double meaning. It is
known that there can be two types of double meaning, doubt or
uncertainty: “patent ambiguity,” which is obvious on the face of
the instrument, and “latent ambiguity,” which becomes apparent
only when the surrounding circumstances are known. The general
rule is that, to resolve patent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is
admissible to enable the court to ascertain the meaning, but not to
give a meaning to a word or phrase capable of being given an
ordinary interpretation. Extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain
a latent ambiguity. Ambiguities in the meaning of a statute or other
legislation are resolved by recourse to rules of construction and
interpretation and resort to source-laws by academics or the high
54. Steyn, supra note 53, at 81.
55. Id. at 90.
56. Id.
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courts, which in Turkey is mostly the Yargıtay (the Turkish Court
of Cassation).
Related to ambiguity, again there is one interesting example
worth looking into. The Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women 57 was ratified by Turkey
in 1985. 58 It is also now the case that the Turkish Constitution is to
be read in the light of International Conventions. 59 The translation
of the Convention uses the word “önlenme” 60 meaning
“prevention” to correspond to “elimination” rather than “tasfiye” 61
or “ortadan kaldırılma” 62 both of which do correspond to
“elimination” or “removal.” These Turkish words have their own
connotations. In addition, “her türlü” in the official title means “all
kinds,” whereas “her biçimiyle” used in Professor Semih
Gemalmaz’s translation means “in all its forms.” 63 Some feminist
lawyers are claiming that the title creates an ambiguity on purpose,
especially in view of the number of reservations Turkey attached to
the Convention. In their opinion, “prevention” implies “from now
on,” whereas “elimination” implies looking through existing
legislation and cleansing them from such discrimination, and that

57. G.A. Res 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at
193 (18 Dec 1979).
58. Kadınlara Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi Sözleşmesi (Resmi
Gazete 187.92; 25/06/1985). This is the title of the official translation. A
translation by Professor Gemalmaz is different: Kadınlara Karşı Her Biçimiyle
Ayrımcılığın Ortadan Kaldırılması Sözleşmesi. Gemalmaz also states that in
the official Turkish translation of the Convention, there are serious mistakes
both in the title and in many of its articles. Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz,
Kadınlara Karşı Her Biçimiyle Ayrımcılığın Ortadan Kaldırılması Sözleşmesi:
Çekinceler Sorunu Işığında Haklar Analizi (The Convention on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women in all its Forms: An Analysis of Rights in the
Light of Reservations)’ in PROF. DR. İL HAN ÖZAY’A ARMAĞAN, LXIX
ISTANBUL ÜNIVERSITESI HUKUK FAKÜLTESI MECMUASI 139-238, 141 (2011).
59. Amended art. 90, 1982 Constitution.
60. Turkish word.
61. Arabic word.
62. Turkish word.
63. Gemalmaz, supra note 58.
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“all kinds” is less effective than “in all its forms.” 64 The claim that
this was done on purpose, so that an ambiguity would be created
and no clear-cut path could be followed, 65 may be well founded
and convincing. Nevertheless, one cannot be sure unless one is
privy to the policy behind this choice of words, so I have some
doubts about this claim.
Using “back translation,” which is a simple technique, though
inadequate for dealing with linguistic comparability, may help in
writing multilingual texts. It would serve as a detector of problems,
however, rather than offering solutions. Comparison of the two
texts can show the sources of difficulty and inconsistency. Yet, an
item in the source language may give rise to more than one version
in a target language and re-translation may create multiple source
language versions. In this context, it might be an interesting
exercise to compare the earlier version and the later version of the
same Turkish Civil Code to detect any changes in meaning in this
“inner” translation between the 1934 and the 1970 texts appearing
side by side. 66 This approach, valuable in the writing of the texts,
may not be so useful in their interpretation.
III. SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF TRANSLATION HURDLES AS SEEN
IN TURKISH CODES AND CASES
Cevdet Menteş, the then President of the Yargıtay (the Turkish
Court of Cassation), in his speech to commemorate the 50th
anniversary of the Civil Code published in a volume by the
University of Ankara, points out that in the preparation of the Civil
Code there were obvious translation errors in articles 65, 85, 187/2,
244/2, 507/3, 552 and 923, and that the mistakes in translation

64. Conversation with Ms. Canan Arın, a well-known and assertive
practicing lawyer in Istanbul, May 2013. In addition, see Feride Acar, CEDAW
ve Türkiye’de Durum, GÜNCEL HUKUK DERGISI 12 (2005).
65. Id.
66. Referenced in supra note 20. For some examples from the Code articles,
see LEWIS, supra note 34, at 128-29.
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were not limited to these only. 67 There were more “mistakes,
inaccuracies and weaknesses of expression.” 68 He also argues that,
although in a decision of 1950 unifying precedents, the Yargıtay
held that, in cases of mistakes in translation, the source-law Swiss
Civil Code would be taken as the basis and the articles interpreted
according to their purpose in the source-law; nevertheless, it would
be more desirable for the legislator to correct these errors. 69
On the same occasion, Professor Necip Kocayusufpaşaoğlu
concentrated on a concept unknown in the old law in the area of
succession: “mirasta iade” (“rapport successoral” or “rapport a
succession” in the French version and “ausgleichung” in the
German version of the Swiss Civil Code). Not being in use before
1926, this institution, which hailed both from Roman and
Germanic laws, was ignored by Turkish lawyers for a long time. In
fact, it was already a problematic one in theory and practice in
Switzerland, Germany and Italy, in spite of its pedigree.
Kocayusufpaşaoğlu also criticizes the choice of terminology,
indicating that the word “iade” (return) does not cover all instances
subsumed under this institution, which he calls “denkleştirme”
(equalization). 70 He then goes on to look at other concepts used in
article 603 which he believes contain wrong word choices, usually
words with established prior meanings and connotations. He is of
the opinion that instead of correcting the mistakes in translation,
this article, which, according to him, has been very badly
translated in the first place, should be rewritten. 71
Another publication, this time from İstanbul University,
commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Civil Code, also
67. Cevdet Menteş, Konuşma (Speech) in MEDENI KANUN’UN 50. YILI,
BILIMSEL HAFTA: 15-17 NISAN 1976, Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi
Yayınları No: 408, 2-6, 2 (1977).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Necip Kocayusufpaşaoğlu, Mirasta İade (= Denkleştirme) ile İlgili
Meseleler’ (Matters related to Equalization in Succession) in MEDENI
KANUN’UN 50. YILI, BILIMSEL HAFTA: 15-17 NISAN 1976, Ankara Üniversitesi
Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları No: 408, 117-38, 117-19 (1977).
71. Id. at 133-35.
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contains a number of contributions assessing the code and the
developments in the law in the Republican period in Turkey.
Among these, there is one by Professor Ernest Hirsch, who was
one of the foreign professors working in Turkey during the
formative years of Turkish law. 72 He talks of his years of teaching
commercial law, not using the Turkish Commercial Code since he
did not know Turkish, but two unofficial French translations of it,
which were not identical. He points out that in the preparation of
the Commercial Code (1926-1929) a number of translators used
different foreign codes, not just the German. 73 The Code was
eclectic and in its translation a variety of terminology was used,
depending on the translator. His Turkish colleagues told him
jokingly that “the Code is a Russian salad in need of mayonnaise to
be put on top by you.” 74 He further admits that since he studied the
Code from those inadequate French translations and lectured in
German, the lectures then being translated into Turkish, all were
partially ambiguous and partially incomprehensible! 75 In fact,
according to Hirsch, it was rumored that since most professors,
judges and lawyers knew no foreign languages, they were mostly
relying on the literal translations of the codes as texts rather than
inquiring into the spirit embodied in them. 76
Let us now turn to some specific examples. One problem
surfaced while the Yargıtay was dealing with “arbitration
agreements” in a unification of precedents. 77 The Court first
determined that a number of different systems of arbitration

72. Ernest Hirsch, Yasama ile Öğreti ve Yargı Arasındaki Karşılıklı
Bağlılık’ (Reciprocal Ties between Legislation, Education and the Judiciary) in
50. YIL ARMAĞANI: CUMHURIYET DÖNEMINDE HUKUK, İstanbul Üniversitesi
Hukuk Fakültesi No: 1888/421, 173-189, at 173 (1973).
73. Id. at 175.
74. Id. at 176.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 93/4; 94/1; 28.1.1994; 20 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1994, 519.
“Unification of precedents” is the one type of decision of the Yargıtay that is
binding on all courts.
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agreements were accepted by the laws of Switzerland, Germany,
Austria and France, and then said:
Article 533 of the Turkish Code of Civil Procedure is
differently arranged to the source-law, the Neuchatel Code
of Civil Procedure article 488. Somehow, the words “unless
otherwise contracted” in article 488/1 have not been
incorporated into article 533. The translation leaves a gap.
Neither does article 533 have any indication as to what
would lead to an appeal. We therefore think that article 533
should be interpreted anew, as the existing interpretations
and practices do not give satisfactory results. 78
Then the Yargıtay unified various decisions emanating from its
chambers stating: “[d]uring the discussions some judges have said
that we cannot follow the source-law. The majority however, is of
the view that we can. Thus, an arbitration award not in accordance
with the law can be appealed against.” 79 One must ask whether this
omission was on purpose or by mistake.
Dealing with letters of guarantee, bills of lading and “clear on
board,” and the resolution of the question as to whether the carrier
is free of liability when the sender enters incorrect information into
the bill of lading, the Yargıtay indicated that the topic had been
widely discussed in international law, and then referred to letters of
guarantee (clear on board) in the French and German Commercial
Codes, showing that there is no agreement on the point.80 A
dissenting opinion referred to German, Italian and French doctrine,
as well as English doctrine, and cases on misrepresentation. It then
suggested that:
Since the applicable provision, section 1064/11 of the
Turkish Commercial Code, does not exist in “the source
German law” (HGB) and neither was it in the Turkish
Government Draft Bill when it went to Parliament, then
this must mean that the Judicial Committee added this in
haste and it went through Parliament without discussion. It
is obvious that the provision was badly written and
78. Id. at 526.
79. Id. at 528.
80. 93/565; 94/3295; 21.4.1994; 20 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1994, 1782.
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hurriedly. If regarded in this light, the rules of the Hamburg
Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea could apply and
section 1064/11 should be thus interpreted. This is also in
accordance with legal opinion given by Turkish Maritime
law experts. 81
An example from family law is also illuminating. In a case
related to the inheritance rights of an adopted child, 82 the Yargıtay
was critical of the translation of article 257/2 of the 1926 Civil
Code. In the case under consideration, the inheritance rights of a
child were postponed till after the death of both adoptive parents at
the time of the adoption agreement. However, article 257/2 stated
that an agreement depriving the adopted child of inheritance rights
must be concluded before the adoption agreement. According to
the Yargıtay, this is not in keeping with the source Swiss Civil
Code, and that this view is also supported by Turkish and Swiss
doctrine. 83 The Court went on to say: “[f]ollowing the unification
of precedents 4/10 of 20.9.1950, errors in translation should be
understood and interpreted in keeping with the source law.” 84 The
authority of foreign doctrine has contributed to the correct
interpretation of the Code, Turkish judges being free to resort to
foreign documents and texts, where necessary.
Now looking at the area of criminal law, we can briefly
consider some further problems. The references in criminal law
and criminal procedure to Italian law are mostly in dissenting
opinions rather than in the decisions themselves and are resorted to
in order to challenge mistaken interpretation of the 1926 Turkish
Criminal Code (now replaced by the 2005 Criminal Code) and the
1929 Code of Criminal Procedure, and to point to mistakes in
translation at the time of reception. The Yargıtay is called upon to
search for the true meanings in the original versions. For instance,
in a case concerning “murder to facilitate the committing of
81. Id. at 1789.
82. 2000/0858; 2000/120077; 12.10.200; 26 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi,
1819-1820.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1820.
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another crime,” 85 the dissenting opinion (Judge Selçuk, wellversed in Italian) claimed that the term “crime” in articles 135, 150
and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a mistaken
translation of the term “act” in the source-law, whereas the term
“action,” used in article 257, was the correct translation. It was
indicated that when article 135 was amended in 1992, this mistake
should have been corrected. 86 After pointing to some other
discrepancies, the same dissenting judge said, “as can be seen, as a
result of giving wrong meanings to terms and concepts, the
Turkish practice has become divorced from the laws of the legal
systems that inspired it.” 87
In another case 88 related to causing bodily harm to, and the
maltreatment of, members of the family, though there were no
references to foreign sources in the decision, again the same
dissenting judge referred to mistakes in translation and
interpretation. He criticized the established view of the Yargıtay
regarding the term “a number of persons” as more than three, and
“a few persons” as three. 89 According to him these variations do
not exist in the Italian source-law, where the term “plu persone” is
used to indicate more than two persons. The Turkish Code and the
“Majno” Annotations 90 use sometimes one, sometimes another
word to translate this term, and there is, therefore, some ambiguity
and confusion. When articles 480 and 482 were being amended,
the legislature followed the mistaken decisions of the Yargıtay and

85. 97/1-76; 97/114; 13.5.1997; 23 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1997, 1608
1616.
86. Id. at 1616.
87. Id.
88. 96/8022; 96/9095; 3.12.1996; 23 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1997, 617.
89. Id. at 620.
90. These annotations (called in Turkish “Manjo Şerhi”) in four volumes
were written by the Italian Criminal lawyer Luigi Manjo and published in the
early years of the Republic, first in the Ottoman script by the then Minister of
Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, including his preface. It was later published in the
Latin script. In 1977 it was re-published by the Yargıtay (Yargıtay Yayını no:3,
Ankara). It is now out of print.
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changed the term “a number of persons” to “three.” The dissenting
judge said:
While the law was being interpreted, the source-law should
have been consulted. It should not have been forgotten that
the Turkish Criminal Code is the outcome of a reception
and translation. Therefore, it is necessary to correct
mistakes in translation by “corrective interpretation.” The
only acceptable departure from the source-laws is where
the legislature has shown reasons for this departure in
debate in Parliament. Therefore, whenever necessary the
Italian Code and reasoning must be used. 91
Where the right to defense of the suspect was being
determined, the Yargıtay was of the opinion that, reminding the
suspect that he has the right to employ a lawyer and that he has the
right to silence are essential elements of procedure, otherwise the
right to defense is to be regarded as limited. 92 After stating that
laws of all democratic states point in the same direction, two
dissenting opinions referred to the source, the German Code of
Criminal Procedure articles 243 and 130, which have the same text
as the Turkish articles 236 and 135. Both opinions extensively
discussed decisions of the German Federal Court (BGH) with
further references to foreign doctrine on criminal procedure. 93 The
Yargıtay was criticized for not applying the aforementioned
articles in line with the German Federal Court practice and for not
using its discretion in determining the value of such procedural
niceties and, instead, taking them as absolutes. 94
In a case dealing with “premeditated murder,” 95 a dissenting
opinion compared the Turkish Yargıtay to its French, German and
Italian counterparts. It then pointed out that the word
“premeditated” was not defined in the Turkish Criminal Code and
that, because in the early years of the Republic it was the practice
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Supra note 88 at 620.
95/7; 95/302; 24.10.1995; 22 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1996, 103.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
94/1-167; 94/188; 27.6.1994, 20 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1994, 1829.
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to interpret this code according to the French Criminal Code rather
than the Italian source-law, a number of problems were created. 96
This was indeed a linguistically easy but mistaken option; it was
not possible to transfer the interpretation of one to the other. The
1810 French Criminal Code was no longer in effect and the new
Code had yet a different system and defined cases of premeditation
as “assassination.” The Italian criminal system left this
determination to the judge. 97 According to this dissenting judge,
the Turkish system seemed to sway between the French and the
Italian systems by sometimes using the French conceptual structure
“calmness” (cool-headedness), and thus had internal
inconsistencies. 98 The Yargıtay should give a final definition of
“premeditation” and then use this definition as a criterion when
viewing the decisions of the lower courts. The dissenting judge
then referred to Spanish teaching and practice, which had also been
influenced by the Italian, German and French laws, to show that
they did follow this path. 99
In another case, it was pointed out by the Yargıtay 100 that the
Turkish Criminal Code does not define “grafts, tricks and
dishonesty,” which are the formal conditions for the proof of
“swindling.” Considering comparative law, the Court discerned
two trends. However, it then decided the case according to the
system of the Turkish Criminal Code. The aforementioned judge in
his dissenting opinion again looked at a number of legal systems
and specifically at the source-law. He said that the Italian Criminal
Code gives weight to the subjective element, “the decision to
commit an offence.” 101 He claimed that by adding a condition not
foreseen by the Code, the Yargıtay was narrowing the scope of
article 80, which can only be done by the legislature. This is
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 1832.
Id. at 1833.
Id. at 1834.
Id. at 1834.
98/6-280; 98/359; 24.11.1998; 25 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1999, 238.
Id. at 240.
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accepted not only in Italian but also in Swiss, Belgian and French
laws. 102 He then summarized the position in the Italian source-law
by reference to legal writers such as Battaglini, Pannain, Ranieri,
Antolesei, Nuvo Lone, Fiandaca, Mantovani, Musco, Padovani and
Cavallo. He pointed to a translation error in article 80, and said that
a Turkish unification of precedents in 1929 had unfortunately
further reinforced this error. 103 In 1941 the section was amended.
As before, the judge blamed this unhappy development on the
interpretation of the Italian-Turkish Criminal Code in the light of
the French Criminal Code, which is incompatible with the Italian
one. According to him, “decision to act” and “criminal intention”
are not equivalent. 104 In an earlier decision, the General Council of
Criminal Law of the Yargıtay 105 compared the Turkish Code with
the source-law and pointed to the fact that article 80 had been
amended and that “the same intention to commit an offence” was
now replaced by “the same decision to commit an offence.” 106
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Modernization and westernization of Turkey’s legal system
were not based on any one dominant culture, and the fact that a
number of different models were chosen might have given the
borrowings “cultural legitimacy.” 107 As stated, the civil law, the
law of obligations and civil procedure were borrowed from
Switzerland, commercial law, maritime law and criminal
procedure from Germany, criminal law from Italy and
administrative law from France; all translated, adapted and
adjusted to solve the social and legal problems of Turkey and to
102. Id. at 241.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 98/11-205; 98/304; 13.10.1998; 24 Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 1998 at
1809.
106. Id. at 1811.
107. Gianmaria Ajani, The Role of Comparative Law in the Adoption of New
Codifications in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE XVTH INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 68-69, 80 (1998).
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interlock. The choice was driven at times by the perceived
“prestige” of the model, at other times by “efficiency,” and
sometimes by “chance,” or “historical accident.” In recent years
the codes have been updated—the Civil Code in 2002, the
Criminal Code in 2005 and the Commercial Code in 2011—but the
bases have not changed and, though not translated now, they still
carry the stamps of the translated laws of the 1920s.
Although Eva Hoffman claims that distortions occur in
translation of even a single word in “transporting human meaning
from one culture to another” unless “the entire language” around
the word or its audience are transported, 108 and Pierre Legrand that
“legislation cannot make mores,” 109 the entire Turkish legal
system, still fully functioning, is built on such institutional
transfers and translations, with a different and brand new audience,
and has been keeping lawyers, judges and academics active since
1926.
A great believer in receptions as a way forward for legal
systems, Alan Watson is of the view that even when
misunderstood or mistranslated, a borrowed institution or concept
may solve the problems for the solution of which it was borrowed.
He says: “. . . a total mistake as to the meaning of the rules which it
is thought are being borrowed need not stop the creation of a new
doctrine nor prevent it becoming authoritative and important.”110
In addition, “. . . foreign law can be influential when it is totally
misunderstood.” 111 When one looks at the Turkish experience, it
can be said that Watson’s views can be endorsed. It is of course
true that, as observed by Glanert, “the inevitably violent
introduction of a newly created legal terminology causes in every
108. EVA HOFFMAN, LOST IN TRANSLATION: A LIFE IN A NEW LANGUAGE
272-73 (Vintage 2008).
109. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT
J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111, 119 (1997).
110. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 52 (Scottish Academic Press 1974).
111. Id. at 99.
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national legal language a semantic earthquake.” 112 Would all this
translation and earthquake have an added meaning today, now that
the Turkish language is also being Europeanized? Can the national
language be reduced to an instrumental dimension? Can we
observe “the adoption of a transnational legal neo-language?” 113
One thing is certain, and that is that the Turkish experience
defies the romantic view that there is an indissoluble bond between
law, language and culture. 114 This experience, therefore, can also
be studied as a useful empirical work on the relations between
language, culture, translation and comparison, and the value of a
code in more than one language. Is this relation indeed as profound
as is purported? Suffice it to say that the Turkish experience, in my
opinion, rightly leads one to ask, “whose law, whose culture,
whose language?”
Through creative interpretation, mistakes and inaccuracies in
translation (unless they are deliberate) can be either eliminated
over time or give a different direction to the law compared to the
source-laws. For this, an active judiciary and creative academics
are needed, which is what has been happening in the Turkish legal
system over the past ninety years.

112. Glanert, supra note 28, at 201.
113. Id.
114. Discussed by Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of
Transplants and Receptions in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 469 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford University
Press 2006). In this paper I am not looking at deeper and contentious questions
such as:
[I]f law lives in and through language, what happens to it when it is
transferred into another language? If the structure of a language
influences, or even determines, the mode and content of thought, might
it not be that any language can only express certain thoughts, and that
these thoughts differ from culture to culture?
See BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE
LAW 101 (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1990). Other questions can also
be raised which jurilinguists will study, such as “how strong is the link between
the law or a legal system and the language of its statues?” and “is a ‘neutral legal
language’ possible or even necessary?” See Dorato, supra note 6, at 618.

FRANÇOIS GÉNY IN LOUISIANA
François-Xavier Licari ∗
For the reviewer, Gény’s analysis and suggested method was not
just an X-ray showing the internal arrangement of the legal system;
it was more a sort of stethoscope, catching the living beat of the law
in action. 1

I. Factors of a Successful Reception ........................................... 484
A. Portalis in Louisiana .......................................................... 485
B. A Trinity of Learned Judges: Justices Barham, Tate and
Dennis ................................................................................ 490
II. The Manifestations of the Reception of Méthode
d’interprétation et sources in Louisiana ................................ 495
A. The Influence of Gény on the Methods of Interpretation
Applied by Louisiana Courts ............................................. 495
B. The Ambiguous Status of Jurisprudence: The Issue of the
Retroactive Effect of Overruling........................................ 503
Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif, 2 a
manifesto of the free objective search for a rule, has been
genuinely received in Louisiana, both by doctrine and by

∗ Dr. en droit (University of Strasbourg, France); Dr. iuris (Saarland
University, Germany), Maître de conférences en droit privé (Associate Professor
of Private Law), Institut François Gény, Université de Lorraine, France. This
article appeared for the first time in a shorter version under the title “François
Gény en Louisiane”, in LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 91 (O. Cachard, F.-X.
Licari & F. Lormant eds., Dalloz 2012). The translation into English was made
by Laura Castaing, Jean-Pierre Huffen and Alexandru-Daniel On, at the Center
of Civil Law Studies, Louisiana State University, under the supervision of
Professor Olivier Moréteau.
1. Albert Tate Jr., Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private
Positive Law by François Gény, 25 LA. L. REV. 577, 586 (1965) (book review).
2. Hereinafter MIS. Unless otherwise indicated, references are to Jaro
Mayda’s translation of Gény’s book: MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES
EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF (La. State L. Inst. 1963). The 1919 edition, as reprinted
in 1954, was the object of the translation.
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jurisprudence, to such an extent that an author wrote that in
Louisiana, jurists “live and work with Gény.” 3
Before turning to Gény’s success story in Louisiana, we think
it not useless to sketch the main ideas of François Gény (18611959). 4 Often cited but rarely read nowadays, Gény’s heritage has
almost sunk into oblivion in the Anglophone world, despite
accessible English material. 5 Gény’s first and most important work
is Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif, whose
first edition appeared in 1899. Not only was it a milestone in
French legal scholarship but also for the entire Western world.
Luminaries like Benjamin N. Cardozo and Roscoe Pound found
great inspiration in his writings; generally, Gény exercised a
notable influence on American scholarship. 6 For contemporary
3. Grover Joseph Rees III, Albert Tate on the Judicial Function, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 721, 740, n.1 (1987): “In Louisiana, thanks in large part to the efforts of
Judge Tate, lawyers also live and work with Gény . . . .”
4. Two excellent accounts should be mentioned: Jaro Mayda, François
Gény And Modern Jurisprudence 1-29 (Louisiana State University Press 1978)
[hereinafter FGMJ]; Benoît Frydman, Le projet scientifique de François Gény
in CENTENAIRE DE MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ
POSITIF 1899-1999: FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHE ET RÉALITÉS 213 (Dalloz &
Bruylant 2000). See also infra note 5.
5. F. Gény, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Necessity and Method in
SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD—SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 2 (E.
Bruncken and L.B. Register trans., Boston Book Company 1917); F. Gény, The
Legislative Technics of Modern Civil Codes, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD—
SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 498 (E. Bruncken and L.B. Register
trans., Boston Book Company 1917); Julien Bonnecase, The Problem of Legal
Interpretation in France, 12 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 79, 88 (1930); B. A.
Wortley, François Gény in MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 139 (I. Jennings ed.,
Oxford University Press 1933); Mitchell Franklin, Gény and Juristic Ideals and
Method in the United States in 2 RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES SUR LES SOURCES DU DROIT
EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 30 (Recueil Sirey 1934); Thomas J.
O’Toole, The Jurisprudence of François Gény, 3 VILL. L. REV. 455 (1958);
Richard Groshut, The Free Scientific Search of François Gény, 17 AM. J. JURIS.
14 (1972); Nicholas Kasirer, François Gény’s libre recherche scientifique as a
Guide for Legal Translation, 61 LA L. REV. 331 (2001); Matthew
Humphreys, François Gény, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MODERN FRENCH THOUGHT
251-54 (Christopher John Murray ed., Routledge 2004); Ward Alexander
Penfold, An Ineluctable Minimum of Natural Law: François Gény, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, and the Limits of Legal Skepticism, in 37 HISTORY OF
EUROPEAN IDEAS 475 (2011); MAYDA, supra note 4.
6. See Duncan Kennedy & Marie-Claire Belleau, François Gény aux
États-Unis in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHE ET RÉALITÉS 1899-1999—CENTENAIRE
DE MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF, ESSAI
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legal scholars nurtured with legal realism or critical legal studies,
Gény’s ideas will seem commonplace. But one ought to remember
that they were formulated at a time when legal formalism ruled
supreme in France, in Europe and in the United States. 7 Gény was
a sort of proto-legal realist: he asked us to lift the mask of formal
logic which hid the reasoning of the courts. One of Gény’s main
theses 8 is that judges under the codes are not just automats
applying legislated law with the use of syllogism and other tools of
formal logic, but rather are active deciders who weigh interests,
apply policies, etc. This reality ought to be admitted and its
consequences carried out. The masks that Gény wanted to lift are
numerous. First, he wanted his readers to recognize that positive
law is more than legislation. Societal relations cannot be regulated
by statutes that are often obsolete by the time they are
promulgated. Here Gény appears as an heir to Portalis, the chief
draftsman of the Civil Code, whom Gény abundantly quotes. Gény
fought for the abandonment of the nineteenth-century exegetic
positivism that was based on three well-established noxious
fictions. The first one is the fiction of the logically necessary
completeness of legislation. 9 But this fiction is corrected by
another fiction that isolates the statute of the authority of its
maker. 10 These fictions lead to the use and abuse of analogy
reasoning as a technique of interpretation. Analogy reasoning is
legitimated by a third fiction, that of the existence of a legislator’s
identifiable intent. This first deconstruction of the decisional
process leads Gény to propose a realist method to decide cases. 11 It

295 (C. Thomasset, J. Vanderlinden & Ph. Jestaz (dir.) eds., Yvon
Blais 2000).
7. For the intellectual context, see Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes
Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 379 (1997).
8. Gény offers an authoritative restatement of his Méthode: MIS, supra
note 2, at nos. 183-187 & nos. 223-224.
9. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 12-19.
10. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 7-82.
11. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 83-187.
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can be summed up as follows: Modern constitutional principles
imply that statutes be always fully implemented. Nevertheless,
“justice and social utility” require that the one applying the law use
all legitimate means when he decides a case. Customary law is the
first of these legitimate resources. When no clear and applicable
rule is available, the judge must draw from scholarship (la
doctrine) and jurisprudence (la jurisprudence). According to Gény,
jurisprudence bears only persuasive authority. His refusal to
consider jurisprudence as a binding authority, i.e. as a real source
of law, has been criticized by many authors. But if no appropriate
source is available, the judge must freely search for a rule on
which to ground his decision. This search is “free” in the sense that
it is of discretionary nature. But it is in no way arbitrary. Gény
rejects every path that could lead to the reign of the judge’s
subjectivity; hence the vehement attacks directed against the hunch
cult of the German Free Law movement 12 or to the anarchic
experiments of the “bon juge Magnaud.” 13 In other words, this
search must be objective, that is, grounded in social realities,
needs, interests and in the nature of things. Thus, it is a scientific
approach comparable to the approach a model legislator would use.
But contrary to a legislator’s rule, the rule created by the judge is
limited to the case at hand.
At first glance, one could believe that the scope of the free
scientific search is limited and that a praetorian rule will seldom
12. On this school of thought, see MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 205-222; see
also James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as
the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399 (1987); more
generally, see Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31
B.C.L. REV. 837 (1990).
13. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 196-200; on the phénomène Magnaud, see
also Max Radin, The Good Judge of Château-Thierry and His American
Counterpart, 10 CAL. L. REV. 300 (1922); Roland Weyl & Monique Picard
Weyl, Socialisme et justice dans la France de 1895: le “bon juge Magnaud” in
3-4 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 367 (Giuffrè 1974-1975); Marie-Anne Frison-Roche,
Le modèle du bon juge Magnaud, in DE CODE EN CODE, MÉLANGES EN
L’HONNEUR DU DOYEN GEORGES WIEDERKEHR 335 (Dalloz 2009); András
Jakab, What Makes a Good Lawyer? Was Magnaud Indeed Such a Good
Judge?, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ÖFFENTLICHES RECH 275 (2007).

2013]

FRANÇOIS GÉNY IN LOUISIANA

479

appear. To the contrary, Gény offers a definition of interpretation
that opens a broad door to the judge’s creativity. In effect,
according to him, the only justified principle of interpretation is to
determine the scope of the text with reference to the time of its
enactment. 14 That means, as we saw before, that the judge must not
try or pretend to guess “the” intent of “the” legislator. 15 That also
means that analogy reasoning is taken for what it is: one form of
the free search and not a technique of interpretation. 16
After this brief account of Gény’s method, we may turn to its
reception in Louisiana.
This reception stems from the combination of various factors,
in particular the remarkable translation by Jaro Mayda, a Czech
comparatist, and the assimilation of François Gény’s work by outof-the-ordinary judges. Nevertheless, an excellent translation,
enthusiastically received by outstanding judges, is not a sufficient
explanation for the fertility of the libre recherche scientifique. An
intellectual terrain within which the reception could flourish was
also required. Louisiana was probably perfectly suited for this.
However, at a 1991 conference in which he spoke for the last
time of François Gény, Jaro Mayda could not hide his bitterness. 17
He regretted that in the United States no one was really interested
in Gény, nor in his own works on the professor from Nancy. He
had the feeling that his work was in vain: his translation of
Méthode d’interprétation et sources en droit privé positif 18 was
largely ignored, and his essay, François Gény and Modern
Jurisprudence, 19 was not even reviewed in Louisiana, although

14. MIS, supra note 2, at no. 97.
15. In the same vein, see Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM.
L. REV. 379, 382 (1907).
16. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 165-168.
17. Jaro Mayda, Gény and the Common-Law World: Thirty Years Later in
FRANÇOIS GÉNY E LA SCIENZIA GIURIDICA DEL NOVECENTO, 20 QUADERNI
FIORENTINI 189, 190 (Giuffrè 1991).
18. MIS, supra note 2.
19. MAYDA, supra note 4.
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edited by Louisiana State University Press. 20 At first sight, this
observation can be confirmed today: a recent article about the links
between the thinking of François Gény and that of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., does not mention Jaro Mayda’s 21 translation or essays.
It may also be noted that François Gény and Modern
Jurisprudence, a work of incredible depth and richness, is rarely
quoted, in France or in the rest of Europe. 22
However, it is contended that the author’s pessimism was
unwarranted. An enthusiastic review of his translation has been
made by one of the most influential judges of the 20th century in
Louisiana, Albert Tate Jr., who became a driving force in
spreading the application of the free objective search for a rule
doctrine in Louisiana jurisprudence. 23 Within a few years, as Jaro
Mayda had indicated, 24 it was genuinely received in the state, not
only by doctrine, but also by jurisprudence. Jaro Mayda’s brilliant
translation 25 surely acted as a propellant. Until its publication,
Méthode d’interprétation et sources was quoted by some authors,
but its diffusion was limited because, by the end of the 19th
century, in legal practice, the use of French had almost vanished. 26

20. Shael Herman, professor at Tulane Law School, had nevertheless
dedicated a review to this excellent work. See Shael Herman, François Gény
and Modern Jurisprudence, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 730 (1979) (book review).
21. Penfold, supra note 5.
22. Henri Batiffol wrote a brief review of the book: Henri Batiffol, Jaro
Mayda—François Gény and Modern Jurisprudence, 33 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 224 (1981) (book review).
23. Albert Tate Jr., Method of Interpretation and Sources of Private
Positive Law by François Gény, 25 LA. L. REV. 577 (1965) (book review).
24. FGMJ, supra note 4, at 68: “The important point . . . is that, despite the
art represented by the current literature, the pragmatic temper of America and of
its mixed jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, may well be the environment that will
send Gény’s themes toward their integration into a rational, modern
jurisprudence.”
25. See Olivier Moréteau, La traduction de l’œuvre de Gény : méthode de
traduction et sources doctrinales in LA PENSÉE DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 69 (O.
Cachard, F.-X. Licari & F. Lormant eds., Dalloz 2012).
26. Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and Legal
Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1283 (1997).
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French doctrine was no longer cited in the original language. 27
Today, great civilians are only known through translations. 28
Since then, it is common to read praises of François Gény’s
work in Louisiana scholarship. He has even been said to be “one of
the civil law’s crown jewels.” 29 These tributes are not merely made
out of propriety by a few nostalgists of the French Louisiana and
the Napoleonic Code. The free objective search for a rule
nourishes the Louisiana legal methodology and in particular the
fundamental question of the connection between legislation and
jurisprudence.
However, assessing the influence of an author on a country’s
jurisprudence is not an easy task. An attempt made on the occasion
of Gény’s centennial proved to be disappointing, 30 probably
because French jurisprudence resists to such an assessment: it is
formulated in a laconic or obscure style, with language free from
doctrinal reference, therefore seldom permitting the identification
of intellectual affiliation, leaving the interpretation open to
speculation. 31

27. See Shelp v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964).
28. About the immense work carried out under the patronage of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, see Joseph Dainow, Civil Law Translations and
Treatises Sponsored in Louisiana, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 521 (1975). Translations
of French doctrine from French into English were also made under the patronage
of the Center of Civil Law Studies. For an overview of these translation projects,
see Alexandru-Daniel On, Making French Doctrine Accessible to the EnglishSpeaking World: The Louisiana Translation Series, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 81 (2012).
29. Paul R. Baier, 100 Years of LSU Law, 1906-2006: A Centennial Gloss,
67 LA. L. REV. 289, 298 (2007).
30. Léon F. Julliot de la Morandière, François Gény et la jurisprudence
française in LE CENTENAIRE DU DOYEN FRANÇOIS GÉNY 67 (Dalloz 1963).
31. French decisions are always a bit frustrating for foreign jurists,
especially for those who are familiar with the American style of lengthy and
policy-oriented opinions. For a comparison, see Jean Louis Goutal,
Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain and U.S.A, 24 AM. J. COMP.
L. 43 (1976); Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE
J. INT’L L. 81, 104 (1994).
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Switzerland provided a more suitable environment, 32 but
revealed judicial reluctance in resorting to the free objective search
for a rule, even though the method can be found in essence in
article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code. 33
On the other hand, Louisiana provides an ideal context to
conduct these investigations. The judicial style is discursive and
gives arguments, following the model of the other U.S. states. 34
Majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions 35 do cite doctrinal
sources, whether contemporary or not. This allowed Joseph
Dainow to assess with precision the influence in Louisiana
jurisprudence of the translation of Planiol’s civil law treatise. 36
More than thirty cases have been identified, where Louisiana
courts cite Méthode d’interprétation et sources 37 to solve a delicate
legal issue, whether in a majority, 38 concurring, 39 or dissenting
32. Walter Yung, François Gény et la jurisprudence en Suisse in LE
1963); FGMJ, supra note 4,
at 31-64.
33. CODE CIVIL [CC] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, RS 210, art. 1(Switz.):
The law governs matters to which the wording or spirit of one of its
provisions are related. In the absence of a provision, the court shall
decide in accordance with customary law and, in the absence of
customary law, in accordance with the rule that it would make as a
legislator. In doing so, it shall draw inspiration from established
doctrine and jurisprudence.
34. Mack E. Barham, La Cour suprême de Louisiane, 30 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 121, 135–137 (1978).
35. About this practice, its role and, in particular, its influence on the
evolution of the law, see Katherine L. Brash, Chief Justice O’Niell and the
Louisiana Civil Code—The Influence of His Dissents, 19 TUL. L. REV. 436
(1944-1945); Joe W. Sanders, The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana, 23
LA. L. REV. 673 (1962-1963); Mack E. Barham, Methodology of the Civil Law
in Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. REV. 474 (1975-1976); C. A. Marvin, Dissents in
Louisiana: Civility Among Civilians, 58 LA. L. REV. 975 (1997-1998).
36. Joseph Dainow, Use of English Translation of Planiol by Louisiana
Courts, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 68 (1965-1966); Joseph Dainow, Planiol Citations
by Louisiana Courts: 1959-1966, 27 LA. L. REV. 231 (1966-1967).
37. There are only two federal court rulings which are based on Gény:
Shelp v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 333 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1964), per Judge Wisdom;
Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999), per Judge Dennis (see
infra Part II.B).
38. The first citation of Gény by the Louisiana Supreme Court is to be
found in an opinion of Justice Tate: Chambers v. Chambers, 249 So. 2d 896 (La.
1971); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 170 (La. 1985); Bergeron v.
Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986); Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La.
CENTENAIRE DU DOYEN FRANÇOIS GÉNY 85 (Dalloz
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opinion. 40 However, a purely statistical approach would be
inadequate. It is more suitable to assess Gény’s influence not
solely by way of express references, but also through the
implementation of the free objective search for a rule, in cases
where the author is not cited. This requires the identification of
cases where the method is applied.
Marc Desserteaux’s criteria may be used to this end. 41 He
focused on “situations in which the interpreter provided a genuine
personal contribution, and in which, furthermore, his contribution
was followed by a majority of judges, and favored a harmonious
customary rule.” 42 Desserteaux identifies two categories of cases;
firstly, the resurrection of a historical tradition which was forgotten
or erased by the legislature: “the mutilated legal institution tends to
be wholly restored . . .” at the courts’ instigation. At least two

1983); Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619 (La. 1972); Bonnette v. Karst, 261
So. 2d 589 (La. 1972); Adoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1982); Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1979); Burger v.
Burger, 357 So. 2d 1178 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Hill v. John L. Crosby,
Inc., 353 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977); Schiffman v. Service Truck
Lines, Inc., 308 So. 2d 824 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Levi v. Sw. Louisiana
Elec. Membership Co-op. (SLEMCO), 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989); Boyer v.
Seal, 553 So. 2d 827 (La. 1989); Quinlan v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 575 So.
2d 336 (La. 1990); Tarver v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 634 So. 2d 356
(La. 1994); to the best of my knowledge, the first citation of Gény in an
American court decision is by Judge Wisdom in Shelp, 333 F.2d 431, just a few
months after the translation of MIS by Mayda.
39. Hill v. Crosby, 353 So. 2d 421, 424 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1977)
(Redmann, J., concurring) (extinctive prescription—MIS, supra note 2, at no.
105); Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374, 382 (La. 1988) (Dennis, J., concurring)
(liability without fault for the act of things—MIS, supra note 2, at no. 155-156);
Schroeder v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Louisiana State Univ., 591 So. 2d 342, 345 (La.
1992) (Cole, J., concurring) (interpretation of an insurance contract—MIS,
supra note 2, at no. 98).
40. Hibbert v. Mudd, 187 So. 2d 503, 510 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (as
the majority refused to reconsider the case, Judge Tate dissented); Sanders v.
Gore, 676 So. 2d 866, 878 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1996) (Yelverton, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (compatibility with public policy of a promise to
marry—see MIS, supra note 2, at no. 175).
41. Marc Desserteaux, À quel critérium peut-on reconnaître le cas
d’application de la libre recherche scientifique? in 2 RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES SUR
LES SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 423 (Recueil Sirey
1934).
42. Id.
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Louisiana jurisprudential landmarks meet this criterion: the maxim
contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio 43 and
enrichment without cause. 44 Another use of the free objective
search for a rule is the more typical case where “the interpreter
opted for solutions not justified by precise legislative will, and not
clearly based on the tradition preceding codification.” 45 In this
situation, the “lever” of the interpreter’s creativity, is the new
economic or political element “which disrupts the earlier
conditions and makes former legal rules difficult to apply.” 46 The
jurisprudential construction of a regime of liability for the acts of
things undoubtedly meets this criterion. 47 Other examples may also
be found. 48
I will first try to identify sociological, historical, and cultural
factors that could have contributed to such a reception (part I).
Subsequently, I will study expressions of such successful reception
(part II).
I. FACTORS OF A SUCCESSFUL RECEPTION
The reception of the libre recherche scientifique in Louisiana
stems from two different essential factors: a favorable scientific
context developed from Portalis’ ideas (A) and the erudition of
43. The renaissance of the well-known maxim is almost exclusively owed
to French law and to former art. 21 of the Louisiana Civil Code (see infra Part
I.A). Its extension and, in particular, the creation of a fourth application by
Judge Tate is undoubtedly attributable to the free objective search for a rule: see
Benjamin W. Janke & Françis-Xavier Licari, Contra non valentem in France
and Louisiana: Revealing the Parenthood, Breaking a Myth, 71 LA. L. REV.
503, 511 (2011).
44. On the case Myniard (1967) and its aftermath as a pertinent situation for
the application of the free objective search for a rule, see Albert Tate, Jr., The
Louisiana Action for Unjustified Enrichment: A Study in Judicial Process, 51
TUL. L. REV. 446 (1976); FGMJ, supra note 4, at 76-77. French jurisprudence
and doctrine have constantly been a model for Louisiana jurisprudence.
Meanwhile, LA. CIV. CODE Art. 2298, introduced in 1998, codified what at that
point was jurisprudence constante.
45. Desserteaux, supra note 41, at 429.
46. Id.
47. For an overview, see Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Liability for the
Acts of Things, 42 LA. L. REV. 979 (1982). See also infra note 106.
48. See infra Part II.
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audacious judges who knew how to bring the civil law legacy to
fruition (B).
A. Portalis in Louisiana
In Louisiana, Portalis literally prepared the landscape for
François Gény. It is worth explaining how. Boulanger allegedly
said that Gény was “Portalis one hundred years later.” 49 These
words were probably intended to deny Gény’s originality, but still
had the merit of emphasizing an intellectual affinity which seems
to have been a catalyst for Gény’s reception in Louisiana. François
Gény restates Portalis’ main ideas on the relationship between the
legislature and the judiciary, 50 but elaborates them, by way of
proposing his method. However, it is worth mentioning that
Portalis’ legal thinking was not as influential in France as in
Louisiana. In France it has a mere doctrinal value, whereas in
Louisiana it is part of positive legal precepts. This aspect of
Louisiana civil law is not well known abroad.
If, indeed, everyone knows that the project of the year IX 51 has
been the model for the first Civil Code of Louisiana (Digest of
1808), few people know that Portalis’ project for the first book of
49. FGMJ, supra note 4, at 136.
50. In MIS, Gény abundantly cites the preliminary discourse and the exposé
des motifs: see, e.g., nos. 45 & 57. In Justice Dennis writings, the two major
authors are cited together in two Louisiana Supreme Court rulings. In the first
one, regarding the custody of a child, the discussion bears on the relations
between jurisprudence constante and the law that partly codifies it: Bergeron v.
Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1198-99 (La. 1986); in the second, the Court
restated that judges are not bound to apply code provisions only to situations
that were known at the time of their adoption: 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney,
538 So. 2d 228, 233 (La. 1989).
51. See, e.g., Joseph Dainow, Codification et révision du droit privé en
Louisiane, 8 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 376, 378 et seq.
(1956); John H. Tucker, Tradition et technique de la codification dans le monde
moderne: l’expérience de la Louisiane, in ÉTUDES JURIDIQUES OFFERTES À
LÉON JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIÈRE 593 (Dalloz 1964); Alain A. Levasseur, Les
codifications en Louisiane, REVUE DE LA RECHERCHE JURIDIQUE 171 (1986);
ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, MOREAU LISLET: THE MAN BEHIND THE DIGEST OF 1808
(Claitor’s Publishing 2008). More generally, regarding the influence of French
law on Louisiana Law, see Vernon V. Palmer, The French Connection and the
Spanish Perception, 64 La. L. Rev. 1067 (2003).
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the code has been copied almost verbatim into the Louisiana Civil
Code, and it can still be found in the code today with a few minor
modifications. 52 This text, which appalled French judges 53 to such
an extent that it was rejected and replaced with a crippled
preliminary chapter in the Code civil des Français, restates in
normative form the ideas expressed by Portalis in his famous
discourse. 54 This introductory part was particularly needed in a
code intended to be applied mainly by judges who were not
familiar with the civil law tradition. 55
The most remarkable norm in this preliminary title of the code,
which simultaneously is an invitation to resort to the free objective
search for a rule, could be found in former article 21: “In civil
matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to
proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably an
appeal is to be made to natural law or reason, or received usages,
where positive law is silent.” 56 The immediate source of article 21,
52. For a thorough study, see Thomas W. Tucker, Interpretations of the
Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808-1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title, 19
TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM 57 (2004).
53. See Marie-Claire Belleau, Pouvoir judiciaire et codification:
perspective historique, 28 REVUE DE DROIT DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE SHERBROOKE
[hereinafter R.D.U.S.] 67, 71 (1997- 1998).
54. Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire sur le projet de
Code civil présenté le 1er pluviôse an IX in LE DISCOURS ET LE CODE. PORTALIS
DEUX SIÈCLES APRÈS LE CODE NAPOLÉON, at XXI (LexisNexis 2004).
55. Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, Les cas non prévus par le droit en vigueur in
MÉLANGES DÉDIÉS À GABRIEL MARTY 1077, 1078-79 (Université des sciences
sociales de Toulouse 1978). On the first decade of the Louisiana Supreme Court
and its judges, see Robert B. Fisher, Jr., The Louisiana Supreme Court, 18121846: Strangers in a Strange Land, 1 TUL. CIV. L.F. [vi] (1973).
56. For a commentary on this text, see Mitchell Franklin, Equity in
Louisiana: The Role of the Article 21, 9 TUL. L. REV. 485 (1935); see also
Joseph Dainow, The Method of Legal Development Through Judicial
Interpretation in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 108, 110-11
(1953); Ferdinand Fairfax Stone, The So-Called Unprovided-For Case, 53 TUL.
L. REV. 93 (1978); MAYDA, supra note 4, at 168. On the importance of equity in
general in Louisiana law, see Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a
Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 7
(1994). Talking about this article, Stone (see supra note 55, at 1082) points out
that it was feared that article 21 would have become a vehicle for the
importation of the common law into Louisiana under the cover of natural law
and reason on the pretext that there is no applicable express law. As seen in the
following discussion, this threat did not come to fruition.
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the gist of which can be found today in article 4, 57 but without
reference to natural law, 58 is article 11 from the project of the
preliminary book of the French Civil Code. 59
Several essential points regarding the relation between
legislation and the judge emerge from Portalis’ and Gény’s ideas.
The legislature cannot foresee everything and, as time passes, the
necessity for creative jurisprudence grows. Judges must decide a
case as fairly as possible and without any reference to positive law,
thus acting as praetors: they recognize a particular interest and
provide a remedy. To this end, they have to resort to a number of
sources such as analogy, equity or natural law.
It is worth discussing these sources further. What Portalis had
in mind was equity. The term is certainly one of the most
polysemous in existence, but, for the father of the Civil Code, it
was synonymous with justice based on natural law in concrete
cases. 60 As to Gény, he sometimes referred to equity, 61 but
preferred the concept of natural law. Through an allusion to natural
law, “the legislature reintroduces roman law, which was renounced
during the revolution because it was lumped together with the

57. The preliminary title was revised in 1987. Louisiana Civil Code article 4
provides: “When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To
decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages.” LA.
CIV. CODE art. 4).
58. See the surprising comment (b) under article 4 (Louisiana Civil Code,
A. N. Yiannopoulos ed., West 2009): “The term “natural law” in article 21 of
the 1870 Code has no defined meaning in Louisiana jurisprudence and is not
reproduced in this revision.”
59. “In civil law matters, where there is no express legislation, the judge
decides in equity. Equity is the return to natural law, or received usages where
positive law is silent.”
60. See Portalis’ Preliminary Discourse Adressed to the national Assembly
in 1800, translated by Shael Herman, in Alain Levasseur, Code Napoleon or
Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV. 762, 771 (1969): “When the legislation is clear,
it must be followed; when it is obscure, we must carefully analyze its provisions.
If there is no particular enactment, custom or equity must be consulted. Equity is
the return to natural law, when positive laws are silent, contradictory or
obscure.”
61. MIS, supra note 2, at 100.
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jurisprudence of the ancien régime . . . .” 62 Gény’s concept of
natural law was certainly ambivalent, 63 but it seems close to that of
Portalis: an uncompromising justice based on the nature of things.
It does not really matter that both authors’ conceptions are not
exactly the same. The suggestive power of the notion was enough
to create a link between the two thinkers. The approach of
Louisiana courts actually seems closer to Raymond Saleilles’ and
Édouard Lambert's views, 64 for whom comparative law was quasisynonymous with natural law. 65 This affinity clearly reveals the
main applications of the free objective search for a rule in
Louisiana courts: by resurrecting the contra non valentem agere
62. Belleau, supra note 53, at 85; for Portalis’ idea of natural law, see
Bernard Beigner, Portalis et le droit naturel dans le Code civil, 6 REVUE
D’HISTOIRE DES FACULTÉS DE DROIT ET DE LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE 77 (1988);
Simone Goyard-Fabre, Montesquieu entre Domat et Portalis, 35 MCGILL L. J.
715 (1990); Michel Ganzin, Portalis et le droit naturel: de la souveraineté pour
le législateur au recours supplétif pour le juge in 20 COLLECTION D’HISTOIRE
DES IDÉES ET DES INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES. UN DIALOGUE JURIDICO-POLITIQUE:
LE DROIT NATUREL, LE LÉGISLATEUR ET LE JUGE 227 (Presses Universitaires
d'Aix-Marseille, 2010). See, more generally, on Portalis’ conception of law: Eric
Gasparini, Regards de Portalis sur le droit révolutionnaire: la quête du juste
milieu, 328 ANNALES HISTORIQUES DE LA REVOLUTION FRANÇAISE 121 (2002).
63. See Eugenio di Carlo, Le droit naturel dans le système d’interprétation
de Gény in 1 RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES SUR LES SOURCES DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE
FRANÇOIS GÉNY 234 (Recueil Sirey 1934); MAYDA, supra note 4, at 14, 130 et
seq.; Michel Villey, François Gény et la renaissance du droit naturel in LE
CENTENAIRE DU DOYEN FRANÇOIS GÉNY 39 (Dalloz 1963); Olivier Cayla,
L’indicible droit naturel de François Gény, 6 REVUE D’HISTOIRE DES FACULTÉS
DE DROIT ET DE LA SCIENCE JURIDIQUE 103 (1988); Bruno Oppetit, François
Gény et le droit naturel in FRANÇOIS GÉNY E LA SCIENZIA GIURIDICA DEL
NOVECENTO, 20 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 89 (Giuffrè 1991); Penfold, supra note
5.
64. On these views, which are rather complementary than conflicting, see
Christophe Jamin, Saleilles' and Lambert's Old Dream Revisited, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 701 (2002). See also, regarding the various aspects of the latter work:
Stephane Caporal, Édouard Lambert. Théoricien de la jurisprudence
sociologique, 5 ACTA U. DANUBIUS JUR. 182 (2009).
65. Raymond Saleilles, École historique et droit naturel, REV. TRIM. DR.
CIV. 80, 131 (1902); Raymond Saleilles, La fonction juridique du droit comparé,
in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BEITRAG
̈ E: JURISTISCHE FESTGABE DES
AUSLANDES ZU JOSEF KOHLERS 60. GEBURTSTAG 164, 168-171 (F. Enke 1909).
In one of the chapters added to the second edition, Gény mentioned Saleilles'
and Lambert's thoughts. He recognized that comparative law can constitute a
useful aid for the renewal of French law. However, he does not go as far as to
consider it as a source of natural law: MIS, supra note 2, at no. 193.
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maxim or the in rem verso action, and by establishing a system of
liability without fault, Louisiana judges have renewed the law of
their state, while wearing both the praetor’s toga and the Lord
Chief Justice’s wig. They found an objective foundation in French
doctrine and jurisprudence, which enabled them to go beyond the
Louisiana Civil Code, but through the Louisiana Civil Code. All in
all, the civil law renaissance has been a re-assimilation of the Civil
Code and a rejuvenation of the same, thanks to an authentic civil
law method.
The reception of Gény’s work was probably made easier by the
reluctance that Louisiana courts have always shown towards
positivism.66 This is demonstrated by the interpretation they made
of the provisions of the 1808 and 1825 codes which aimed at
repealing all laws predating codification, a jungle of customary
law, French law and Spanish law. Thus, in the Reynolds v. Swain
case, Chief Justice François-Xavier Martin stated, without beating
around the bush, that the legislature did not repeal unwritten law
such as natural law or the law of nations, or even jurisprudence
constante. 67 That is why applying a rule of roman “corporation
law” was confirmed in that case and why, in another case, natural
law was presented as the foundation for the contra non valentem
66. Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus: The Place of the Civil Code in
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe in LE DROIT CIVIL ET SES CODES: PARCOURS
À TRAVERS LES AMÉRIQUES 1, 11 (Jimena Andino Dorato, Jean-Frédérick
Ménard & Lionel Smith eds., Thémis 2011), republished in 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31
(2012); Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA. L. REV. 301
(1998), republished in ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL: A PRIEST OF RIGHT ORDER
129 (Olivier Moréteau ed., Center of Civil Law Studies, LSU Law Center 2010).
67. Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193, 198 (1839):
The repeal spoken of in the code, and the act of 1828, cannot extend
beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted. . . . It cannot
be extended to those unwritten laws which do not derive their authority
from the positive institution of any people, as the revealed law, the
natural law, the law of nations, the laws of peace and war, and those
laws which are founded in those relations of justice that existed in the
nature of things, antecedent to any positive precept.
Reynolds v. Swain has been referred to as François-Xavier Martin’s “most
influential contribution.” MARK F. FERNANDEZ, FROM CHAOS TO CONTINUITY:
THE EVOLUTION OF LOUISIANA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM, 1712-1862 84 (Louisiana
State University Press 2001).
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agere non currit praescriptio maxim. 68 This sound resistance to
positivism certainly was another expression of the influence
Portalis had in Louisiana.
Thus, Louisiana had rules of interpretation incorporated in its
code and a suitable method of implementation. Great judges found
a way to make the best out of it: the libre recherche scientifique
was fully promoted, and Louisiana law was overtly modernized.
B. A Trinity of Learned Judges: Justices Barham, Tate and Dennis
The fruitfulness of the method has been noticed by some
learned and audacious judges who made the Méthode
d’interprétation et sources a preferred tool for completing the
rebirth of civil law in Louisiana. 69 Mack Elwin Barham (19242006), made the community of jurists realize that in order to
strengthen the Louisiana civil law resurgence movement, the
implementation of a civil law methodology was necessary: that of
François Gény. 70 He set an example by applying it in many of his

68. The first time a position was taken on the historical origins of contra
non valentem by a Louisiana court is to be found in Justice Mathews’ opinion in
Morgan v. Robinson, 12 Mart. (o.s.) 76, 77 (La. 1822), affirming his Spanish
and natural law origins:
[The plaintiff] relies principally on the maxim, contra non valentem
agere, non currit prescriptio as adopted and recognized by the Spanish
law, and being an axiom, or first principle of natural law and justice,
and therefore applicable to every system of jurisprudence, wherein the
contrary is not expressly established by legislative power. In this view
of the subject we agree with the counsel of the plaintiff, and,
notwithstanding the express terms of limitation in our code, it is
thought, that they ought not to be interpreted as to conflict with this
universal maxim of justice.
About the parallel development of the maxim in France and in Louisiana, see
Janke & Licari, supra note 43.
69. Kenneth M. Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana’s Civilian
Tradition: A Surprising Triumph for the American Influence, 49 LA. L. REV. 1
(1988).
70. Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana,
33 LA. L. REV. 357 (1973), republished in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND IN MIXED JURISDICTIONS 38 (Joseph Dainow
dir., Louisiana State University Press 1974).
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opinions. 71 Judge Albert Tate, Jr. (1920-1986) certainly was one of
the greatest Louisiana judges; relying on Gény, but also on his
unmatched knowledge of French law, he has developed, in a series
of articles, an important reflection on the role of judges in a mixed
legal system 72 and gave Louisiana jurisprudence real pieces of
anthology. 73 James L. Dennis, another judge of great erudition,
followed the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors and has
consolidated the position of both doctrine 74 and jurisprudence.
One might wonder why Gény became the cardinal reference in
Louisiana, even though American doctrine already had brilliant
critics of formalism, 75 amongst the most famous of them being
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841- 1935), 76 Benjamin N. Cardozo
71. See, e.g., his remarkable dissenting opinion in the case Tannehill v.
Tannehill, 261 So. 2d 619, 624-29 (La. 1972).
72. ALBERT TATE, JR., REFLECTIONS ON LAW, LAWYERING, & JUDGING.
THE ESSAYS AND ARTICLES OF JUSTICE ALBERT TATE, JR. (Pugh Institute for
Justice, LSU Law Center 2006) (with a foreword by Judge Dennis). It is an
excellent book, compiling all his writings, with the exception of his judicial
opinions. On Albert Tate's doctrine, see Rees, supra note 3.
73. Mack E. Barham, A Civilian of Our Times: Justice Albert Tate, Jr., 47
LA. L. REV. 929 (1987); Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law in Judge
Tate’s Court: Three Decades of Challenge, 61 TUL. L. REV. 743 (1987); Paul R.
Baier, Of Judicial Freedom and Judicial Constraint: The Voice of Louisiana’s
Judge Albert Tate, Jr., 35 S.U. L. REV. 443 (2008).
74. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993). In this
remarkable article, Judge Dennis was inspired not only by writings of Portalis
and Gény, but also by those of Philipp Heck, founder of
Interressenjurisprudenz. In his work, he elaborated upon the significance of
weighing conflicting interests as a method for the court to fill the gaps in the
law. This method was merely sketched by Gény (regarding this topic, see
Guillaume Lazzarin, Le juge administratif et la doctrine de François Gény.
Réflexions sur la méthode de la “balance des intérêts”, JCP Adm. 2011. 2222
(Fr.). See also, James L. Dennis, Capitant Lecture, 63 LA. L. REV. 1003 (2003)).
75. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA.
L. REV. 999 (1972); Françoise Michaut, Le rôle créateur du juge selon l’école
de la “sociological jurisprudence” et le mouvement réaliste américain. Le juge
et la règle de droit, 39 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 343 (1987);
Marie-Claire Belleau, Le classicisme et le progressisme dans la pensée juridique
aux États-Unis selon l’analyse historique de Morton J. Horwitz, 34 LES
CAHIERS DE DROIT 1235 (1993).
76. Holmes is generally referred to as a forerunner of the legal realism
movement (see, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER III, MORTON J. HORWITZ & THOMAS
A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 3 (Oxford University Press 1993)). His

492

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

(1870-1938), 77 Dean Roscoe Pound (1870-1964), 78 Jerome Frank
(1889-1957), 79 Karl N. Llewelyn (1893-1962) 80 and Fred Rodell
(1907-1980), 81 the enfant terrible of Legal Realism.

most important work is THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown, and Co. 1881;
reprinted by The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2009, with an
introduction and annotations by G. Edward White); see also another work of his,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), which is, likewise, a
canonical text of American realism. The latter has recently been translated by
Françoise Michaut. The translation is entitled “La passe étroite du droit”
(Clio@Themis, Revue électronique d’histoire du droit, no. 2). The thinking of
Judge Holmes continuously inspires American doctrine and jurisprudence. An
article of major reference would be G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of
Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971). See also, Ruth Gavison, Holmes’s
Heritage: Living Greatly in the Law, 78 B. U. L. REV. 844 (1998).
77. In the United States Judge Cardozo was one of the main authors
spreading Gény’s thinking. He cites the latter no less than twenty six times in his
book THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale University Press 1921).
78. Roscoe Pound, whose influence on American legal science is still
considerable, shares various common traits with François Gény, whom he cites
in numerous writings of his. The first series of citations can be found in an
article criticizing conceptualism, which was the prevailing view at that time:
Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908). The work of the then
future Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1916 to 1936, founder of the
Sociological Jurisprudence and spiritual father of Legal Realism, is impressively
prolific and deep. It is enriched with history, philosophy and comparative law,
and fully reached maturity in a collection of conferences published towards the
end of his life and which remained undisclosed for a long time: THE IDEAL
ELEMENT IN LAW (University of Calcutta Press 1958, reprinted by Liberty Fund,
Inc. 2002). Gény and Pound have different views on natural law: see Karl
Kreilkamp, Dean Pound and the Immutable Natural Law, 18 FORDHAM L. REV.
173 (1949).
79. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Brentano’s 1930);
COURTS ON TRIAL. MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (Princeton
University Press 1949). On the personality and the influence of Jerome Frank,
founder of legal realism, see ROBERT J. GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS
REFORMER. JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (Cornell University
Press 1985).
80. K. N. Llewelyn is one of the great characters of American legal
scholarship and one of the pioneers of American legal realism. He taught at the
University of Columbia and at the University of Chicago. THE BRAMBLE BUSH
(Oceana Publications 1930, reprinted by Oxford University Press 2008) became
“classic” literature. Another major work of his, which until recently was only a
manuscript, has been published: THE THEORY OF RULES (University of Chicago
Press 2011) (with an introduction by Frederick Schauer). It proves a relative
return to legal classicism.
81. Fred Rodell and Jerome Frank were probably the most radical advocates
of legal realism. Rodell’s sharp criticism of academism in law reviews
constitutes a piece of anthology: Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA.
L. REV. 38 (1936).
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The reason for this is probably the fact that Judge Holmes,
while brilliantly attacking formalism, by way of formulating
general ideas, disseminated in his judicial and extrajudicial
works, 82 never proposed an alternative method. Judge Cardozo, in
his landmark work, while methodically identifying the flaws of
formalism, left “unresolved the basic question of how the judge is
to decide cases that fall in the open area (and indeed how to
demarcate that area).” 83
As to Jerome Frank, his fundamental skepticism, his radical
criticism of the law and its methods, stimulating as they are, may
have been deemed to be of limited utility for a judge confronted
with a concrete case. 84 As for Llewelyn and Pound, their influence
is present in certain judgments although they are not explicitly
cited. 85
When the translation of Jaro Mayda was published, Gény was
already known in America. Méthode d’interprétation et sources
had already left a significant mark over American legal science. 86
This changed its perception, the work now being understood the
way it was initially designed: as a methodology for judges.
Gény, who was at the same time catholic, conservative and
reformer, proposed a compromise 87 which was able to seduce

82. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS,
SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, JR. (Richard A. Posner dir., University of Chicago Press 1992).
83. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO. A STUDY IN REPUTATION 30
(University of Chicago Press 1993).
84. Regarding the attitude of Jerome Frank when he was judge, see
GLENNON, supra note 79, at 129-63.
85. Rees, supra note 3.
86. Mitchell Franklin, L’influence de M. Gény sur les conceptions et les
méthodes juridiques aux États-Unis in 2 RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES SUR LES SOURCES
DU DROIT EN L’HONNEUR DE FRANÇOIS GÉNY 30 (Recueil Sirey 1934); Kennedy
& Belleau, supra note 6, at 295; Carlos Petit, A Contributor to the Method of
Investigation. Sobre la fortuna de Gény en America in FRANÇOIS GÉNY E LA
SCIENZIA GIURIDICA DEL NOVECENTO, 29 QUADERNI FIORENTINI 201 (Giuffrè
1991).
87. Compare to Belleau, supra note 7, at 382-83: “By offering sufficient
change, they sought to salvage a rapidly deteriorating situation and to keep
social peace.”
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elected judges, and therefore in line with a Louisianan society
which, although conservative, was also in transition. 88 Gény was a
French civilian, by contrast with most of his American peers, who
were inevitably common law jurists, focused on, if not obsessed
with, the system of binding precedent or stare decisis, as well as on
the power of the Supreme Court. He proposed a modern and
balanced method, able to favor the rebirth of the civil law in
Louisiana. Lastly, or perhaps above all, Louisiana judges saw their
creative activity justified for the past and encouraged for the
future, by an undisputed master of the civil law. This diminished
the risk of giving new arguments to those who saw Louisiana and
its system as an unacknowledged common law system. 89
What now remains to be seen is the expression of this reception
of the work of Gény by the Louisiana jurisprudence.

88. For a portrait of the typical Louisiana judge as a magistrate, statesman
and politician, see Symeon C. Symeonides, The Louisiana Judge: Judge,
Statesman, Politician in LOUISIANA: MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 89
(Vernon V. Palmer dir., Carolina Academic Press 1999).
89. Since the incendiary article of Gordon Ireland, Bench and Bar:
Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1937), the question
of the adherence of Louisiana to the civil law family is of major importance,
binding both doctrine and jurisprudence to take positions consistent with the
civil law. This attitude is sometimes borderline to ultra-orthodoxy. Thus, the
courts regularly and vigorously assert that they are not applying the principle of
stare decisis, but that of jurisprudence constante; the corollary is the adhesion to
the questionable fiction of non-retroactivity of court decisions (infra Part II).
Also, this probably explains why Louisiana jurisprudence is deeply attached to
the principle pacta sunt servanda to the point of rejecting the theory of
imprevision (revision of contracts in case of hardship) and refusing any idea of
judicial control of unreasonable contractual provisions—see Jean-Louis
Baudouin, Theory of Imprevision and Judicial Intervention to Change a
Contract in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 151, 160 (Joseph
Dainow ed., Louisiana State University Press 1969); Jonathan Riley, Embracing
the Principle of Growth: A Call for An Expansion of the Doctrine of Fortuitous
Event in Louisiana Law, 35 S.U. L. REV. 413 (2008). Regarding abusive clauses,
the jurisprudence seems to lean towards a moderate reception of
unconscionability: R. Fritz Niswanger, An Unconscionability Formula for
Louisiana Civilians?, 81 TUL. L. REV. 509 (2006).
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II. THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RECEPTION OF MÉTHODE
D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES IN LOUISIANA
Most of the judgments citing Méthode d’interprétation et
sources would deserve a commentary. The most significant reveal
the influence of Gény’s doctrine on the methods of interpretation
applied by Louisiana courts (A) and on the issue of the retroactive
effect of court decisions (B).
A. The Influence of Gény on the Methods of Interpretation Applied
by Louisiana Courts
Writing about the Swiss Civil Code, Gény said that “. . . the
formula given in article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 could be
seen as the most accurate summary of my developments.” 90 The
provision capturing the essence of Gény's method is certainly
paragraph 2 of the same article according to which: “In the absence
of a provision, the court shall decide . . . in accordance with the
rule that it would make as legislator.” It is no wonder that its spirit
became a real leitmotiv of the Louisiana jurisprudence.
This is how it was implemented: In the context of a very
ordinary case, like a divorce where alimony was also sought, the
Louisiana Supreme Court had to decide on an issue of principle
related both to the constitutionalization of private law, 91 and to
legal methodology, in particular to courts filling gaps in the law.
The Louisiana Civil Code contained an article 160 as follows:
“When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient
means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property
and earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed onethird of his income.”

90. MIS, supra note 2, at no. 204; Oscar Gauye, François Gény est-il le
père de l’article 1er, 2e alinéa, du Code civil suisse?, 92 REVUE DE DROIT
SUISSE 271 (1973).
91. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978). Regarding the
constitutionalization of Louisiana private law, see Moréteau, supra note 66, at
25, 27.

496

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

There was no provision expressly authorizing a court to grant
alimony after divorce to the husband. The husband, who was also
the defendant, argued that article 160 was unconstitutional because
it violated both the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution92 and article 1 § 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of
1973, written in similar language. The reasoning which led Justice
Dennis not to annul this provision, while reaching a solution
adapted to the evolution of Louisianan society, constitutes a topical
application of the free objective search for a rule.
Justice Dennis began by noticing that the arguments based on
constitutional law are relevant, because the contested provision
established a difference between man and woman which was
unreasonable and arbitrary. Then he explained that this provision
was justified by the socio-economic context of the time of its
adoption:
Although not based solely on sex, such classifications for
purposes of entitlement to alimony after divorce probably
were founded on the assumption that all former husbands
have sufficient means for their support, or that few
divorced women have property and earnings out of which
alimony could be paid, or upon both. If these propositions
were ever true, common experience tells us that the
deviations from them are now too numerous for the
classifications to withstand equal protection challenge. 93
Interestingly, Justice Dennis asserts that:
The failure of the legislature to expressly authorize the
allowance of alimony after divorce for male citizens,
however, does not necessarily invalidate Civil Code article
160. Because Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, the
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
93. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 307.
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absence of express law does not imply a lack of authority
for courts to provide relief. In all civil matters, where
positive law is silent, the judge is bound by the Civil Code
to proceed and decide according to equity, i.e., according to
natural law and reason, or to received usages. This Court
has recognized its duty to proceed and decide important
issues under these circumstances on many occasions. 94
Taking his reasoning further, Justice Dennis presented the
method employed so as not to annul article 160 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, nevertheless deciding that divorced husbands should
be granted alimony, even in the absence of an express legal
provision. He invoked not only articles 13 to 30 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which offer guidance for interpretation, but also, and
above all, legal doctrine:
We are also mindful of the doctrine of reputable scholars,
which teaches that civilian judges are not required to
depend merely upon a logical analysis of the existing
statutes, but may employ other recognized methods of
interpretation. They may perform extensive exegesis to
discover the original legislative intent; legislative texts may
be interpreted so as to give them an application that is
consistent with the contemporary conditions they are called
upon to regulate; and a particular conflict of interests
before the court may be resolved in accordance with the
general policy considerations which induced legislative
action rather than by reliance on logical deductions from
the language of the text. 95
The last sentence carries beyond all doubt the mark of François
Gény’s thinking. And if Justice Dennis did not explicitly cite him
in support of his methodological developments, he relies on a
series of doctrinal contributions obviously inspired by the free
search for a rule. 96 Also influenced by the central idea of Gény’s
work is the following assertion:
94. Id. at 307-08 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 308.
96. Id. at 308, citing A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
89-93 (Claitor's Pub. Division 1977); Barham, supra note 70, at 371; Albert
Tate, Jr., Law Making Function of a Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211 (1968); Albert
Tate, Jr., Louisiana and the Civil Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 727 (1962).
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Consequently, when we attribute to Article 160 the
meaning that a present day legislator would have attributed
to it, we must assume that he would have taken cognizance
of the increasing and expanding nature of women’s
activities and responsibilities, as well as our constitution’s
prohibition of arbitrary or unreasonable gender based legal
classifications, and that he would not have intended by the
legislation to discriminate against husbands who have not
sufficient means for their maintenance by declaring them
ineligible for alimony after a divorce. 97
In his conclusion, Justice Dennis wrote for the majority that
“Equity and our constitution demand that the husband be awarded
alimony under the same circumstances in which it can be claimed
by the wife.” 98 Thus, the libre recherche scientifique applied by
Justice Dennis led him to the conclusion that article 160 did not
breach the Constitution, while giving it a sphere of applicability
compatible with the Louisiana legal system.
Other developments followed. During a petition for rehearing,
the Court reversed its position and, according to a doubtful
analysis, concluded that article 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code
was not unconstitutional and that the plaintiff could not demand
alimony. 99 Then, Mr. Loyacano took the case to the United States
Supreme Court which annulled the decision of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana and sent the case back to the latter to be retried in the
light of the precedent established in Orr v. Orr. 100 However, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana did not have to reverse its judgment,
because, on rehearing, Mr. Loyacano declared his consent to the
judgment of the Court. 101 Therefore, according to the Court, there
was no longer any reason to rule on the constitutionality of article
160. It was possible to reinstate the judgment previously annulled
97. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 309.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 314.
100. Loyacano v. LeBlanc, 440 U.S. 952 (1979).
101. Loyacano v. Loyacano, 375 So. 2d 1314, 1315 (La. 1979). One of the
reasons invoked by Mr. Loyacano was that in the meantime article 160 was
amended in a way that made no distinction according to the gender of the one
requesting alimony.
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by the Supreme Court. Article 160 was eventually reformed, in
order to eliminate any reference to gender and to restore equality
between spouses, but the Loyacano case continued to have
significant repercussions. 102
In Loyacano v. Loyacano, Justice Dennis also talks about
interpretation and seems reluctant to openly acknowledge the
necessary consequence of applying the free objective search for a
102. In Clausen v. Clausen, 375 So. 2d 1315 (La. 1979), the Supreme Court
of Louisiana decided that the husband was not entitled to require alimony on the
basis of article 160 given that it is granted solely to the wife. Justice Calogero,
writing for the majority, emphasized the importance of the Loyacano case, but
felt that it would be futile for the Court to rule on the constitutionality of article
160. Id. at 1318 n.4. The Court noted that declaring the article unconstitutional
would not benefit the ex-husband because “[s]triking Louisiana’s provisions
affording wives the right to alimony would not thereby create a corollary right
for husbands.” Id. Nonetheless, the Court held that the lower court had to retry
the case and apply the revised article 160 for the period subsequent to its entry
into force. Id. at 1318. Justice Tate and Justice Dennis wrote concurring
opinions on this last point, but dissented as to the applicable law for the period
prior to the revision. Id. at 1318-19. They reaffirmed their attachment to the
solution reached by the majority in the original Loyacano v. Loyacano case, see
358 So. 2d at 309, i.e., that it was possible to say, on the basis of article 21 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, that the husband was also entitled to alimony. Clausen,
375 So. 2d at 1318-19. The issue of constitutionality of article 160 seems to
have been eluded in order to avoid deciding the more delicate issue of the
validity of judgments which previously granted alimony on the basis of the
above-mentioned article. In Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979), the
Supreme Court accepted to confront this problem and end the Loyacano saga.
Justice Marcus, writing for the majority, recognized the unconstitutionality of
the criticized provision, but also held that the judgment would only produce
effects for the future. Id. at 422. In order to reach this decision, he relied on the
“test” developed in the leading case decided by the United States Supreme
Court, Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). See Clausen, 375
So. 2d at 421-22. He wrote:
Upon consideration of each of these factors, we conclude that our
decision should not be applied retroactively. Our decision establishes a
new principle of law by overruling clear past precedent on which
litigants have relied. Innumerable divorced persons, both those paying
and receiving alimony, have relied on the constitutionality of art. 160.
Loyacano v. Loyacano, upholding the constitutionality of this statute,
was decided by this court as recently as last year. Moreover,
retrospective application would undermine the objectives of art. 160.
Finally, substantial inequity would result if prior judgments awarding
alimony were declared invalid. . . . [i]t would subject divorced wives to
suits by their former husbands seeking repayment of alimony paid by
husbands under art. 160 prior to its amendment. Id. at 422.
On the possible repercussions of Loyacano v. Loyacano in the law of
matrimonial regimes, see Burger v. Burger, supra note 38.
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rule: the creation of a rule. Several years later, in Bell v. Jet Wheel
Blast, 103 in a case concerning the issue of whether the fault of the
victim can reduce liability (regarding strict liability for defective
products), the idea was expressed without ambiguity:
The court’s purpose in an objective search is to discover a
rule which will satisfy, as well as possible, justice and
social usefulness in the case at hand and in similar cases.
Even if the legislature has tacitly authorized the courts to
update the statute by including as one of its elements a
dynamic concept, such as “fault” or “public policy”, the
search for a subsidiary rule more specifically defining the
dynamic concept must be objective. The court must
eliminate any personal influence or influence related to the
specific case and base its decision on objective elements; it
should take into account all of the social, moral, economic
and other considerations that an objective rule-maker
would consider in forming a rule to govern the case. 104
The idea that “it is necessary for the judge . . . to consider the
particular situation from the same standpoint as would a legislator
regulating the matter,” has been expressed this way many times by
Justice Dennis. 105 As seen above, this idea expresses the
103. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 170 (La. 1985).
104. The translation of MIS, nos. 155-56, is cited. See Bell v. Jet Wheel
Blast, 462 So. 2d at 170. The well-known book of Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale University Press 1921), is also cited
alongside Gény’s. A third reference is made to JULIO C. CUETO-RUA, JUDICIAL
METHODS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW 80-81 (The Publications Institute,
LSU Law Center 1981).
105. See, e.g., in another “great judgment” concerning the law of liability for
the act of things, Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1148-49 (La. 1983). MIS is
cited many times: nos. 173, 174, and 183. See Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d. at
1149. In the paragraph last cited (no. 183), Gény wrote:
In the absence of any formal directive—a clear statutory or customary
rule—the lawyer must scrutinize the essence of the matter and directly
investigate the social elements for which he is to find the rule. In the
complex of the resulting data . . . [a]s the legislator himself would do,
he must [assess the elements according to their own nature and]
determine the laws of their harmony, aiming his sight at the ideal of
justice and social usefulness . . . .
MIS, supra note 2, at no. 183 (trans. note: added text was not included in
Mayda’s translation). The Entrevia case and its reference to Gény had a great
influence, as attested by the multiple citations in subsequent cases: Celestine v.
Union Oil Company of California, 636 So. 2d 1138, 1142-43 (La. Ct. App.
1994); Billiot v. State, 654 So. 2d 753, 759 (La. Ct. App. 1995). On the Entrevia
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quintessence of Gény’s thinking. Its appearance in the field of the
purely jurisprudential construction of liability for the act of things
is not a surprise. 106
In this field, the boundary between common law and civil law
is abolished. 107 The opinion of Judge Dennis was welcomed by

case, see Elizabeth Baucum, Entrevia v. Hood: Back to Loescher v. Parr, 44 LA.
L. REV. 1485 (1984).
106. The law of liability for the act of things developed similarly to French
law, which was openly used as a model. The founding judgment was Loescher v.
Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975), in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana (A.
Tate, Jr., for the majority) decided for the first time that the plaintiff, whose
defense was based on Louisiana Civil Code article 2317, did not have to prove
the fault of the person who caused the injury. Article 2317 at that point
reproduced verbatim article 1384, paragraph 1, of the French Civil Code and has
been considered until then a mere transition article, without normative effect.
After comparing provisions from the French Civil Code and the Louisiana Civil
Code, the owner of a tree which was 90% rotten was held liable by the Supreme
Court for the damage inflicted on a Cadillac, though the tree was apparently
healthy. The thing being in the defendant’s custody, he was held liable because
the vice or defect of the tree constituted an unreasonable hazard and because this
vice or defect was the cause of the damage. The Entrevia case marked a return
to the standards laid down in Loescher and which had been in the meantime
modified by Kent v. Gulf State Utilities Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); for more
detail, see Baucum, supra note 105. Even though an author convincingly
advocates the abandonment of liability for the act of things in French law (JeanSébastien Borghetti, La responsabilité du fait des choses, un régime qui a fait
son temps, REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 1 (2010)), one may note that the system
stemming from Loescher v. Parr and subsequent cases has been abolished by
the Louisiana legislature who has reintegrated the liability for the act of things
into fault-based liability (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315). In 1996, Louisiana Civil
Code article 2317.1 was inserted:
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned
by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or
defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been
prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to
exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the
court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an
appropriate case. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2317.1.
For a commentary, see Joseph S. Piacun, The Abolition of Strict Liability in
Louisiana: A Return to a Fairer Standard or an Impossible Burden for
Plaintiffs, 43 LOY. L. REV. 215 (1997); concerning the central question of
knowledge of the defect, see Joseph E. Lee III, A Return to Negligence or
Something More? Proving Knowledge in “Strict Liability” Cases in Louisiana
Under Civil Code Article 2317.1, 59 LA. L. REV. 1225 (1999).
107. Compare to André Tunc, La méthode du droit civil : analyse des
conceptions françaises, 27 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 817,
824 (1975):
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Judge Doucet’s dissent in Adoption of Meaux. 108 The natural
parents of Jason Michael Meaux wished to adopt him. This
adoption was denied at trial because the Louisiana Civil Code did
not provide for the adoption of a child by single persons when
none of them is a legitimate parent. Since there was no legal way
to adopt, the judgment was affirmed. In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Doucet noted that the judgment disregarded the interest of
the child and discriminated against an innocent child. The
following paragraph from his opinion constitutes an additional
illustration of the free objective search for a rule:
This is an un-provided-for case. Because ours is a free
society and Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, the absence
of express law does not imply a prohibition upon the
petitioners or this court. Inasmuch as our adoption laws are
designed to protect, not destroy, the natural rights of
parents, I do not believe R.S. 9:422 can be construed as
providing an exclusive list of remedies. Such an
interpretation is consonant with constitutional prohibitions
against discrimination based on birth. Thus, the silence of
positive law requires we proceed according to equity as we
are bound to do under C.C. Art. 21. . . . See also Justice
Dennis' concurrence in Lovell v. Lovell and his original
opinion in Loyacano v. Loyacano and Geny (sic), Method
of Interpretation, § 105. Applying equity I believe that the
best interest of the child and due regard for natural rights of
the parents dictates that we allow the relief sought. 109

[T]he jurisprudence that developed on the basis of art. 1384, par. 1 of
our Code . . . is not typical of the relations of the law and the judge in a
jurisdiction where the law is codified. We are facing a pure judge-made
law, detached from the Code to such an extent that it has been
compared to a pyramid constructed on the head of a pin. It evolves in a
free, sometimes surprising or contradictory, manner reminiscent of the
common law rather than of the jurisprudence in a codified jurisdiction.
See also René Savatier, Le gouvernement des juges en matière de responsabilité
civile in 1 RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES EN L’HONNEUR D’ÉDOUARD LAMBERT 453
(L.G.D.J. 1938).
108. Adoption of Meaux, 417 So. 2d 522, 523-24 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
109. Id. at 523-24.
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B. The Ambiguous Status of Jurisprudence: The Issue of the
Retroactive Effect of Overruling
The case Hulin v. Fibreboard Corporation 110 is certainly one
of the most remarkable, as it deals with a highly controversial issue
among both civilians and common law lawyers: the retroactivity of
overrulings. 111 Mrs. Hulin and other plaintiffs sued the American
Tobacco Company and various manufacturers of products
containing asbestos, alleging that the defendants’ products
contributed to the development of lung cancer and subsequent
death of Mr. Hulin, husband and father of the plaintiffs. They
sought recovery under strict liability, ultra-hazardous activities,
and negligence. Six weeks after the complaint was filed, in the
Halphen 112 case, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided that if the
plaintiff proves that the product was unreasonably dangerous per
se, i.e. “if a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-infact of the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the
utility of the product,” 113 whether because of defective design or
another kind of defect, or unreasonably dangerous in construction
or composition, “a manufacturer may be held liable for injuries
caused by [the] product even though [the] manufacturer did not
know and reasonably could not have known of the danger.” 114 The
plaintiffs amended their complaint, alleging that tobacco is
unreasonably dangerous per se, because a reasonable person would
conclude that the danger-in-fact of tobacco outweighs its utility.
Then, the case focused on the applicability of the Halphen
jurisprudence. The plaintiffs argued that this jurisprudence could
not apply retroactively to the facts of the case. The district court
agreed with the defendant on this issue and, in a separate
110. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
111. LES REVIREMENTS DE JURISPRUDENCE. RAPPORT REMIS À M. LE PREMIER
PRÉSIDENT GUY CANIVET (Nicolas Molfessis dir., Litec 2005).
112. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 116-117 (La.
1986).
113. Id. at 114.
114. Id. at 116.
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judgment, the same court noted that the plaintiffs relied only on the
Halphen jurisprudence and that such jurisprudence could not be
applied retroactively; therefore, the case was to be dismissed. The
plaintiffs appealed from this judgment before the United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. The Court reversed the judgment
and remanded the case to the district court. In essence, Justice
Dennis—the author of the opinion—noted that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has always firmly applied the principle that
“[u]nder the State’s constitution and Civil Code, Louisiana courts
cannot make law but are bound to decide cases according to their
best understanding of the law established by legislation and
custom.” 115 Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court considers that such
an interpretation should lead to full retroactivity unless the court
specifies otherwise or unless such an application would be
impossible due to prescription.
Citing an abundant jurisprudence constante, Justice Dennis
reminds that “[t]he law as construed in an overruled case is
considered as though it had never existed, and the law as construed
in the last case is considered as though it has always been the
law.” 116 Thus, “the law as construed in the last decision operates
both prospectively and retrospectively, except that it will not be
permitted to disturb vested rights.” 117 This opinion is based on
both the Louisania Constitution, which declares that, without
exception, the legislative power is vested solely in the Legislature,
and the Louisiana Civil Code, 118 whereby legislation and custom
are the only sources of law. Justice Dennis also pointed out that
“[i]n Louisiana and other civil law jurisdictions, the judicial
method of applying Civil Code principles by analogy to facts
115. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d at 319.
116. Id. at 320 (citing Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135 (La.
1933)).
117. Id.
118. Louisiana Civil Code article 1 provides: “The sources of law are
legislation and custom.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2014). These sources are
respectively defined in Louisiana Civil Code articles 3 and 4.
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unforeseen by the Code always has been used and considered as
judicial interpretation of law and not law making.” 119 Some
precedents and Louisianan distinguished authors were cited.
Philipp Heck and François Gény were also cited. 120 Among
contemporary authors, Justice Dennis also cites François Terré
who maintains that court decisions, besides being retroactive, are
also declarative. Justice Dennis relied also on article 5 of the
French Civil Code and on the spirit of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Subsequently, there is an overview in the case of “the relatively
small number of cases in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has
limited the retroactive effect of its own decisions.” 121 They mostly
concern family matters and matters related to the interpretation of
the Constitution. Then, the case considers the situations where
some “overriding legal principles” can limit the retroactive effect
of court decisions, such as res judicata, prescription, or the theory
of vested rights. Afterwards, Justice Dennis mentions how, based
on identical provisions to those of the Napoleonic Code, liability
for the acts of things and liability for defective products (the
Halphen case being the most recent example when Justice Dennis
was writing) were developed by jurisprudence. To further
consolidate his argument, he also notes that all Louisiana courts
applied Halphen retroactively. Finally, Justice Dennis completed
his argument by appealing to the common law. 122 He meticulously
offered an overview of the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court to show that even though the Supreme Court was
also tempted for a while by the idea of prospective overruling, 123
this “experience” has been abandoned. Though it has great
119. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d at 320.
120. MIS, supra note 2, at nos. 107, 165, 166.
121. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d at 322.
122. It is interesting to note how Justice Dennis justified his analysis based
on the common law.
123. In addition to the discussion contained in the judgment, see Horatia
Muir Watt, La gestion de la rétroactivité des revirements de jurisprudence:
systèmes de common law in LES REVIREMENTS DE JURISPRUDENCE. RAPPORT
REMIS À M. LE PREMIER PRÉSIDENT GUY CANIVET 53 (N. Molfessis ed., Litec
2005).
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doctrinal value, this opinion can leave the reader bemused. While
not qualified to assert whether the relation made between the
position of the Louisiana Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court regarding the retroactivity of overrulings is valid,
this author is of opinion that it may not be the case. Its faithfulness
to François Gény in general and to civilian doctrine in particular
may be doubted. It is true that Gény always adopted an ambivalent
position and never succeeded in offering a theory that would
adequately reflect the significance of jurisprudence in French
law. 124 That being said, contrary to what Justice Dennis wrote,
Gény always said, quite clearly, that analogical reasoning did not
stem from interpretation, but from free objective search for a rule,
and is therefore an act of creation. 125 Arguing that judges only
declare the law and do not create it, so that jurisprudence is not a
source of law, is a position that practically no one takes seriously,
neither in Louisiana nor in France. 126 Interestingly, this assertion is
to be found in a case related to one of the most sophisticated
jurisprudential constructions Louisiana law has ever known: that of
strict liability. It can be noted that in order to illustrate the place of
reasoning by analogy, Justice Dennis mentions the jurisprudence
on mineral servitudes, which constitutes one of the most brilliant
manifestations of the free objective search for a rule in
Louisiana. 127
124. See the remarkable developments of Mayda, FGMJ, supra note 4, at 16
et seq.
125. MIS, supra note 2, at no. 165: “Let us first discuss analogy. We have
already met it as a proposed procedure of interpretation in the proper sense of
the statute law. I could not admit it on that level.”
126. It can be concluded, as a commentator of the judgment previously has,
that a lawyer taking Louisiana Civil Code article 1 literally would need to
substantially invest in liability insurance: William Reed Huguet, Hulin v.
Fibreboard Corp.—In Pursuit of a Workable Framework for Adjudicative
Retroactivity Analysis in Louisiana, 60 LA. L. REV. 1003, 1016 n.84 (2000).
127. It comes as no coincidence that a learned lawyer who presided the
Louisiana Law Institute chose, in order to summarize the creative work of the
Louisianan jurisprudence, to borrow Raymond Saleilles’ famous expression in
his foreword to the first edition of MIS: see John H. Tucker, Jr., Au-delà du
Code civil, mais par le Code civil, 34 LA. L. REV. 957 (1974).
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***
Had François Gény been aware of article 21 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, he would probably have looked at it in the light of
article 1 of the Swiss Civil Code. 128 Had he been exposed to
subsequent Louisiana jurisprudence, he would have discovered the
fertility of his method. It is hard to imagine a better reward for his
work.

128. See supra note 33 and supra p. 495.
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I. ABSTRACT
This article analyzes undue influence in the South African law
of wills in light of scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue
influence doctrine in the United States. The article assesses in
particular whether the so-called “undue influence paradox”
identified in American scholarship is manifest in the South African
law of wills: is testamentary undue influence’s role as guardian of
testamentary freedom undermined by the judicial pursuit of family
protectionism? The article proceeds, with due recognition of the
differences between the American and South African legal
traditions, from American scholars’ conceptualization of the
paradox and their views on other complexities associated with the
doctrine, to an exposition on the conceptualization, the statutory
regulation, and the judicial utilization of testamentary undue
influence in South Africa. The article determines whether or not
the South African legal position conforms to some or all of the
assertions made with regard to the undue influence paradox and
further complexities associated with the testamentary undue
influence doctrine in the American context. The article provides a
mixed jurisdiction’s response to the call for the abolition of the
testamentary undue influence doctrine in recent scholarship from
the United States.
II. INTRODUCTION
Jurisdictions that acknowledge freedom of testamentary
disposition recognize generally that a will or testamentary bequest
is invalid if it was obtained through influence that destroyed the
testator’s free agency and substituted the testator’s dispositive
preferences with those of another. The aforementioned constitutes
the usual test for testamentary undue influence in such
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jurisdictions. 1 Over the past two decades scholars from the United
States have voiced various concerns regarding the testamentary
undue influence doctrine’s operation in the American context.
While some American commentators support the doctrine, 2 a
number of others have criticized it and called for reform, 3 with at
least one demanding that the doctrine be abolished in the United
States. 4
The South African law of wills, which is a branch of the law of
successions, acknowledges that undue influence invalidates a will
or testamentary bequest. However, neither South African case law
nor South African scholarly texts on succession law typify
testamentary undue influence as an independent legal doctrine in
the South African legal system. In fact, Scholtens, 5 in his analysis
of undue influence in Roman-Dutch law—the civil law component
of South Africa’s common law to this day—concludes that apart
from the restricted doctrine of metus reverentialis (fear by reason
of awe, respect or deference) a general doctrine of undue influence
was not part of Roman-Dutch law.
Notwithstanding differences between the South African and
American positions on testamentary undue influence at a doctrinal
level, both legal systems acknowledge that destruction of a
testator’s free agency and displacement of testamentary intent
constitute grounds for the invalidation of a will or testamentary
bequest. Moreover, both systems have a history of judicial
1. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent
Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture
Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 279 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay of Testamentary
Capacity and the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We Protecting Older
Testators or Overriding Individual Preference?, 24 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 253
(2001).
3. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996); Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81
MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for
Testamentary Freedom, 42 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 129 (2008).
4. Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence
Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245 (2010).
5. J.E. Scholtens, Undue Influence, ACTA JURIDICA 276, 287 (1960).
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engagement with these principles. It is submitted, therefore, that an
instructive comparative analysis on testamentary undue influence
is possible despite dogmatic differences between the South African
and American jurisdictions.
South African scholars generally regard testamentary undue
influence as a benign construct that protects the testamentary
freedom of particularly aged or otherwise vulnerable testators
against the importunities of false persuaders or enterprising
impostors. 6 However, South African judgments in which
testamentary undue influence was found to have been present are
few and far between. Can this dearth of South African cases be
explained by reflecting on the criticism of the testamentary undue
influence doctrine in the American context? Do aspects of South
African testamentary undue influence judgments conform to the
assertions made by critics of the doctrine in regard to its
problematic, unorthodox and paradoxical operation in the United
States? Are these assertions appropriate to the South African
legislature’s treatment of testamentary undue influence? Insofar as
American scholarly critique of the doctrine can be distilled into
general themes unconfined by jurisdictional or doctrinal
peculiarities, is the South African legal position on testamentary
undue influence, when measured against such a critical thematic
perspective, satisfactory, or in need of reform? Can South Africa
learn some lessons from the criticism of the testamentary undue
influence doctrine in the United States?
This article attempts to answer these questions. The case
against testamentary undue influence, as presented in American
scholarship, is analyzed first. In particular, the so-called “undue
influence paradox” that negates the traditional view of undue
influence as protective of testamentary freedom is outlined. Other
6. See, e.g., Jean C. Sonnekus, Freedom of Testation and the Ageing
Testator in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL,
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 78 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. De Waal &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh Univ. Press 2007).
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complexities associated with testamentary undue influence raised
by American commentators are also highlighted, particularly
insofar as these complexities reinforce the paradox. Second, and in
light of the centrality of family protectionism in the criticism
leveled at the American doctrine, aspects of familial solidarity in
South African inheritance law are outlined. Third, the South
African legal position on testamentary undue influence is
contextualized. It is shown that English law influenced its
reception and development in South Africa, but that the South
African law on testamentary undue influence is rooted, by and
large, in the civil law, particularly Roman-Dutch law. Fourth, an
investigation is undertaken to determine whether the undue
influence paradox, or aspects thereof, and some of the American
doctrine’s associated complexities, are manifest in the South
African law of wills. To this end, the South African legislature’s
engagement with testamentary undue influence, as well as South
African courts’ utilization of testamentary undue influence, is
investigated. The article concludes with an assessment, in light of
calls for abolition of the doctrine in American scholarship, of the
need for reformative measures regarding the South African legal
position on testamentary undue influence.
III. TESTAMENTARY UNDUE INFLUENCE: CRITICISM OF THE
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The “Undue Influence Paradox”
Conventional wisdom casts testamentary undue influence in
the role of guardian of freedom of testation through the
invalidation of wills or testamentary bequests when the testator’s
will is substituted with that of the person who exercised the
influence. Madoff calls this the “dominant paradigm” of undue
influence in the United States; within this paradigm, undue
influence is related to, but distinct from, fraud and duress insofar
as all three doctrines protect testators’ rights to dispose freely of
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their property. 7 She contends that courts, when invoking the
doctrine, invariably do so “with strong rhetoric in support of
freedom of testation.” 8 Paradoxically, according to Madoff, the
doctrine can, and frequently does, occasion a disregard of testators’
freedom of testation when it is judicially utilized in an unorthodox
manner to quash testamentary dispositions. This occurs despite
ample evidence that such dispositions represent the testators’ true
wishes. 9
What causes the undue influence paradox? Some American
commentators advance judicial pursuit of family protectionism as a
principal reason. Courts seek to ensure, ostensibly for the greater
social good, that wealth will remain within the testators’ biological
family, thus protecting, in particular, intestate heirs against
disinheritance. According to this view, a judge or jury will favor,
for example, an estranged child’s argument that a will, in which
her father instituted as sole heir a caring remote blood relative or a
non-consanguineous relation (such as a supportive neighbor or
helpful friend), is the product of undue influence exercised by an
unscrupulous legacy hunter on a vulnerable testator. Invalidation
of such a will on the ground of undue influence secures the child’s
intestate inheritance and satisfies society’s normative insistence on
wealth transfer upon death between (close) consanguineous
relatives. The testator’s probable intention to benefit the remote
relative, neighbor or friend, so the argument goes, is effectively
negated by a finding that the act of testation was a product of
undue influence. 10
7. Madoff, supra note 3, at 575-76, 578. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at
244; Ronald J. Scalise, Undue Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative
Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 41, 54-55 (2008).
8. Madoff, supra note 3, at 581.
9. Id. at 601. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at 236-37.
10. Leslie, supra note 3, at 236-37; Madoff, supra note 3, at 576-77; Spitko,
supra note 1, at 280; Scalise, supra note 7, at 55, 101; Spivack, supra note 4, at
246; Tate, supra note 3, at 143. Even supporters of the doctrine concede that it
permits significant leeway for courts to supplant testamentary directions: see,
e.g., Frolik, supra note 2, at 261, who admits that the doctrine allows a court to
substitute its opinion of the reasonableness of a dispositive plan for that of the
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Madoff illustrates the existence of the paradox through a
comparison between two American jurisdictions. 11 The first
jurisdiction, Georgia, affords no statutory protection against
disinheritance of spouses; the other, Louisiana, not only provides
statutory protection against spousal disinheritance, but also
protects children against disinheritance through a statutorily
imposed legitime. Madoff’s analysis of undue influence judgments
from these two states shows that a will in which a testator
disinherited a spouse and children is much more likely to be
invalidated on the ground of undue influence by courts in Georgia
than by their counterparts in Louisiana. Madoff asserts that these
judicial tendencies are indicative of a strong correlation between
the existence of family protection devices, on the one hand, and the
application of the undue influence doctrine, on the other. She
concludes that the doctrine’s dominant purpose is not to protect
testators’ autonomy, but rather to protect testators’ families against
disinheritance. 12
Interestingly, Madoff, 13 and some of the doctrine’s other
critics, 14 acknowledge the fundamental changes in patterns of
family wealth transmission in the twentieth century described by
Langbein in his seminal article on the topic. 15 Langbein shows,
among other things, that traditional wealth transmission from
parents to children through the latter’s inheritance of the farm or
firm was supplanted gradually in the twentieth century by parents’
investment in human capital. Inter vivos wealth transfer to ensure
that children are well-educated and enjoy a good start in life has

testator; moreover, that wills failing to provide for spouses and close blood
relatives, and for equal divisions among children, are most vulnerable to judicial
invalidation on the ground of undue influence.
11. Madoff, supra note 3, at 611-19.
12. Id. at 612.
13. Id. at 625-29.
14. E.g., Tate, supra note 3, at 163-66.
15. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988).
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become the modern trend in intergenerational wealth transfer.16
This phenomenon occasions significant consumption of wealth
during the parents’ lifetimes, leaving children with less of an
expectation that they will inherit from their parents upon their
death. 17 Notwithstanding this change in wealth transmission
practices, many critics of the testamentary undue influence
doctrine in America advocate for the introduction of measures to
retain wealth within families upon death, either through instituting
typically civilian forced heirship devices, or by recognizing
judicial discretion to order family maintenance. They argue that
such measures will alleviate pressure on courts to use the
testamentary undue influence doctrine to attain the goal of family
protectionism.
Spivack, who argues for the abolition of the doctrine, is a
proponent of this approach:
The unsatisfactory doctrine of undue influence challenges
us to decide what we, as a society, care about. If we care
about protecting families, let legislatures institute forced
heirship. If we value testamentary freedom over protecting
families, let courts give it effect. 18
Scalise similarly advocates that the greater and more
significant a legal system’s family protective scheme is, the less
necessary a doctrine such as undue influence becomes. 19 In this
light, it is interesting that in the Netherlands, a typical civilian
jurisdiction with extensive forced heirship devices, a frequentlyadvanced argument for retaining imperative inheritance law
focuses on the adverse consequences that follow from a parent
disinheriting, under undue influence, his children in favor of
outsiders. 20 The potency of this argument is, however, suspect by

16. Id. at 723.
17. Id. at 740-43.
18. Spivack, supra note 4, at 246.
19. Scalise, supra note 7, at 81.
20. Martin Jan A. Van Mourik, Perspective 5: Comparative Law—the
Netherlands in IMPERATIVE INHERITANCE LAW IN A LATE-MODERN SOCIETY
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reason of the Dutch Civil Code’s prescripts aimed specifically at
eliminating opportunities for testamentary undue influence. 21
It is nevertheless understandable that forced heirship, along the
lines decreed in the civil codes of many continental European
jurisdictions, 22 appears attractive to American scholars as a cure
for the perceived unorthodox judicial utilization of the undue
influence doctrine in order to accomplish familial economic
protectionism. This is because the introduction of imperative
inheritance law will constitute a novel addition to the American
legal tradition, with its roots in the English common law (with the
exception of Louisiana, a typically mixed jurisdiction, where a
legitime protects children’s inheritance rights). It must be noted,
however, that forced heirship has come under increased criticism
in contemporary scholarship from civil law jurisdictions, primarily
because of its inflexibility and consequent inability to respond in a
refined manner to changing socio-economic realities. Castelein, for
example, criticizes mandatory succession in continental European
jurisdictions for the constraints it imposes on the freedom to
dispose of property, as well as for its limiting effect on human self-

107, 111 (Christoph Castelein, René Foqué & Alain Verbeke eds., Intersentia
2009).
21. Id. The Code’s Book 4 on inheritance law prescribes that a testator
cannot make a testamentary disposition in favor of, among others, any
professional in the field of individual healthcare who attended to the testator
during the time of the illness that resulted in death as well as those who provided
mental care and support to the testator during that time (art. 4:59), nor in favor
of caregivers and nurses at institutions for elders or institutions for those who
suffer from mental disorders (in respect of wills made during a stay at such
institutions) (art. 4:59). Such dispositions are, however, not void but only
voidable in favor of those invoking a ground for nullification (art. 4:62). The
aforementioned prohibitions are aimed at negating undue influence occasioned
by the relationship between a testator and the indicated persons: see F.W.J.M.
Schols, Wie Uiterste Wilsbeschikkingen Kunnen Maken en Wie Daaruit
Voordeel Kunnen Genieten, in HANDBOEK ERFRECHT 248 (M.J.A. Van Mourik
ed., Kluwer 2011).
22. Spivack, supra note 4, at 305-306.
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development. 23 This criticism suggests that imperative inheritance
law is, arguably, an imperfect solution to the demand for economic
protectionism in the family context. The South African experience,
among others, suggests that Spivack’s alternative proposal, namely
the override of wills through a family maintenance order, 24 is a
more effective way of achieving such a goal. 25
B. Associated Complexities
A number of other factors that complicate the testamentary
undue influence doctrine in the American context are evident from
the scholarship under discussion. Spivack argues that the
evidentiary difficulties associated with the doctrine are among
these factors. 26 Averments of undue influence are invariably
adjudicated on circumstantial evidence because the person whose
state of mind is at issue is dead at the time of the inquiry. 27
Therefore, the success of a challenge to a will’s validity on the
ground of undue influence depends largely on whether the party
bearing the burden of proof can establish or refute the existence of
undue influence. American jurisdictions generally permit burdenshifting in the course of an undue influence inquiry: initially the
onus rests on the party who alleges undue influence, but if this
party can raise a presumption of undue influence, the burden shifts
to the will’s proponent to disprove the existence of undue
influence. In some American jurisdictions, a will’s challenger
needs to show no more than the existence of a confidential
relationship between the testator and the alleged influencer in order
to raise a presumption of undue influence. 28 Therefore, it is
23. Christoph Castelein, Introduction and Objectives in IMPERATIVE
INHERITANCE LAW IN A LATE-MODERN SOCIETY 1, 38 (Christoph Castelein,
René Foqué & Alain Verbeke eds., Intersentia 2009).
24. Spivack, supra note 4, at 305.
25. See infra, Part IV.A on the South African position.
26. Spivak, supra note 4, at 263-65.
27. Madoff, supra note 3, at 582.
28. Id. at 583. See also Leslie, supra note 3, at 245, 253; Spivack, supra
note 4, at 263; Tate, supra note 3, at 190.
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relatively easy in those jurisdictions for a will’s challenger to effect
burden-shifting, particularly if the bequest that the testator is
alleged to have made under undue influence does not take the form
of a so-called “natural bequest.” 29 Madoff argues that the undue
influence paradox is rendered more pronounced by the
“confidential relationship/natural bequest dichotomy.” 30 She
explains that, on the one hand, the existence of a confidential
relationship between the testator and alleged influencer is often
sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence. If, on the
other hand, the will contains a “natural bequest”—one in which,
typically, the whole or the greatest portion of the deceased’s estate
is bequeathed to the testator’s spouse and/or (close) blood
relatives—it generally serves, notwithstanding a confidential
relationship between the parties concerned, as a strong indicator
that the testator’s will was not displaced by that of the alleged
influencer. 31
Some American scholars are even skeptical of a judicial
inquiry into the displacement of a testator’s will by that of
someone else. Scalise acknowledges that the concept of undue
influence is notoriously difficult, but bemoans the fact that it has
frequently degenerated into “nothing more than platitudes about
‘substituting one’s volition for another’ and generalities
concerning whether a testator is ‘susceptible’ to a kind of influence
considered ‘undue’ by the law.” 32 Spivack questions whether,
given the psychology and relational power dynamics at play,
judges or juries are best suited to be adjudicators of undue
influence. 33 She argues that testamentary capacity (or the lack
thereof) is much easier to prove than undue influence 34 and,
29. Madoff, supra note 3, at 602.
30. Id.
31. Madoff, supra note 3, at 602, 607.
32. Scalise, supra note 7, at 43.
33. Spivack, supra note 4, at 268-76.
34. See also, Madoff, supra note 3, at 574, who states that lack of mental
capacity and undue influence are the most frequent grounds for invalidating
wills in America.
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because the two doctrines are closely related, many challenges of
wills can be resolved if decided on capacity alone, without the
need for adjudication on undue influence. Spivack favors ante
mortem capacity determinations to prevent spurious and vexatious
challenges of wills on capacity grounds. 35 Moreover, she regards
the few cases that would not be brought before a court if the undue
influence doctrine were abolished in America as not constituting
sufficient harm to justify the doctrine’s continued existence in the
American context. 36
Frolik opines that the judicial preference for finding undue
influence, rather than declaring a will invalid for want of
testamentary capacity, can be explained by judicial reluctance to
raise the level of capacity that is required to make a will. 37 He
contends that disqualifying wills with questionable dispositive
provisions on the ground of testators’ incapacity will seriously
erode freedom of testation. 38 Frolik, therefore, supports the
testamentary undue influence doctrine because it permits courts to
protect vulnerable testators by creating a middle-ground between
testamentary capacity and incapacity; one where a testator
possesses marginal capacity that renders will-making possible, but
leaves the testator, potentially at least, open to undue influence. 39
Spivack disagrees, contending that the level of capacity required to
make a will is generally extremely low (compared to, for example,
the capacity required for concluding a contract) and that this
suggests that a “safety valve of undue influence” is not required—
once minimal capacity has been shown to exist, the testator’s
dispositive preferences must prevail. 40

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Spivack, supra note 4, at 291. See also Tate, supra note 3, at 144.
Spivack, supra note 4, at 307-308.
Frolik, supra note 2, at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265. See also Scalise, supra note 7, at 75.
Spivack, supra note 4, at 292-93.
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IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION
A. Family Protectionism in South African Inheritance Law
American scholarly critique of the testamentary undue
influence doctrine, highlighted in the foregoing part of this article,
advances American jurisdictions’ general dearth of devices that
safeguard wealth retention for a testator’s close consanguineous
relatives, and the consequent judicial pursuit of such wealth
retention through the testamentary undue influence doctrine at the
expense of testamentary freedom, as foundational to the undue
influence paradox. In light of these opinions on the
interrelationship between the undue influence doctrine and familial
wealth retention in the American context, a brief exposition on
economic familial solidarity in South African inheritance law is
apposite.
Family protectionism features in numerous common law
constructs of South African inheritance law. 41 More pertinent to
this article, however, is the South African legal position on
imperative inheritance and the provision of family maintenance.
Forced heirship was part of Roman-Dutch law introduced by
Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope (present-day Cape Town)
from the middle of the seventeenth century. 42 However, all
manifestations of compulsory succession, such as the legitimate
41. E.g., a general presumption, founded thereon that a parent is deemed not
to intend the disinheritance of children in favor of remoter relatives or outsiders,
operates against disinheritance and in favor of equal treatment of children in
parents’ testamentary dispositions; the duty of collation (collatio bonorum),
based on the presumption that a parent or grandparent intends an equal division
of assets among children and further descendants, is imposed on a deceased’s
descendants to account to the estate for certain gifts or advances received from,
or debts incurred to, the ascendant during the latter’s lifetime; and one of the
principles that governs implied fideicommissa states that a gift-over from a
testator’s descendant to a third person is regarded as being subject to an implied
condition of si sine liberis decesserit—that the descendant left no issue. This
implied condition is founded on the notion that a testator would not pass over
grandchildren (or other descendants) in favor of remoter beneficiaries.
42. N.J. VAN DER MERWE & C.J. ROWLAND, DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE
ERFREG, 616 (6th ed., J.P. van der Walt 1990). See infra Part IV.B on RomanDutch law as part of South Africa’s common law.
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portion, the Lex hac edictali, as well as the Falcidian and
Trebellian fourths, were abolished by statute under English
influence in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 43 Modern South African law is, therefore, devoid of the
typical Romanist-Continental forced heirship devices. 44
South African law nevertheless recognizes that a person’s
indigent minor child, whether born in or out of wedlock, has a
common law claim for maintenance against that person’s estate. 45
This claim is secondary to those of estate creditors, but is preferred
to the claims of legatees and heirs. 46 An adult child in need of
maintenance can also bring such a claim. 47 A child’s maintenance
claim against a deceased parent’s estate is lodged, along with all
other charges on the estate, with the estate’s executor and does not
require judicial confirmation.
A deceased’s indigent surviving spouse enjoys a statutory
maintenance claim under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act 27 of 1990. This claim, also lodged with the executor, is for
the provision of the surviving spouse’s reasonable maintenance
needs until death or remarriage, insofar as the spouse is unable to
provide for such needs from his or her own means and earnings. 48
The traditional meaning attributed to “survivor” for the purpose
of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act, namely that of the
surviving spouse to a valid civil marriage concluded under the
Marriage Act 25 of 1961, has been broadened by South African
courts under constitutional direction. This meaning now includes
the surviving spouse of a de facto monogamous unrecognized

43. Act 23 of 1874 (Cape); Law 7 of 1885 (Natal); Proc 28 of 1902
(Transvaal); Law Book of 1902 (Orange Free State).
44. M.M. CORBETT, H.R. HAHLO, GYS HOFMEYR & ELLISON KAHN, THE
LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 34 (1st ed., Juta 1980).
45. Carelse v. Estate De Vries (1906) 23 SC 532; Glazer v. Glazer 1963 (4)
SA 694 (A).
46. Ex parte Zietsman: In re Estate Barnard 1952 (2) SA 16 (C).
47. Hoffmann v. Herdan 1982 (2) SA 274 (T).
48. Art. 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990.
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Muslim marriage; 49 the surviving spouse or spouses of a valid
customary law marriage concluded by Black South Africans either
under customary law or under the Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act 120 of 1998; 50 and each surviving spouse of an
unrecognized polygynous Muslim marriage. 51 The South African
Constitutional Court nevertheless refused extension of such a claim
to the surviving partner of a permanent heterosexual lifepartnership. 52 However, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 provides
that the legal consequences of a marriage as contemplated in the
Marriage Act apply to all civil unions. The Civil Union Act
provides further that any reference to “marriage” in any other law,
including the common law, includes a civil union, and that
“husband,” “wife” or “spouse” in any other law, including the
common law, includes a civil union partner. 53 Consequently, a
surviving civil union partner, whether heterosexual or of the same
sex, fully enjoys the benefits of the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act.
In light of the foregoing, De Waal is correct when he lists, in
his analysis of the socio-economic underpinnings of South African
inheritance law, the support of the family as one of the basic
functions of the law of succession. De Waal explains that sociallybased restrictions on freedom of testation, such as the
aforementioned rules on family maintenance, serve to attain this
goal. 54 The question arises whether the principles regarding
testamentary undue influence—in conformity with the undue
influence paradox as described in American scholarship—function
as a (further) socially-based restriction on testamentary freedom in
49. Daniels v. Campbell 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC).
50. Kambule v. The Master 2007 (3) SA 403 (E); Reform of Customary
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 (Sch.).
51. Hassam v. Jacobs [2008] 4 All SA 350 (C).
52. Volks v. Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
53. Art. 13 of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006.
54. M.J. de Waal, The Social and Economic Foundations of the Law of
Succession, 8 STELL. L. REV. 164, 170-71 (1997). See also, generally, François
du Toit, The Constitutional Family in the Law of Succession, 126 S. AFRICAN L.
J. 463 (2009).
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South Africa. Does economic family protectionism underpin
statutory engagement with, and judicial utilization of, testamentary
undue influence in South African law? Next, before these
questions are addressed, the conceptualization of undue influence
in the South African law of wills will be explained.
B. The Conceptualization of Testamentary Undue Influence in
South Africa
The South African legal system can best be described as mixed
or hybrid in nature. It originated as an outgrowth of the interplay
between Roman-Dutch and English common law legal traditions.
Roman-Dutch law is a legal system which was developed in the
Netherlands in the latter part of the fifteenth, through the sixteenth
and into the seventeenth centuries. It is the product of the reception
of Roman law and its synthesis with Germanic customary law,
feudal law and canon law, and it was introduced to South Africa at
the Cape of Good Hope by Dutch settlers in the seventeenth
century. Roman-Dutch law remains part of South Africa’s law to
this day. However, it no longer exists in its pure form because of
extensive judicial and legislative adaptation and development. In
the aftermath of the second British occupation of the Cape in 1806,
the ideas from the English system began to affect Roman-Dutch
law. The new English rulers retained Roman-Dutch law, but
English legal influence on the existing civilian legal system was
unavoidable. 55 The convergence of Roman-Dutch law and English
law is particularly manifest in South African inheritance law,
especially its law of wills. Formal aspects of wills, especially their
execution, are regulated statutorily in the Wills Act 7 of 1953,56
55. For a concise overview of the development of South Africa’s common
law and its mixed legal system, see A.B. EDWARDS, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW—AN OUTLINE (LexisNexis South Africa 1996); Reinhard
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser, Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed
Legal System, in SOUTHERN CROSS: CIVIL LAW AND COMMON LAW IN SOUTH
AFRICA 2 (R. Zimmermann & D. Visser eds., Clarendon Press 1996).
56. The Act commenced on 1 January 1954, but was subsequently amended
on a number of occasions. The most significant recent amendment of the Wills
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which takes its prescripts largely from legislation that mirrored the
English Wills Act of 1837. On the other hand, the majority of
typical testamentary institutions and constructs encountered in
modern South African wills (such as the fideicommissum, the
modus, and the right of accrual (ius accrescendi)) originated in
Roman law and were received as such into Roman-Dutch law and
ultimately into South African law. 57
Freedom of testation is a foundational principle of South
African testate succession, and relatively few impediments restrict
testators’ dispositive caprice. 58 The principles pertaining to
testamentary undue influence, ostensibly designed to foster free
expression of testamentary wishes, are part of the South African
law of wills.
Considering English influence that pervaded the law after
1806, it is unsurprising that early South African jurisprudence on
testamentary undue influence relied greatly on English legal
authority. In Finucane v. MacDonald, 59 for example, the court
opined that the South African legal position on testamentary undue
influence accords with that espoused in the leading English case of
Craig v. Lamoureux. 60 Even earlier, in one of the first South
African judgments to find testamentary undue influence, Executors
of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire, 61 the court cited the English case of
Parfitt v. Lawless 62 in support of its findings that the burden of

Act occurred in 1992 through the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of
1992, which commenced on 1 October 1992.
57. For a concise overview of the hybrid nature of the South African law of
wills, see François du Toit, Succession Law in South Africa – A Historical
Perspective in EXPLORING THE LAW OF SUCCESSION: STUDIES NATIONAL,
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 67 (Kenneth G.C. Reid, Marius J. De Waal &
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Edinburgh University Press 2007).
58. M.M. CORBETT ET AL., THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 40
(2d ed., Juta Law 2001), who contend that South African law takes “the
principle of freedom of testation further than any other Western legal system.”
59. Finucane v. MacDonald 1942 CPD 19 33-34.
60. Craig v. Lamoureux 1920 AC 349.
61. Executors of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire 1873 Buch 47.
62. Parfitt v. Lawless (1872) LR 2 P&D 462.
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proof must be borne by the party asserting undue influence, and
that no presumption of undue influence arises on the basis of the
relationship between the parties. 63
In light of this reliance on English authority, it is equally
unsurprising that South African courts initially conceptualized
testamentary undue influence, in accordance with the thenprevailing view in English law, as a manifestation of force or
coercion. 64 In Taylor v. Pim, 65 for example, the court cited the
English case of Wingrove v. Wingrove, 66 where it was said that, to
establish undue influence, it must be shown that “the will of the
testator was coerced into doing that which he did not desire to
do.” 67 Engagement with Roman-Dutch authority on testamentary
undue influence is conspicuously absent from the Finucane,
Cerfonteyn and Taylor judgments.
Later South African cases moved away from coercion as the
hallmark of testamentary undue influence and embraced the notion
of substituted volition, although not forsaking entirely the interplay
between undue influence and coercion. In Spies v. Smith, 68 the
locus classicus of testamentary undue influence in South Africa,
the court said:
[A] last will may in fact be declared invalid if the testator
has been moved by artifices of such a nature that they may
be equated by reason of their effect to the exercise of
coercion or fraud to make a bequest which he would not
otherwise have made and which therefore expresses
another person’s will rather than his own. In such a case
one is not dealing with the authentic wishes of the testator
but with a displacement of volition and the will is thus not
upheld. 69
63. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61, at 72. See also Tregea v. Godart 1939 AD 16
22.
64. See, e.g., Cerfonteyn, supra note 61, at 72, 78.
65. Taylor v. Pim (1903) 24 NLR 484.
66. Wingrove v. Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81.
67. Taylor, supra note 65, at 490.
68. Spies v. Smith 1957 (1) SA 539 (A).
69. Id. at 547 (translation from the original Afrikaans taken from M.J. DE
WAAL & M.C. SCHOEMAN-MALAN, LAW OF SUCCESSION 44 (4th ed. Juta 2008).
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A feature of the Spies case is the court’s contextualization of
undue influence within South Africa’s Romanist-Civilian common
law, and thus its break from earlier judicial reliance on English
authority to resolve undue influence challenges to wills. The court
made note of Roman-Dutch legal scholars’ insistence that “the pen
of the dying must be free” and that it is contra bonos mores to
deprive a testator of this freedom. 70 However, these scholars
acknowledged that not all interferences with expressions of
testamentary intent occasion nullity—the interference must have
negated a testator’s volition and caused the making of a will
contrary to the testator’s intent. 71 The scholars used the typical
examples of severely ill or dying testators whose resistance to
influence is easily overcome by reason of their physical and/or
mental infirmity. The Spies court recognized, therefore, that the
relationship between the parties is not the only factor to be
considered in an undue influence inquiry, but that the mental
ability of the testator, as well as the time that elapsed between the
making of the disputed will and the testator’s death, are also
matters pertinent to such an inquiry. 72
The court emphasized in Spies v. Smith that the mere existence
of a relationship between the testator and the alleged influencer
that could occasion, for example, metus reverentialis does not give
rise to a presumption of displacement of volition. This is because
cum sola potentia metum non arguat (power alone does not prove
fear)—a will’s challenger bears the onus throughout, and each
instance must be decided on the particular facts at hand. 73
This finding in Spies v. Smith was confirmed in two
commentaries on undue influence in Roman-Dutch law published
by South African scholars in the judgment’s aftermath. First,
70. Spies, supra note 68, at 545-46, relying on JOHANNES VOET,
COMMENTARIUS AD PANDECTAS 29.6.1 (1698-1704) and CORNELIUS VAN
BIJNKERSHOEK, DE CAPTATORIIS INSTITUTIONIBUS Ch. 10 (1743).
71. Spies, supra note 68, at 547.
72. Id. at 547-48.
73. Id.
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Scholtens concluded that, although a leading legal scholar such as
Johannes Voet recognized that undue influence invalidates a will, a
general doctrine of undue influence (aside from a restricted
doctrine of metus reverentialis) was not part of pure Roman-Dutch
law. 74 Joubert went even further and found that “metus
reverentialis was never in itself a sufficient ground for attacking
the validity of a legal act” 75—insofar as the legal scholars
acknowledged metus reverentialis as a ground for nullifying a will,
it was “always with the qualification that the law does not
recognize any presumption of improper action because of any
special relationship existing between the parties.” 76
Notwithstanding undue influence’s (and, possibly, metus
reverentialis’s) lack of doctrinal status in Roman-Dutch law, the
conceptualization of testamentary undue influence in Spies v.
Smith and subsequent academic commentaries provides strong
support for the assertion that its role in South African law is prima
facie to protect testamentary freedom by invalidating testamentary
dispositions where the testator’s will was substituted for that of the
influencer. In light of South African inheritance law’s firm stance
in favor of family protectionism, 77 this assertion raises the
question: is testamentary undue influence, despite its
aforementioned role, primarily applied in the South African
context to retain familial wealth and, in so doing, to safeguard the
testator’s biological family, particularly those who stand to inherit
on intestacy, from disinheritance? Is the undue influence paradox
and complexities associated with the American doctrine also
manifest in the South African law of wills? These questions will be
addressed in the article’s next two parts through a consideration of,
first, the single provision dealing with undue influence contained

74. Scholtens, supra note 5, at 287.
75. D.J. Joubert, Some Aspects of Metus Reverentialis, 87 S. AFRICAN L. J.
94, 98 (1970).
76. Id.
77. See supra Part IV.A.
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in the South African Wills Act and, second, the engagement of
South African courts with testamentary undue influence.
C. Undue Influence and the South African Wills Act
The South African Wills Act regulates testamentary capacity. 78
Testamentary undue influence, on the other hand, is governed, for
the greater part, by the South African common law.
Article 4A(1) of the Wills Act, imported through the Law of
Succession Amendment Act, 79 nevertheless disqualifies certain
persons who participated in the making or execution of a will from
benefiting under that will. People who witnessed a will, or who
signed a will as a testator’s amanuensis, or who wrote a will or any
part thereof in their own handwriting, and the person who was the
spouse of any of the aforementioned people at the time of the
will’s execution, are so disqualified. This prescript is not novel to
the Wills Act. Article 4A(1) replaced the Act’s former
disqualification provisions contained in the now-repealed articles 5
and 6. These two articles prohibited a witness, an amanuensis, the
spouse of a witness or amanuensis, or any person claiming under a
witness, amanuensis or their spouse, from benefiting under the
particular will, or from being nominated as testamentary executor,
administrator, trustee or guardian in that will. Significantly, the
South African Law Commission (as it was formerly called 80), in its
report that preceded the Law of Succession Amendment Act, 81
recommended that the disqualifications contained in the
aforementioned articles 5 and 6 be abolished. The legislature
78. Art. 4 of the Act prescribes that every person of the age of sixteen years
or older may make a will unless such person is, at the time of making the will,
mentally incapable of appreciating the nature and effect of will-making;
moreover, that the burden of proof in respect of mental incapacity rests on the
person alleging the same.
79. Art. 4A was inserted into the Wills Act by art. 7 of the Law of
Succession Amendment Act.
80. The Commission is now called the South African Law Reform
Commission.
81. PROJECT 22, Reform of the Law of Succession, June 1991, 93-94.
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rejected this recommendation, and retained these disqualifications,
in amended form, under article 4A, to effect disqualification from
testamentary benefit of the designated persons who participated in
the making or execution of a will.
Article 4A(1) is aimed at preventing fraud and undue
influence; this is apparent from article 4A(2)(a), which stipulates
that the High Court may order that any person who is disqualified
under article 4A(1) is nevertheless competent to receive a benefit
from the will concerned if the court is satisfied that such person did
not defraud or unduly influence the testator in the execution of the
will. 82
Article 4A(2)(b) of the Act contains a further exception to the
general disqualification in article 4A(1), which exception has a
distinct family protectionism flavor:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1). . . .
(b) a person or his spouse who in terms of the law relating
to intestate succession would have been entitled to inherit
from the testator if that testator has died intestate shall not
be thus disqualified to receive a benefit from that will:
Provided that the value of the benefit which the person
concerned or his spouse received, shall not exceed the
value of the share to which that person would have been
entitled in terms of the law relating to intestate succession.
This paragraph is a novel addition to the Wills Act. It negates
the disqualification imposed by article 4A(1), and enables a
deceased estate’s executor to effect distribution to the testator’s
otherwise-disqualified family members despite their involvement
in the making or execution of a will. The executor can do so purely
on the basis that they are the testator’s intestate heirs; however,
they will receive no more than their intestate shares from the
deceased’s estate. Significantly, the executor can act independently
in this regard; 83 alternatively, the Master of the High Court, a
82. See In re Estate Barrable 1913 CPD 364 368 and Smith v. Clarkson
1925 AD 501 503-504, regarding the corresponding common law position.
83. DE WAAL & SCHOEMAN-MALAN, supra note 69, at 124.
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judicial officer charged with aspects of the administration of
justice, will make a determination. 84 Therefore, unlike the
exception contained in article 4A(2)(a), no court order is required
for the executor to effect distribution to the family members
mentioned. 85
Paragraph (b) has been described as the “central provision” in
article 4A(2), 86 and effects legislative ring-fencing of at least an
intestate share of a deceased’s estate in favor of the testator’s
spouse and consanguineous relatives. This occurs regardless of
their involvement in the making or execution of a will, and
notwithstanding the possibility that they might have unduly
influenced the testator during those processes. Moreover, the South
African Supreme Court of Appeal held in Blom v. Brown that the
availability of the relief under article 4A(2)(a) based on the
absence of fraud or undue influence is not dependent on the
inapplicability of the intestate-inheritance-exception of article
4A(2)(b). The court opined that the legislature did not intend for a
testator’s spouse or consanguineous relatives to rely solely on
article 4A(2)(b), without recourse to article 4A(2)(a), in order to
escape the disqualification imposed under article 4A(1). 87
In this light, the statutory attention given to undue influence in
the Wills Act, although confined to the narrow aspect of
participation in the making or execution of wills, conforms to the
familial solidarity paradigm insofar as paragraph (b)—the central
provision in article 4A(2)—ensures ex lege wealth retention (albeit
limited to shares on intestacy) by a testator’s spouse and
consanguineous relatives who participated in the making or
execution of a will. Moreover, the Blom judgment confirms that
these persons are free also to invoke the broader protection
84. Mohamed Paleker, Capacity to Inherit in THE LAW OF SUCCESSION IN
SOUTH AFRICA 111 (Juanita Jamneck & Christa Rautenbach eds., Oxford Univ.
Press Southern Africa 2009).
85. Blom v. Brown [2011] 3 All SA 223 (SCA) § 19.
86. Paleker, supra note 84, at 111.
87. Blom, supra note 85, at § 19, § 20.
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afforded by article 4A(2)(a) in order to escape the legislative
limitation regarding the award of intestate shares.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Wills Act’s engagement with
testamentary undue influence yields familial wealth protection as a
consequence, particularly insofar as a testator’s surviving spouse
and biological family members are protected against wealth loss.
D. South African Testamentary Undue Influence Case Law
In order to determine whether South African courts’
engagement with testamentary undue influence is susceptible to
criticism similar to that raised against the testamentary undue
influence doctrine’s application in the United States, it is useful to
restate four principal assertions regarding the undue influence
paradox and complexities associated with testamentary undue
influence gleaned from American scholarly critique of the
doctrine: 88
1) Courts hail the undue influence doctrine as protective of
testamentary freedom, but utilize it in an unorthodox manner to
negate that very freedom by quashing prima facie unnatural
bequests (bequests under which outsiders benefit to the exclusion
of a testator’s surviving spouse and (close) consanguineous
relatives) (hereinafter “the first assertion”);
2) The courts’ unorthodox use of testamentary undue influence
can be explained by a judicial pursuit of wealth preservation for a
testator’s surviving spouse and (close) consanguineous relatives,
thereby protecting them against disinheritance (hereinafter “the
second assertion”);
3) Courts in jurisdictions where inheritance systems recognize
economic familial solidarity through the operation of family
protection devices are less inclined to use testamentary undue
influence to achieve this goal of wealth retention (hereinafter “the
third assertion”); and
88. See supra Parts III.A & B.
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4) Other inheritance law doctrines and constructs such as
testamentary capacity, fraud, and coercion ensure that testamentary
dispositions are made validly and freely, thus rendering the undue
influence doctrine superfluous (hereinafter “the fourth assertion”).
It is useful to note that South African courts have found
testamentary undue influence in only a handful of cases: Executors
of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire; 89 Kirsten v. Bailey; 90 Du Toit v. Van der
Merwe; 91 and Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.92 can be counted
among them. The extent to which these cases conform to the
aforementioned assertions is investigated hereafter by dealing with
each assertion in turn.
1. Testamentary Freedom Undermined in Instances of
Unnatural Bequests
The “strong rhetoric in support of freedom of testation” that,
according to Madoff, 93 emanates from undue influence judgments
in the United States, is also apparent in corresponding South
African case law. 94 Does this pro-freedom-of-testation stance hold
true in instances where South African testators made prima facie
unnatural bequests to remote relatives or outsiders to the exclusion
of spouses and/or close consanguineous relatives? Two of the
abovementioned four South African cases were indeed decided in
favor of testators’ family members who challenged wills. In

89. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61.
90. Kirsten v. Bailey 1976 (4) SA 108 (C).
91. Du Toit v. Van der Merwe [2000] JOL 5920 (NC).
92. Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd. [2010] ZAWCHC 117 (28 April 2010)
[unreported
judgment,
accessible
at
http://www.saflii.org/cgi-bin/
disp.pl?file=za/cases/ZAWCHC/2010/117.html&query=longfellow (last visited
on March 11, 2014)].
93. See supra Part III.A.
94. E.g., in Tregea v. Godart, supra note 63, at 22, the court typified undue
influence as an “encroachment upon the freedom of the testator”, and in Thirion
v. The Master 2001 (4) SA 1078 (T) 1091I, the court cautioned that one is free
to dispose of one’s property even in an unreasonable manner, but that the law
does not permit undue attempts by exploiters to manipulate dying, ill or
otherwise vulnerable persons.
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Kirsten v. Bailey 95 the successful challengers were the testatrix’s
sole intestate heirs, and in Du Toit v. Van der Merwe 96 the
testator’s daughters from his first marriage invoked undue
influence successfully against the testator’s second wife and a nonconsanguineous outsider. On the other hand, in Executors of
Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire 97 the successful challengers were nonconsanguineous outsiders—the executors of the testatrix’s estate,
and in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.98 the court’s finding that the
applicant exercised undue influence with regard to a formallydefective will precedent secured the operation of the testatrix’s
existing will in terms of which her former husband was the sole
heir.
Of the aforementioned judgments, only the Kirsten and Du Toit
cases conform to the first assertion in regard to the undue influence
paradox. However, the Cerfonteyn case concerned a fairly unique
scenario 99 and, it is submitted, is not instructive on this point.
Moreover, it will be shown below that the Longfellow court’s
engagement with undue influence is open to criticism, and it is
arguable that this case, despite its outcome, in fact supports the
first assertion.
In some judgments where undue influence was alleged but not
found, South African courts have made emphatic pronouncements
in favor of testamentary freedom. In Thirion v. The Master, 100 for
example, the testator benefited his girlfriend to the exclusion of his
biological family. She brought an application to have the formally
non-compliant document that contained her appointment as heir
condoned under the Wills Act’s condonation (dispensing)
provision. 101 The testator’s mother opposed this application on the
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Kirsten, supra note 90.
Du Toit, supra note 91.
Cerfonteyn, supra note 61.
Longfellow, supra note 92.
See infra Part IV.D.2.
Thirion, supra note 94.
Art. 2(3) of the Wills Act.
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ground that the girlfriend had unduly influenced the testator. The
court found that undue influence did not occur, and Judge Van der
Westhuizen reasoned:
The one thing that is apparent is that he wanted to make the
applicant his heir. Even in his earlier will in which he
benefited his parents, he made provision for the possibility
of meeting and marrying his dream wife . . . and that she
would then receive preference over his parents. . . . It is
clear that [the testator] did exactly what he intended to do
with fervency. Whether his reasons were sensible and
morally acceptable to others, and whether it attests to
immaturity, is beside the point. . . . The law recognizes a
deceased’s disposition of property, even at the expense of
others, whether out of respect for death or out of respect for
the concept of ownership. 102
In this case the testator was party to a confidential relationship
with the applicant and made a prima facie unnatural bequest (one
to the exclusion of his biological family) in her favor; moreover,
no family protection devices were available to his mother (and
other family members) to secure wealth retention. If ever a court
was intent on conforming to the first assertion, and on invoking
undue influence at the expense of freedom of testation to quash the
disinheritance of consanguineous relatives in order to secure
familial wealth retention, Thirion’s case provided the ideal
opportunity to do so. The court nevertheless ruled, notwithstanding
the testator’s non-conforming dispositive plan, that undue
influence did not occur. 103

102. Thirion, supra note 94, at 1095H-1096A (author’s translation from the
original Afrikaans).
103. A similar approach was followed in the earlier case of Finucane, supra
note 59, where a testatrix benefited the defendant—her attorney—to the
exclusion of her biological family and her adopted son. The court ruled that
“however extraordinary it may seem that [the testatrix] should have passed over
her relatives and adopted son for MacDonald . . . the Court cannot deduce from
that that MacDonald exercised undue influence over her and that it was by
means of the exercise of such influence that he obtained the benefit under the
will.” Id. at 35-36.
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In Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.,104 on the other hand, the
testatrix made a natural bequest (one in favor of a close relative
and, according to American scholarship, usually a strong indicator
of the absence of undue influence) to the applicant, her second
husband, in a will precedent completed by the applicant and,
according to his evidence, approved by the testatrix. The court
found that the applicant had unduly influenced the testatrix.
Therefore, this natural bequest yielded before the court’s view on
the applicant’s exploitation of his confidential relationship with the
testatrix. As a result, the testatrix’s existing will, in terms of which
her first husband was the sole heir, remained intact. But the
Longfellow court’s undue influence ruling is suspect because the
facts before the court showed that the testatrix and the applicant
were ostensibly happily married for more than a decade; the
applicant called on a commercial bank for assistance in drafting the
testatrix’s will, and only when the bank failed to respond, did he
resort to the will precedent. Furthermore, two persons (the
testatrix’s nurse as well as a colleague of hers) were present when
the will precedent was completed, and two weeks had elapsed
between the completion of the will precedent and the testatrix’s
death. This was sufficient time for her, although terminally ill, to
express a change of heart in another will. When these facts are
measured against the test for undue influence in South African law
laid down in Spies v. Smith, it is certainly arguable that the court
erred in its finding that the applicant had unduly influenced the
testatrix. It seems highly probable that the testatrix in fact intended
to benefit her (second) husband. 105 In this light, it is submitted that
Longfellow, despite its outcome, supports the assertion that
findings of testamentary undue influence can occasion, in South
104. Longfellow, supra note 92.
105. See A. van der Linde, Longfellow v BOE Trust Ltd NO (13591/2008)
[2010] ZAWCHC 117, Mabika v Mabika [2011] ZAGPJHC 109, Taylor v
Taylor [2011] ZAECPEHC 48: Requirements in terms of section 2(3) of the
Wills Act 7 of 1953: Some comments on judgments in recent case law, 45 DE
JURE 412, 417 (2012).
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Africa as in the United States, the negation of testamentary
freedom.
The above exposition shows that, generally, South African
cases in which wills were challenged successfully on the ground of
testamentary undue influence secured wealth for testators’
consanguineous relatives, thus protecting them from
disinheritance. However, in Thirion v. The Master 106 the court
rejected an averment of undue influence and upheld a nonconforming bequest to an outsider with emphatic reliance on
testamentary freedom. The Thirion court’s pro-freedom-oftestation stance is, however, undermined by the Longfellow court’s
negation of testamentary freedom where, as it was argued above, it
erroneously found that undue influence was present based on the
facts at hand.
In light of this mixed picture, the next two assertions regarding
the undue influence paradox and its associated complexities
require investigation: were the South African judgments in which
testamentary undue influence was found motivated primarily by
the judicial pursuit of familial wealth retention? And does the
availability of family protection devices in South African law
nullify the (potential) unorthodox use of testamentary undue
influence?
2. Familial Wealth Retention
The second assertion posits the unorthodox judicial utilization
of testamentary undue influence as a means to secure wealth
retention by a testator’s spouse and/or consanguineous relatives
through the negation of wealth acquisition at their expense by
either the influencer or by a third-party outsider. The South
African judgment in Executors of Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire 107 is
somewhat of an enigma on this point. The court opined that “[t]he
106. Thirion, supra note 94.
107. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61.
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nature or quality of the object sought to be attained by the use of
the influence does not guide the decision of the Court. The
‘undueness’. . . of the influence is in the use of it.” 108 This
observation is appropriate in light of the Cerfonteyn case’s unique
feature—the fact that the influencer was wholly disinterested. In
this case it was alleged that the defendant, a Roman Catholic priest
who was the testatrix’s spiritual adviser and who received no
benefit under her will, unduly influenced the testatrix to execute a
codicil in which he was appointed as guardian and tutor of the
testatrix’s minor children. Judge Fitzpatrick said:
I have searched every law book to which I have access, and
have not been able to find one case like the present, where
the person charged with having exercised undue influence
to procure the execution of a will had not a personal
interest of one shilling in the transaction, and did not gain
one farthing as the result of his influence. 109
A two-judge majority held, the absence of personal gain on the
defendant’s part notwithstanding, that undue influence was present
insofar as the “persistent importunity of the defendant, continued
for years and culminating on the morning of the death” defeated
the testatrix’s resistance and occasioned the execution of the
disputed codicil. 110 Therefore, the peculiar Cerfonteyn judgment
refutes the second assertion insofar as the court’s finding that
undue influence was present did not negate financial gain by the
influencer, nor did it prevent wealth loss for, or disinheritance of,
the testatrix’s consanguineous relatives.
The judgment in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd.111 also does not
fit the familial wealth retention paradigm. The undue influence
ruling against the testatrix’s second husband of twelve years in this
case secured operation of the testatrix’s will, in terms of which her
first husband was the sole heir. Familial wealth retention was
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 73.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 74.
Longfellow, supra note 92.

2013]

UNDUE INFLUENCE

539

clearly not achieved through this ruling. However, it was argued
earlier 112 that the Longfellow case is susceptible to criticism; and,
as it will be shown later, 113 the undue influence rulings in both
Cerfornteyn and Longfellow were secondary to other grounds of
invalidity of the respective documents.
Du Toit v. Van der Merwe 114 stands alone among the four
South African undue influence judgments under discussion in that
the challenge of the will in this case was decided on the common
law ground of testamentary undue influence alone (the plaintiffs
abandoned lack of testamentary capacity as an alternative ground
for the challenge). The challengers were the testator’s three
daughters, while the will’s principal proponent—the first
defendant—was the testator’s second wife, to whom he was
married for more than a decade prior to his death. The testator,
seventy-nine years of age and in poor health, executed the disputed
will seventeen days after having made a will in which his
daughters were appointed as his sole heirs. In the disputed will, the
testator appointed W—the second defendant—as legatee in respect
of, among others, the testator’s farm, and designated the first
defendant as sole heir to the estate residue.
The court noted the history of discord between the plaintiffs
and the first defendant, which arose primarily because the first
defendant convinced the testator that his daughters were not his
biological children. 115 The court further opined that the first
defendant and W were unreliable witnesses and that their evidence
was fraught with lies. 116 As a result, it held that the evidence
pointed strongly to the conclusion that the disputed will came
about through the first defendant’s and W’s undue influence of the
testator, and that the will had to be set aside. 117
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra Part IV.D.1.
See infra Part IV.D.4.
Du Toit, supra note 91.
Id. at 47, 59.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 54.
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The bequests in this case conform partly to the confidential
relationship/natural bequest dichotomy. The legacy of the farm to
W corresponds to the dichotomy in that a confidential relationship
of sorts existed between the testator and W (W was the lessee of
the testator’s farm for some years prior to the latter’s death), while
the legacy to W was not a natural bequest (W was not a
consanguineous relative of the testator), thus raising the suspicion
that the testator might have acted under undue influence with
regard to the legacy of the farm. On the other hand, the natural
bequest to the first defendant as the testator’s wife of more than ten
years, presented in American scholarship as a strong indicator of
the absence of undue influence, yielded before the court’s view on
the confidential and exploitive relationship that existed between
the first defendant and the testator.
The Du Toit judgment conforms to the second assertion with
regard to the undue influence paradox insofar as the court attached
particular weight to evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs
that the testator would never have contemplated the disinheritance
of his daughters; particularly not to let the farm fall into an
outsider’s (W’s) hands. 118 The judgment leaves the distinct
impression that the court was very concerned with the harm caused
by the daughters’ loss of the family estate. Judge President
Steenkamp opined, for example, that W had forsaken a legal duty
that rested on him to correct the testator’s misperceptions
regarding his daughters, and said:
In this case the inference can be drawn against [W] that . . .
[W] should have realized that the deceased, by reason of
the misperception, was going to disinherit his children and
would nominate him [W] . . . and first defendant as heirs of
his estate. The plaintiffs were consequently prejudiced and
he [W] and first defendant benefited from the
misperception. 119
118. Id. at 13, 45.
119. Id. at 54 (author’s translation from the original Afrikaans; emphasis
added).
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This judgment, one of only a handful of South African cases in
which testamentary undue influence was established and the only
one in which the challenge to the will was decided on undue
influence alone, fits the familial wealth retention paradigm. It
raises the question, however, whether the dearth of South African
judgments in which testamentary undue influence was invoked
successfully is attributable to the presence of family protection
devices as stated in the third assertion.
3. Family Protection Devices Curtail the Unorthodox Use of
Testamentary Undue Influence
The undue influence ruling in Executors of Cerfonteyn v.
O’Haire 120 was handed down prior to the statutory abolition of
Roman-Dutch law’s forced heirship devices in the erstwhile Cape
Colony—at a time, therefore, when family protectionism was
particularly potent. Cerfonteyn seemingly disproves the assertion
that the availability of family protection devices decreases judicial
utilization of undue influence to achieve family protectionism.
However, given the disinterestedness of the influencer in this
case, 121 it is submitted that the Cerfonteyn judgment is not
instructive on this point. The undue influence ruling in Kirsten v.
Bailey 122 was handed down at a time when only a testator’s
children
enjoyed
maintenance-based
protection
against
disinheritance under South African law. In this case, the undue
influence ruling favored the testatrix’s only intestate heirs who,
significantly, were not her own children but those of her brother,
thus not claimants under the common law maintenance
dispensation. Therefore, Kirsten’s case conforms to the third
assertion in regard to the undue influence paradox insofar as the
ruling that undue influence was present secured wealth on
intestacy for the testatrix’s only consanguineous relatives, who not
120. Cerfonteyn, supra note 61.
121. See supra Part IV.D.2.
122. Kirsten, supra note 90.
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only fell outside the ambit of existing family protection devices but
who were also disinherited under the disputed wills.
Du Toit v. Van der Merwe 123 also supports the third assertion,
if evaluated from the perspective of the court’s ruling in favor of
the successful challengers of the will. The plaintiffs were the adult
daughters of the testator, born from his first marriage. They had no
recourse to the common law maintenance dispensation for
dependent minor children and were, moreover, disinherited under
the disputed will. The undue influence ruling in their favor
undeniably procured wealth for them through the reinstatement of
the first will under which they were the testator’s sole heirs.
The judgment in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd., 124 on the other
hand, does not conform to assertion three—it was handed down
after the enactment of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
which allowed the applicant, if he met the prescribed criteria, a
maintenance claim against his deceased wife’s estate (the judgment
is silent, however, on whether he instituted such a claim). The
court nevertheless made an undue influence ruling against the
testatrix’s husband and the potential availability of a family
protection device did not deter the court from ruling that the
husband unduly influenced the testatrix.
South African judgments in which testamentary undue
influence was alleged but not found, paint a different picture. The
challengers of the wills in these judgments were, for the greater
part, not claimants under any maintenance dispensation and were,
therefore, without recourse to family protection devices as means
of procuring wealth from the estates of the allegedly unduly
influenced testators. 125 Yet, the challenges of the wills were not
successful. In some of these cases, the unsuccessful challengers
123. Du Toit, supra note 91.
124. Longfellow, supra note 92.
125. E.g., Finucane, supra note 59 (challenger of the will was the testatrix’s
adult child); Spies, supra note 68 (challenger of the will was the testator’s
stepmother, on behalf of the testator’s minor half-sister); Katz v. Katz [2004] 4
All SA 545 (C) (challengers of the will were the testator’s adult children).
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were indeed heirs under earlier wills, but they still could not
procure findings that undue influence was present with respect to
the disputed wills (which findings would have secured the
operation of such earlier wills in their favor). 126 Evidently, neither
the unavailability of family protection devices, nor the
procurement of wealth through earlier wills swayed courts in favor
of undue influence rulings in these cases. South African judgments
are, therefore, dichotomous with respect to the third assertion.
Judgments in which testamentary undue influence was found
conform, by and large, to the third assertion; however, judgments
in which testamentary undue influence was not found generally left
the unsuccessful challengers of the wills without recourse to family
protection devices as a means of wealth procurement.
4. Secondary Undue Influence Findings Are Superfluous
South African testamentary undue influence judgments
conform, by and large, to the fourth assertion. In Executors of
Cerfonteyn v. O’Haire 127 the two-judge majority found, first, that
the testatrix, by reason of pulmonary consumption (tuberculosis)
and the taking of opiates, lacked testamentary capacity. Clearly,
the case should have rested there. Both judges nevertheless
proceeded to a secondary undue influence inquiry, probably
because it was pleaded in the alternative. Similarly, in Kirsten v.
Bailey 128 the plaintiffs pleaded lack of testamentary capacity on the
testatrix’s part, and undue influence in the alternative, in regard to
three wills made by the testatrix shortly before her death. The court
held that the testatrix lacked the requisite capacity when she made
each of the three wills and, as a result, set all three wills aside. 129
The court ruled, moreover, that the first and third wills were “in
any event obtained as a result of undue influence exerted upon the
126.
127.
128.
129.

E.g., Finucane, supra note 59; Spies, supra note 68.
Cerfonteyn, supra note 61.
Kirsten, supra note 90.
Id. at 111.
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testatrix by the first defendant [the sole heir in terms of both these
wills] and that they could, for this reason also, be set aside.”130
Evidently, this finding was secondary to the capacity ruling and,
again, superfluous. As in Cerfonteyn, the case should have rested
with the capacity ruling.
This tendency persisted in Longfellow v. BOE Trust Ltd., 131
where the court ruled that a will precedent completed by the
applicant did not comply with the Wills Act’s formal requirements,
and could not be rescued under the Wills Act’s condonation
(dispensing) provision. 132 The court, having made this ruling,
proceeded to an undue influence ruling on synoptic evidence
regarding the testatrix’s physical and mental state, and did so in
two meager paragraphs of the judgment. 133 Such a secondary
finding typecasts testamentary undue influence as the “safety
valve” that Spivack bemoans 134—Judge Baartman admitted in
Longfellow that she made the undue influence finding to allow for
the possibility that she was wrong on the condonation ruling135—
and fortifies the conclusion that South African undue influence
judgments conform, by and large, to the fourth assertion.
A survey of case law reveals that South African courts opt
frequently to resolve challenges to wills where undue influence is
averred (invariably as one among a number of alternatives) on
grounds other than undue influence. The Cerfonteyn and Kirsten
cases show that testators’ lack of testamentary capacity is the
alternative ground on which such judgments are most commonly
based. In another case, the court concluded that testamentary
undue influence did not occur, but ruled that the alleged influencer
was unworthy to inherit by reason of reprehensible conduct
towards the testatrix, which disqualified him from testamentary
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 111, 113.
Longfellow, supra note 92.
Id. at § 24.
Id. at § 29-§ 30.
See supra Part III.B.
Longfellow, supra note 92, at § 29.
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benefit. 136 This state of affairs leads one to conclude that in South
Africa, contrary to the position in the United States, testamentary
undue influence is readily averred or pleaded, but, certainly
because of evidentiary difficulties of meeting the burden of proof,
it is very difficult to procure a ruling that undue influence was in
fact perpetrated. 137 It is submitted, therefore, that South African
courts generally underplay pleas of testamentary undue influence
in challenges to wills, thus conforming, by and large, to the fourth
assertion insofar as testamentary undue influence is frequently
displaced by other inheritance rules or statutory prescripts.
V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
The exposition in Part IV of this article on testamentary undue
influence in South Africa showed that some points of contact exist
between the South African legislature’s and courts’ engagement
with this aspect of the law of wills, on the one hand, and issues
raised in scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue influence
doctrine in the United States, on the other hand. Do these
similarities warrant the conclusion that the undue influence
paradox and the American doctrine’s associated complexities are
manifest in the South African law of wills? And, even if this
question is answered in the negative, can South Africa learn some
lessons from scholars’ critical appraisal of testamentary undue
influence in the American context?
The South African Wills Act’s engagement with testamentary
undue influence, although limited, yields family protectionism
through article 4A(2)(b)’s 138 ring-fencing of wealth in favor of a
testator’s intestate heirs. It is certainly arguable that article
136. Taylor, supra note 65.
137. Roger Kerridge, Wills Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem
of the Vulnerable Testator, 59 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 310, 328 (2000), laments a
similar state of affairs in England when he argues that “it is too easy in England
to coerce, or deceive, a vulnerable testator into making a will and it is not easy
enough to challenge a suspicious will when one comes to light.”
138. See supra Part IV.C.
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4A(2)(b) functions as a family protection device in South African
inheritance law, alongside the devices highlighted in Part IV.A of
this article. Critics of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in
the United States will undoubtedly register their lack of surprise at
the fact that South African courts have issued very few orders in
favor of testators’ consanguineous relatives under article 4A(2)(a).
Evidently, article 4A(2)(b) protects these relatives adequately
against wealth loss; consequently they need not resort to court
orders under article 4A(2)(a) to secure wealth on the ground that
they had not perpetrated undue influence when testators made or
executed their wills. It is submitted, therefore, that the South
African legislature’s limited engagement with testamentary undue
influence in the Wills Act conforms generally to the familial
economic solidarity paradigm that underpins the undue influence
paradox in the American context.
South African courts’ use of testamentary undue influence also
conforms to elements of the paradox and assertions made with
regard to the testamentary undue influence doctrine in the United
States. Significantly, such conformity is manifest in Du Toit v. Van
der Merwe, 139 a case in which the challenge of the will was
decided on undue influence alone, and especially insofar as the Du
Toit court, in its reasoning on the presence of undue influence,
voiced concern regarding wealth loss by the testator’s disinherited
daughters.
It is submitted, however, that, notwithstanding the South
African legislature’s aforementioned stance in favor of familial
solidarity, it is difficult to conclude from the judgments surveyed
in Part IV of this article that South African courts are driven
primarily by family protectionism in their engagement with
testamentary undue influence. Even in Du Toit the undue influence
ruling was a two-edged sword: the finding of undue influence
made against the testator’s wife indeed prevented wealth loss by
139. Du Toit, supra note 91.
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the testator’s daughters through their disinheritance under the
disputed will, but denied the wife wealth in spite of her spousal
status (of more than a decade) and of the natural character of the
bequest to her.
In this light, the first lesson that South Africa must learn from
scholarly criticism of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in
the United States is that testamentary undue influence lends itself
to unorthodox usage that can contort it into a mechanism for
familial wealth retention at the expense of its role as guardian of
testamentary freedom. It cannot be said definitively that South
African courts have followed their American counterparts into
what its critics find to be testamentary undue influence’s
paradoxical trap. Nevertheless, South African judgments in which
testamentary undue influence was found to have been present were
generally decided in favor of consanguineous relatives who were
disinherited under the disputed wills, and who were, moreover,
without recourse to family protection devices to secure wealth
retention. The broad contours of a familial economic solidarity
paradigm are, therefore, detectable in South African courts’
engagement with testamentary undue influence. Consequently, it is
imperative for these courts to be alerted to the dangers associated
with the unorthodox and paradoxical judicial utilization of undue
influence in the law of wills.
The second lesson that South Africa must learn from American
scholars’ criticism of the testamentary undue influence doctrine’s
operation in the United States concerns the necessity of affirming
testamentary undue influence in its role as guardian of
testamentary freedom. Regrettably, South African courts’
engagement with testamentary undue influence has not
consistently reinforced this truism. On the one hand, a judgment
such as Thirion v. The Master 140 should satisfy all but the fiercest
critics of the undue influence doctrine in the United States: in this
140. Thirion, supra note 94.
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case the court rejected a claim of undue influence and upheld a
bequest to a non-consanguineous outsider; moreover, it founded its
ruling on a firm adherence to testamentary freedom, even with
regard to the non-confirming dispositive plan that excluded the
testator’s biological family. On the other hand, scholars who are
critical of the way the undue influence doctrine operates in the
United States may share the view that in Longfellow v. BOE Trust
Ltd., 141 the court’s ruling that testamentary undue influence was
present was artificial on the facts at hand and indeed negated the
testatrix’s testamentary freedom in that case. The Longfellow
judgment shows that South African courts are not immune to
derogating from freedom of testation through ill-conceived
findings of testamentary undue influence.
The third lesson that South Africa must learn from the criticism
of the testamentary undue influence doctrine in American
scholarship concerns the condemnation of undue influence to a
subsidiary role in challenges of wills. South African courts have
made secondary, often superfluous, testamentary undue influence
rulings in the past which, as Spivack points out, 142 cast
testamentary undue influence in the role of a mere “safety valve”.
This unfortunate tendency is exacerbated in South African law by
the fact that it is apparently difficult for the challengers of wills to
prove that undue influence was in fact perpetrated. Placing the
onus exclusively on the plaintiff throughout may lie at the heart of
this problem.
How can this situation be remedied? The American experience
suggests burden-shifting as a possible solution. Although burdenshifting does not accord with the South African common law
position on testamentary undue influence, the South African
legislature can decree a departure from the common law. Some
South African scholars have called for burden-shifting in
challenges of wills in the past. For example, Sonnekus proposed
141. Longfellow, supra note 92.
142. See supra Part III.B.
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that the South African legislature should amend the Wills Act’s
provision on testamentary capacity by placing the burden of proof
on the wills’ proponents in challenges of wills based on lack of
capacity if such wills were executed after the testators attained a
statutorily-determined age. 143 In this light, it must be noted that the
South African judgments in which testamentary undue influence
was found to have been present concerned mostly testators who
were of advanced age. Building on Sonnekus’s suggestion, the
Wills Act’s testamentary capacity provision could be amended also
in the sense of placing the burden of proving the absence of undue
influence on wills’ proponents in all undue influence challenges
where testators exceeded, at the time of the wills’ execution, a
statutorily-determined age. The introduction of such an age-based
rule to regulate burden placement is, arguably, preferable to a
“confidential relationship rule” or a “suspicious circumstances
rule” because an age-based rule would not violate the South
African common law’s firm stance that a special relationship or
suspicious circumstances do not in themselves raise a presumption
of undue influence.
Manipulating burden placement in challenges of wills may,
however, not be acceptable to South African law reformers. It is
submitted that, in the alternative, Spivack’s assertion that
prevention is better than cure points the way for possible South
African legal development: ante mortem mechanisms should be
instituted to ensure the valid and free expression of testamentary
wishes. 144 Again, South African scholars have proffered solutions
akin to those advocated in American scholarship to achieve this
goal. 145 But perhaps an answer lies in South Africa’s common law
143. Jean C. Sonnekus, Testeerbevoegdheid en Testeervryheid as
Grondwetlik Beskermde Bates (1), 75 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINSHOLLANDSE REG 1 (2012). Sonnekus proposes seventy-five years of age as
appropriate to this end.
144. See supra Part III.B.
145. E.g., Jean C. Sonnekus, Freedom of Testation and the Ageing Testator,
supra note 6, at 88, who advocates for the amendment of the South African
Wills Act to require every witness to a will to supplement the attesting signature
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insofar as the notarial will was, until its abolition under the current
Wills Act, a recognized Roman-Dutch will form. The common law
notarial will required the involvement of a notary, either as will
drafter or to confirm a will as expressing freely a testator’s final
wishes. It is submitted that a statutory reintroduction of the notarial
will, particularly if made compulsory in regard to testators who
have attained a statutorily-fixed age and/or in regard to wills made
in institutions for the mentally and/or physically infirm, would be
an important safeguard for South African testators’ free expression
of wishes.
The foregoing proposals suggest that the South African legal
position on capacity-related and undue influence challenges of
wills can be enhanced through relatively simple law reform. And
herein lies, arguably, the greatest lesson that South Africa must
learn from scholarly critique of the testamentary undue influence
doctrine in the United States: South African scholars have
subjected the South African law on testamentary undue influence
to analysis and criticism only infrequently. American scholars, on
the other hand, have highlighted the shortcomings of the
testamentary undue influence doctrine in their legal system in a
sustained manner, and at least one scholar called for the abolition
of the doctrine in the United States. 146 South African scholarship
has, for the most part, shied away from a critical appraisal of undue
influence in the South African law of wills. While the rules
pertaining to testamentary undue influence are integral to South
African testamentary succession, these rules can certainly be

with full disclosure of identity in order to allow such witnesses to be traced and
questioned with regard to the circumstances of the will’s execution. Sonnekus
(id. at 95) also proposes that the South African legislature should introduce
statutory prescripts that permit an officer of the court to execute a will on behalf
of a mentally infirm testator. See also Jean C. Sonnekus, Testeerbevoegdheid,
Herroeping van ‘n Testament en Kuratele Sorg, 15 STELL. L. REV. 450 (2004).
François du Toit, Mental Capacity as an Element of Testamentary Capacity, 122
S. AFRICAN L. J. 661 (2005), calls for the involvement of a testator’s attending
physician or psychologist to confirm capacity.
146. See supra Part III.A.
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enhanced to provide, as Frolik reasons, 147 optimal protection to
vulnerable testators with marginal capacity. Sustained comparative
research by South African inheritance law scholars on the way
testamentary undue influence functions in other jurisdictions will
contribute significantly to attaining such enhancement.

147. See supra Part III.B.
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I. ABSTRACT
Inflation can be one of the risks assumed by the parties to a
contract. Notwithstanding, contractual terms may provide for
monetary corrections to offset that risk in cases of foreseeable
inflation. The same may not hold true, however, for claims based
on unjustified enrichment. They may find themselves in the
position of innocents because the events that brought about the
decline of purchasing power of the currency were unconnected to
them. This paper analyses the approach recently favoured in the
new Brazilian Civil Code on inflation in enrichment claims. Its
focus is on article 884 (headed “enriquecimento sem justa causa”),
and it argues that while inflation may be taken into account in
certain situations of unjustified enrichment claims (whether falling
within the category of “undue payment” or that of “unjustified
enrichment”), the application of article 884 should not be
automatic in all enrichment claims. An automatic application of the
general principle may lead to incongruent outcomes.
II. ON ENRICHMENT LAW IN GENERAL
A. Introductory Remarks
The recently enacted Brazilian Civil Code of 2002, which came
into force in 2003, revised the 1916 Brazilian Civil Code (The
Beviláqua Code) 1 and added a title to its law of obligations
1. The Bevilaqua Code largely followed the approach of the French Civil
Code, although it was different in many aspects. Consequently, the 1916 Code
adhered, as a general rule, to the principle of monetary nominalism. According
to this principle, “the nominal identity of money entails an irrefutable
presumption of identity of value.” See Ejan Mackaay & Claude Fabien, Civil
Law and the Fight Against Inflation—A Legal and Economic Analysis of the
Quebec Case, 44 LA. L. REV. 719, 722 (1984). Nominalism is a practical
concept that “allows agreements to be made and judgments to be awarded for
fixed sums which do not need to be subsequently revised.” Id. at 722. Therefore,
“the certainty or stability of legal relationships, one of the fundamental values of
law, is clearly favored.” Id. It is necessary, however, to admit that where
depreciation of currency exists this stability is acquired at the price of some
injustice. The 2002 Civil Code departed from the principle of nominalism and
adopted the principle of valorism. In essence, valorism is an approach under
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denominated “Enrichment sine causa” (articles 884-886). Article
884 enacts a general principle against unjustified enrichment in
Brazilian law, which was lacking in the previous Code. The
provision of article 884 reads as follows:
A person who is enriched at another’s expense without just
cause is obliged to restore what was unduly obtained, after
making monetary correction (emphasis added).
[Caveat] (parágrafo único) 2: If the object of the enrichment
claim consists of a specific thing, the person who received
it is under a duty to give it back, and, if the thing no longer
subsists, its restitution shall be effected by its value at the
time the demand was made. 3
The reflection that follows explores the meaning and
implications of adding the expression “after making monetary
correction” 4 to the general principle against unjustified
enrichment. 5

which the extent of a monetary obligation is defined by the value of the
currency. For a thorough treatment of the concepts “nominalism” and
“valorism”, see ELIAHU HIRSCHBERG, THE NOMINALISM PRINCIPLE: A LEGAL
APPROACH TO INFLATION, DEFLATION, DEVALUATION AND REVALUATION (BarIlan Univ. 1971); CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY
(7th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012); Mackaay & Fabien, supra, at 721; ARTHUR
NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW (Foundation Press 1939).
2. “Parágrafo único” is a caveat which literally means “single paragraph”.
It is the technical term used when an Article (Section) is composed of a single
subsection which qualifies as the provision in the main article (section). Because
such a nomenclature is not used in the English statutes, I preferred not to
translate it.
3. BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE, art. 884 (author’s translation).
4. Monetary correction, which reflects the valorism theory of money, is
provided throughout the new Code, in provisions such as arts. 389, 395, 405,
418, 772, etc. However, it is not the object of this paper to deal with those
provisions, as they do not create major problems in practice, the way art. 884 is
likely to create.
5. See, e.g., art. 2041 of the Italian Civil Code, § 812 of the German BGB,
art. 473-480 of the Portuguese Código Civil, arts. 1493-1496 and art. 1699 of
the Québec Civil Code, and art. 6:212 of the Netherlands BW. See also the
European Draft Common Frame of Reference DCFR 2009 Book VII, 1-101.
This last provision reads as follows: “A person who obtains an unjustified
enrichment which is attributable to another’s disadvantage is obliged to that
other person to reverse the enrichment.”
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B. The Adoption of the General Principle against Unjustified
Enrichment. A Brief Overview of the Changes from the 1916 Code
to the 2002 Code
Before dealing specifically with the expression “after making
monetary correction,” a quick overview of the provision (article
884) as a whole, and the context in which it appears, is in order.
The new Code added three provisions regarding unjustified
enrichment, and slightly modified some provisions in the “undue
payment” section. 6 The provisions added are: article 884 (general
principle against unjustified enrichment), 7 article 885 (general
circumstances in which the claim is allowed), 8 and article 886
(subsidiarity rule). 9 The caveat to article 884 also refers to the
timing and measure of enrichment where the enrichment consisted
of a specific thing and that thing no longer subsists. According to
article 884, “if the enrichment consisted in a specific thing, and
such thing no longer subsists, restitution shall be effected by its
value at the time of the demand.”
Article 884 enacts a general principle against unjustified
enrichment. It fills a gap that was identified in the previous Code
by several Brazilian writers. 10 Many writers held the opinion that
the reasoning by analogy used in the Brazilian jurisprudence to

6. I will not deal with the few modifications on ‘undue payment’ as they
are of no consequence for the purpose of this article, unless the need to make
reference to them should arise.
7. See supra Part II.A.
8. Art. 885: “Restitution is due not only when there has been no cause that
justifies the enrichment, but also when such a ‘cause’ ceased to exist.”
9. Art. 886: “No enrichment action shall be entertained if the law grants to
the aggrieved party other means to redress the loss suffered.”
10. See, e.g., SILVIO RODRIGUES, DOS CONTRATOS E ATOS UNILATERIAS
(Editora Forense 2003); FRANCISCO C. PONTES DE MIRANDA, 43 TRATADO DE
DIREITO PRIVADO 195 (2d ed., Editora Borsoi 1963); JOÃO MANOEL DE
CARVALHO SANTOS, CÓDIGO CIVIL BRASILEIRO INTERPRETADO 378-79 (13th
ed., Freitas Bastos 1988); Agostinho Alvim, Do Enriquecimento Sem Causa,
REVISTA DOS TRIBUNAIS 259/3 (1957) and REVISTA FORENSE 173/47-67 (1957);
but see the contrary view expressed by JORGE AMERICANO, ENSAIOS SOBRE
ENRIQUECIMETO SEM CAUSA: DOS INSTITUTOS DE DIREITO EM QUE SE
MANIFESTA A CONDENAÇÃO DO LOCUPLETAMENTO INJUSTIFICADO 122-26
(Livraria Academica 1933).
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solve problems that the provisions of the 1916 code on undue
payment could not address was an inadequate mechanism. They
argued that the procedure was vulnerable to allowing “injustice” to
be committed in certain deserving cases. 11 The enactment of article
884 also lends credence to the point made by Pontes de Miranda, a
prominent Brazilian writer. He once stressed that in cases of
unjustified enrichment the legal system should look not only at
what occurs with the creditor, but also at what is happening to the
debtor’s assets. This sidesteps the idea that all cases of enrichment
are linked to a “payment.” 12 Indeed, enrichment claims go beyond
the case of payment of money. This is exactly what the new Code
endeavoured to achieve. This paper argues that it has indeed
managed to do this.
C. Brief Remarks on Enrichment Liability in General
Before specifically discussing the issue of inflation in
unjustified enrichment, a few remarks on liability for unjustified
enrichment need to be made. The concept and doctrine of unjust or
unjustified enrichment is ancient, but still evolving.
Although there is no single all-encompassing definition for the
concept of unjust or unjustified enrichment, the following
description is illustrative of what the notion may entail:
“enrichment liability is a doctrine stating that if a person receives a
benefit (money or other kinds of benefits) through no effort of his
own, at the expense of another, the recipient should return what
was received to the rightful person, even if such benefit was not
obtained illegally.” 13 How do the nuances of this concept and
doctrine operate in different legal systems? Some comparative
remarks follow below.
11. See Alvim, supra note 10, at 47-50; PONTES DE MIRANDA, supra note
10, at 195.
12. FRANCISCO C. PONTES DE MIRANDA, 26 TRATADO DAS OBRIGAÇÕES
167 (Editora Borsoi 1959).
13. DANIEL P. VISSER, UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT at ch. 1 (Juta 2008).
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1. Civil Law Systems
The essence of the civilian approach to unjustified enrichment
is to be found in the notion of sine causa transfer. 14 Sine causa is
understood as the “absence of a legal ground”, which implies that
either the ground (causa) did not exist when the transaction
occurred to sustain the validity of the “transfer of the benefit,” or,
if it ever existed, it has since ceased to exist (an actio ob causam
finitam). Civil law countries generally share the “negative
approach” 15 as a basis to a claim in unjustified enrichment.
“Negative approach” means that it must be proved that there is no
cause (hence the terminology “sine causa” and “unjustified” used
in the civilian systems), i.e., a legally recognised ground for the
defendant to retain the enrichment “transferred” to him. Put
differently, all civilian systems begin from the proposition that all
enrichment at another’s expense either has an explanation known
to the law (a causa) or it does not. 16 Enrichments are ordinarily
transferred with the purpose of discharging an obligation or, if
there is no such obligation, at least to achieve some other objective
14. “Transfer” here is used in a very loose sense, to include both active and
passive “transfer”. It encompasses not only an actual “transfer of the benefit
from one person to another”, but also an acquisition by omission, i.e., the saving
of expenses that would have been incurred in the absence of the act complained
about. It also includes the increase of liabilities on the part of the plaintiff while
the defendant decreases his liabilities due to the fact complained about.
15. The opposite of the “negative approach” is the English common-law
“positive approach”—based on the “unjust factor”, which is briefly discussed
below.
16. Jan G. Lotz (updates by Fritz D.J. Brand), Enrichment in 9 THE LAW OF
SOUTH AFRICA (LAWSA) § 209d (2d ed., Wouter A. Joubert ed., Butterworths
2005); REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 834 (Juta 1990); Reinhard
Zimmermann, Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach, 15
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 411 (1995); DANIEL P. VISSER, UNJUSTIFIED
ENRICHMENT 171-75 (Juta 2008); Jacques Du Plessis, Towards a Rational
Structure of Liability for Unjustified Enrichment: Thoughts from Two Mixed
Jurisdictions, S. AFRICAN L. J. [hereinafter SALJ] 142, 155-59 (2005). Du
Plessis observes that although there is unanimity about the absence of legal
ground (causa) as a requirement for a claim based on the doctrine of unjustified
enrichment in civil law in general, in the civil law in general, the meaning and
content of that legal ground (causa) varies considerably within the civil law
family. See id. at 157 (where Du Plessis gives French and Dutch examples).
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as, for example, making a gift, the satisfaction of a condition, or
the creation of a new contract. 17 If these outcomes succeed, then
the enrichment is sufficiently explained, i.e., it is obtained cum
causa. If the enrichment turns out to have no such explanation, it is
seen as inexplicable; therefore it cannot be retained. 18 The
recipient is not entitled to it and must give it up. Otherwise, its
retention would be sine causa.
The consensus, however, ends here. Civil law countries drift
apart when it comes to defining the measure of the enrichment, and
questions like whether it is the object received itself or its value
that should be returned, or what should be done if the enrichment
ceased to exist, receive different answers. Differences also exist as
to the moment of assessment of the enrichment—whether it is the
moment the object was received or at litis contestatio.
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that what we
actually find in civil law jurisdictions today is, for convenience
sake, what could broadly be called the “Pothier” and the “GlückWindscheid” schools of thought. The issue sometimes goes down
to the structure of enrichment law itself. Those authors who share
the idea that enrichment law should emphasise “value received” as
the “sole” measure of enrichment (thereby denying implicitly or
partially a change of position defence) belong to the Pothier
school. The Glück-Windscheid 19 school covers all those who
17. Current Canadian law labels all these situations and others as ‘juristic
reasons’ (see Garland v. Consumer Gas Co. [2004] SCC 25; (2004) 237 DLR
(4th) 385.
18. In South African law, Visser poses the following questions: (1) whether
one should only consider the causa retinendi or also the causa dandi; and (2)
how to categorise the notion of causa in the face of the recognition than an
invasion of rights can give rise to enrichment claims? The same problem arises
in cases of contracts discharged by supervening impossibility. VISSER, supra
note 16, at 173-74.
19. Current adherents of the Glück-Windscheid school align with what was
concluded back in time by CHRISTIAN F. GLÜCK, AUSFÜHRLICHE ERLÄUTERUNG
DER PANDEKTEN ad D 12.6 (§ 835) (Erlangen 1797) and BERNARD
WINDSCHEID, 2 LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHT § 424 (Rütten & Loening
1887) that loss of enrichment applies both to a genus and to a species, and,
therefore, loss of enrichment can be pleaded in all cases.
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defend the idea that enrichment law should concentrate on the
value that survives, rather than the value received, save some
exceptions. 20
Obviously, there are intermediate positions between these two
camps. The other school, adopting Pothier’s perspective on the
field as a whole, tends to deal extensively with paiement de l’indue
(undue payment) apart from negotiorum gestio. Though there is
diversity of thought in the Pothier school as to the place of all other
enrichment situations 21 and the requirement of error, the general
trend is that the nature of the enrichment claim does not depend on
the type of benefit conferred. The Brazilian law of unjustified
enrichment, as structured in the new Code, largely follows the
approach of the Pothier school.
2. Common Law Systems
Common law countries are not unitary either in their
understanding of unjust enrichment. 22 While English law generally
seeks to determine enrichment liability based on the requirement of
“at the expense of the claimant,” there is no specific reference in
English law that the claimant must have suffered a loss. However,
U.S. law, as presented in the new Restatement (Third) of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 23 seem generally to have a
different approach, which to some extent is closer to some civilian
systems, whereby the claimant must show an impoverishment. It
also requires a connection between loss and gain. On the other
hand, where English law would ask what remedy is to be applied,
20. Among the limitations generally advocated, one would be that a mala
fide recipient is always liable for value received, and where the enrichment
claim arose as part of an (invalid) reciprocal contract, value received is also the
right measure.
21. The Brazilian law of enrichment in the new Code has a dual structure:
“undue payment” and “enrichment sine causa.” The same approach is also
followed the Dutch Civil Code (BW), using a similar structure, and many other
civil law codes (such as the Italian Civil Code).
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW. RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT at ch. 1 (A.L.I. 2011).
23. Id.
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U.S. systems seek “an absence of a remedy.” This indicates that
American law uses unjust enrichment only where no other remedy
can be found. It must also be noted that U.S. legal systems are
increasingly using the concept of “absence of justification for
enrichment liability.” 24 English law, however, continues to employ
the approach of inquiring whether the “enrichment was unjust”
through the identification of an “unjust factor.” The unjust factors
relied on by English courts are generally illegality, mistake, duress,
undue influence, total failure of consideration, and miscellaneous
policy-based unjust factors such as withdrawal within the locus
poenitentiae, fiduciary's lack of authority, exploitation of a
weakness, and also ignorance and powerlessness. 25 U.S. law also
uses the “absence of justification approach” which identifies
enrichments with no legitimate explanatory basis, without looking
to black-letter legal factors. U.S. law, however, knows the concept
of disgorgement, which is not prominent in civil law systems.
Nevertheless, in the U.S., the requirement of loss is not as stringent
as in other civil law jurisdictions. While requiring some loss, the
law of unjust enrichment in the U.S. does not limit the measure of
the award to the plaintiff’s loss. Of course, this also means that this
difference is of vital importance in practice because the measure of
recovery may vary greatly between different jurisdictions.

24. Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary
Common Law Conceptualism, 52 VILLANOVA L. REV. 487 (2007); Caprice L.
Roberts, The Case for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent
Law, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 101-32 (2010). The cases: Meyer v. Meyer, 620
N.W.2d 382 (Wis. 2000); The National Bank v. FCC Equipment Financing, No.
10-0837 (Iowa, 2011); Soma v. Zurawski, 772 N.W.2d 724 (Wis. App. 2009).
25. See generally ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION (3d ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2011); see also ANDREW BURROWS, A RESTATEMENT OF
THE ENGLISH LAW OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT §10-20 (Oxford Univ. Press 2012).
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III. DESCRIPTIVE CONSIDERATIONS OF ARTICLE 884 OF THE
BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE
A. Enriched at Another’s Expense Sine Causa
The first part of the Brazilian general principle corresponds by
and large to the elements recognized in other jurisdictions as well.
In order for a claimant to successfully institute an enrichment
claim he/she must satisfy three requirements. First, there must be
an enrichment; second, such enrichment must have come at
another’s expense; and third, there must be an absence of ground
for the enrichment (the sine causa requirement).
The notion of enrichment generally presupposes a “transfer” of
assets or benefits from the patrimony of one party to that of
another. “Transfer” here is used in a very loose sense, to include
both active and passive transfer. It encompasses not only an actual
transfer of the benefit from one person to another, but also an
acquisition by omission; that is to say, by the saving of expenses
which would have been incurred in the absence of the act that
triggered the complaint. It also includes an increase of liabilities on
the part of the plaintiff while the defendant decreases his liabilities
due to the fact complained about.
There are other ways in which a defendant might be said to
have been enriched at another’s expense, but ultimately all of them
must lead to the conclusion that the defendant is not entitled to
keep that benefit, unless there is a causa for its retention. The
defendant’s enrichment must be sine causa. The concept sine
causa is understood here as the “absence of a legal ground” which
implies that either the ground (causa) did not exist at the time of
the transaction, or, if it ever existed, it has since ceased to exist (an
actio ob causam finitam).
It is common knowledge that Brazil is a civil law jurisdiction.
Although civil law jurisdictions are not homogenous in their
approach to unjustified enrichment, it is nonetheless true that all of
them share the negative approach to found a claim in unjustified
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enrichment. Brazil is no exception in following that tradition. The
enquiry is based on the proposition that all enrichment at another’s
expense either has an explanation known to the law (a causa) or it
does not. If it has one, then, generally speaking, an enrichment
claim is not sustainable. If it has no such explanation, then, the
retention of the enrichment would be sine causa. Therefore, it must
be disgorged to the person from whom it was acquired without
legal ground. The requirement “at the expense of another” does not
generally create many problems though there are a few issues to be
addressed with respect to the so-called “corresponding
impoverishment” approach. Normally, the correlation that the law
requires in this regard translates into the fact that any patrimonial
advantage acquired by the defendant must result in a
corresponding disadvantage suffered by the claimant. This is what
elsewhere 26 I have termed as the “mirror-image gain-loss.” An
example is when a payment has been made to one who has made a
cession, after the cession took place but before the payor is notified
of the cession. Another situation is where a debtor has paid a
creditor after a guarantor has fulfilled the obligation, but without
notifying the debtor. In these cases the value that enters into the
patrimony of the enriched party is the same as the value that left
the assets of the impoverished party. However, the soundness of
the unqualified “gain-loss” requirement is also doubted in
Brazilian circles.
If all three requisites described above are satisfied, the
enrichment must be given up. The measure of enrichment is
generally accepted to be calculated from the time the claim is
instituted, or at the time a demand is made, should this be
antecedent to the institution of the claim itself. According to the
caveat to the general principle, if the enrichment consists of a
specific thing, the thing itself shall be restored. If it no longer
26. See generally Aimite Jorge, Change of Position in Comparative
Perspective 190-91, 262, 270, 279 (Doctoral thesis, 2009, University of Cape
Town).
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exists, the restoration shall be made based on the value of the thing
at the time of the demand. How does monetary deterioration due to
inflation find its way in assessing the measure of enrichment? The
following section will analyze this issue.
B. “After Updating the Monetary Values” (Monetary Correction)
The expression “after updating the monetary values” (feita a
atualização de valores monetários) is somewhat confusing in the
context in which it is used and its exact meaning has not yet been
fully tested in courts. Article 884 was meant to introduce a general
enrichment action as a catch-all provision. Yet the provision
speaks of “updating or adjusting monetary values” apparently as a
fourth requirement of such a general action. The existence of this
element seems to indicate that the enrichment claim provided for
under this general action embraces money claims alone and any
enrichment that does not fit into the monetary mold would not be
considered. This observation may be corroborated by the wording
of the caveat to the general claim that follows it and which speaks
of “if an enrichment consisted in a specific thing.” This expression
appears to be there as the opposite of money in the preceding
clause. There is a suggestion in the Brazilian legal literature to the
effect that such an expression is related to currency devaluation or
inflation in the country as a whole, but the context does not seem
to fully support such a broad contention. Carlos Gonçalves who
advocates this proposition says that:
[T]he determination that restitution of that which was
unduly received be done with “adjustment of monetary
values” is due to the fact that jurisprudence has for long
manifested that the corresponding monetary value
constitutes a mere re-establishment of the value of the
currency weakened by inflation, and its calculation is to be
computed from the moment the “payment” (emphasis
added) was made, in order to avoid the enrichment sine
causa of the debtor, rendering irrelevant any delay that
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might have occurred in the institution of the demand. 27
Gonçalves, however, does not cite any authority supporting this
contention, save a single reference to one court decision, 28 and his
discussion of this issue appears in a single paragraph of seven
lines. He also does not present the facts of that decision (in which,
supposedly, such a proposition might have been made). He does
not say how the judge updated the monetary values and the criteria
he used to do so. Be that as it may, Claúdio Michelon 29 has in the
meantime also adopted the same view as Carlos Gonçalves, while
commenting on article 884 and cross-referencing it to articles 315,
317 and 404 of the Code. Furthermore, the observations of Judge
Sena Rebouças in an Appeal Court decision in São Paulo
(426.304/1 SP) seem indeed to corroborate Gonçalves and
Michelon’s interpretation: 30
27. CARLOS ROBERTO GONÇALVES, 3 DIREITO CIVIL BRASILEIRO—DE
ACORDO COM O NOVO CÓDIGO 588-90 (Editora Saraiva 2004) (author’s
translation).
28. STJ, REsp 31. 791-MG, 4a. Turma; Rel. Min. Barros Monteiro; DJU,
22/04/2002, p. 212.
29. CLAÚDIO MICHELON, DIREITO RESTITUITÓRIO 242 (Revista dos
Tribunais 2006). The author says:
With regard to situation (b) [the situation wherein the value received—
which is expressed in money—has suffered a decrease due to currency
devaluation. In this case , one must ask whether the obligation to the
enriched person also comprises the duty to restore not only the nominal
value, but also the real value, i.e. effecting a monetary correction] the
provisions of article 884 seem to make an exception to the general rule
in the Civil Code. Article 315 of the Civil Code determines that debts
(owed) in money must be paid in their nominal value. The automatic
monetary correction (not agreed upon) is a consequence that the Code
ascribes to the non-performance of a pecuniary obligation, with the aim
of preserving the purchasing value correspondent to the nominal value
at the time of non-compliance (art. 404). The so-called “nominalism
principle” that is opposed to the notion that debts have to be paid by the
value of the purchase, admits exceptions, such as the possibility of
correction of pecuniary value due to the disequilibrium between
performances arising from unforeseen events that have occurred from
the time the obligation arose (art. 317). Thus, article 884 makes an
exception to the ‘nominalism principle’ because it expressly determines
that the value unduly acquired be restored after adjusting the monetary
values (author’s translation).
30. The whole issue of currency devaluation leading to the assertion of
“adjustment according to inflation” is linked to a period of the economic crisis
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Masking the inflationary process (alleging or pretending
that it does not exist, institutionalizing the tale of a “strong
currency,” but which has always been the same weak
currency under a different name), also results in hiding the
profits that inflation brings to the State as debtor. The
process that once was open is now hidden, but it continues
to exist. Inflation is lucrative to the extent that it transfers
the assets of the creditors to the debtors. Whenever there is
inflation and the fact is ignored for whatever reason (by the
law or by the courts’ decisions), there is a transfer of assets.
The creditor is impoverished (decreasing his credit in real
value), and the debtor is enriched (decreasing his debits), to
the extent of the inflation. The profit is exactly what the
debtor (in casu, the depositary) has ceased to pay for a
while, postponing his debt without any duty of adjusting it
(because in effect, inflation continues), which results in an
enrichment sine causa, which cannot and must not pass
unnoticed by the Judiciary. The institutionalization of a
monetary correction (monetary adjustment mechanism) in
judicio is an instrument of justice through which judges and
courts correct the distortions that, in the face of inflation,
legal and contractual norms bring to the rights of the
parties.
It is important to correctly establish the concept of
monetary correction in judicio (or monetary correction as
an instrument of justice), peculiar to the law, although it is
of economic origins, or emanating from an economic
concept. Monetary correction in judicio is an inherent
mechanism to the inflationary process, and for that reason it
is only possible to conceive the non-existence of monetary
correction in the absence of inflation. It is not only
unacceptable, but even contrary to the notion of good faith,
to establish a “nominalistic” principle in time of steep
inflation. Also, it is objectionable to implement any other
idea that could hamper and curb the enforcement of
monetary correction in this time of inflation, for, such “fact
would impose the transfer of the above mentioned assets to
the benefit of the debtors while harming the creditors.” Yet,
the worst that comes from this same situation is the effect
of transforming the Judicial Power in the process to be an
instrument of windfalls, or, in the best of hypotheses, as an
and its main features are embodied in Lei No. 6.899/81, which deals with
judicial deposits. This legislative act is also known as “the law of indexation.”
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accomplice of what conventionally is called enrichment
sine causa. The non-implementation of a monetary
correction (adjustment) mechanism is a profound shock to
the general ethical sentiment, and consequently, the
suggestion to return the same genuine deposit unchanged
represents the idea of returning nothing at all. It would lead
to an absurd result, economically indefensible and
judicially an aberration, which cannot be sustained. For this
reason, it must be ensured that the rules on the actualization
of values of the sums deposited must be the same as those
that are used to update judicial calculus (assessments), i.e.,
the use of IPC (CPI—Consumer Price Index), in periods in
which the government plans above-cited have modified the
system of “remuneration” of savings, mandating the
implementation of indexes that did not reflect the reality of
inflation. In these cases, jurisprudence has acquiesced,
admitting a real correction. The correction, as a “ceiling,” is
aimed at maintaining the currency at its initial level of
acquisitive power, and consequently, it is not an “income.”
The devolution of an amount deposited must be corrected
(adjusted) from the date of the deposit up to the effective
date of receiving such deposits. 31
Further support for this position can be drawn from the effect
that Law No. 6.899/81 (Indexation Decree) may have in the law as
a whole. This law is very complex. It contains relevant aspects for
unjustified enrichment which will be discussed here.
It has been held in a case reported at REsp. 12.591.0/SP 32 that
“the systematic monetary adjustment of debits arising from judicial
decisions—sanctioned by Law No. 6.899/81—constitutes a real
legal principle that is applicable to any kind of legal relationships
and in all branches of the law.” The court further said that it is well
known that the phenomenon of monetary adjustment “is
exclusively aimed at maintaining over time the real value of the
debt by means of an alteration in its ‘nominal’ (numeric)
expression. It does not generate any increase in the value nor does
31. Apelação Cível, REsp 426.304/1 SP. (de Lins, 2a Câmara do extinto
Primeiro Tribunal de Alçada Civil de São Paulo, v.u. (june 17.04.91, Relator
Juiz Sena Rebouças).
32. REsp 12.591-0/SP (1ª Turma STJ) (18.5.1992) Relator, Min. Demócrito
Reinaldo, in Boletim Adcoas No. 138.819].

568

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

it translate into a punitive sanction. It simply derives from the
passage of time under the currency devaluation regime.”
Under the rules sanctioned by such a law in a generally
indexed economy, 33 it is said that one must transform any
monetary obligations—especially those arising from contractual
transactions—into “value-based debts” (dívidas de valores) in
which the currency serves as a mere indicator of an amount which
changes according to pre-established indexes. 34 It is to be noted
that, in regard to the debts arising from judicial decisions, article 1
of Law 6.899/81 clearly encompasses all pending payments arising
from unfulfilled obligations, and it mandates monetary adjustments
of any pecuniary debt even in the absence of a specific contractual
provision. In the case of a liquidated debt, monetary adjustment is
to be undertaken from the time the debtor fell in mora, and in all
other cases, from the time the judgment was issued. In some
instances, i.e., obligations envisaging payment in a foreign
currency, 35 the operation itself is usually not invalidated, but the
clause that stipulates the foreign currency operation is sometimes
nullified, although the sum agreed upon still has to be converted
33. It is debatable to what extent the Brazilian economy can still be
considered a generally indexed economy, for, over time, many have argued for
its des-indexation to some extent. Therefore, the “adjustment of monetary
values” under article 884 of the New Civil Code should be put in perspective
with time, if it is indeed correct.
34. GUSTAVO TEPEDINO, TEMAS DE DIREITO CIVIL 110-11 (3d ed., Editora
Renovar 2004). There are official indexes for the adjustment of the monetary
value of debts emanating from judicial decision. Law No. 6.899/81 itself was the
product of the then-highly inflationary Brazilian economy, under the currency
known as “Cruzeiro.” For further details on these indexes and related matters,
and especially quotations in foreign currencies, see ARNOLDO WALD,
OBRIGAÇÕES E CONTRATOS 53 (Editora Saraiva 2006); TEPEDINO, supra, at 11115.
35. This issue is based on Decree No. 23.501 of 27/11/1933. This decree
forbade in all internal contracts (contracts within the territory of Brazil)
stipulations and payments in gold (it is to be remembered that in 1933 the world
still operated under the gold standard) or in other determined currency, other
than local currency. This provision originated from the inflation and the cambial
imbalances of the time. These imbalances forced the Provisional Government of
1930 to enact such legislation, following the example of other countries. This
legislation is still in force, but it has been modified over time and several
exceptions are now included in its provisions.
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into the national currency. In these cases the problem that often
arises is to determine the value date for the conversion, whether it
is the stipulation date or the payment date. In either hypothesis, the
possibility of an unjustified enrichment can arise. In these
situations, the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal
(STF)) has decided that the conversion to the national currency is
to be considered from the date of the stipulation (i.e., of the
judgment), because, according to the court (Rel. Min. Morreira
Alves), 36 a conversion based on the date of the payment would
result in an unjustified enrichment (inaccurately labelled as
enriquecimento ilícito) 37 of the creditor, who would benefit from
the adjustment of the foreign currency during the duration of the
contract. The adjustment of a contract to be performed in a foreign
currency within the territory of Brazil was considered an invalid
act by Article 1 of Decree No. 23.501/33. 38 Logically, the appealed
decision from the TJRJ (Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro)
was equally founded on the principle forbidding an enrichment
sine causa, but in that decision, the reasoning of the court
regarding unjustified enrichment was based on the position of the
other party. According to the TJRJ, the conversion of the sum
borrowed through a loan contracted in a foreign currency had to be
made from the date of payment, in order to avoid an enrichment
36. Foreign readers should take notice that under Brazilian legal
terminology the justice (judge) issuing the judgment is commonly referred to as
“Relator” (in brief, Rel.) and the judges or justices at the “Supremo Tribunal
Federal” (STF) are referred to as “Ministers” (in brief, Min.).
37. It is not infrequent that some writers interchangeably use
“enriquecimento ilícito” with “enriquecimento injustificado” (sine causa). Also,
the confusion occasionally appears in some court decisions, like the one referred
to here.
38. Decree 857/69 replaced Decree 23.501/33. Decree 857/69 envisaged in
its art. 1, that “all contracts, titles and other documents as well as all obligations
to be performed in Brazil, would be null and without effect, if they stipulated
payment in gold or in a foreign currency, or in any other way restricted or
rejected the use of Cruzeiro”. But art. 2 of Decree 857/69 made five exceptions.
For further references see Judgment in REsp 1.323.219/RJ (Rel. Min. Nancy
Andrighi, 3a. Turma). Other related decisions are: REsp 1.212.847/PR, REsp
804.791/MG, AgRg no Ag 1.043.637/MS, REsp 848.424/RJ e REsp
194.629/SP.
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sine causa of the debtor in the face of the devaluation of the
national currency while the contract was in operation. Thus,
however the issue of “monetary adjustment” is seen, it is obvious
that it leaves a windfall to one party in the equation, which though
it might ultimately be justified (i.e., it is cum causa, because of the
application of said Law 6.899/81), it might still be unfair.
Inflation ordinarily is not created by private citizens. It is
usually the result of changes in market conditions, and sometimes
the effect of government intervention in the economy. How can a
provision aimed at all private persons (as well as public bodies) be
made dependent upon an action taken by the state (where the state
intervenes)? While the above interpretation would be adequate
where one party is a public body (e.g., depository institutions such
as a bank or the like), stretching that interpretation to cover
ordinary private citizens has a penal quality to it, and its universal
applicability to any branch of the law is questionable.
In order to capture the possible meaning of the phrase
“updating the monetary values,” one must analyse the provision as
a whole. It says that “whoever has been enriched at another’s
expense without just cause shall restore what he has unduly
acquired, after updating the monetary values.” The provision states
a general principle and does not refer exclusively to money claims,
although its final part speaks of “monetary values.” It refers to any
enrichment acquired sine causa, be it a monetary benefit or any
kind of a benefit whereby the recipient enriches himself at
another’s expense. The caveat (parágrafo único) that follows the
provision also indicates that if “updating monetary values” were to
refer to currency inflation, it would be incongruent with an
enrichment consisting in a specific thing—for which the
calculation of the value of the enrichment, if the thing has been lost
or no longer exists, is made at the time when the demand is made
(litis contestatio), and not the moment when the thing was acquired
by the defendant. This assertion—that the enrichment generally is
to be considered from the time of litis contestatio—is well
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entrenched in Brazilian law, because, as Pontes de Miranda once
said: “what is given in the case of unjustified enrichment is not the
value of the thing at the time the enrichment occurred, but the
value of the defendant’s enrichment as it enriches him at the time
the action is brought.” 39 The same author elaborated on this view
by adding the following example in respect of a specific thing:
If the thing had remained in the hands of the plaintiff its
value would now be ‘a’, but because it remained in the
hands of the defendant, its value is now ‘a+x’, then the
value to be restored to the claimant is ‘a+x’, save for the
cases that fall under article 966 of the Civil Code of 1916. 40
Article 966, which constitutes an exception in Pontes de
Miranda’s analysis, provided as follows: “The provisions of
articles 510-519 shall apply to the fruits, accessories,
improvements and deteriorations of the thing given in undue
payment.” 41 These provisions have not changed that much under
the new Code. 42 Rodrigues Filho Eulámpio 43 exemplifies the
application of the then article 966 by referring to a São Paulo court
decision 44 in which it appears that a disputed salary was fixed in a
decision by a lower court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced
the quantum to a lower sum, and of course ordered the immediate
restitution of the excess. The losing party tried to launch an appeal
for a monetary correction of the quantity returned, but the court
held the appeal to be inadmissible.

39. PONTES DE MIRANDA, supra note 12, at 176.
40. Id. at 177.
41. Article 966, BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE of 1916.
42. The new Civil Code, in art. 878, provides the following: “The
provisions of this Code dealing with good faith or bad faith possession also
apply, as the case may be, to fruits, accessories, improvements and
deteriorations of the thing given in undue payment” (Aos frutos, acessões,
benfeitorias e deteriorações sobrevindas à coisa dada em pagamento indevido,
aplica-se o disposto neste Código sobre o possuidor de boa-fé ou de má-fé,
conforme o caso).
43. RODRIGUES FILHO EULÁMPIO, CÓDIGO CIVIL ANOTADO 838 (3d ed.,
Editora Síntese 2001).
44. The decision is reported and commented upon at TJSP, RT 613/96.
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The example given by Pontes de Miranda does not detract from
the general proposition that in an enrichment claim, the measure of
the enrichment is calculated from the time of the institution of the
action, save some exceptions. In this example he is dealing with an
existing thing which is still held by the defendant, and while
remaining with the defendant, its value has changed from x to y.
Because what ought to be restored is the thing itself, the
proposition does not create any problem. However, if what ought
to be restored is not the thing itself, but its value, and the holder
had notice at the time that the thing might have been lost, then the
measure can indeed be (a+x), for in such a case the defendant will
be precluded from denying the claim because he had knowledge
that the thing belonged to another. Therefore, in some
circumstances of unjustified enrichment liability, the fungible or
non-fungible character of the thing might be relevant.
In any event, the words “after updating the monetary values”
added to the general principle seem to reflect the old notion of
enrichment liability adopted in the 1916 Civil Code, which only
considered “undue payment” and made the whole field look as if it
were dependent upon a payment, as earlier stated. 45 Indeed, that
seems to be the message that those words are conveying; that is to
say, the general principle of enrichment sine causa is seen as
though it could only emanate from a performance through payment
of money. If that is the meaning ascribed to the general principle,
then, if it is not a limited vision of the field as a whole, it might be
an oversight of the drafting team. The latter is probably an accurate
explanation, because no one today adopts the restrictive view that
makes up the first possibility of interpretation. The Italian
provision (article 2041 of the Codice Civile) that inspired the
Brazilian drafters does not mention any sort of balancing of
monetary values. The provision there reads:

45. Supra Part II.B.
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General cause of action for unjustified enrichment. A
person who has enriched himself without cause 46 at the
expense of another shall, to the extent of the enrichment,
indemnify the other for his correlative financial loss. If the
enrichment consists of a special thing, the person who
received it is bound to return it in kind if it is still in
existence at the time of the demand. 47
In this author's opinion it would have been better not to attach
the words “updating monetary values” to the general enrichment
principle, but to have inserted a separate clause dealing with the
issue. Each case could have been dealt with according to its merits,
but with the benefit of having a clause in the Code authorizing
such mechanism, thus avoiding the danger of excessive exercise of
discretionary powers by the courts.
A further problem that can arise from the fact that those words
are attached to the general enrichment principle becomes evident
from the fact that the structure adopted for the unjustified
enrichment law in the Civil Code clearly separates “undue
payment” (the condictio-claim) from the “general enrichment
claim” (the versio-claim). Under such a scheme, where a
condictio-claim (undue payment) applies, the versio-claim (the
general principle) does not. If that is not the case, why were they
separated, and why do the undue payment clauses precede the
general enrichment clauses? When one looks at the practical
application of “adjustment of monetary values”, although this
phrase is used in the general enrichment clause, adjustments are
applied to scenarios that fall under the concept of “undue
payment,” and even beyond. The above-cited quotation in REsp.
12.591.0/SP 48 illustrates this fact. For this reason, it would have
46. Note that similar to Brazilian art. 884 of the Civil Code of 2002, Italian
art. 2041 says “senza giusta causa” (“without a just cause”).
47. This Italian general principle is then followed by the subsidiarity rule in
art. 2042 which provides: “Subsidiary character of action: An action for
unjustified enrichment cannot be instituted if the injured person can exercise
another action to obtain compensation for the injury suffered.”
48. REsp. 12.591-0/SP (1ª Turma STJ) (18.5.1992) Relator, Min.
Demócrito Reinaldo, in Boletim Adcoas No. 138.819]: “The systematic
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been better if the general principle would have been placed earlier
in the structure of the Code, rather than after the heading on
“undue payment.”
IV. CHANGE OF POSITION (LOSS OF ENRICHMENT) DEFENCE AND
INFLATION
Can change of position (loss of enrichment) be a defence in
circumstances of monetary inflation under Brazilian enrichment
law? Prima facie, Brazilian law does not directly recognise change
of position (loss of enrichment) as a defence to unjustified
enrichment claims, save perhaps an application by analogy of
article 238 of the new Civil Code, which deals with impossibility
of performance in cases of obligations to give a certa res (a
specific thing). Article 238 reads as follows: “If the obligation is to
restore a certain thing, and this thing, without the debtor’s fault, is
lost before the transfer (traditio), the creditor shall suffer the loss,
and the obligation will be terminated, save his rights up to the date
of the loss.” This provision does not appear in the law of
unjustified enrichment. I have discussed elsewhere 49 that, because
the caveat to article 884 of the new Civil Code already provides a
solution where the thing has been lost (i.e., “it must be restored by
its value”), article 238 does not seem to apply to claims arising
under article 884 because, if it were otherwise, the mechanism
provided for in article 884 would be rendered redundant. 50 There
are, however, subtle manifestations of a change of position defence
in the formulation of some provisions of the Code. 51 The issue of
monetary adjustment in unjustified enrichment law may indeed
constitute another subtle manifestation of the need of a change-of-

monetary adjustment of debits arising from judicial decisions—sanctioned by
Law No. 6.899/81—constitutes a real legal principle that is applicable to any
kind of legal relationships and in all branches of the law” (author’s translation).
49. See Jorge, supra note 26, ch. 4.
50. Id.
51. See Jorge, supra note 26, at 158-278.
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position (loss of enrichment) defence. This proposition will be
discussed below. 52 For the time being, however, it is enough to say
that in loss of enrichment situations, the defendant is saying: “I do
not have the enrichment I once had anymore.” In contrast, in
situations of monetary correction, the plaintiff, by asking for the
monetary value to be adjusted, or by having it done by the court
mero motu, is really saying that “the defendant has, in fact, more
than he seems to have.” If the defendant indeed has more than he
seems to have, on what ground is the plaintiff entitled to that “extra
amount”?
V. SUBTLE MESSAGES EMANATING FROM THE BRAZILIAN
FORMULATION OF ENRICHMENT LIABILITY
A. General Remarks
No one doubts today that a general principle is a welcome
development. By sanctioning a general principle, the Brazilian
legal system has made it easier for the claim to be raised without
undue complications. The formulation followed, however, seems
problematic. Adding the expression “after making monetary
correction” impacts not only the measure of recovery, but also the
timing of its assessment and the interlinked issue of interest in
money. To what extent is an unjustified enrichment claim
amenable to adjustment? Does the new provision sanction a dual
interest regime in enrichment claims (if interest is at all claimable),
or does it sanction only one regime? These issues are addressed
below. 53
B. What Does the Brazilian Approach and Experience Tell Us?
The general manifestation of the unjustified enrichment
doctrine under current Brazilian law is, to some extent, similar or
analogous to many other civil law jurisdictions, especially those
52. See infra Part V.B.
53. See infra Part V.C.
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following the “Pothier School,” varying only in some nuances.
However, there are at least two important aspects in which
Brazilian law is very peculiar and such aspects relay noteworthy
messages to other jurisdictions. The first message that can be
extracted from the Brazilian formulation of the unjustified
enrichment doctrine is that in whatever way a legal system tries to
ward off loss of enrichment as an objective defence in its
enrichment law, the system will still need to address the issue. If it
cannot do so directly, it will do so by analogy. If a system gives
way to a general enrichment action, it is bound to establish not
only mechanisms to protect vulnerable receivers, but also to
specify to what extent its enrichment law will delimit the right of
recovery in “borderline” cases. Notwithstanding, omitting a
general enrichment defence and relying on analogy is problematic.
That is because the approach may lead to the conception of an
enrichment doctrine which is too restrictive and leaves aside many
deserving cases in the attempt to protect the integrity of the
principle as enshrined in the code.
The need for a change of position defence becomes even
stronger if that system also places emphasis on the concept of good
faith throughout its private law. That is exactly what happens
under current Brazilian enrichment law, because the notion of good
faith permeates the civil code; hence, the subtle manifestations of
loss of enrichment defence we observe in the Brazilian enrichment
law.
The second important message emanating from Brazilian
enrichment law is the need to establish the real place and the
consequences of inflation within enrichment liability. Generally, in
their private law, most legal systems adhere to the “nominal value
principle,” and this principle, prima facie, constitutes an obstacle
to adapt, say, a contract, on the basis of regular inflation, unless the
parties have agreed to do so. While, on the one hand, the creditor
normally ought to bear the risk of depreciation of the currency, an
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appreciation of the currency seems to favour the debtor. 54 The
situation, however, might be different if inflation is no longer
ordinary in so far as contract law in general is concerned. Here we
encounter two trends of thought (in some legal systems), one
adhering strictly to the “nominal value principle,” while the other
advocates adjustment rules. Different reasons are advanced to
sustain each contention. It ought to be remembered that, acording
to the nominalist theory, the extent of monetary obligations is
independent of the functional value of money, especially its
purchasing power. Equally important is the fact that nominalism
favors stability of transactions and offers courts a cushion for
expediency. It is impossible to account for every fluctuation in the
purchasing power of money. Another difficulty in adopting fullfledged valorism and abandoning nominalism is the possible
question as to whether a change in the purchasing power of money
54. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, art. 6:111. To the
same effect is article 6:258 of Burgerlejk Wetboek (the new Dutch Civil Code)
[hereinafter BW], and, to some extent, article 6:260 BW. In Dutch legal
doctrine, Hartkamp, for instance, remarks that in reverse cases regarding the
influence of appreciation of immovable property on marriage settlements, the
Dutch Supreme Court disregarded the nominal value principle on the basis of
unforeseen circumstances. ARTHUR S. HARTKAMP, ASSER’S HANDLEIDING TOT
BEOEFENING
VAN
HET
NEDERLANDS
BURGERLIJK
RECHT,
DE
VERBINSTENISSENRECHT, ALGEMENE LEER DER OVEREENKOMSTEN n. 338
(2005), cited in Mirella Peletier, Common Core of European Private Law –
Change of Circumstances – Dutch Report (Research Offices, Supreme Court of
The Netherlands), available at http://www.unexpected-circumstances.org/
Dutch%20report%20nov.%2006.doc (last visited September 28, 2013). In other
words, the court adjusted the value, taking into account appreciation or
depreciation of the currency. Hartkamp refers here to cases reported in HR 10
January 1992, NJ 1992, 651; HR 15 September 1995, NJ 1996, 616; HR 12 June
1987, NJ 1988, 150. For a detailed discussion of the issue in Québec, see
Mackaay & Fabien, supra note 1. Other informative sources in a historical
perspective may be the following: John P. Dawson & Frank E. Cooper, The
Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 MICH. L.
REV. 852 (1935); John P. Dawson, The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts:
Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1934); PROCTOR, supra note 1
(who discusses, among other aspects, the impact of the decision in Sempra
Metals on the right to interest and the nominalism principle); HIRSCHBERG,
supra note 1; John Swan, Damages, Specific Performance, Inflation and
Interest, 10 REAL PROPERTY REPORT 267 (1980) (Can.) and Duncan Wallace,
Inflation and Assessment of Construction Cost Damages, 98 L.Q.R. 406 (1982)
(Can.).
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not originating from credit expansion or contraction should be
taken into account. 55 Thus, those adhering to the general
application of the nominal principle usually contend that it would
be contrary to the “criterion” of reasonableness and equity if, for
example, the judge were to adapt a contract in random occurrences
(i.e., in the case of one plaintiff), even though many other people in
society will equally be affected by the same “exceptional
inflation.” However, where regular inflation affects a long-term
contract, there is a tendency to consider exceptional cases and
allow some judicial intervention to adjust the contract. The
underlying idea for such adjustment is that it would be
unreasonable if a disproportionately inflationary advantage simply
fell into the lap of one of the contracting parties. To avoid that
“unjust” outcome, some theorists think that the “disturbed
contractual equilibrium should always be restored.” 56 These
considerations, however, fall mostly within contract law, though
their ambit can stretch beyond that field.
What is the position under unjustified enrichment law, in which
the parties to the claim may not necessarily be linked by an
underlying contract denoting voluntary assumption of risks? Can
monetary inflation qualify as a form of change-ofposition/circumstances? If so, how would it operate? Are there any
difficulties in proving this potential aspect of the defence?
The appendage of “monetary correction” to the general
principle against enrichment sine causa in the new Brazilian Civil
Code 57 indicates that the issue transcends the ambit of contractual
obligations. Such an appendage to the general principle was
unfortunate, as mentioned earlier, because this appendage throws
55. Friedrich Kessler, Book Review: Money in the Law, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
175, 176 (1940).
56. A few examples of case law leaning in this direction can be found in
Dutch law: HR 12 June 1987, NJ 1988, 150; HR 30 January 1991, NJ 1992,
191; HR 15 September 1995, NJ 1996, 616 (all Dutch cases cited here are taken
from Peletier, supra note 54, at 6).
57. Brazilian Civil Code, art. 884 (2002).
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the general principle into confusion. But the disapproval of the
appendage does not necessarily mean that the issue should not
feature within the doctrine of unjustified enrichment. Mention was
made earlier that the drafters of the Civil Code should have done
so in a separate provision. What is the message that can be
extracted from inflation in the context of unjustified enrichment?
The general process of inflation can give rise to a multitude of
different problems. For the purpose of this paper the most salient
problems would be revalorization and discharge. 58 Once again, it
can be seen that there is a need to know how the enrichment came
about. While revalorization (of a currency), in this context,
presupposes a debt that must be paid or repaid in certain monetary
units and, thereby, the possibility of adjustment, discharge of the
obligation indicates that the claim arises from a contract and there
are underlying cost variations. 59 When inflation is seen from the
perspective of discharging a contractual obligation, the concept
presupposes a voluntary agreement between the parties, and
inflation might be seen as one of the risks voluntarily assumed.
When looking at things from the perspective of revalorization, the
concept does not necessarily presuppose a contract between the
parties. It may also entail a unilateral act.
The issue straddles several areas: third party claims, risk
assumption, and termination or modification of contracts, among
others. Apparently, in cases of devaluation there is ordinarily no
problem of impossibility to restore the benefit received, nor is
there any issue of bad faith. The receiver is ready to restore the
benefit received, the only problem being that the “purchasing
power” of the money has diminished. Restoring the “money” in the
same units as received corresponds numerically with restoring the
58. Ewoud Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit, Part III—The Case
Studies in UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 216-17
(Ewoud Hondius & Hans Christoph Grigoleit eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011;
published as part of THE COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW series).
59. See, e.g., Ian F.G. Baxter, Depreciation of Money, 52 CANADIAN BAR
REVIEW 577 (1974); Mackaay & Fabien, supra note 1.
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“value received,” but value-wise, it actually corresponds to the
“value remaining.” On what basis, then, can the plaintiff claim the
restoration of the “actual value” (adjusted value), without leaving
the defendant worse off, as a result of having received an
undue/unjust gain? In these cases, why should the loss be shifted
from an innocent and “mistaken or unmistaken” party to an
innocent party who neither made a mistake nor brought about the
event that led to the decline of the value?
The message that can be distilled from the Brazilian
enrichment law (the new enrichment sine causa under article 884
of the new Civil Code, as discussed above) is that a situation of
hyper-inflation can result in involuntary enrichment of one party at
the expense of another. The issue, however, is complicated when
addressed within the unjustified enrichment doctrine, because the
act enriching one party and correspondingly impoverishing the
other is ordinarily not done by the parties themselves, but by a
third party, generally the government. 60 From the perspective of
the parties, such an occurrence (currency devaluation) is more akin
to a supervening event outside their control. Both parties would
seemingly be innocent. Can a rule favouring the defendant apply to
such cases where both parties are innocent? What would be the
implications of such an application?
Thus far, it is prima facie a moot point in South African law, as
well as in English 61 and American 62 law, whether monetary

60. Inflation is normally the product of government action, but, in the long
run, events such as market turmoil in times of global recession, conflicts, or
wars, may also lead to inflation. See the example of Germany, which borrowed
heavily for the war effort during World War I, and the resulting effect after the
Versailles Treaty, when the country had to pay reparations of billions of dollars
in gold, leading to the uselessness of the Reichtmark and the introduction of the
Rentenmark in 1924. See generally GERMAN HYPERINFLATION 1922/23: A LAW
AND ECONOMICS APPROACH (Wolfgang Chr. Fischer ed., Eul Verlag 2010)
[hereinafter GERMAN HYPERINFLATION].
61. In English law, note, however, that a dictum by Lord Roskill in National
Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] 1 AC 675, 712 refers to
inflation as one of the “circumstances in which the doctrine of frustration has
been invoked, sometimes with success, sometimes without.” So, it is not very
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inflation can qualify as relevant for the “change of position”
defense to unjustified enrichment claims. Such a situation would
be more common where there are steep currency fluctuations or
hyperinflation, or total collapse of the currency, as happened in
Germany in 1923 63 and Hungary in 1948, 64 or a near total collapse
of the currency, such as the Brazilian “triple digit inflation” 65 of
the 1980s-1990s, or the recent hyper-inflation in Zimbabwe. In
assessing whether inflation should be considered as a potential
basis for change-of-position, a distinction must be made between
different degrees of inflation: slight inflation, severe or acute
inflation, and a total collapse of the currency. Although the last
two might be considered speculative in some economies, we have
had a recent example, that of Zimbabwe, where it could not be said
that inflation was acute or severe, but rather that it resulted in total

clear whether inflation falls within the former or within the latter group of
circumstances.
62. Note, equally, some nuanced references to discharge of contract for
inflation in ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 488 (§1360) (1962). He
says that the “difference in value between the gold and paper currencies could
have been taken into account in action for damages” thereby suggesting the
possibility of discharging the contract (references to gold and paper currencies
are made in relation to the “gold standard” which used to regulate international
exchange, and which is more commonly known as the “Breton Wood system”).
For related issues on the Gold Standard and possible unjust enrichment in
currency devaluation in the U.S.A., see Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330
(1935).
63. See generally GERMAN HYPERINFLATION, supra note 60.
64. PIERRE L. SIKLOS, WAR FINANCES, HYPERINFLATION AND
STABILIZATION IN HUNGARY 1938-1948 (MacMillan & St. Martin Press 1991).
65. A basic look at the data in Brazilian statistics in the 1980-1990s offers
briefly the following picture: In the second half of the 1980s, and the beginning
of 1990s, yearly inflation in Brazil reached the four digit level, with month-tomonth inflation reaching 40%. Inflation, however, declined from a peak of
6,821.3% in the early 1990s to 375% within twelve months, on the back of
seemingly more coherent macroeconomic policies anchored on a social contract.
The launch of the Plano Real in July 1994 saw inflation, which had risen to
4,922%, decline to 33% within a year. In the second half of the 1990s, average
inflation remained below 10%. It reached its lowest point in December 1998 at
1.65%. Today Brazil boasts, on average, of inflation below 6%. In September
2013, the recorded inflation rate was at 5.86% (See generally the 2013 edition of
the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics), IBGE2013, BRASIL
EM NUMEROS, BRAZIL IN FIGURES (IBGE 2003), also available at:
http://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/2/bn_2013_v21.pdf.
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collapse of the currency. It is not unimaginable that the judiciary
might be called upon to decide enrichment cases in these
circumstances. Where the claim arises from a “functioning”
contract, the contract itself might provide for payment to be
“indexed.” However, this only works if the inflation is somewhat
predictable and manageable, and the remedy is contractual. Where
the inflation is so extreme as to amount to a total collapse of
currency, an indexation based on criteria pre-established by the
parties may not work. The contract is simply “defunct”;
performance amounts to near-impossibility, and thus, discharge
might be the logical outcome.
It is more likely that in cases of extreme inflation, or total
collapse of the currency, such effects on contracts and other private
law matters will be dealt with by legislation and, therefore, the
questions raised here would not need to be resolved by the courts
based on default principles. 66 But should such legislation be
wanting, there would still be room for judicial pronouncement and,
therefore, the change-of-position defence would be available in
these circumstances.
C. “Updating Monetary Value” and Interest on Money
A corollary to “valorism” in the unjustified enrichment
doctrine is another important question: that of interest on money.
This question, though only incidental for the purpose of this paper,
is of great significance because it may influence the whole
conception of unjustified enrichment law. Is interest on money
recoverable under current Brazilian enrichment doctrine? If it is
not, that is the end of the matter. However, if it is, then the
following ramifications arise: If interest is due on a sum of money
that must be returned, it is obvious that such interest is more likely

66. GUENTER H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE 277 (Sweet
& Maxwell 1994). See also supra note 65.
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to be regarded as a fruit 67 of the principal sum. That being the case,
it must also be assumed that such interest is to be earned from the
time of receipt of the money, 68 or at least from the time of litis
contestatio. Then, for example, if it is assumed that in an undue
payment claim the restoration of interest is no less due than the
restoration of the principal, the further question that needs to be
asked is whether there are two different regimes for the
recoverability of interest in enrichment claims under Brazilian law.
Or, to frame the question another way, one would ask the
following subsequent questions: (i) Is interest recoverable on a
claim based on undue payment—the condictio version—or not? If
it is, from what sum? (ii) Is interest recoverable in a claim based on
enrichment sine causa or not? And, (iii) if the answer to (ii) is in
the affirmative, what are the consequences that the recoverability
of interest will have on calculating the measure of enrichment
under article 884?
If one takes into consideration the fact that in many cases
falling within the ambit of undue payment (the condictio-version
of the enrichment claim) there is no special agreement between the
parties regarding recovery, one should also assume that interest
might not be recoverable. That is so because the sum owed on the
basis of undue payment is not a commercial loan; even if it were
considered a loan (mutuum) by way of analogy, the provisions
dealing with “o mútuo” (articles 586-592) do not attract interest,
except where the mutuum falls within the provisions of article
591, 69 which provides that a “mútuo” given for economic purposes
attracts interest. 70
67. For example, art. 878 of the Brazilian Civil Code may implicitly be said
to consider interest a fruit, for the article provides that: “The provisions of this
Code dealing with good faith or bad faith possession, as the case may be, also
apply to fruits, accessories, improvements and deteriorations of the thing given
in undue payment.”
68. Other provisions of the Code making reference to interest are art. 591
and arts. 297, 389, 395, 404, 405, 406, 407, 552, 677, 833, etc.
69. Article 591 reads: “If a loan (mutuum) is given for economic purposes,
interest is presumed to accrue, and such interest may not exceed the rate referred
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In taking this view (of the non-recoverability of interest on
undue payment), the assumption being made in this paper is that if
the party received the money in good faith, believing it was his
own, then he must also be free to deal with his money as he deems
fit. Were it otherwise, there would be a danger that the defendant,
who has not been earning interest on the money that he received,
will be bound to make restoration beyond the extent of his
enrichment. This would be equivalent to imposing additional
liability on people without their knowledge. Put differently, if B
had no agreement with A for the receipt of A’s money, B cannot be
bound to pay interest to A on that sum, because B is not A’s
investor. A probable exception to this, if the receiver is in good
faith, would be if the money were directly deposited in an interest
bearing account.
Meanwhile, if the word “fruits” in article 878 of the Code is
understood to also encompass “interest,” as it would appear to do
(unless “thing given in undue payment” excludes money, which
does not make sense), then the defendant equated to a mala fide
possessor can be liable to the extent he was enriched by the
“fruits,” even if they might have been consumed. Should, however,
a defendant under a claim falling within such provision be equated
to (or assumed to be) a bona fide possessor, he should not be
liable, even to the extent that he was enriched by the “fruits” he

to in article 406 (of the Code) on annual capitalization, otherwise it will be
reduced” (Destinando-se o mútuo a fins económicos, presumem-se devidos
juros, os quais, sob pena de redução, não poderá exceder a taxa a que se refere
o art. 406, permitida a capitalização anual). BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE, art. 591
(2002).
70. The Brazilian Civil Code drafters manifest here an authentic fidelity to
Roman law, because interest was not payable on mutuum in Roman law as it
was considered a gratuitous loan, normally concluded between friends. In fact,
the drafters clearly distinguish two types of loans: the comodato (arts. 579-585)
and mútuo (arts. 586-592). Comodato, according to the Code (art. 579), is the
loan of non-fungible objects, while mútuo is conceived as the loan of fungible
objects (art. 586). The borrower in the case of mútuo “has the obligation to
restore to the lender a thing of the same nature, quality and quantity as received.
BRAZILIAN CIVIL CODE, art. 586 (2002).
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gathered and consumed in good faith. I reiterate that the provision
clearly says that “[t]he provisions of this Code dealing with good
faith or bad faith possession, as the case may be, also apply to
fruits, accessories, improvements and deteriorations of the thing
given in undue payment.” It is clear that the Brazilian Legislature,
by framing article 878 (in so far as the consequences of the accrued
fruits to “a thing received in undue payment” are concerned) to
analogously differentiate a defendant who is a bona fide possessor
from a mala fide possessor, directly indicates that the maxim
“bona fide possessor facit fructose perceptos et consumptos
suos” 71 would indeed apply to such cases. This, in turn, implies by
inference that a defendant who is equated to a bona fide possessor
under article 878 of the Brazilian Civil Code has the defence of
change of position (or loss of enrichment) in regard to the fruits.
That would also imply that the defence which is applicable to the
“fruits” is also applicable to the “principal”. For the time being, the
question of interest in enrichment law as a whole will be
addressed.
What about a case falling within the actio de in rem versio
aspect of the claim? Does it attract interest and, if so, why? The
circumstances giving rise to such a claim may vary from case to
case, and there appears to be no unanimity about the contours of
the claim. Nonetheless, the provisions of the Brazilian Civil Code
(articles 884-886) are silent. For this reason, any conclusion that
interest is claimable must be drawn either by inference or by crossreferencing to other provisions of the Code. Nonetheless, prima
facie, interest seems to be claimable in unjustified enrichment
law. 72 According to article 404 of the Code, “losses and damages”,

71. Translated, the maxim means “The bona fide possessor makes the fruits
gathered and consumed his own.”
72. For comparative insight, see art. VII-5:104 of the European Union
DCFR (Draft Common Frame of Reference). Art. VII-5:105 there reads:
(1) Reversal of the enrichment extends to the fruits and use of the
enrichment or, if less, any saving resulting from the fruits or use.
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in case of monetary obligations, are to be paid after adjusting their
monetary values in accordance with official indexes regularly
established. The payment encompasses “interest, expenses and
lawyer’s fees, without prejudice to contractual penalties.”
According to article 405 of the Code “interest on mora accrues
from the ‘initial citation’” 73 (in some cases, it is probably from the
moment of first notification). These two provisions, however,
cannot be said to apply to enrichment sine causa, because article
404 speaks of “losses and damages.” This clearly indicates it is not
applicable to enrichment claims, because an unjustified enrichment
claim is about gains obtained at another's expense without grounds
and not “losses or damages” suffered. “Losses and damages”
presuppose contractual or delictual (tort, or civil liability) claims.
Likewise, article 405 cannot be said to apply because a defendant
in an unjustified enrichment claim is not presumed to be in mora
for the payment of money until he has notice of his delay. Until
then, the defendant must be able to rely on the money that he
received as being absolutely his. By inference, however, article
405 casts some light on the issue. If interest on mora runs from the
initial citation, it is implied that from the moment the defendant
has notice interest starts to accrue. By implication, this can be
extended to an enrichment claim. If, under the enrichment sine
causa doctrine, the measure of enrichment is calculated from the
time of litis contestatio (or litis pendente), that also means that
from that moment the defendant has notice of the claim. Any
money “retained sine causa” is due from that moment as a debt,

(2) However, if the enriched person obtains the fruits or use in bad
faith, reversal of the enrichment extends to the fruits and use even if the
saving is less than the value of the fruits or use.
73. “Initial citation” is used in a wider sense. In some contexts it would
appear that “initial citation” is strictly equated with “court judgment”, as
“citation” seems to refer to a judge’s pronouncement. However, if being put in
mora were to be understood in that sense alone, it would be too restrictive, even
contradictory in some cases. A defendant who has been notified that he owes a
sum of money is certainly put in mora from that moment if he knows that the
money is not his to keep, even if the court decides so only at a future date.
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unless the defendant has a recognised defence. 74 It can analogously
be said that from the moment of litis contestation the defendant is
put in mora, and therefore interest would start to accrue, and the
sum owed from that moment is the base value (the principal sum)
for calculating the interest.
Article 884 provides, however, that the amount to be restored is
“known” only “after adjusting monetary values.” If the principal
sum is not known until “monetary values have been adjusted,” can
it really be said that the defendant has been put in mora for that
unknown value of the debt? Put differently, if monetary adjustment
is to be undertaken, from what date does interest start to accrue and
based upon what principal sum? Is the “pre-adjusted value” of the
principal taken into consideration for calculating the interest, or the
“adjusted value”?
In any event, it is worth noting that the idea of a sum held sine
causa being susceptible to adjustment according to the level of
inflation implicitly embodies a nuanced conception of that sum
being analogously considered a commercial loan (a mutuum). On
this assumption, one might say that interest would accrue as of
right, unless the parties “agreed” otherwise. If it does not accrue as
of right, then it might be dependent on other factors. Policy
considerations might be a candidate here.
If the measure of enrichment is considered as the “value
received”, and this value is only “known” with certainty when the
sum of money has been adjusted according to the rate of inflation
over a given period, there is no “exact amount” to calculate interest
on until the adjusted sum is determined. In such cases
incongruence can arise between the sum claimed (the amount by
which the defendant has been enriched) as “principal value”, and
the sum that will serve as a basis for the calculation of interest. For
example, if B is enriched sine causa at the expense of A for the
sum of $R 50.000 on January 29, 2008 and by January 31, 2009
74. Obviously, if “initial notice” is equated to court judgment, whichever
defence the defendant might have had is of no consequence after judgment.
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there is a 50% inflation of the currency with the result that the real
value of the sum owed ($R 50.000) has now become $R 75.000, by
the time judgment is passed, a simple interest of 20% on the
principal amount owed from 29 January 2008 to 31 January 2009
would amount to $R 10.000. If, on the other hand, the principal
sum for the calculation of interest is now considered $R 75.000, a
simple interest of 20% on that sum is $R15.000, if calculated per
annum. However, interest may not be due before the date of the
determination of the value (the day the judgment is issued),
because there is no principal amount to serve as a basis for the
calculation of interest. If the rate of 20% interest is levied on the
$R 75.000 now owed, it may not be applicable retrospectively to
the date of litis contestatio (the date the claim arises), because no
such amount was owed on January 29, 2008. The defendant was
never put in mora on that date as owing the sum of $R 75.000.
Interest is ordinarily due either ex lege, ex contractu or ex mora. If
none of these aspects apply, as a matter of principle, it becomes
difficult to levy interest on a sum of money to be paid. One must
then find ways to justify the imposition of interest on that sum of
money.
In essence, accepting that the “final” proof of the extent of
enrichment is only established after “adjusting the monetary
values” would be equivalent to saying that any sum to be awarded
as interest will be assessed as a “pre-judgment” interest, if it started
to accrue from the time of receipt of the money. As a matter of
principle, a dilemma emerges. On one hand, it can be said that
whenever a defendant receives money and keeps it for a reasonable
time, there is a presumption that he is earning ‘fruits’, and
therefore he is being enriched sine causa with the plaintiff’s
money. On the other hand, it is also uncertain whether the
defendant is actually earning any interest, and, therefore, it is
uncertain that he is being enriched. Consequently, in the face of
uncertainty, to allow relief in any case where actual enrichment has
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not been proved is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of
unjustified enrichment.
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I. ABSTRACT
Rights are, without a doubt, the most outstanding feature of
contemporary legal systems. It can be argued that since the middle
of the past century we are immersed in a culture of rights. Neoconstitutionalism is one among other such concepts that has been
used to designate and study this phenomenon. The hypothesis we
will attempt to address in this paper is that some of the central
characters of our culture of rights, here termed as “neoconstitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently without an
explicit reference to natural law.
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We will specifically examine the connection between the
assertion that there exist natural law principles of justice and the
following characteristics of our culture of rights: a) the recognition
of rights; b) the reference of state or national legal systems to
supranational legal systems; c) constitutions as a result of a
network of principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality;
and e) the principle of reasonableness. While the first three
characteristics constitute the structure of any neo-constitutional
practice, the two latter ones are features of the processes of legal
reception and legal allocation of rights in such a legal practice.
This paper aims to show that, ultimately, identifying, explaining,
and understanding each and all of these five characteristics of
contemporary legal culture depends upon the existence of a
normative resort that goes beyond the legal culture itself.
II. INTRODUCTION
The recognition of human rights is, without a doubt, the most
outstanding feature of contemporary legal systems. It can be
argued that since the middle of the past century we are immersed
in a culture of rights. Neo-constitutionalism is one among many
concepts that has been used to designate and study this
phenomenon. The hypothesis we will address in this paper is that
some of the central characters of our culture of rights, here referred
to as “neo-constitutionalism,” cannot be explained consistently
without a reference to natural law.
In order to highlight this general statement, I will address today
the conceptual connection between natural law and the following
features of neo-constitutional practices: a) the recognition of rights;
b) the relationship between state legal systems and supra-state
legal systems; c) constitutions resulting from a framework of
principles and rules; d) the principle of proportionality; and e) the
principle of reasonableness.
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The first three features are dimensions to the overall structure
of neo-constitutional states, while the two latter are features of the
legal determination and judicial enforcement of human rights. This
paper aims to show that identifying, explaining, and understanding
each and all of these five characteristics of contemporary legal
culture depends upon the existence of a normative instance which
is beyond the legal culture itself.
III. RIGHTS AND THEIR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In an article written thirty years ago, Javier Hervada made
some observations that, with the passage of time, have gained
interest. 1 Hervada noted that: a) the whole of the International
Conventions, Declarations and Treaties on human rights explicitly
stated that they “acknowledged” or “recognized” the rights there
enumerated, and b) that this explicit “recognition” posed
“problems” for the philosophy of law of his time. Hervada was
correct in both cases. First, human rights are acknowledged, as is
shown in the explicit language used in all legal texts concerning
them. This language aims at distinguishing these rights from other
kind of rights, whose proximate ground or root is the fact that a
competent legal authority has made a decision. Secondly, Hervada
maintained that this language of “recognition” posed problems for
the philosophy of law, especially for legal positivism which was
widely present in Spanish legal philosophy at the moment in which
that article was written. If, as positivism asserts, law is
fundamentally and exclusively positive law, and if the obligatory
nature of positive law is fully based upon its mere existence as a
social practice, then there is no room for pre-existing rights. The
whole of positive law and therefore of positive rights would be the
product of the choice of the person or of the group of persons

1. Javier Hervada, Problemas que una nota esencial de los derechos
humanos plantea a la filosofía del derecho, 9 PERSONA Y DERECHO 243, 256
(1982).
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socially empowered with the authority to do so, with no further
limit than their imagination.
Therefore, if the positivist approach to the study of law was the
only one possible, we would be forced to choose between two
alternatives: a) either the assimilation of human rights to positive
rights, which is a conceptual contradiction; b) or the assertion that
rights are pure fiction and cannot be rationally based. Both ways
pose multiple difficulties which cannot be discussed here. 2 Yet, it
is worth noticing the existence of an alternative solution, consisting
in connecting the concept of human rights with basic human
good, 3 and simultaneously preserving the determinative or positive
dimension of human rights law (both in the area of legislation as
well as in the adjudication process).
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL SCOPE OF THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND
PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
In the last thirty years, we have witnessed a process of
recognition, promotion, and protection of human rights, both
within the boundaries of national states and in the international
field. Although these national and international processes are
generally converging movements, they sometimes conflict between
each other. What should be done when these conflicts emerge?
Which of the two should take preeminence? Three answers have
been set forth in the history of public international law: for national
monism, priority is given to state law; for international monism, on
the other hand, priority is given to international law; whereas, with
dualism, each system has its own independent criteria for validity
or recognition.
2. PEDRO
SERNA
BERMÚDEZ,
POSITIVISMO
FUNDAMENTACIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (EUNSA

CONCEPTUAL

Y

1990); Pedro Serna
Bermúdez, El derecho a la vida en el horizonte cultural europeo de fin de siglo
in EL DERECHO A LA VIDA 79 (Carlos I. Massini Correas & Pedro Serna eds.,
EUNSA 1998).
3. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59 (2d ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2011).
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In the case of Argentina, those who support state monism
usually cite two texts from the Constitution itself to support their
stance: article 27, which establishes that international agreements
should conform to constitutional public law principles, and article
31, which refers to the “Supreme Law of the Nation,” and states its
content in the following order: “this Constitution, the laws of the
Nation that in its consequence are dictated by Congress, and the
treaties with foreign powers.” 4
Those advocating for the other two perspectives, international
monism or dualism, argue on the basis of international law texts.
For example, they look at the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which establishes in article 27 that “a party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty.” 5As Carlos Nino accurately noticed,
“the interesting thing about this controversy is that both positions
are completely circular, since those who defend the priority of the
constitution support their arguments by the constitution itself, and
those who defend the precedence of international conventions
support their arguments by international conventions.” 6 This
shows, the author continues, “that the validity of a specific legal
system cannot be founded on rules coming from that same legal
system, but should instead be derived from principles which are
external to the system. Judges or legislators debating these monist
or dualist positions, therefore, cannot flee from extra-legal
principles of a moral nature in the wider sense in order to support
their positions.” 7 While monism will accentuate sovereignty,
dualism in its two variations would prefer to emphasize the
4. Art. 27 and art. 31, Const. Arg. (author’s translation), available at:
http://www1.hcdn.gov.ar/dependencias/dip/congreso/Constitucion%20sola.pdf.
5. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27;
1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969); available at:
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%2000-52%20AM/Ch
_XXIII_01p.pdf.
6. CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, DERECHO, MORAL Y POLÍTICA. UNA REVISIÓN
DE LA TEORÍA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 62 (Ariel 1994).
7. Id. at 62.
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universality of rights. This allows for concluding that neoconstitutional legal systems do not provide for a “closed system of
justifiable solutions.” 8
V. RIGHTS AND IUS-FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
The constitutionalist and philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin,
towards the end of the 1960s, brought to everyone’s attention the
fact that the United States’ legal system enclosed two categories of
norms: principles and rules. 9 According to Dworkin, the positivist
approach to the study of law had concentrated its analysis on the
rules, without taking into sufficient account the existence of
principles, nor the role they played within constitutional legal
practices. This deficient attention to principles strongly
conditioned, in his opinion, the plausibility of the description of
law proposed by the work of Herbert Hart and his followers. 10
The main argument posed by Dworkin against Hart was that
the rule of recognition, proposed by Hart as criteria for identifying
valid positive law and distinguishing it from other normative
systems, was incapable of detecting principles, whose existence in
a legal system like the North American one is unquestionable. This
is because the existence of principles within legal systems is not
primarily grounded on the fact of their having been positively or
explicitly acknowledged by legal institutions but, instead, on the
fact of having been recognized by these same institutions as
“intrinsically reasonable,” using an expression coined by Joseph
Esser. 11
Avoiding the further and divergent debates raised by this line
of reasoning, especially after the publication of Hart’s most famous
8. Id.
9. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 46
(1967), reprinted in DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (Harvard Univ.
Press 1977).
10. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1961).
11. JOSEF ESSER, PRINCIPIO Y NORMA EN LA ELABORACIÓN
JURISPRUDENCIAL DEL DERECHO PRIVADO 87 (Eduardo Valentí Fiol trans.,
Bosch 1961).
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work, Postscriptum, 12 the truth is that the acceptance of
“intrinsically reasonable” principles only makes sense if these refer
to (that is to say, have as reference) goods whose character, as
such, does not depend upon the legislator or judge who applies the
principles. 13 In other words, the presence of principles with these
characteristics can only be explained through references to realities
that exist beyond the scope of the positive law which
acknowledges them and the constant effort of interpreting them
according to the specific case at hand.
VI. THE JUSTIFICATION AND THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY
The recognition of human rights in constitutions (as
fundamental rights or constitutional rights) has gone hand in hand
with the spread of the practice known as “judicial review.” The
latter is a creation of the United States Supreme Court, which
allocates to judges the power to invalidate laws which they deem
contrary to constitutional rights. While not denying the existence
of important differences with that which different constitutional
systems have previously incorporated, it cannot be questioned that
judicial review is present in every constitutional practice. 14
Now then, how is this judicial review put into practice? In
other words: how do judges determine that the statutory regulation
of a fundamental or constitutional right violates what has been
established as lawful in the constitution? Constitutional Law
practice has responded to these questions with the principle of

12. Published posthumously in the second edition of Hart’s THE CONCEPT
LAW; see Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for
the Perplexed, Univ. of Michigan, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, No. 77 (2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968657 and
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.968657.
13. See Carlos I. Massini Correas, Razón práctica y objetividad del
Derecho. El debate contemporáneo acerca de los principios jurídicos, 64
SAPIENTIA 224-41 (2004).
14. Juan Cianciardo, The Principle of Proportionality: The Challenges of
Human Rights, 3 J. CIV. L. STUD. 177-86 (2010).
OF
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proportionality. 15 According to this principle, a statutory norm is
considered constitutional if it suits three sub-principles: a) it should
be adequate and therefore capable of producing its own point or
end (sub-principle of adaptation); b) it should be necessary and,
therefore, the least restrictive of the equally efficient ones (subprinciple of necessity); c) lastly, it should be proportional stricto
sensu, that is to say, it should express a proportionate deliberation
concerning the benefits and prejudices which might result from the
enforcement of the norm.
The principle of proportionality refers without a doubt to
evaluative instances that are situated beyond the domain of both
the text of the norms under constitutional control, and the text of
the constitution itself. This reference to a meta-positive instance is
shown, at least, in the following two items: first, in the grounds for
justifying the principle itself. Why is proportionality or
reasonableness a constitutional principle? How are we to justify
this constitutional requirement? Except at the cost of circularity,
this question cannot be answered from the perspective of the
constitution in question. Second, it becomes apparent in each of the
sub-principles that frame the principle, since all of them refer to
endsalthough from perspectives that do not entirely
coincidewhose determination cannot be reduced to an internal
analysis of the norms.
VII. THE JUSTIFICATION AND CONTENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
REASONABLENESS
A second feature of the dynamics of the “culture of rights” in
which we are immersed is the principle of reasonableness. In the
19th century, the dominant trend concerning the description of
legal interpretation was “legal formalism.” This, in a very short
15. ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 69, 414 (Julian
Rivers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002); see also CARLOS BERNAL PULIDO, EL
PRINCIPIO DE PROPORCIONALIDAD Y LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de
Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales 2003).
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synthesis, could be described as a theory which attempts to reduce
the adjudication of law to deductive logic. In the 20th century,
however, it was soon perceived that in order to establish the facts
in each of the cases a judge must resolve and determine the
applicable norms, requiring a decision to be made between various
alternatives that are, prima facie, formally correct. 16
In effect, legal operators are compelled, on the one hand, to reconstruct the facts in a case, and this implies choosing: a) the
legally relevant facts within a framework of facts, b) the legal
means of evidence, and c) the most convincing evidence. On the
other hand, judges and lawyers are faced with the need to: a)
choose the applicable norms, b) choose the method or methods of
interpretation with which they will apply the norms, and c) choose
the results towards which these methods of interpretation lead. 17
These factual and normative choices raise the obvious question
about the right criteria according to which they should be decided.
While legal theories in the past century oscillated between, on the
one hand, the practical conflation between discretion and
unreasonableness, 18 and, on the other hand, the practical negation
of discretion or reasonableness, 19 comparative constitutional
analysis has come gradually to answer this question with the
principle of reasonableness, as a counterpart to arbitrariness,
expressly proscribed by some constitutions, as is the case, for
example, of article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution. 20
16. See ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON (2d ed., Springer
2009).
17. In effect, “the notion of ‘reasonable’ is also used . . . at every stage of
judicial reasoning: the determination of the facts, the qualification and
interpretation of the applicable laws, the use of various rhetorical and logical
formulas.” Oliver Corten, The Notion of “Reasonable” in International Law:
Legal Discourse, Reason and Contradictions, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 613
(1999).
18. HANS KELSEN, TEORÍA PURA DEL DERECHO 353 (2d ed., Porrúa 1993).
19. Dworkin, supra note 9.
20. Article 9.3 of the Spanish Constitution states:
The Constitution guarantees the principle of legality, the hierarchy of
legal provisions, the publicity of legal statutes, the non-retroactivity of
punitive provisions that are not favorable to or restrictive of individual

600

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

In accordance with this principle, each and all of the decisions
taken by a legal operator must demonstrably surpass the test of
“reasonableness.” This means that a legal operator is obliged to
give reasons and, particularly, to justify the reason for choosing a
certain path from all the alternatives he is faced with. A decision
without motivation is considered unreasonable, arbitrary, and thus
a violation of the due process of law, or in the terms used in
European Constitutional Law, a violation of effective judicial
tutelage. 21
The justification and content of the principle of reasonableness
raises questions analogous to those posed by the principles of
proportionality: why reasonableness, and not the lack of
reasonableness? How does one justify the use of this principle?
Furthermore, which are the reasons that justify the establishment of
facts and the determination of norms, and what are the grounds for
these reasons? They cannot originate in the norms themselves
because, once again, this would be circular. In other words,
because the problem that must be dealt with consists of
determining that which is not already determined by the norms
themselves, the solution cannot lie in them but in something
outside them, although connected with them.
VIII. THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION: RIGHTS TAKEN SERIOUSLY
A few years ago, Robert Alexy explained that a normative
system is not a legal system unless it formulates a “claim of
correctness.” 22 This occurs when governmental authorities act with

rights, the certainty that the rule of law shall prevail, the accountability
of public authorities, and the prohibition of arbitrary action of public
authorities. (Author’s translation)
21. This allows the importance of the study of reasonability to be seen from
the very beginning of a lawyer’s training. See Suzanne R. Painter, Improving the
Teaching of School Law: A Call for Dialogue, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 213
(2001).
22. See ROBERT ALEXY, BEGRIFF UND GELTUNG DES RECHTS (The Concept
and Validity of the Law) (Karl Alber 2005); and Robert Alexy, On the Concept

2013]

NEOCONSTITUTIONALISM

601

the assumption that what they are doing is correct, regardless of
whether it is actually entirely so. According to Alexy, when this
assumption is not formulated, and when those who govern only
take a personal or a class advantage with their power, practice of
the law does not amount to a legal system.
Yet it seems evident that not just any content allocated to that
which is assumed as correct will attain legality for a normative
system. For this reason, Alexy complements his thesis on
correctness with a reference to ius-fundamental principles. The
correctness of the assumption of a government’s actions is
basically expressed through its reference to fundamental rights.
What does this mean? When does a State recognize, identify,
protect, and promote rights? When does it put forth its “politics of
rights” as imposed by its constitution? 23 Or, in other words, how
can human rights be consistently conceptualized, indexed,
justified, and interpreted? In the preceding account, each of the
problems being dealt with has directly involved these questions.
The answer to such questions necessarily requires appealing to
instances beyond the legal texts where rights are recognized, as I
have attempted to demonstrate here in general terms.
It could be thought, together with Norberto Bobbio, that the
suggested element is a consensus, 24 in which the basis of human
rights could be found and the place where semantic indecisiveness
could be resolved when interpreting them. Yet there is an argument

and the Nature of Law, 21:3 RATIO JURIS 281,299 (2008). See also Eugenio
Bulygin, Alexy's Thesis of the Necessary Connection between Law and Morality,
13:2 RATIO JURIS 133, 137 (2000); and Robert Alexy, On the Thesis of a
Necessary Connection between Law and Morality: Bulygin's Critique, 13:2
RATIO JURIS 138,147 (2000).
23. ANTONIO-LUIS MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, LA GARANTÍA DEL CONTENIDO
ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES (Centro de Estudios
Constitucionales 1997).
24. Norberto Bobbio, El fundamento de los derechos humanos in
DICCIONARIO CRÍTICO DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS (Ramón Soriano Díaz,
Carlos Alarcón Cabrera & Juan Mora Molina dirs. and coords., Universidad
Internacional de Andalucía 2000).
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which destroys all the appeal of this alternative: human rights
discourse has been presented historically as the limit to what is
“able to be settled by agreement,” or to paraphrase the German
Constitutional Court, the “limit of limits” that consensus (including
democratic consensus) can legitimately impose upon the freedom
of human actions. 25 In other words, if the meaning of rights
depends on consensus, these rights are devoid of meaning. The
solution, thus, must be found elsewhere.
The question, however, is where? What has been presented
here so far supports the proposal of a possible answer that lies in
the following: all current legal systems formulate not one but two
assumptions. On the one hand, the claim to correctness as
postulated by Alexy, and on the other hand, a claim to moral
objectivity, found implicitly in the defense of principles. 26 Without
one or the other, the discourse of rights turns into self-reference
and, for this reason, becomes groundless and unintelligible. 27

25. See BVerfGE 19, 342, 348.
26. PILAR ZAMBRANO, LA INEVITABLE CREATIVIDAD EN LA
INTERPRETACIÓN JURÍDICA. UNA APROXIMACIÓN IUSFILOSÓFICA A LA TESIS DE
LA DISCRECIONALIDAD (UNAM 2009; published as no. 142 in the ESTUDIOS
JURIDICOS series).
27. As pointed out recently, it is noteworthy that the acceptance of the
presence of moral elements in legal reasoning by neo-constitutionalists and
inclusive positivists has not brought about further and more profound reflection
on moral objectivity. Above all, a negative response to this last question would
imply the negation of legal objectivity. See JUAN B. ETCHEVERRY, EL DEBATE
SOBRE EL POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO INCLUYENTE. UN ESTADO DE LA CUESTIÓN
(UNAM 2006), and ETCHEVERRY, OBJETIVIDAD Y DETERMINACIÓN DEL
DERECHO. UN DIÁLOGO CON LOS HEREDEROS DE HART (Comares 2008;
published as vol. 20 FILOSOFÍA, DERECHO & SOCIEDAD).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Most civil codes, following the Code Napoléon, have defined
servitudes as “a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a
dominant estate” (art. 646, Louisiana Civil Code). 1 A bit further,
after considering some legal rules on servitudes, the Louisiana
Civil Code divides them into natural, legal, and voluntary or
conventional (art. 654, Louisiana Civil Code). 2 The whole
systematic treatment of servitudes is based on this division. The
definition is, in the context of real rights, quite unusual. It defines
servitudes as a charge—that is to say, in a negative way—and not
as a right, in positive terms. It is also exceptional in a historical
context, for it does not follow the traditional medieval definition
∗ Professor of Roman Law, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. This
article is part of the CONICYT project Anillos de Investigación Asociativa SOC
1111.
1. Compare this with the definition of art. 637 of the Code Napoléon:
“Une servitude est une charge imposée sur un héritage pour l’usage et l’utilité
d’un héritage appartenant à un autre propriétaire.” On the matter, see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1968) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos,
Predial Servitudes].
2. See art. 639, Code Napoléon: “Elle dérive ou de la situation naturelle
des lieux, ou des obligations imposées par la loi, ou des conventions entre les
propriétaires.” Again, see Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, supra note 1, at
43.
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already present in the Siete Partidas 3 and popularized by
Bartolus, 4 nor the humanist versions of the 16th century, 5 nor the
definitions of the rationalist schools of the 17th and 18th
centuries. 6

3. “Properly the wise said that servitude is the right one has to use the
buildings or the estates of another man and to profit from them in the benefit of
those that one owns” (author’s translation); (Propiamente dixeron los sabios que
tal servidumbre como esta es derecho e uso que ome ha en los edificios, o enlas
heredades agenas para servirse dellas a pro de las suyas.) LAS SIETE PARTIDAS,
pt. 3, tit. XXXI, law I.
4. The usual definition from the Middle Ages is due to Bartolus, who
defined real servitudes as “a certain right inherent in a estate, that looks for its
benefit and diminishes the liberty of the other estate” (author’s translation);
(quoddam ius praedio inherens, et ipsus utilitatem re spiciens, et alterius
praedius ius sive libertatem diminuens). BARTOLI A SAXOFERRATO, IN PRIMAM
DIGESTI VETERIS PERTEM COMMENTARIA 182v (1574 ed.), 364 (2004 ed.)
(Nicolau Bevilaquam 1574; Elec. ed., A.J. Sirks 2004).
5. For instance, Donellus says: “It is [a servitude] the one that is imposed
on a alien estate, for the use of a neighboring estate, constituted in perpetuity”
(author’s translation); (Ea est [servitus] quae alieno praedio imposita ad vicini
alicujus praedii solius ususm, eumque perpetuum constituta est). HUGONIS
DONELLI, 3 OPERA OMNIA, COMENTARIORUM DE IURE CIVILI 226 (Osualdi
Hilligeri ed., Maceratae 1839).
6. Pothier says on the matter: “Le droit de servitude est le droit de se servir
de la chose d’autrui à quelque usage, ou d’en interdire quelque usage au
propiétarire ou possesseur. Jus faciendi aut prohibendi aliquid in alieno.”
ROBERT-JOSEPH POTHIER, Coutume d’Orléans in 1 ŒUVRES DE POTHIER 312
(Videcoq 1845).
Along the same lines, we can quote other less influential 18th century French
authors who also define servitudes in a positive way. For instance, Astruc, at the
beginning of the 18th century, says that a servitude is “un droit établi dans la
chose d’autrui, contre le droit naturel, à l’utilité des fonds des personnes.”
LOUIS ASTRUC, TRAITÉ DES SERVITUDES RÉELLES. NOUVELLE ÉDITION MISE EN
RAPPORT AVEC LE CODE CIVIL, PAR H. SOLON 10 (Gallica 1841). What is
particularly striking is that, according to him, real servitudes are against natural
law, which he explains a bit further stating that ownership should be free. Id. at
11.
Later, Desgodets, who wrote an important work on servitudes in the mid-18th
century, defines them simply as “l’Assujetissement d’une chose à une autre.”
ANTOINE BABUTY DESGODETS, LES LOIX DES BÂTIMENS, SUIVANT LA COUTUME
DE PARIS: TRAITANT DE CE QUI CONCERNE LES SERVITUDES RÉELLES, LES
RAPPORTS DES JURÉS-EXPERTS, LES RÉPARATIONS LOCATIVES, DOUAIRIÈRES,
USUFRUITIÈRES, BÉNÉFICIALES, ETC. 1 (1748).
Gabriel François d’Olivier, who wrote the first Civil Code Project for
revolutionary France, also uses a positive definition: “droit particulier attribué à
une personne contre une autre personne, pour obliger celle-ci à supporter
quelque chose ou l’empêcher de faire quelque chose.” GABRIEL FRANÇOIS
D’OLIVIER, 1 PRINCIPES DU DROIT CIVIL ROMAIN 207 (Merigot 1776), although
in his project he does not include any definition.
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The definition is a creation of the French codification process
that appeared for the first time in the Cambacèrés project of 1793.
Following Falcone, it seems to have been taken from the Latin
translation of Theophilus’ Paraphrasis, a somewhat awkward
source that eventually extended globally due to the influence of the
French codification. 7
Something similar happens with the division of servitudes into
natural, legal and conventional, a classification that structures the
systematic approach of most 19th century civil codes and was
taken from the French codification. This was an innovation
regarding the Hispanic tradition 8 that underlies the Louisiana Civil
Code, and it has been subject to harsh criticism. 9 In fact, many of
the so-called legal servitudes do not fit well into the category. For
instance, the common wall servitude (art. 673, Louisiana Civil
Code) can hardly be a servitude at all, for there is no dominant nor
servient estate. In fact, both estates are liable to the same rights and
duties. This type of servitude seems to regulate the legal limits of
7. As one might expect, it was a legal humanist—Janus a Costa—who
brought this concept into the Western legal tradition. While addressing
servitudes, he quoted Theophilus and said: “It is therefore a servitude, as rightly
our Theophilus said, a right constituted in a certain way, that makes the neighbor
stand a charge” (author’s translation); (Est igitur servitus, ut recte Theophilus
noster, jus quoddam certis modis constitutum, quod efficit, ut vicinus vicini
onera sustineat). JANI A COSTA, PRAELECTIONES AD ILLUSTRIORES QUOSDAM
TÍTULOS LOCAQUE SELECTA JURIS CIVILIS 22 (Bavius Voorda 1773). For a
detailed study, see Giuseppe Falcone, Note historique sur la définition
législative de la servitude (article 637 Code Napoléon – article 1027 Code Civil
Italien), 79:1 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ÉTRANGER 13-30
(2001) [hereinafter Falcone, Note historique].
8. For instance, García Goyena, when he proposes this division for the
Spanish Civil Code Project, says that neither Roman law nor Hispanic law
included property limits among servitudes: “El Derecho romano y patrio no
comprendieron estos gravámenes entre las servidumbres, y les dedicaron títulos
separados, como se ve en los tres primeros del libro 39, y en casi todos del 43
del Digesto, y en el título 32, Partida 3, sobre las labores nuevas.” See
FLORENCIO GARCÍA GOYENA, 1 CONCORDANCIAS MOTIVOS Y COMENTARIOS DEL
CÓDIGO CIVIL ESPAÑOL 420 (Sociedad Tipográfico-Editorial 1852).
9. We quote here the very important comments of Professor Yiannopoulos:
“[C]ritics have observed that, from the viewpoint of accurate analysis, natural
and legal servitudes involve limitations on the content of ownership rather than
veritable servitudes. Indeed, it is often impossible to determine which is the
dominant estate . . . .” Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, supra note 1, at 44.
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property, for its primary function is to establish the legal
atmosphere of ownership. 10 Therefore, the formal equality of both
estates seems necessary, because property limits compel both
owners. This is something unthinkable in regular servitudes, for
these have an asymmetric structure, where one estate beholds the
rights and the other the duties. 11 In this sense, legal servitudes are
intended to protect the estates’ freedom and the equality between
neighboring real estates, because they configure the normal frame
of property, while true servitudes tend to restrain the exercise of
ownership in one estate to the benefit of another estate. 12 As
Professor Yiannopoulos said, “In modern civil codes, the concepts
of natural and legal [servitudes] have thus given way to the idea of
limitations on the content of ownership.” 13
Although its reform was under discussion in 1976, 14 the
division was, at that time, unfortunately left unchanged, as an odd
legal transplant in the heart of Louisiana’s Civil Code. As Watson
explains, “law is often adopted because of the reputation and
authority of its model or promulgator; hence, in part, [this implies]
the reception of even less than adequate rules.” 15
II. SERVITUDES IN THE ROMAN SYSTEMATIC
The origin of the inclusion of these limits to property into the
category of servitudes is quite curious. Romans did not face the
problem of ownership limits this way. In Roman law, the different
10. RUDOFL VON JHERING, 6 JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DIE DOGMATIK DES
HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 91 (F. Mauke 1863).
11. BIONDO BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA ROMANA DELLE “SERVITUTES” 19 (Vita
e Pensiero 1938) [hereinafter BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA ROMANA].
12. In this sense, see ESTHER ALGARRA PRATS, LA DEFENSA JURÍDICO-CIVIL
FRENTE A HUMOS, OLORES, RUIDOS Y OTRAS AGRESIONES A LA PROPIEDAD Y A LA
PERSONA 16 (McGraw-Hill 1995).
13. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes, supra note 1, at 44.
14. See Katheleen A. Manning, Malcom S. Murchison, Judy F. Pierce,
Randall C. Songy & James C. Wear, The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for
the 1976 Regular Session: A Student Symposium, 37 LA. L. REV. 89-202 (1976).
15. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE LAW 90 (2d ed., Univ. of Georgia Press 1993).
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property limits had a very heterogeneous nature. 16 They were
sometimes structured as interdictae possessoria, in other cases as
negative actions, or other different legal figures. Therefore, what
we now call property limits were treated in an unsystematic
fashion and included into different institutions.
Originally in Rome, real estates should have been separated
from each other by a physical space that did not belong to any of
the neighbors. For urban real estates, it was called ambitus. As
time went by and Rome grew into an overpopulated metropolis,
the system became untenable. To allow the use of all the land in
the city for construction, the ambitus system was replaced and in
its place the wall that separated two estates started to be considered
common for both owners (paries communis) 17 and a new
regulation established many different sorts of obligations regarding
it. The wall was not considered to be under a servitude, but, on the
contrary, there was a whole set of things that the owners could not
do regarding the wall unless they had a servitude over the
neighboring estate.
Generally speaking, in Rome, the main issue regarding the
neighborhood was the power that an owner had to exclude nonowners from his estate, and especially, of course, his neighbors. 18

16. BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA ROMANA, supra note 11.
On the matter, Paricio says:
En el Derecho romano, dada la particular naturaleza del dominium
con su carácter absoluto e independiente (salvo que hubiese sido
limitado voluntariamente, p.ej. con una servidumbre), las relaciones
entre los titulares de los diversos fundos vecinos se nos presenta bajo
la forma de un régimen negativo, es decir, de una respectiva libertad
tutelada y defendida por diferentes recursos procesales . . . . Lo que
existen son medios jurídicos de defensa y no limitaciones a la
propiedad; por ello los recursos procesales que se concedían para
resolver problemas surgidos en las relaciones de vecindad no pueden
ser considerados estrictamente como limitaciones sobre la propiedad.
JAVIER PARICIO, LA DENUNCIA DE OBRA NUEVA EN EL DERECHO ROMANO
CLÁSICO 1 (Bosch, 1982). See also BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA ROMANA, supra note
11, at 20.
17. BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA ROMANA, supra note 11, at 46.
18. Id. at 20.
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The “legal atmosphere” of each estate should be protected. 19 To do
something on someone else’s property (facere in alieno) was
prohibited. In order to act on another man’s property, one must
have had a servitude, for its function was to alter the normal
regime of the exclusion of non-owners. Therefore, the whole
system of servitudes was designed to authorize acts in alien estates,
whether they were directly done in their physical limits or the
owner just had to suffer the negative consequences of acts
performed on another estate (direct and indirect immissions).
Therefore, the function of servitudes was to change the normal
regime of third parties’ exclusion that was implied in property, and
many times, when one of these immissive acts was performed, the
existence of a servitude was under discussion. The interdictae
possessoria were a typical tool to determine the legal position of
each part in the possible legal action that was to be summoned.20
The one that claimed the existence of a servitude had a real action
to assert its existence, while the one that denied its existence had a
real action, called a negative action, that aimed to defend the
freedom of the estate. 21

19. VON JHERING, supra note 10, at 91.
20. On the relation between interdictae possessoria and actions we follow
Falcone’s thesis. See Giuseppe Falcone, Ricerche sull’origine dell’interdetto uti
possidetis in 44 ANNALI DEL SEMINARIO GIURIDICO DELLA UNIVERSITÀ DI
PALERMO 5-360 (1996).
21. On the matter, the jurist Gaius gives the following division:
A real action is one in which we either claim some corporeal property
to be ours, or that we are entitled to some particular right in the
property, for instance, the right of use and enjoyment; or the right to
walk or drive through the land of another; or to conduct water from his
land; or to raise the height of a building, or to have the view
unobstructed; or when a negative action is brought by the adverse
party; (translation by Francis de Zulueta, Oxford Univ.). (In rem actio
est, cum aut corporalem rem intendimus nostram esse aut ius aliquod
nobis conpetere, uelut utendi aut utendi fruendi, eundi, agendi
aquamue ducendi uel altius tollendi prospiciendiue, aut cum actio ex
diuerso aduersario est negatiua.)
THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at bk. 4.3 [hereinafter GAIUS].
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Although in Classical times, servitudes were treated in an
unsystematic fashion, 22 Justinian’s Corpus made a systematic
effort to put them altogether and bring some order to their
treatment. 23 This effort tended to obscure its dogmatism in the
centuries to come. Justinian puts them in a separate book in the
Digest, where he starts by elaborating general aspects of servitudes
(Digest 8.1), to continue with urban servitudes (Digest 8.2),
followed by rustic ones (Digest 8.3) and then their common rules
(Digest 8.4). Having done this, he then continues with the actions
that can be put forward (Digest 8.5) and, finally, the rules that
regard the liberation of the estates. That the main systematic
depends on their being rural or urban makes sense in Classical
Roman law, for the first are res mancipi, and therefore they can
only be transferred following certain formalities, while the others
are not. Nevertheless, in Justinian’s law—which did not
contemplate this division of res mancipi and nec mancipi—the
reasons for keeping this kind of systematic approach are obscure.
Regardless, the main issue in servitudes was the exclusion of the
neighbor’s acts from an estate and, therefore, Digest 8.5 (on
vindication and denial of servitudes) was mainly concerned with
problems of neighboring estates, which could also be treated as
problems of interdictae possessoria. Some problems were even
addressed in both places.
Nevertheless, Justinian did something more than merely
systematizing, for he also included some property limits under the
title of servitudes in his Codex. 24 In the western part of the former
22. This appears quite clearly in the treatment that Gaius gives to servitudes
in his INSTITUTES. They are mentioned among incorporeal things (GAIUS 2.14),
the res mancipi (GAIUS 2.17) and the acquisition of property (GAIUS 2.29),
supra note 21. See BIONDO BIONDI, LE SERVITÙ 4 (Giuffrè 1967; published as
Vol. 12 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE).
23. They are contained in Justinian’s INSTITUTES (bk. 2, tit. 3), in the 8th
book of the DIGEST and in the 34th title of the 3rd book of the CODEX.
24. This tendency would have expanded during Late Antiquity as a
simplification of the complex classical legal system. It is mentioned in the
CODEX THEODOSIANUS [hereinafter C.TH.] in an Imperial Constitution on the
distance that two buildings should keep: C.TH. 4.24 De servitute luminis vel
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Empire, legal simplification meant the disappearance of the whole
dogmatic category of servitudes. 25
III. RECEPTION OF SERVITUDES IN THE WEST AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIVISION
When the Corpus was received in the West (c.1100 AD), the
institution of servitudes was resurrected, and it is through
Justinian’s text that they again came to rule in European law. Some

aeris similiter constitutum est, ut inter privatorum fabricas decem pedes, inter
publicas quindecim dimittantur.
For the eastern part of the Empire, Emperor Zeno repeats the statute and gives a
new Imperial Constitution, this time in Greek, that expressly calls this legal limit
to property a servitude. Justinian also repeats this Constitution and adds some
interpretation, for there were, apparently, some uncertainties about its
application.
CODEX 8.10.13 Imperator Justinianus. Cum dubitabatur, utrum
constitutio Zenonis divae memoriae ad Adamantium praefectum urbis
scripta, quae de servitutibus loquitur, localis est et huic florentissimae
urbi dedicata et debent illius quidem iura in hac observari, antiqua
vero, quae contraria sunt, locum habere in provinciis: indignum esse
nostro tempore putantes aliud ius in hac regia civitate de huiusmodi
observari, aliud apud nostros esse provinciales, sancimus eandem
constitutionem in omnibus urbibus Romani imperii obtinere et
secundum eius definitionem omnia procedere et, si quid ius ex ea lege
innovatum est a vetere dispositione, et hoc in provinciis a praesidibus
earum observari: ceteris videlicet omnibus, quae non per Zenonianam
legem innovata sunt, sed veteribus legibus comprehensa, in sua
firmitate in omni loco manentibus. * iust. a. iohanni pp. *<a 531 d. k.
sept. Constantinopoli post con sulatum lampadii et orestis vv. cc.>
See BIONDO BIONDI, LE SERVITÙ PREDIALI NEL DIRITTO ROMANO 67-73 (Giuffrè
1969) [hereinafter BIONDI, LE SERVITÙ PREDIALI]; BIONDI, LA CATEGORIA
ROMANA, supra note 11, at 23-40; and Mª CARMEN JIMÉNEZ SALCEDO, E L
RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LAS RELACIONES DE VECINDAD EN DERECHO ROMANO 25
(Universidad de Córdoba 1999).
For the western part of the former Empire, there was also some regulation given
by the Germanic kings. For instance, in the LEX ROMANA BURGUNDIORUM
[hereinafter L.R.B.]: De servitute luminis vel aeris similiter constitutum: ut inter
privatorum fabricas decem pedes, inter publicas quindecim dimittantur,
secundum legem Theudosiani libri iv, sub titulo: de edificiis privatis et publicis.
L.R.B 17.6.
25. This explains, for instance, their absence from the LIBER IUDICIORUM in
Visigothic times. See FRANCISCO PACHECO CABALLERO, LAS SERVIDUMBRES
PREDIALES EN EL DERECHO HISTÓRICO ESPAÑOL 125 (Pagés Editors 1991).
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scholars—like Biondi and Bonfante 26—explicitly attest that it
would have been during the Middle Ages that the category of legal
and natural servitudes would have been developed, although we
have not found any evidence of it. In truth, although the glossators
and commentators hold the idea that some limits to property should
be treated as servitudes—an idea they inherited from Justinian—
their systematization follows the scheme of the Corpus. In fact, the
main system that will encompass servitudes during the whole
period between the reception of the Corpus and the French
codification can be found in the work of Bartolus called the arbor
servitutum, or tree of servitudes. 27 This is a sort of general
systematization into personal, real (as the Louisiana Civil Code
does in article 533) and mixed servitudes, taken from a fragment of
Marcian that has been considered interpolated with which the book
of servitudes starts in the Digest. 28 According to this
systematization, real servitudes can be divided into urban and
rural. The complex casuistry that regards the acts that may or may
not be performed without the existence of a servitude are
considered innominated servitudes, which can fit into the urban or
the rural ones. The systematization was so successful that became
the regular treatment of servitudes in the following centuries.
Legal humanism (16th century) kept this same systematization,
although it put the division into a more logical place: after
26. BIONDI, LE SERVITÙ PREDIALI, supra note 24, at 75; PIETRO BONFANTE,
11.2 CORSO DI DIRITTO ROMANO. LA PROPRIETÀ 322 (Giuffrè 1966).
27. The systematization is a creation of Bartolus of Saxoferrato.
Nevertheless, it was so successful that it was included in the later editions of the
MAGNA GLOSSA as an introduction to the 8th book of the DIGEST. See BARTOLI
A SAXOFERRATO, supra note 3, at 182v and for the MAGNA GLOSSA, 1
DIGESTUM VETUS SEU PANDECTARUM IURIS CIVILIS 1091 (Iunta 1592).
28. DIGEST 8.1.1 Marcianus libro tertio regularum. Servitutes aut
personarum sunt, ut usus et usus fructus, aut rerum, ut servitutes rusticorum
praediorum et urbanorum. (“Servitudes are personal, like use or usufruct, or
real, like the servitudes on rural and urban states.” (Author’s translation.)) The
quotation—strongly interpolated—comes from the jurist Marcian. He wrote a
pedagogical work called regulae, where he probably introduced some new
categories in order to systematize the iura in re aliena for teaching proposes. We
think it is probable that the original fragment just said iura praediorum aut
personarum.
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addressing ownership, right before the other real rights, and not
just before real servitudes, as the Louisiana Civil Code does.
During humanism, mixed servitudes went into oblivion. 29 Anyway,
at this historical point some new dogmatic categories came into
existence in order to analyze servitudes. First, new legal definitions
of servitudes appeared, which eventually led to the one adopted by
the French Civil Code. 30 Second, some systematic elements were
introduced. For instance, Donellus, when commenting on the
composition of servitudes, tells us that they can be created either
by nature or by non-natural elements. 31 These non-natural
elements can be due to our own action (conventions and pacts) or
by an act of authority (a judge’s act). This is not the proper
division into natural, legal and conventional servitudes, but at least
some of its elements are present.
Nevertheless, the jurists of legal rationalism (17th and 18th
centuries) seemed to return to the Bartolistic scheme. In fact,
Domat kept a traditional systematic approach, distinguishing
between personal and real servitudes, and then focusing his
treatment of the subject on the difference between urban and rural
servitudes. As was traditional, the limits of property were included
among the servitudes, following Justinian’s model to the letter. 32
Astruc, author of an important treaty on servitudes at the
beginning of the 18th century, even excludes servitudes from
natural law, 33 because, according to him, they restricted
ownership’s natural freedom. His classification also followed the
Bartolistic model. Desgodets, who wrote an important treaty on the
29. On the matter, Donellus follows this same line, passing from servitudes
in general, to urban servitudes, rural ones and then the rules involved in actiones
confesoria and negatoria. See DONELLI, supra note 5, at 3-4.
30. See supra note 6.
31. “On the acquisition of servitudes. They are acquired when they are
rightly constituted. They are constituted by nature or by an external event”
(author’s translation); (De acquirenda praedii servitute. Acquiri tunc, cum recte
constituta est. Constitui Natura aut Externo facto.) DONELLI, supra note 5, at
295.
32. JEAN DOMAT, 4 ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES 188 (Alex-Gobelet 1835).
33. See supra note 6.
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matter regarding the Coutume de Paris, also followed the
traditional model. 34
Pothier is more innovative on the treatment of servitudes.
Although he followed the traditional Bartolistic order dividing
servitudes into personal and real, to then distinguish between urban
and rural, 35 he separated neighborhood relations and property
limits from servitudes, which he conceptualized as quasi-contracts.
He addresses them in a separate place, in the book of societies, in
an appendix of community.
Olivier, author of the first revolutionary civil code project, also
follows the traditional division of servitudes,36 although he does
not include any classification in his project.
The major systematic change comes only with the Code
Napoléon. This legal body not only includes a somewhat
extravagant definition of servitudes, constructed in a passive voice
due to the reception of byzantine ideas from 16th century France,
but it also includes an exotic systematic in the institution, which
transforms a complex casuistry on property limits and interdictae
possessoria into servitudes. Falcone points out that the definition
would come from a work of the 16th century that was lucky
enough to be included in a compilation of the 18th century, edited
by Meerman. 37 Nevertheless, although the jurist under
discussion—Jani a Costa—adopts the definition of Theophilus on
real servitudes, he addresses the institution following the
traditional systematic approach, without any mention of natural,
legal and conventional servitudes. On the other hand, such a work,
written in Latin and edited in Holland, would hardly have the
diffusion and influence to impose itself in Napoleonic France over
Pothier himself, practically without any discussion in the codifying
34.
35.
36.
37.

DESGODETS, supra note 6, at 2.
POTHIER, supra note 6, at 312-18.
D’OLIVIER, supra note 6, at 207.
The work would be GERARD MEERMAN, NOVUS THESAURUS JURIS
CIVILIS ET CANONICI (Petrus de Hond 1751). See Falcone, Note historique, supra
note 7, at 13-30.
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commission. 38 It seems that the commission had already assumed
the division and, therefore, another work must have the dubious
honor of inspiring it on the subject. In fact, just a few years before
the Cambacérès Project, a monumental work was published,
written in a forensic style quite along the lines of the abovementioned approach. It is the Répertoire universel et raisonné de
jurisprudence, a sort of legal encyclopedia very popular in the late
18th century. In it, in volume 58, we find a systematic treatment of
servitudes that can be considered as the key antecedent of the
French Civil Code. In fact, we find there not only a definition of
servitudes in the passive voice, 39 but it also takes Donellus’ model
of sources of servitudes, transforming it into the systematic axis of
the subject by introducing the division of servitudes into natural,
legal and conventional. 40 Neighborhood relations are included in
legal servitudes, 41 and institutions that traditionally were not
included among servitudes, such as the common wall, are
considered among them. In short, this work constitutes the
dogmatic base of the Code Napoléon’s treatment of servitudes. The
article was written by Jean Phillip Garran de Coulon, who later
participated in the French codification by presenting a proposition
to the National Assembly to name a commission to codify the civil
38. In fact, when one checks the preparatory works of the codifying
commission, the uncritical manner in which such a revolutionary way to
systematize servitudes is taken by the Commission is striking. The whole title on
servitudes is adopted with only minor observations. The project was presented
by Treilhard in the session of 4th Brumaire of the 12th year of the Revolution
(October 27, 1803). Although some discussion was generated among the
commissioners that were present (Cambacérès, Treilhard, Bigot-Préameneu
Pelet, Berlier, Regnaud and Tronchet), their concerns were on other aspects of
the project. In fact, both the definition (art. 637) and the division (art. 639) were
immediately approved. See PIERRE ANTOINE FENET, 11 RECUEIL COMPLET DES
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES DU CODE CIVIL 245 et seq. (Videdoq 1836).
39. “L’assujettissement d’un domaine à un autre domaine, ou à une
personne, en vertu duquel le possesseur est obligé d’y souffrir certaines charges
ou incommodités, au profit d’autrui, comme l’écoulement des eaux de la maison
voisine, un passage, une vue, etc.” PIERRE JEAN JACQUES GUILLAUME GUYOT,
58 RÉPERTOIRE UNIVERSEL ET RAISONNÉ DE JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL, CRIMINELLE,
CANONIQUE ET BÉNÉFICIALE 232 (Panckoucke 1783).
40. GUYOT, supra note 39, at 238.
41. Id. at 240.
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law. 42 Both its diffusion and the prestige of the author of the work
would explain the adoption of its systematization by the codifying
commission, who aimed to depart from the medieval models that
had anteceded the Code. 43 With a revolutionary spirit, a confused
nomenclature and a weak dogmatism were adopted, which forced
19th century French jurisprudence to create a regulation of
neighborhood relations outside of servitudes.
In conclusion, it is worth taking a second look at Professor
Yiannopoulos’ proposal to modify the Louisiana Civil Code’s
division of servitudes, replacing natural and legal servitudes for
limitations on the content of ownership and its subsequent
discussion. 44 This should involve a close examination of the
treatment of servitudes and limitations of ownership established in
the BGB. This legal body limits the concept of servitudes to
conventional ones 45 (as in traditional Roman law), while the legal
and natural servitudes are encompassed in the larger category of
limitations to ownership, 46 where other important aspects, as the
immissions theory, are regulated. At that time, the traditionalist
opinion prevailed over pure legal dogmatism in the belief that by
preserving this odd classification, the civil law tradition that
characterizes Louisiana would be secured. By this historical
analysis we would like to prove that this division is not only
illogical, but it is not even really founded in the civil law tradition.
It was invented shortly before the Code Napoléon and it has
persisted in many civil codes because of the authority of the
French codification. Like many legal transplants, it is founded on
42. See PETER VAN DEN BERG, THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN CODIFICATION:
A HISTORY OF THE UNIFICATION OF LAW IN FRANCE, PRUSSIA, THE AUSTRIAN
MONARCHY AND THE NETHERLANDS 195 (Europa Law Publ’g 2007).
43. For instance, Pardessus, in the most popular treaty on servitudes after
the codification, says that even the name of the institution should be changed in
order to distinguish it from the one that existed during the Ancien Régime.
JEAN-MARIE PARDESSUS, 1 TRAITÉ DES SERVITUDES, OU SERVICES FONCIERS 4-5
(8th ed., Thorel 1838).
44. See 1976 La. Acts, No. 103.
45. See para. 1018 to 1029, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB].
46. See para. 905 et seq., BGB.
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“the authority of the donor system,” but “[a]t times this respect
might lead to odd results.” 47

47. WATSON, supra note 15, at 57.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ADVENT OF GAY RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Recognition of rights based on sexual orientation (referred to
interchangeably as “gay rights”) is a fairly new phenomenon in the
European Union (EU). Before the Treaty of Amsterdam 1—
specifically, article 13—sexual orientation protection had never
been expressly mentioned in EU law. Article 13 makes it clear that
sexual orientation discrimination—among others, such as race, sex,
and religion—would be combated.” 2 During the development of
gay rights generally in the EU, there have been three legislative
texts and resolutions aimed at combating sexual orientation
discrimination. These texts are: the European Parliament
Resolution (hereinafter “Resolution”), 3 article 13 in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter
“Charter of Rights”), 4 which were recognized or passed in 1994,
1997, and 2000, respectively.

1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct.
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (First mention
of sexual orientation discrimination in EU law).
2. Presently art. 19 (1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, formerly art. 13 of the Treaty on European Union.
Article 19 (1) provides:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the
limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council,
acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
3. European Parliament, Resolution on Equal Rights for Homosexuals and
Lesbians in the EC, 1994 O.J. (C 61/40) [hereinafter Resolution].
4. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010 O.J. C
83/02 [hereinafter Charter of Rights]. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union
[hereinafter TEU] created the article of fundamental rights—European Union’s
Charter of Fundamental Rights. This article is binding as long as EU Member
States and EU institutions are applying Union law. This Charter was actually
passed in 2000, and would have been modified in the failed 2004 European
Constitution. Thus, its legal force was in the balance until it was successfully
implemented in the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in December 2007, came into force
in December 2009).
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The 1994 Resolution asked Member States 5 to provide gays
and lesbians with legal protection. The Resolution recognized that
gays and lesbians should be treated equally with their heterosexual
counterparts. The Resolution affirmatively called for the decriminalization of homosexuality and also sought to protect sexual
orientation minorities in the areas of inheritance, social security,
and housing. 6 Notwithstanding the Resolution’s non-binding
effect, it was noteworthy as it explicitly recognized the rights of
sexual orientation minorities in the EU. Consequently, due to the
Resolution’s non-binding effect, EU Member States citizens could
not rely upon the Resolution in court. 7 Nevertheless, the European
Parliament reaffirmed the 1994 Resolution in 1996, 8 just before the
Treaty of Amsterdam was signed.
On October 2, 1997, the then fifteen Member States signed the
Treaty of Amsterdam, which went into effect in 1999. 9 Before this
provision, there was an unanswered question as to whether the EU
was competent to enact anti-discrimination laws to protect sexual
orientation minorities. 10 One of the effects of the implementation
of article 13 in the Treaty of Amsterdam was that the above
question was answered in the affirmative. 11 The article 13
provision forbidding discrimination based on sexual orientation
was also vital in leading the way for other anti-discrimination
laws. 12

5. See discussion infra Part IV. Member States of the EU are countries that
have relinquished some national power to the European Union.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Resolution of the Respect of Equal Rights in the European Union,
1996 O.J. (C 320).
9. The 15 Member States were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
10. Dimitry Kochenove, Gay Rights in the EU: A Long Way Forward for
the Union of 27, 3 CROATIAN Y.B. OF EUR. L. AND POL’Y 469 (2007).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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On December 7, 2000—shortly after the Treaty of Amsterdam
went into effect—the Charter of Rights was signed. 13 The nondiscrimination clause of the Charter of Rights forbade
discrimination on many grounds, including sexual orientation. 14
However, the Charter of Rights was ineffective and lacked legal
force until December 1, 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon, 15 in
which it was incorporated, took effect.
Outside the EU, the European Convention on Human Rights
(hereinafter “the Convention”) 16 was promulgated by the Council
of Europe, 17 which is comprised of 47 countries including all EU
Member States. The Convention was originally enacted in 1950,
and has been amended several times to encompass a wider array of
human rights issues. 18 Even though the Convention pre-dates the
establishment of the EU, every EU Member State has ratified the
Convention. 19 The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter
“ECHR”) was created to ensure compliance with the Convention. 20
Any person who believes that a state party to the Convention has
violated their rights under the Convention can file a complaint to
13. Charter of Rights, supra note 4.
14. Charter of Rights, supra note 4, art. 21. The Charter is comprehensive
and forbids discrimination based on “race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic
features, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a
national minority, property, birth right, disability age, and sexual orientation.”
15. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306)1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
16. European Convention on Human Rights (formerly, Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,) Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ.T.S. No. 5; 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
17. The Council of Europe was founded on May 5, 1949, as a political
institution. The Council of Europe has promulgated a plethora of conventions.
The Most important of these is the European Convention of Human Rights.
18. The Convention covers, among others: (art. 1) right to life, (art.11)
freedom of association, (art. 14) freedom from discrimination, (art. 12) right to
marriage. The amendments made through additional protocols further expand
the rights granted: E.g. Protocol 12 (art. 1), prohibition of discrimination,
Protocol 13 (art. 1) abolition of the death penalty.
19. EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/
dictionary/definitions/europeanconventionfortheprotectionofhumanrightsandfun
damentalfreedoms.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
20. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 19.
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the ECHR. 21 Likewise, a High Contracting Party may file a
complaint to the ECHR against another High Contracting Party for
a violation of the Convention. 22 All of the court’s decisions are
binding. 23 Nonetheless, the relevant provision on the prohibition of
discrimination fails to mention sexual orientation. 24
The gradual development of EU powers lead to much stronger
anti-discrimination laws. In 2000, the Council unanimously passed
the Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation
(hereinafter “Directive”). 25 The goal of the Directive is stated in
article 1: “The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general
framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion
or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in
the Member States the principle of equal treatment.” 26 There is no
doubt that earlier attempts were insufficient to combat sexual
orientation discrimination. The Directive can be considered a

21. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 34:
The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the
rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective
exercise of this right.
22. The Convention, supra note 16, art. 33.
23. Id.
24. See The Convention, supra note 16, art. 14: “sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status”; see also Protocol 12, art. 1,
para. 1. covers: “sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other statutes” & para. 2: “No one shall be discriminated against by any public
authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.”
25. Council Directive 2000/78/EC Establishing a General Framework for
Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303/16)
[hereinafter Directive]. A directive is binding upon the Member States or group
of Member States to which it is addressed to. This Directive was addressed to all
Member States. A directive is specific as to the results that should be achieved.
Directives work to secure uniformity among the EU Member States. Although it
is binding, the form or method of implementation are left at the discretion of the
Member States, as long as the objective of the Directive are transposed into
national law before the deadline for implementation.
26. Directive, supra note 25, art. 1.
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beacon of hope in sexual orientation anti-discrimination law
because it specifically banned sexual orientation discrimination in
the workplace. 27
Although there is a plethora of issues that arises in the context
of sexual orientation discrimination in the EU workplace, this
essay focuses on the rights of EU citizens—in registered same-sex
partnerships—to recover employment benefits. Civil statuses, such
as registered same-sex partnerships, are within the competence of
the individual Member States. 28 Nevertheless, as the rejection of
employment benefits is not the only issue faced by sexual
orientation minorities in the EU workplace, this essay also delves
into the effects of the Directive in other employment areas. This
essay also shows that, to a certain degree, the efforts to strengthen
protection of sexual orientation minorities in the EU workplace are
hindered by the interaction of EU law with the national laws of the
Member States.
Following the brief introduction in Part I, Part II discusses the
scope of the Directive. Part III focuses on the EU courts
interpretation of the Directive in three seminal cases. Part IV
contains an analysis of the court rulings and a survey of the effects
of the Directive. Part V sets forth novel recommendations to
improve the equality of sexual orientation minorities in the EU
workplace. Finally, Part VI is a brief conclusion.
II. SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT DIRECTIVE
A. Content of the Equal Treatment Directive
As mentioned above, the Directive lays down “a general
framework for combatting discrimination” on the grounds
covered. 29 The Directive covers both direct and indirect
discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs “where one person is
27. Id.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See supra note 26.

2013]

EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND GAY RIGHTS

623

treated less [favorably] than another is, has been or would be
treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to
. . . .” 30 Likewise, indirect discrimination occurs where an
“apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put
persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular
disability, a particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a
particular disadvantage compared with other persons.” 31 Unlike
direct discrimination, there are few exceptions made in the context
of indirect discrimination. For instance, indirect discrimination is
acceptable if the criterion used is “objectively justified.” 32 Lastly,
the Directive covers harassment, which is defined as an “unwanted
conduct related to any grounds . . . with the purpose of violating
the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile,
degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.” 33 Furthermore,
unlike the direct and indirect discrimination provisions, the
Directive allows Member States to define harassment in
accordance with their national law. 34 Although the Directive is a
beacon of hope, it nevertheless has some defects. 35
30. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 2.
31. Id.
32. Directive, supra note 25, art. 2 (b)(i)-(ii):
For the purposes of paragraph 1:
...
(b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons having a
particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a
particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with
other persons unless:
(i) that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary, or
(ii) as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any
person or organisation to whom this Directive applies, is obliged, under
national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with the
principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages
entailed by such provision, criterion or practice.
33. Directive, supra note 25, art. 2(3).
34. Id.
35. See discussion infra Part III. See also Directive, supra note 25, art. 2. In
defining types of discrimination, among other things, definitions of
discrimination, harassment are too limited.
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B. Scope of the Equal Treatment Directive
Along with the force in employment and occupation, the
Directive covers vocational training and employer/employee
organizational memberships. 36 The Directive is applicable to both
private and public sectors, including public entities. The Directive
encompasses dismissals, pay, 37 working conditions, and access to
employment. 38 The Member States may provide for a more
heightened level of protection, but the Council, when drafting
Directives, sets forth minimum requirements, which Member
States must follow. 39 The Directive does not cover “payment of
any kind made by state scheme or similar, including state social
security or social protection schemes.” 40 Member States are
allowed to opt out of the Directive’s provision on age and
disability as it relates to their armed forces. 41 Article 10 imposes
remedies for individuals in national court (the referring court).
Furthermore, in a suit based on the Directive, the burden of proof
is placed upon the defendant to prove the absence of an unlawful
discrimination. 42 Currently, all 28 Member States have
implemented the Directive into national law. By December 2,
2003—the deadline for the implementation—all of the “old
36. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3.
37. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c) (This essay explores, among other
issues, whether Directive art. 3(1)(c) is applicable to the parties’ claims, or
whether art. 3(3)—relating to social security or state schemes—would exclude
the coverage of the Directive).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(3).
41. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(4).
42. Directive, supra note 25, art. 10:
1. Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in
accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when
persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of
equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or
other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that
there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the
respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of
equal treatment.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Member States from introducing rules
of evidence, which are more [favorable] to plaintiffs.
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Member States,” had transposed the Directive into national law.43
The 10 “new Member States” 44 had implemented the Directive
into national law by May 1, 2004. Two Member States, Romania
and Bulgaria, joined the EU on January 1, 2007, 45 and have
implemented the Directive. Croatia also became a member of the
EU in 2013.
III. LANDMARK COURT DECISIONS
An important aspect of gauging anti-discrimination progress
against sexual orientation minorities in the EU workplace is to
analyze the rulings of the EU courts. There have been three
landmark court cases. These three cases—Sweden v. Council, 46
Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen 47 and Römer
v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg 48—will be discussed and
analyzed to determine the level of protection of sexual orientation
minorities in regard to employment benefits for registered samesex partners.
In order to better understand the rulings of the following
decisions, it is essential to understand the process that the cases
underwent, in particular, the ECJ’s 49 preliminary reference
process.

43. See
EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-0869_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
44. See Treaty concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, the
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the
European Union, April 16, 2003.
45. See Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and
Romania to the European Union, April 25, 2005.
46. Joined Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99P, Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R.
I-4319.
47. Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen
Bühnen, 2008 E.C.R I-01757.
48. Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, 2010
E.C.R. I-3595.
49. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 19,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 1, at 27 [hereinafter TEU].
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A. The European Court of Justice Preliminary Reference Process
The preliminary reference process is detailed in article 267 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter
“TFEU”). 50 The article describes the process in which a Member
State’s national court may refer a case to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (hereinafter “ECJ” or “the Court”). The article
confers jurisdiction to the Court on preliminary rulings in
interpreting treaties. Furthermore, jurisdiction is conferred “where
such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member
State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on
the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the
Court to give a ruling thereon.” 51 In essence when there is a
question as to how to interpret EU law by the national Member
States, the Member States are allowed to refer the question to the
Court.
Procedurally, there are three stages to the preliminary
reference. The first stage is when the national court of a Member
State seeks a preliminary reference from the Court. The next stage
is when the Court makes a decision regarding the interpretation of
EU law or answers a legal question brought before it. Lastly, after
the Court has made a decision, the national court and the litigants
decide how to implement the decision of the Court. After the Court
rules, the national court will then make its own decision, while

The Court of Justice of the European Union includes the Court of Justice, the
General Court and specialized courts. The Court is tasked with ensuring proper
application and interpretation of Treaty laws. The body of the Court consists of
one judge from each Member State. The Court of Justice of the European Union
shall:
[in] accordance with the Treaties: (a) rule on actions brought by a
Member State, an institution or a natural or legal person; (b) give
preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member
States, on the interpretation of Union Law or the validity of acts
adopted by the institutions; (c) rule in other cases provided for in the
Treaties. Id.
50. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 267, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, [hereinafter TFEU].
51. Id.
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applying the Court’s interpretation of EU law, or the Court’s
answer to the legal question brought before it. 52
The jurisdiction of the Court is limited in scope. As such,
“there are two legal norms that can become the object of a
preliminary ruling.” 53 The Court has jurisdiction over the
interpretation of Treaties and the “validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the
Union.” 54
B. The Application of the Directive in Landmark Cases
1. Sweden v. Council
Sweden v. Council consolidated two appeals from the judgment
in the Court of First Instance. 55 The law applicable to the facts of
Sweden predated the implementation of the Directive, but the
ruling was made after the Directive was passed. 56 The plaintiff,
Mr. D, brought action against the Council of the European Union
(hereinafter “Council”) after its refusal to award Mr. D a
household allowance under the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Communities (hereinafter “Staff Regulations”). 57 The
52. Stacy Nvikos, The European Court of Justice and National Courts:
Strategic Interaction within the EU Judicial Process (eds. Lee Epstein and
Stanley L. Paulsen, Paper presented at Washington University at St. Louis on
Comparative
Constitutional
Courts,
2001),
available
at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.195.6306&rep=rep1&
type=pdf (Last visited March 25, 2014).
53. See ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
305-310 (2nd ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2013).
54. Id.
55. Case T-264/97, D v. Council, 1999 E.C.R.-SC I-A-1 and II-1. Prior to
2009 the Court of First Instance (hereinafter CFI) heard appeals from
Commission decisions. Post-2009, the CFI is known as the General Court.
56. Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, para. 4. (The Coucil rejected Mr. D’s
application for the Staff Regulation benefit in 1996. The case was decided in
2001, one year after the Directive was implemented).
57. Article 1(2) of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations of Officials of the
European Communities (‘the Staff Regulations’) provides as follows:
The household allowance shall be granted to:
a. A married official;
b. An official who is widowed, divorced, legally separated or
unmarried and has one or more dependent children . . . .
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Council enacted the Staff Regulation, which regulated employee
pension benefits. Mr. D, a Swedish national, was an official of the
European Communities, as an employee of the Council. 58 Mr. D
entered into a registered same-sex partnership with another
Swedish national on June 23, 1995. 59 The allowances were
available to married officials, among others. 60 Mr. D applied for
the allowance and requested that his same-sex partnership be
treated equivalently to marriage for purposes of qualifying for the
allowance. 61 The Council denied his request. 62 The Council
reasoned that the same-sex partnerships could not be treated as
equivalent to marriage for the purpose of obtaining the allowance.
Mr. D subsequently filed a complaint with the Secretary
General of the Council. The Secretary General denied his request,
and cited the same reasons given by the Council. 63 Mr. D then filed
a complaint to the Court of First Instance. 64 His complaint
requested—among other things 65—for the Court of First Instance

c. By special reasoned decision of the appointing authority based on
supporting documents, an official who, while not fulfilling the
conditions laid down in (a) and (b), nevertheless actually assumes
family responsibilities.
58. Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. I-4319, para. 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (“The Council rejected the application, by note of 29 November
1996, on the ground that the provisions of the Staff Regulations could not be
construed as allowing a ‘registered partnership’ to be treated equivalent to
marriage”).
63. Id. at para. 6.
64. Id.
65. Id. at para 7. Mr. D also pleaded:
1. Entitlement to other general provisions “applicable to officials of the
European Communities”.
2. An infringement on non-discrimination based on EU law—including the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.
3. “Infringement of the principle of equal pay for men and women contained in
Article 119 of the EC Treaty—Article 117 to 12o of the EC Treaty have been
replaced by Articles 136 EC to 143 EC).” Id.
As to first plea, the court acknowledged only the household allowance under the
Staff Regulations, and no other general provisions that are applicable to officials
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to annul the refusal of the Secretary General to allow his same-sex
partnership to be considered equivalent to marriage for the
purposes of obtaining the household allowance.
Although Mr. D raised other grounds on appeal, 66 the Court of
First Instance limited its ruling to the household allowances under
the Staff Regulation. 67 The court cited Arouxo v. Commission 68 in
concluding that for purposes of the Staff Regulation “the concept
of marriage must be understood as meaning a relationship based on
civil marriage within the traditional meaning of the term.” 69 The
court further ruled that the Council was under “no obligation to
regard as equivalent to marriage, for the purposes of the Staff
Regulation, the situation of a person who had a stable relationship
with a partner of the same sex, even if the relationship was
recognized by national authority.” 70 Lastly, the court held that the
reference to the Member State’s law on marriage was inapplicable
as the Staff Regulation was susceptible of an independent
interpretation. 71 Thus, the court rejected his claim.

of the European Communities. In regards to the second plea, the court held that
since the Convention of Human Rights does “not cover long-term homosexual
relationships” no infringement could have occurred. Finally, the court held that
as to the plea of equal pay, the Staff Regulations applied equally to both sexes,
and thus do not lead to discrimination.
66. See Id.
67. Id. at para. 8. The court held that:
[the plea of non-discrimination was under] Council Regulation (EC,
ECSCM Euratom) No 781/91 of 7 April 1988 amending the Staff
Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other
Servants of the European Communities in respect of equal treatment
(O.J. 1998 L. 113, p. 4), which introduced Article 1a into the Staff
Regulations giving officials entitlement to equal treatment irrespective
of their sexual orientation, without prejudice to the provision of the
Staff Regulations requiring a particular marital status, did not enter into
force until after the adoption of the contested decision and so it was not
appropriate to take the regulation into consideration. Id.
68. Id. at para. 11. Case T-65/92, 1993 E.C.R. II-593.
69. Case T-65/92, Arauxo-Dumay, 1993 E.C.R., para. 28.
70. Id. at para. 12.
71. Id. at para. 11.
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Mr. D appealed to the ECJ, and the Government of Sweden
(hereinafter “Government”) intervened on his behalf. 72 The
Government argued that since civil status is a matter which comes
within the exclusive competence of the Member States, terms such
as married official or spouse should be interpreted by reference to
law of the Member States and not given an independent
interpretation (as defined in the Staff Regulation). 73 The issue
before the Court was whether married spouses and same-sex
couples in a registered partnership should be treated as equivalent
for the purposes of the allowance, and if so, whether Mr. D was
discriminated against because of his sexual orientation.
Furthermore, the Court was asked which definition of marriage—
the Member States or the Staff Regulation—should control in
regards to the household allowance under the Staff Regulation.
The Court held that the Court of First Instance did not err when
it rejected the petition because “even in the law of those Member
States which recognize the concept of registered partnership, that
concept is distinct from marriage . . . .” 74 The Court stated that the
issue in this case (“the question whether the concepts of marriage
and registered partnership should be treated as distinct or
equivalent . . .” 75) was an issue of first impression. Nevertheless,
the Court held that refusal to grant the allowance was not
discriminatory based on sex, as it was applicable to both men and
women. 76 Furthermore, the Court held that the sex of the partners
is not determinative, but rather it is the tie between the partners
that counts. 77 Next, the Court held that the “principle of equal
treatment can apply only to persons in comparable situations,”78
72. Id. at para 17.
73. Id. at para. 29.
74. Id. (The court further stated that it was for the EU legislature to decide
the equivalency and not the role of the judiciary, as the EU legislature dealt with
budgetary and financial impact of the Staff Regulation).
75. Id. at para. 33.
76. Id. at para. 46.
77. Id. at para. 47.
78. Id. at para. 48.
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thus it was necessary to consider whether a married official could
be comparable to registered partnership between same-sex
couples. 79 The Court first assessed the prominent view of the
“Community” in its entirety—and stated that there was an
“absence of any general assimilation of marriage and other forms
of statutory union.” 80 As such, and in light of the Court’s
observations, the appeal was rejected. 81 Nevertheless, the Court
stated that it is for the Community legislature to amend the Staff
Regulation language to encompass same-sex partnership for the
purpose of qualifying for the allowance under the Staff Regulation.
2. Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen
In 2008, Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen
was decided. In 2001, Mr. Maruko entered into a registered samesex partnership with another German national. 82 His partner, Hans
Hettinger, was a theatrical costume designer. 83 Their partnership
was formed under the Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz (LParG), 84 a
German law that provides legal protection for partnerships that
resembled marriage. In 2005, Mr. Maruko’s partner died. 85

79. Id.
80. Id. at para. 50.
81. Mr. D, for the first time (in front of the Court of Justice) raised an issue
of a plea relating to discrimination based on nationality and restriction of
freedom of movement. The Court rejected these pleas because they were not
asserted in the lower court. The Court also rejected Mr. D’s plea relating to
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
82. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 19.
83. Id.
84. See paragraph 1 of the Law on registered life partnerships (Gesetz uber
die Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaft) of 16 February 2001 (BGBI. 2001, I, p.
266), as amended by the Law of 15 Dec 2004 (BGBI. 2004 I, p. 3396, the
“LPartG”):
(1) Two persons of the same sex establish a partnership when they each
declare, in person and in the presence of the other that they wish to live
together in partnership for life (as life partners). The declarations
cannot be made conditionally or for a fixed period. Declarations are
effective when they are made before the competent authority.
85. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 21.
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A month after his partner’s death, Mr. Maruko petitioned the
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhnen (VddB), 86 the insurance
company that provided his partner’s survivor pension for artists, to
receive the widowers or surviving spouse pension. 87 Maruko’s
partner, as a costume designer, qualified for the pension.
Furthermore, Maruko’s partner voluntarily contributed to the
insurance plan, even though he was under no obligation to do so.88
The VddB denied Mr. Maruko’s petition. 89
The VddB’s interpretation of a widow or widower pension
included married spouses only, and did not include partners in a
registered partnership. 90 Mr. Maruko brought a claim before the
Bayerisches
Verwaltungsgericht
München
(Bavarian
91
Administrative Court) in Munich. Mr. Maruko asserted that
VddB’s refusal to grant the pension infringed “the principle of
equal treatment” since registered partnerships have been placed on
the same footing as marriage, specifically, because paragraph 46(4)
was introduced in the Social Security Code. 92 Mr. Maruko further
asserted that to deny the pension would constitute discrimination
based on sexual orientation since married spouses were in a
comparable situation with registered partners. 93 Lastly, Mr.
Maruko claimed that because German law prescribed the same

86. Id. at para. 22.
87. Paragraphs 32 and 34 of the VddB Regulations defined Widow(er’s)
pension as follows:
Para. 32 (widow’s pension): (1) “The spouse of the insured man or retired man,
if the marriage subsists on the day of the latter’s death, shall be entitled to a
widow’s pension.”
Para. 34 (widower’s pension): (1) “The spouse of the insured woman or retired
woman, if the marriage subsists on the day of the latter’s death, shall be entitled
to a widower’s pension.”
88. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 20.
89. Id. at para. 22 (the VddB rejected Mr. Maruko’s application “on the
ground that its regulations did not provide for such entitlement for surviving life
partners”).
90. Id.
91. Id. at para. 23 (the Bavarian Administrative Court, Munich, is the
referring court).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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rules relating to property to both life partnerships and marriages,
by extension, the VddB could not withhold the pension. 94 The
VddB considered 95 their insurance scheme as a state social
security96 and, as such, argued that it should not be defined as
“pay” within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) 97 of the Directive.
Consequently, if the insurance scheme was not within the scope
and reach of the Directive, the VddB was not obligated to grant
Mr. Maruko’s request.
The Bavarian Administrative Court stated that “in view of the
structure of the VddB and the decisive influence exercised by the
theatre companies and insured persons over its operations, we are
inclined to think that the VddB does not manage a scheme
equivalent to a state social security scheme, within the meaning of
Article 3(3) of Directive 2000/78.” 98 The court further stated that
unlike heterosexual couples, it was impossible for Mr. Maruko and
his partner to satisfy the terms of marriage set forth in the VddB
survivors’ insurance benefit because of their sexual orientation. 99
Furthermore, satisfying the terms of marriage was dependent upon
receiving the pension. 100 The court, in its referral to the ECJ, asked
whether the “combined provisions of Article 1 and Article 2(2)(a)
of the Directive precludes provisions in regulations such as those
of the VddB,” 101 under which a person whose life partner has died
94. Id.
95. Id. at para. 35.
96. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(3): “This Directive does not apply to
payments of any kind made by state schemes or similar, including state social
security or social protection schemes.”
97. Directive, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c): “[T]his Directive shall apply to all
persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies,
in relation to . . . employment and working conditions, including . . . pay.”
98. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, at para. 25.
99. Id. at para. 29.
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 27. See also Directive, supra note 25, art. 1 (“The purpose of
this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination
on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as
regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the
Member States the principle of equal treatment”) & art. 2(2)(a) (“[D]irect
discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favorably
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does not receive survivor’s benefits equivalent to those offered to a
surviving spouse, even though, like spouses, the life partners have
been living in a union of mutual support and assistance which was
constituted for life.
The court stated that the VddB provision was contrary to the
Directive, which “precludes provisions such as those of the VddB
regulation,” 102 under which entitlement to those benefit was
restricted to surviving spouses. The court concluded that there was
discrimination based on sexual orientation against Mr. Maruko
because his claim fell within the Directive. 103
Nevertheless, the Bavarian Court suspended its proceedings
and sought a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. 104 The issue
presented to the Court was whether VddB’s insurance scheme was
a state scheme under article 3(3), 105 or, more specifically, whether
the insurance scheme for widow and widower’s pension qualified
as “pay” under Article 3(1)(c) 106 of the Directive. The Bavarian
Court also presented the issue of whether article 1, in conjunction
with article 2(2)(a) precludes regulations such as those by the
VddB in which a registered partnership is not treated equivalent to
married spouses in obtaining pension benefits. 107 Lastly, the court
questioned (if the above issues were answered in the affirmative)
whether Mr. Maruko was discriminated based on his sexual
orientation. 108 The Bavarian Court feared that they would interpret
the Directive broadly if they answered the above issues in the
affirmative without first obtaining a preliminary reference from the
ECJ.

than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any
of the grounds referred to in Article 1”).
102. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para. 30.
103. Id. at para. 28.
104. Id. at para. 33.
105. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. Maruko, 2008 E.C.R. I-01757, para 33.
108. Id.
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The ECJ deduced that first; the survivors’ pension was the
result of the employment relationship between Maruko’s partner
and the VddB, and “therefore, must be classified as ‘pay’ within
the meaning of the Directive.” 109 Next, the Court ruled that articles
1 and 2 of the Directive forbid both direct and indirect sexual
orientation discrimination. 110 As such, the VddB’s requirement
that the recipient of the survivor benefit be married constituted
indirect discrimination under the Directive since gays and lesbians
are unable to marry in Germany, but are afforded equal protection
as married spouses and considered to be in comparable
situations. 111 The national law recognized a movement in the
equivalency of marriage and partnerships, and likewise, that:
[T]he combined provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of [the
Directive] preclude provisions such as that at issue in the
main proceedings under which, after the death of his life
partner, the surviving partner does not receive a survivor’s
benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse,
even though, under national law, life partnership places
persons of the same sex in a situation comparable to that of
spouses so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit. 112
The Court referred the case back to the Bavarian
Administrative Court to determine whether spouses and
partnerships are equivalent or compatible 113 under German law. If
they were, then Maruko would be entitled to the insurance benefit
held by VddB.
3. Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg
Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg was decided in 2011.
Römer worked for Freie (employer) as an administrative employee
109. Id. at para. 56.
110. Id. at para. 66.
111. Id.
112. Id. at para. 73.
113. Id. The Court also stated “it is for the referring court to determine
whether a surviving life partner is in a situation comparable to that of a spouse
who is entitled to the survivor’s benefit under the occupational pension scheme
managed by the VddB.”
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from 1950 until May 1990, when he ceased working due to
incapacity. 114 On October 15, 2001, Mr. Römer and his partner,
Mr. U entered into a registered partnership pursuant to the
LPartG. 115 Before their registered partnership, Mr. Römer and Mr.
U resided together continuously since 1969. 116 Shortly after the
couple entered the registered partnership, Mr. Römer wrote a letter
to inform his [former] employer of the registered partnership. 117 A
month after the first letter—and on November 28, 2001—Mr.
Römer wrote a second letter and “requested a recalculation of his
ongoing pension entitlement on the basis of the more advantageous
deduction of income tax . . . .” 118 under the First RGG. 119 The
employer refused and stated that, according to the First RGG, only
married pensioners were entitled to the tax calculations, and since
Römer was in a partnership, he would not qualify for the
calculation under the First RGG pension plan. 120 The calculations
showed that Römer’s retirement pension would have been higher if
Römer was in tax category 111/0 as opposed to tax category I. 121
After the employer refused to re-calculate his pension, Römer
brought suit in the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg, a national labor court
114. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595, at para 22.
115. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Erstes Ruhegeldgesetz, (the First RGG—Additional Supplementary
Retirement and Survivors’ Pensions Act), May 30, 1995, [GVBI.] at 108 (Ger.)
[hereinafter the First RGG].
120. Id. The employer cited paragraph 10(6)(1) of the First RGG, which
states, in pertinent part:
[I]n a day of commencement of the retirement benefits . . . is not
permanently separated married pensioners, as well as a pension
recipient who is entitled to child allowance or a corresponding power to
this day, the amount of that day as a wage tax . . . would be paid by tax
class 111/0.
121. Id. at para. 24:
Mr. Römer’s monthly pension, from September 2001, determined on
the basis of tax category I, amounted to DEM 1204.55 (EUR 615.88).
According to Mr. Römer’s calculations, which are not disputed by his
ex-employer, that monthly retirement pension would have been, in
September 2001, DEM 590.87 (EUR 302.11) higher if tax category III
had been applied.
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in Germany. 122 He argued that under the Directive his calculations
for the tax in his pension should be viewed as equal with married
pensioners, and argued that “the criterion of ‘married pensioners,’
laid down by the provision must be interpreted as meaning that it
includes pensioners who have entered into a civil partnership in
accordance with the LPartG.” 123 Römer further contended that,
under the Directive, he had a cause of action to claim an equal
calculation as a married pensioner. 124
Römer’s employer rejected the above-mentioned contentions
and claimed that the pension calculation system applies only to
“families under the special protection of the state,” 125 and marriage
is “usually a prerequisite to forming a family, because it is the
most usual form of relationship between men and women
[recognized] by law and it constitutes a framework for the birth of
children, and therefore the transformation of the married couple
into a family.” 126 Thus, the employer continued, the advantage of
the calculation system was designed to compensate for the extra
financial burden involved in having a family. 127 The Arbeitsgericht
Hamburg acknowledged that the LPartG—the law, under which
Römer and his partner registered their partnership, as amended in
2004—was geared towards a gradual harmonization of registered
partnerships and marriage. Furthermore, the court stated that under
German law there are no significant differences between
partnerships and marriage, except that marriage is between people
of opposite sex.
However, the court decided to suspend its proceedings and
refer the case to the ECJ.128 The question to be decided was
whether the supplementary retirement pensions such as those given
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at para. 25.
Id. at para. 26.
Id. at para. 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at para. 34.
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to former employees of Freie fall within the scope of the
Directive. 129 If so, whether article 2 130 of the Directive prohibits a
scheme that favors married pensioners over partners in a registered
same-sex partnership, resulting in either direct or indirect
discrimination. 131
First, the Court held that the supplementary retirement pension
qualified as “pay” within the Directive, and further held that the
state social security scheme exception under article 3(3) was
inapplicable. 132 The Court also held that under the national law of
Germany, registered partnerships and marriage have no legally
significant differences, and “the main remaining difference is the
fact that marriage presupposes that the spouses are of different
gender, whereas registered life partnership presupposes that the
partners are of the same gender.” 133 Thus, no sufficient difference
exists which would justify the unequal treatment of Römer and as
such, provisions such as that in the First RGG that grants lower
supplemental retirement pension to registered partnerships based
solely on sexual orientation constitutes direct discrimination.134
Furthermore, after the Court’s finding of direct discrimination, it
held that it is for the “referring court to assess the comparability”
of spouses and individuals in a registered partnership. 135
Accordingly, the Court stated that in making this assessment, the
referring court should focus on the rights and obligations of
129. Id.
130. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 2, which provides, in pertinent parts:
For purposes of paragraph 1:
(a) [D]irect discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is
treated less [favorably] than another is, has been or would be treated in
a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to . . . .
(b) [I]ndirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons
having a particular . . . sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage
compared with others . . . .
131. Id.
132. Id. at para. 35-36.
133. Id. at para 45.
134. Id. at para. 52.
135. Id.
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married spouses and persons in partnerships, which are relevant
inquiries considering “the purpose of and the conditions for the
grant of the benefit in question.” 136 Nevertheless, the Court, citing
Maruko, noted that German law “. . . made it clear that registered
life partnership is to be treated as equivalent to marriage as regards
the widow’s or widower’s pension.” 137
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. The Supranational Nature of EU Law
The EU operates on a supranational level and on limited
sovereign powers that have been conceded by the Member
States. 138 A constitutional treaty which some argue might have
resulted in a federalist structure was proposed, but never
ratified. 139 Accordingly, the Member States participate in a
cooperative manner in exercising their sovereignty. 140 Therefore,
the EU can only act “within the limits of the areas of competence
conferred on the Community.” 141 Thus, in accepting a case that has
been referred to it, the Court must first decide whether the issue
initially presented before the national court (referring court) deals
with interpretation of EU law, as the Court cannot interpret
national law. 142 Furthermore, the Court is also limited in granting
an opinion to the issue referred to it. 143 The Court must find a
balance between enforcing EU law and refraining from enforcing
areas of law that are within the exclusive competence of Member
States. 144
136. Id.
137. Id. at para. 42.
138. KLAUS-DIETER BURCHARDT, THE ABC OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2388 (Publication office of the European Union 2010).
139. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004 O.J. (C
310) 1 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Constitutional Treaty].
140. Id. at 98.
141. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3.
142. See supra Part III.A.
143. Id.
144. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595, para. 38.
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The “marital status of persons falls exclusively within the
competence of the Member States.” 145 As such, an important
hurdle in the applicability of the Directive in the above cases was
to determine whether the national court (referring court) would
make the compatibility determination—that is, whether marriage is
treated equivalently as a registered same-sex partnership. 146 The
Court cannot decide the validity of a Member States’ restriction on
same-sex partnerships, marriages or unions. However, once a
Member State has decided to confer a status on same-sex
partnerships that is comparable to married spouses—as in the
Maruko and Römer decisions—the denial of benefits on the basis
of a claimant’s sexual orientation would then be within the
purview of the Court’s jurisdiction. 147
The Makuo decision was the first time the Court ruled “in favor
of same-sex couples.” 148 Thus, the Maruko and Römer decisions
where progressive milestones in the right of sexual orientation
minority in EU in general, and in the employment benefit context,
in particular. These cases were in stark contrast to the ruling in
Sweden. The Sweden decision was distinguishable from the latter
two cases for several reasons. First, in the Sweden decision, the
issue of comparability determination between same-sex
partnerships and marriage was an issue of first impression before
the Court. 149 Second, the Sweden decision dealt with a Community
Staff Regulation, which was susceptible to its own independent
interpretation. According to the Court, the independent
interpretation correlated with the Community practices at the time

145. Id.
146. See discussion supra Part III.B.
147. Id. In both the Maruko and Römer decisions, the Court stated that if the
national court where to find that the status conferred to same-sex partnership is
comparable to that of married spouses in regard to the respective pension plans,
then the claimants would be entitled to receive the pension benefits,
notwithstanding the classification of the relationships.
148. EU backs gay man’s pension rights, BBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008, 15:44
GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7324824.stm.
149. See supra Part III.B.1.
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Sweden was decided. 150 As such, the decision in Sweden derived
from the Court’s determination that in implementing the Staff
Regulation, the Community legislature had the traditional meaning
of marriage in mind. That is, the Staff Regulation did not anticipate
coverage of same-sex partnerships, marriages or unions because
there was an “absence of any general assimilation of marriage and
other forms of statutory union,” for same-sex couples within the
Community. 151 Thus, although there was clear discrimination in
Sweden, the Court was limited in its ruling, as the Staff Regulation
interpretation forbade further scrutiny by the Court. Third, unlike
Maruko and Römer, the Staff Regulations’ ability of independent
interpretation hindered the comparability analysis in Sweden.
The Court went on to rule, however, in the later cases, that the
Member States should determine the compatibility of partnerships
and marriages, and if such compatibility were founded, the
plaintiffs would be entitled to their pensions and insurance,
respectively. Thus, even though the Swedish Government granted
a comparative situation to same-sex registered partnerships as
married couples, the ability of the Staff Regulations independent
interpretation made such determination irrelevant. Ironically, the
latter cases hinged upon such determination. The Court, for its
part, called for the EU legislature to amend the language of the
Staff Regulation. 152 It remains to be seen whether the result of the
Court in Sweden would have been different if the case dealt instead
with an insurance company such as the VddB in Maruko, and not a
Staff Regulation sponsored by the Community. 153 Lastly, Sweden
is distinguishable from Maruko and Römer, as the Sweden
150. See, e.g., Ian Curry-Sumner, Same-sex Realationships in Europe:
Trends Toward Tolerance? 3 AMSTERDAM L. FORUM 44, 51 (2011) (When
Sweden was decided in 2001, Germany and Finland allowed registeredpartnership, and only the Netherlands allowed same-sex marriage. This suggests
that the court took into account the “Community practice,” which indicated a
reluctance to grant martial and partnership status to same-sex couples).
151. See supra Part III.B.1.
152. Id.
153. Note, however, that both public and private entities are covered under
the Directive.
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decision, although factually similar to the latter cases, could not
have been analyzed under the Directive. It would have been
interesting whether Sweden would have been decided differently if
the Directive would have been applicable.
An essential part of the applicability of the Directive was
whether the employment benefit sought qualified as “pay.” If the
benefit did not qualify as “pay” it would fall outside the scope of
the Directive. 154 The relevant articles of the Directive are articles
1, 2 and 3. 155 Article 1 established the protected grounds. 156 Article
2 defines direct and indirect discrimination, both of which are
covered under the Directive. 157 Article 3(1)(c) covers “pay” within
the confines of the Directive, 158 while article 3(3) removes state
social security schemes from the Directive’s coverage. 159
The Court’s recognition that the calculation scheme in Römer
and the insurance scheme in Maruko qualified as “pay” within
article 3, was the first step in order for appellant’s to assert their
claim under the Directive. 160 Had the Court ruled differently (that
these benefits were not considered “pay” for the purposes of the
Directive) the Court would not have reached the question of
whether the respective provisions were discriminatory. The next
step was the Court’s ruling that—pursuant to article 2—the
appellants were either directly or indirectly discriminated against
because they were not treated comparably with married couples
with whom they were similarly situated. 161 Without such finding,
the Court would not have had a reason to request the compatibility
analysis from the national courts so as to determine whether
partnerships where comparable to marriage in order for the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See Directive, supra note 25, arts. 1, 2 & 3.
See supra Part I.
See supra note 130.
See supra note 97.
See supra note 96.
See supra Part III.B.2 & Part III.B.3.
See supra Part III.B.
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appellants to claim entitlement of such benefits. 162 Thus, the Court
was right to find that the rejection of a survivor pension by a
partner should be deemed less favorable treatment, because a
married spouse would be automatically entitled to the pension,
while a partner would not. Furthermore, it was important that the
Court not only concluded that the treatment was less favorable, but
that the provisions in both Römer and Maruko were unacceptable
because they attempted to restrict benefits for same-sex partners,
who otherwise qualified for the benefits under national law.
Although the Directive is not as strong as it could be due to the
nature of the EU, 163 the Member States are entitled to grant greater
protection than the Directive provides. 164 As such, the Member
States and their judicial branch should be at the forefront in
providing for higher protection than the Directive calls for. This
request at first glance seems feasible. However, while heighted
protection from Germany made all the difference in the latter two
cases, the Sweden case showed how a different level of protection
failed to accomplish the task. 165 As a consequence, the question
becomes whether the protection for same-sex partnership rests
upon the type of benefit that is challenged, as opposed to the
Member State’s grant to same-sex partners of comparable status to
married spouses. Furthermore, in Sweden the Court stated that the
sexual orientation of the partners did not matter, but that it was the
tie between the partners that mattered. 166 However, in Maruko and
Römer, the Court ruled that it was discrimination based on sexual
orientation because the tie between the partners could never be one
of marriage due to their sexual orientation. 167 The rulings in both
Maruko and Römer have proven to be big steps forward for EU

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. See also Part II.
See supra Part III.B.
See Part III.B.1 through 3.
See Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.B.2 & Part III.B.3.
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citizens in registered same-sex partnerships in providing the
opportunity to recover employment benefits.
Currently, sixteen of the EU Member States recognize some
form of registered partnership, with nearly ten of the Member
States recognizing same-sex marriage. 168 However, since the
definition of comparability is within the Member States
competence, it is possible that provisions such as the VddB, and
those in Freie 169 would be considered non-discriminatory, if samesex partnerships and marriage are not considered comparable to
married spouses. Accordingly, if a Member State allows same sex
partnerships, but does not confer comparable benefits to the
partners as those of married spouses, the citizen would
undoubtedly be treated as second class solely because the Member
State does not accord comparability status. Thus, in essence, “this
means that the Member States frame the comparability between
homosexual and heterosexual situations and thereby indirectly
decide upon the applicability of EU law,” 170 by granting a benefit
to a same-sex partner, but failing to uphold such benefit like in the
case of married spouses, thereby removing the matter from the
confines of the Directive, and from the Court’s jurisdiction.
Furthermore, it would also be legal to refuse same-sex partners
from benefitting from the same employment benefits as those
enjoyed by married spouses. In the Maruko case, the “results
would have been very different if Germany would [not have
168. See Emmanuelle Bribosia, Isabelle Rorive & Laura Van den Eynde,
Same-Sex Marriage—Building an Argument before the European Court of
Human Rights in Light of the U.S. Experience, 32 BERKELEY INT’L L. J. (2013).
The Netherlands was the first to do so in 2001, since then, Belgium, Spain,
Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom have legalized
same-sex marriage. Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Austria, Ireland and Spain recognize some form of same-sex
partnership, while Croatia recognizes unregistered cohabitation. Cyprus,
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and
Bulgaria do not recognize any form of same-sex partnership or marriage.
169. Römer, 2010 E.C.R. I-3595.
170. Gabriel N. Toggenburg, LGTB go Luxembourg: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual
and Transgender Rights before the European Court of Justice, 5 EUR. L. REP.
174 (2008).

2013]

EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND GAY RIGHTS

645

provided] life partners with a ‘comparable situation so far as it
concerns survivors benefit . . . .’” 171 Even though, concededly, the
structure of the EU lends itself to this form of governance, the goal
of equal application of the Directive to all Member States would be
hampered. Articles 1 and 2 call for combating unfavorable
treatment based on sexual orientation. The cases presented above
show that a Member State could allow same-sex partnerships, but
with none of the benefits that married couples would have, if the
Member State decides that partnerships and marriage are not
comparable. In such a case, essentially, the partnership would be in
name only.
B. A Survey of Sexual Orientation Rights Before and After the
Directive
The Directive itself—having been implemented—is an
important step towards equal treatment of sexual minorities, of
same-sex partners in regard to employment benefits, in particular,
and EU sexual minorities citizens in general. Even though the case
law on the Directive has been based on granting pensions and
insurance benefit for same-sex partners, the Directive has provided
relief in other areas as well. For instance, before the Directive,
sexual minorities in the workplace did not have a cause of action or
remedy against those who discriminated against them. The
Directive offers explicit judicial and administrative remedy for
victims, reinforced by the stipulations that the sanctions chosen
must be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive in case of
breaches of the obligation . . . .” 172
The Directive, in effect, stands for a proposition that sexual
orientation discrimination ought to be taken seriously, and
remedied accordingly. This tough stance on discrimination is
further apparent under the Directive as the defendant has the
burden of proving the absence of discrimination.
171. Id. at 180.
172. See Directive, supra note 25, art. 3.
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Under the Directive, it is easier to “challenge legally the
conduct of persons responsible for carrying out homophobic
harassment in the workplace.” 173 In turn, as stated before, the
Directive grants a direct remedy to those who have been
discriminated against. 174 As such, those discriminated against
would no longer have to rely on weaker law and weaker theories of
recovery, such as harassment, assault or battery.
As a result of the Directive, labor organizations in the EU have
mobilized in an effort to promote the Directive’s objectives and
goals. The European Trade Union Confederation (hereinafter
“ETUC”) is one such organization. One aim of the ETUC is to
promote and defend human and civil rights, while demanding
equality in the workplace for sexual orientation minorities. 175 In
the wake of the Directive, the ETUC has partnered with other
national governmental organizations and trade unions in furthering
their commitment to equal treatment, respect and dignity for
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered (hereinafter “LGBT”)
citizens in the workplace. 176 As part of its commitment to
eliminate sexual orientation discrimination, the ETUC has set up a
four-year action plan. 177 This plan is aimed at raising awareness of
LGBT discrimination in the workplace, and promoting diversity,
non-discrimination, as well as raising awareness to sexual
orientation discrimination among trade union members. 178

173. Id.
174. See e.g., supra Part I, discussing the judicial unenforceability of earlier
provisions by EU citizens against those who discriminated against them.
175. Jane Pillinger, Extending Equality: Trade Unions Actions to Organise
and Promote Equal Rights, Respect and Dignity for Workers Regardless of their
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 9-45 (European Trade Union
Confederation 2008), available at http://www.etuc.org/sites/www.etuc.org
/files/ETUC_inside-2.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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In the EU, sexual orientation minorities are sometimes referred
to as invisible citizens 179 because they have to hide their sexual
orientation to prevent harassment. Another labor organization, the
European Commission EQUAL Community Initiative (hereinafter
“EQUAL”), has the objective of ending the invisibility of sexual
minorities in the workplace. 180 The EQUAL initiative was cofounded by the Member States after the adoption of the
Directive. 181 The aim of EQUAL resembles that of the ETUC. 182
EQUAL’s objective is to create a working environment in the EU
where homosexuals feel safe in the workplace. 183 It is safe to say
that without the Directive the above-mentioned organizations
would not have been created. Furthermore, absent the Directive,
such organizations could not effectively promote and raise
awareness of discrimination of sexual minorities in the workplace.
As such, the Directive has had notable accomplishments. First,
the Directive provided labor organizations with a law to rely on in
implementing change. Second, EU Member States sexual
orientation minority citizens can rely on the Directive in court.
Third, in connection with the applicability of the Directive in court,
sexual minority citizens are able to seek remedies against violators
179. See, e.g., Homosexuals. The Invisible Citizens of Lithuania, BALTIC
WORLDS,
http://balticworlds.com/homosexuals-the-invisible-citizens-oflithuania (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). These “invisible citizens”—as they are
termed by the sociologists who authored a large-scale survey on homophobia in
Lithuania—are subject to several forms of discrimination, most notably in the
workplace. In Lithuania, they do not benefit from any legal recognition or
organized communal life.
180. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
Member States of 14.04.2000 Establishing the Guidelines for the Community
Initiative EQUAL Concerning Transnational Cooperation to Promote New
Means of Combating Discrimination and Inequalities in Connection with the
Labour Market, C (2000) 853, 2000 O.J. (C 127).
181. Id. The European Social Funds initially funded EQUAL.
182. Id. EQUAL also relies on the impact of media coverage to raise
awareness of the rights of sexual minorities in the workplace. In addition,
EQUAL takes it a step further and addresses LGBT issues in organizations such
as churches, the police and the military. Furthermore, the EQUAL partnership
has succeeded in educating and training management groups, trade union and
work personnel.
183. Id.
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of the Directive. In light of the above, the Directive has been
successful.
C. By the Numbers: Sexual Orientation Discrimination Prevalence
Before and After the Directive
In comparing the prevalence of sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace, it is important to view both preDirective and post-Directive numbers. Unfortunately, there is no
system for assessing adverse impact of discrimination in the EU.
This makes tracking the progress made after the implementation of
the Directive difficult. However, “an action plan on statistics and a
forthcoming EU Regulation are geared towards achieving
comparable data of sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace at the EU level.” 184
Nevertheless, statistics are taken from independent sources to
gauge the progress of the Directive’s anti-discrimination measures.
Before the Directive was implemented, anti-gay discrimination
was considered prevalent. 185 A 1994 survey revealed that almost
sixteen percent of respondents agreed that they had been
discriminated against at work, while half answered that they were
harassed. 186 Eight percent of respondents reported that they were
fired from their jobs due to their sexual orientation. 187 Twenty-five
percent said that they were “too afraid to apply for certain jobs or
to specific employers.” 188 There is support for such fear. For
example, up until recently, Italy considered homosexuals as being
“unfit” to serve in the military. 189
184. JAMES OUTTZ, ADVERSE IMPACT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
STAFFING AND HIGH STAKES SELECTION (Psychology Press 2010).
185. See, e.g., Gill Valentine, An Equal Place to Work? Anti-Lesbian
Discrimination and Sexual Citizenship in the European Union in Women of the
European Union: The Politics of Work and Daily Life 111, 112 (Maria Dolors
García-Ramon & Janice J. Monk eds., Routledge 1996).
186. Id. at 112.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 113.
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Since the implementation of the Directive, Member State
citizens have taken advantage of its legal provisions. In 2007,
official statistics by the European Union Agency for Fundamental
Rights were released. 190 The following countries’ courts made
findings of discrimination based on the “total number of
complaints in each country.” 191 In Sweden, sixty-two cases of
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace were filed, with
a result in six instances of proven discrimination. 192 In Latvia,
there were twelve cases filed and only one case resulted in a
finding of sexual orientation discrimination. In the Czech
Republic, there was only one case of sexual orientation
discrimination filed, and discrimination was found in that sole
case. 193 It is important to point out that in Great Britain, the highest
monetary remedy for a victim of sexual orientation discrimination
in the workplace was £120,000. 194 Unfortunately, these statistics
also revealed the prevalence of discrimination post-Directive. For
instance, France reported sixteen percent of individuals were
discriminated against in the workplace. In the United Kingdom,
that number is fifty two percent (more than triple in comparison to
France). In Sweden, thirty percent reported such instances of
discrimination. 195
Respondents replied to a survey conducted by the European
Commission.196 The respondents stated that if a “company can
190. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Homophobia and
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in the EU
member states: part II—the social situation (updated version) 56 (2009),
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/397-FRA_hdgso_report_part2
_en.pdf (last visited March 31, 2014).
191. Id. at 60.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. STEFAN GRÖSCHL, DIVERSITY IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Gower Pub. 2011).
195. Id. at 64.
196. Special Eurobarometer 263, Discrimination in the European Union 3,
18-20
(European
Commission,
2007),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_263_en.pdf (last visited
March 31, 2013).
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choose between two candidates with equal skills and
qualifications,” a sexual orientation minority would be at a
nineteen percent hiring disadvantage. 197 Forty-three percent
responded that they would be either as likely or more likely to
grant a promotion to a sexual orientation minority. 198 Furthermore,
sixty-six percent responded that they are in favor of adopting
“measures that provide equal opportunities” to sexual orientation
minorities in the “field of employment.” 199 The above statistics
indicate that, while sexual orientation discrimination is not as
prevalent and blatant as before the implementation of the
Directive, there is still work to be done.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Not all discrimination is based on a refusal to grant a surviving
same-sex partner a pension or insurance benefit. Most
discrimination in the workplace deals with a hostile environment
from either co-workers or superiors. Studies have shown that
LGBT experience harassment and discrimination—direct and
indirect—in the workplace. 200 This impacts an individual’s
decision to be either openly gay in the workplace or become an
invisible citizen. 201 Sexual minorities should not be forced to
accept such a choice. 202 Based on the above analysis and
discussion, the following are practical and feasible
recommendations.
First, with any aspect of life, education should be in the
forefront of a successful implementation of this Directive.
197. Id. at 18.
198. Id. at 19.
199. Id. at 20.
200. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, supra note 190, at
63.
201. Id. at 67.
202. Id. (“Many workplaces are currently not considered ‘safe havens’ for
LGBT staff. Although data varies according to national context, studies and
interviews with National Equality Bodies and LGBT NGOs demonstrate that the
majority of LGBT persons are generally reluctant, or somewhat reluctant, to
being ‘out’ and open in the workplace”).
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Currently, only Sweden has a body specifically authorized to deal
with discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 203 That body
is the HomO, one of four Equality Ombudspersons in Sweden. 204
More Member States should raise awareness and educate their
citizenry about this issue. Furthermore, it is essential that
employers develop training programs focused on educating
workplace personnel from the very top management to the
employees.
Next, it is recommended that the Member States offer
incentives to employers who take action in the effort to combat
sexual orientation discrimination. This will provide sexual
orientation minorities with hiring and promotional opportunities
that would not have otherwise been available. As noted above, the
European Commission has conducted surveys and studies into the
prevalence of sexual orientation discrimination. The European
Commission should work on developing a system that focuses on
creating a mandatory reporting system for statistical data in order
to gauge the progress of the Directive.
Lastly, it seems that the national courts and the ECJ are
interpreting the Directive in a way that is favorable towards samesex partnerships. Looking onward, this trend should continue, as
the Member States and individual companies, such as the VddB,
would be less inclined to implement provisions that would have a
discriminatory effect on sexual orientation minorities in the EU.
While recognizing that this is a brave recommendation, Member
States that want to grant same-sex partnerships should be
mandated to create such a scheme, whereby same-sex partnerships
would be recognized as comparable to marriage for the purpose of
securing employment benefits, among other things. It could be
possible, however, that mandating Member States to provide
comparability status would generate resistance to granting any
recognition of same-sex partnership rights. While this might be the
203. Id. at 58.
204. Id.
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case, Member States who do intend to recognize such status but
refuse to confer the benefits of such status create comparability in
name only, thereby rendering it ineffective. This contradicts the
essence of the recognition of same-sex partnerships, unions, or
marriages.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is true that laws aimed at combating sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace are a fairly new concept. However,
the EU has come a long way since the non-binding provisions of
the Parliamentary Resolution. Perhaps a comprehensive Directive
that focuses on sexual orientation minorities’ rights in all aspects
of life (subject to the competence limitations of EU institutions)
would be the next step. There is not much an EU Directive can do
in regards to the recommendations made above, except that the
Member States would have to raise their standards, while also
granting a comparable situation to married spouses. Another option
would be for the EU to move towards a model of federalism,
which will allow the EU more discretion in implementing antidiscriminatory laws. Concededly, this is an ambitious goal, since
there have been debates about a federal EU, but the model was
rejected. 205 Until further reconsideration, the progress of the EU in
implementing Directive 2000/78/EC should be commended.

205. See supra Part IV.

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE
Volume 5 of the Journal of Civil Law Studies published several
titles of the Louisiana Civil Code in English and in French. This
included the Preliminary Title and the general law of obligations,
namely three titles of Book Three: Obligations in General (Title 3),
Conventional Obligations or Contracts (Title 4), and Obligations
Arising without Agreement (Title 5). The English and the French
appeared side by side, rather than one above the other, as on the
webpage. Representation and Mandate (Title 15) and Suretyship
(Title 16) are the object of the present publication. These two titles
were translated by Dr. Ivan Tchotourian, then Associate Professor
at the Université de Nantes (France) and presently Professor at the
Université Laval (Québec), during a two-month visit at the LSU
Law Center in the fall of 2011. The translation was revised by Dr.
Matthias Martin, Université de Lorraine (France), during his visit
at the LSU Law Center in the spring of 2014. 1

1. For a general presentation of the translation project, see Olivier
Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J.
CIV. L. STUD. 97-104 (2012).
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BOOK III. OF THE
DIFFERENT MODES OF
ACQUIRING THE
OWNERSHIP OF THINGS
(…)
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LIVRE III. DES DIFFERENTS
MOYENS DONT ON
ACQUIERT LA PROPRIETE
DES BIENS
(…)

TITLE XV.
REPRESENTATION AND
MANDATE
[Acts 1871, No. 87; Acts 1997,
No. 261, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998]

TITRE XV. DE LA
REPRESENTATION ET DU
MANDAT
[Loi de 1871, n°87 ; Loi de 1997,
n°261, § 1, entrée en vigueur le
1er janvier 1998]

CHAPTER 1.
REPRESENTATION

CHAPITRE 1. DE LA
REPRESENTATION

Art. 2985. A person may
represent another person in legal
relations as provided by law or
by juridical act. This is called
representation.

Art. 2985. Suivant les termes
de la loi ou d’un acte juridique,
une personne peut en représenter
une autre dans ses rapports
juridiques. Ceci s’appelle la
représentation.

Art. 2986. The authority of
the representative may be
conferred by law, by contract,
such as mandate or partnership,
or by the unilateral juridical act
of procuration.
Art. 2987. A procuration is a
unilateral juridical act by which a
person, the principal, confers
authority on another person, the
representative, to represent the
principal in legal relations.
The procuration may be
addressed to the representative or
to a person with whom the
representative is authorized to
represent the principal in legal
relations.

Art. 2986. Le pouvoir du
représentant peut être conféré
par la loi, par un contrat tel que
le mandat ou la société en nom
collectif, ou par un acte juridique
unilatéral de procuration.
Art. 2987. La procuration est
l’acte juridique unilatéral par
lequel une personne, le
représenté, donne pouvoir à une
autre personne, le représentant,
de la représenter dans ses
rapports juridiques.
La procuration peut être
adressée au représentant ou à un
tiers avec lequel il a le pouvoir
d’agir au nom du représenté
dans ses rapports juridiques.
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Art. 2988. A procuration is
subject to the rules governing
mandate to the extent that the
application of those rules is
compatible with the nature of the
procuration.
CHAPTER 2. MANDATE
SECTION 1. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
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Art. 2988. La procuration est
soumise aux règles du mandat
dans la mesure où leur
application est compatible avec
la nature de la procuration.

CHAPITRE 2. DU MANDAT
SECTION 1. PRINCIPES
GÉNÉRAUX

Art. 2989. A mandate is a
contract by which a person, the
principal, confers authority on
another person, the mandatary, to
transact one or more affairs for
the principal.

Art. 2989. Le mandat est un
contrat par lequel une personne,
le mandant, donne pouvoir à une
autre personne, le mandataire,
de faire une ou plusieurs affaires
pour lui.

Art. 2990. In all matters for
which no special provision is
made in this Title, the contract of
mandate is governed by the
Titles
of "Obligations
in
General" and "Conventional
Obligations or Contracts".

Art. 2990. Pour toutes les
matières dans lesquelles il
n’existe pas de dispositions
particulières dans le présent
titre, le mandat est régi par les
titres “Des obligations en
général” et “Des obligations
conventionnelles ou des
contrats”.

Art. 2991. The contract of
mandate may serve the exclusive
or the common interest of the
principal, the mandatary, or a
third person.

Art. 2991. Le mandat peut
être conclu dans l’intérêt exclusif
ou commun du mandant, du
mandataire ou d’une tierce
personne.

Art. 2992. The contract of
mandate may be either onerous
or gratuitous. It is gratuitous in
the absence of contrary
agreement.

Art. 2992. Le mandat est à
titre onéreux ou à titre gratuit. Il
est réputé à titre gratuit en
l’absence de convention
contraire.
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Art. 2993. The contract of
mandate is not required to be in
any particular form.
Nevertheless, when the law
prescribes a certain form for an
act, a mandate authorizing the act
must be in that form.
Art. 2994. The principal
may confer on the mandatary
general authority to do whatever
is appropriate under the
circumstances.
Art. 2995. The mandatary
may perform all acts that are
incidental to or necessary for the
performance of the mandate.
The authority granted to a
mandatary to perform an act that
is an ordinary part of his
profession or calling, or an act
that follows from the nature of
his profession or calling, need
not be specified.
Art. 2996. The authority to
alienate, acquire, encumber, or
lease a thing must be given
expressly. Neither the property
nor its location need be
specifically described.
Art. 2997. Authority also
must be given expressly to:
(1) Make an inter vivos
donation, either outright or to a
new or existing trust or other
custodial arrangement, and, when
also expressly so provided, to
impose such conditions on the
donation, including, without
limitation, the power to revoke,
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Art. 2993. Aucune forme
spécifique n’est requise pour le
mandat.
Néanmoins, lorsque la loi
impose une forme particulière
pour l’accomplissement d’un
acte, le mandat doit être donné
dans cette forme.
Art. 2994. Le mandant peut
donner au mandataire le pouvoir
général de faire tout ce qui est
approprié selon les
circonstances.
Art. 2995. Le mandataire
peut accomplir tous les actes qui
sont nécessaires ou accessoires à
l’exécution du mandat.
Le pouvoir donné au
mandataire d’exécuter un acte
qui fait partie ou qui découle de
l’exercice normal de sa
profession ou de son commerce
n’a pas besoin d’être précisé.
Art. 2996. Le pouvoir
d’aliéner, d’acquérir, de grever
ou de louer un bien doit être
donné expressément. Le bien et
sa localisation n’ont à faire
l’objet d’aucune description
spécifique.
Art. 2997. Il est également
nécessaire de donner un pouvoir
exprès en vue de :
(1) Effectuer une donation
entre vifs, directement ou par le
biais d’un trust ou tout autre
arrangement fiduciaire, nouveau
ou existant, et, dans la mesure où
cela a été expressément prévu,
affecter cette donation de
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that are not contrary to the other
express terms of the mandate.
(2) Accept or renounce a
succession.
(3) Contract a loan,
acknowledge or make remission
of a debt, or become a surety.
(4) Draw or endorse
promissory notes and negotiable
instruments.
(5) Enter into a compromise
or refer a matter to arbitration.
(6) Make health care
decisions, such as surgery,
medical expenses, nursing home
residency, and medication.
[Amended by Acts 2001, No.
594, §1]

charges, y compris le pouvoir de
révoquer sans aucune limite, si
celles-ci ne sont pas contraires
aux autres termes exprès du
mandat.
(2) Accepter ou renoncer à
une succession.
(3) Contracter un emprunt,
reconnaître l’existence d’une
dette ou la remettre, ou encore se
porter caution.
(4) Tirer ou endosser des
billets à ordre ou tout autre effet
de commerce.
(5) Compromettre ou
soumettre une matière à
l’arbitrage.
(6) Prendre une décision
relative à la santé telle qu’une
intervention chirurgicale, des
dépenses médicales, un
placement en maison de soins et
un traitement médicamenteux.
[Modifié par Loi de 2001, n°594,
§ 1]

Art. 2998. A mandatary who
represents the principal as the
other contracting party may not
contract with himself unless he is
authorized by the principal, or, in
making such contract, he is
merely fulfilling a duty to the
principal.

Art. 2998. Le mandataire qui
représente le mandant en tant
qu’autre partie contractante ne
peut contracter avec lui-même
sans l’autorisation du mandant,
à moins qu’en concluant un tel
contrat, il s’acquitte simplement
de son devoir vis-à-vis du
mandant.

Art. 2999. A person of
limited capacity may act as a
mandatary for matters for which
he is capable of contracting. In
such a case, the rights of the
principal against the mandatary

Art. 2999. La personne dont
la capacité est limitée peut agir
comme mandataire dans les
matières pour lesquelles elle est
capable de contracter. En pareil
cas, les droits du mandant à
l’encontre du mandataire sont
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are subject to the rules governing
the obligations of persons of
limited capacity.
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soumis aux règles relatives aux
obligations des personnes dont la
capacité est limitée.

Art. 3000. Une personne peut
être mandataire de deux parties
Art. 3000. A person may be
ou davantage, tel qu’un acheteur
the mandatary of two or more
et un vendeur, en vue de conclure
parties, such as a buyer and a
une ou plusieurs affaires dans
seller, for the purpose of
lesquelles elles sont toutes
transacting one or more affairs
impliquées. En pareil cas, le
involving all of them. In such a
mandataire doit révéler à
case, the mandatary must
chacune des parties qu’il
disclose to each party that he also
représente les autres.
represents the other
SECTION 2. RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL
AND THE MANDATARY

SECTION 2. DES RELATIONS
ENTRE LE MANDANT ET LE
MANDATAIRE

Art. 3001. The mandatary is
bound to fulfill with prudence
and diligence the mandate he has
accepted. He is responsible to the
principal for the loss that the
principal sustains as a result of
the mandatary's failure to
perform.

Art. 3001. Le mandataire est
tenu d’exécuter avec prudence et
diligence le mandat qu’il a
accepté. Il répond envers le
mandant de la perte supportée
par ce dernier du fait de
l’inexécution de son mandat.

Art. 3002. When the mandate
is gratuitous, the court may
reduce the amount of loss for
which the mandatary is liable.

Art.3002. Lorsque le mandat
est à titre gratuit, le juge peut
réduire le montant des pertes
dont le mandataire doit
répondre.

Art. 3003. At the request of
the principal, or when the
circumstances so require, the
mandatary is bound to provide
information and render an
account of his performance of the
mandate. The mandatary is
bound to notify the principal,

Art. 3003. A la demande du
mandant ou lorsque les
circonstances l’exigent, le
mandataire doit le renseigner et
lui rendre compte de l’exécution
du mandat. Le mandataire doit
informer, sans délai, le mandant
de l’accomplissement du mandat.
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without delay, of the fulfillment
of the mandate.
Art. 3004. The mandatary is
bound to deliver to the principal
everything he received by virtue
of the mandate, including things
he received unduly.
The mandatary may retain in
his possession sufficient property
of the principal to pay the
mandatary's expenses and
remuneration.
Art. 3005. The mandatary
owes interest, from the date used,
on sums of money of the
principal that the mandatary
applies to his own use.
Art. 3006. In the absence of
contrary agreement, the
mandatary is bound to fulfill the
mandate himself.
Nevertheless, if the interests
of the principal so require, when
unforeseen circumstances
prevent the mandatary from
performing his duties and he is
unable to communicate with the
principal, the mandatary may
appoint a substitute.
Art. 3007. When the
mandatary is authorized to
appoint a substitute, he is
answerable to the principal for
the acts of the substitute only if
he fails to exercise diligence in
selecting the substitute or in
giving instructions.
When not authorized to
appoint a substitute, the

Art. 3004. Le mandataire
doit remettre au mandant tout ce
qu’il a reçu en vertu du mandat,
quand bien même ce qu'il aurait
reçu n'eût point été dû au
mandant.
Le mandataire peut retenir
en sa possession suffisamment de
biens du mandant pour couvrir
ses dépenses et sa rémunération.
Art. 3005. A compter du jour
de leur utilisation, le mandataire
doit l’intérêt sur les sommes
d’argent dues au mandant que le
mandataire a utilisé pour son
propre usage.
Art. 3006. Sauf convention
contraire, le mandataire est tenu
d’accomplir personnellement le
mandat.
Néanmoins, le mandataire
peut, si les intérêts du mandant
l’exigent, se substituer un tiers
lorsque des circonstances
imprévues l’empêchent
d’accomplir le mandat et qu’il ne
peut en aviser le mandant.
Art. 3007. Lorsque le
mandataire est autorisé à se
substituer un tiers, il répond
envers le mandant des actes de la
personne qu’il s’est substitué
uniquement dans l’hypothèse où
il n’a pas fait preuve de diligence
dans le choix de ce tiers ou dans
les instructions qu’il lui a
données.
Lorsqu’il n’a pas été
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mandatary is answerable to the
principal for the acts of the
substitute as if the mandatary had
performed the mandate himself.
In all cases, the principal has
recourse against the substitute.

Art. 3008. If the mandatary
exceeds his authority, he is
answerable to the principal for
resulting loss that the principal
sustains.
The principal is not
answerable to the mandatary for
loss that the mandatary sustains
because of acts that exceed his
authority unless the principal
ratifies those acts.
Art. 3009. Multiple
mandataries are not solidarily
liable to their common principal,
unless the mandate provides
otherwise.
Art. 3010. The principal is
bound to the mandatary to
perform the obligations that he
mandatary contracted within the
limits of his authority. The
principal is also bound to the
mandatary for obligations
contracted by the mandatary after
the termination of the mandate if
at the time of contracting the
mandatary did not know that the
mandate had terminated.
The principal is not bound to
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autorisé à se substituer un tiers,
le mandataire répond envers le
mandant des actes de la
personne qu’il s’est substituée
comme s’il les avait
personnellement accomplis.
Dans tous les cas, le mandant
a un recours contre la personne
que le mandataire s’est
substituée.
Art. 3008. Lorsque le
mandataire excède ses pouvoirs,
il est responsable des pertes qui
en résultent et qui sont subies
par le mandant.
Le mandant n’est pas
responsable envers le
mandataire des pertes subies par
ce dernier et trouvant leur source
dans des actes excédant ses
pouvoirs à moins que le mandant
ne les ait ratifiés.
Art. 3009. A moins que le
mandat n’en dispose autrement,
plusieurs mandataires ne sont
pas responsables solidairement à
l’égard de leur mandant
commun.
Art. 3010. Le mandant est
tenu d’exécuter les obligations
contractées par le mandataire
dans la limite de ses pouvoirs. Le
mandant est également tenu des
obligations contractées par le
mandataire après la fin du
mandat si, au moment de leur
conclusion, le mandataire
ignorait que le mandat avait pris
fin.
A moins qu’il ne ratifie les
actes accomplis, le mandant
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the mandatary to perform the
obligations that the mandatary
contracted which exceed the
limits of the mandatary's
authority unless the principal
ratifies those acts.
Art. 3011. The mandatary
acts within the limits of his
authority even when he fulfills
his duties in a manner more
advantageous to the principal
than was authorized.
Art. 3012. The principal is
bound to reimburse the
mandatary for the expenses and
charges he has incurred and to
pay him the remuneration to
which he is entitled.
The principal is bound to
reimburse and pay the mandatary
even though without the
mandatary's fault the purpose of
the mandate was not
accomplished.
Art. 3013. The principal is
bound to compensate the
mandatary for loss the mandatary
sustains as a result of the
mandate, but not for loss caused
by the fault of the mandatary.
Art. 3014. The principal
owes interest from the date of the
expenditure on sums expended
by the mandatary in performance
of the mandate.
Art. 3015. Multiple
principals for an affair common
to them are solidarily bound to
their mandatary.
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n’est pas tenu d’exécuter les
obligations contractées par le
mandataire qui excèderaient les
limites de ses pouvoirs.
Art. 3011. Le mandataire
reste dans les limites de ses
pouvoirs lorsqu’il agit d’une
manière plus avantageuse pour
le mandant que celle qui était
convenue.
Art. 3012. Le mandant doit
rembourser au mandataire les
dépenses et les frais qu’il a dû
engager et lui payer la
rémunération à laquelle il a
droit.
Le mandant doit ce
remboursement et ce paiement
même lorsque, en l’absence de
faute du mandataire, l’objectif du
mandat n’a pas été atteint.
Art. 3013. Le mandant doit
indemniser le mandataire des
pertes résultant du mandat, mais
non de celles causées par la
faute du mandataire.
Art. 3014. A compter du
jour de leur dépense, le mandant
doit l’intérêt sur les sommes
d’argent engagées par le
mandataire dans l’exécution du
mandat.
Art. 3015. En cas de
pluralité de mandants pour une
affaire commune, chacun est tenu
solidairement envers le
mandataire.
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SECTION 3. RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL,
THE MANDATARY, AND
THIRD PERSONS
SUBSECTION A. RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE
MANDATARY AND THIRD
PERSONS
Art. 3016. A mandatary who
contracts in the name of the
principal within the limits of his
authority does not bind himself
personally for the performance of
the contract.
Art. 3017. A mandatary who
contracts in his own name
without disclosing his status as a
mandatary binds himself
personally for the performance of
the contract.
Art. 3018. A mandatary who
enters into a contract and
discloses his status as a
mandatary, though not his
principal, binds himself
personally for the performance of
the contract. The mandatary
ceases to be bound when the
principal is disclosed.
Art. 3019. A mandatary who
exceeds his authority is
personally bound to the third
person with whom he contracts,
unless that person knew at the
time the contract was made that
the mandatary had exceeded his
authority or unless the principal
ratifies the contract.
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SECTION 3. DES RELATIONS
ETRE LE MANDANT, LE
MANDATAIRE ET LES TIERS
SOUS-SECTION A. DES
RELATIONS ENTRE LE
MANDATAIRE ET LES TIERS
Art. 3016. Le mandataire
qui contracte au nom du
mandant dans les limites de ses
pouvoirs n’est pas tenu à titre
personnel de l’exécution de ce
contrat.
Art. 3017. Le mandataire
qui contracte en son nom propre
sans révéler son statut de
mandataire est tenu à titre
personnel de l’exécution de ce
contrat.
Art. 3018. Le mandataire
qui contracte et révèle son statut
de mandataire mais pas l’identité
de son mandant est tenu à titre
personnel de l’exécution de ce
contrat. Le mandataire n’est plus
engagé dès lors que l’identité du
mandant est révélée.
Art. 3019. Le mandataire
qui excède ses pouvoirs est
personnellement tenu envers le
tiers avec lequel il contracte, à
moins que le tiers n’ait su
au moment du contrat que le
mandataire excédait ses pouvoirs
ou que le mandant n’ait ratifié le
contrat.
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SUBSECTION B. RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL
AND THIRD PERSONS

SOUS-SECTION B. DES
RELATIONS ENTRE LE
MANDANT ET LES TIERS

Art. 3020. The principal is
bound to perform the contract
that the mandatary, acting within
the limits of his authority, makes
with a third person.

Art. 3020. Lorsque le
mandataire agit dans les limites
de ses pouvoirs, le mandant est
tenu d’exécuter le contrat conclu
avec le tiers.

Art. 3021. One who causes a
third person to believe that
another person is his mandatary
is bound to the third person who
in good faith contracts with the
putative mandatary.

Art. 3021. Celui qui laisse
croire à un tiers qu’une autre
personne est son mandataire est
tenu envers le tiers qui a conclu
de bonne foi avec ce prétendu
mandataire.

Art. 3022. A third person
with whom a mandatary
contracts in the name of the
principal, or in his own name as
mandatary, is bound to the
principal for the performance of
the contract.

Art. 3022. Le tiers qui
contracte avec un mandataire
agissant au nom du mandant, ou
en son propre nom en qualité de
mandataire, est tenu envers le
mandant d’exécuter le contrat.

Art. 3023. A third person
with whom a mandatary
contracts without disclosing his
status or the identity of the
principal is bound to the
principal for the performance of
the contract unless the obligation
is strictly personal or the right
non-assignable. The third person
may raise all defenses that may
be asserted against the mandatary
or the principal.

Art. 3023. Le tiers qui
contracte avec un mandataire
qui ne révèle pas son statut ou
l’identité du mandant est tenu
envers ce dernier d’exécuter le
contrat, à moins que l’obligation
ne soit strictement personnelle
ou que le droit soit incessible. Le
tiers peut opposer au mandataire
ou au mandant tout moyen de
défense.
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SECTION 4. TERMINATION
OF THE MANDATE AND OF
THE AUTHORITY OF THE
MANDATARY

SECTION 4. DE LA FIN DU
MANDAT ET DES POUVOIRS
DU MANDATAIRE

Art. 3024. In addition to
causes of termination of
contracts under the Titles
governing "Obligations in
General" and "Conventional
Obligations or Contracts", both
the mandate and the authority of
the mandatary terminate upon
the:
(1) Death of the principal or
of the mandatary.
(2) Interdiction of the
mandatary.
(3) Qualification of the
curator after the interdiction of
the principal.

Art. 3024. Outre les causes
de fin de contrat prévues aux
titres “Des obligations en
général” et “Des obligations
conventionnelles ou des
contrats”, le mandat ainsi que
les pouvoirs du mandataire
prennent fin :
(1) Au décès du mandant ou
du mandataire ;
(2) A compter de
l’interdiction légale 2 du
mandataire ;
(3) A compter de la prise de
fonction 3 du curateur après
interdiction légale du mandant.

Art. 3025. The principal
may terminate the mandate and
the authority of the mandatary at
any time. A mandate in the
interest of the principal, and also
of the mandatary or of a third
party, may be irrevocable, if the
parties so agree, for as long as
the object of the contract may
require.

Art. 3025. Le mandant peut
mettre fin au mandat et aux
pouvoirs du mandataire à tout
moment. Lorsque les parties en
conviennent et aussi longtemps
que l’objet du contrat est
susceptible de le requérir, le
mandat peut être irrévocable,
lorsqu’il est donné non
seulement dans l’intérêt du
mandant, mais aussi dans celui
du mandataire ou d’un tiers.

2. NdT : L’interdiction légale est le statut de majeur protégé l’empêchant
d’effectuer des actes conservatoires, des actes d’administration ou de disposition
(art. 389 et s.).
3. NdT : Le curateur est nommé (appointed) par le juge et prend ses
fonctions (qualification) à compter de la prestation de serment et du dépôt de
garantie (art. 392 C. civ. et 4562 C. proc. civ.).
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Art. 3026. In the absence of
contrary agreement, neither the
contract nor the authority of the
mandatary is terminated by the
principal's incapacity, disability,
or other condition that makes an
express revocation of the
mandate impossible or
impractical.

Art. 3026. Sauf convention
contraire, ni le mandat ni les
pouvoirs du mandataire ne
prennent fin par l’incapacité, le
handicap ou toute autre
condition du mandant qui
rendrait une révocation expresse
du mandat impossible ou
impraticable.

Art. 3027. Until filed for
recordation, a revocation or
modification of a recorded
mandate is ineffective as to the
persons entitled to rely upon the
public records.

Art. 3027. Jusqu’au dépôt
pour publication, une révocation
ou une modification d’un mandat
enregistré est inopposable aux
personnes ayant le droit de se
fonder sur les registres publics.

Art. 3028. The principal
must notify third persons with
whom the mandatary was
authorized to contract of the
revocation of the mandate or of
the mandatary's authority. If the
principal fails to do so, he is
bound to perform the obligations
that the mandatary has
undertaken.

Art. 3028. Le mandant doit
avertir les tiers avec qui le
mandataire a été autorisé à
contracter de la révocation du
mandat ou des pouvoirs du
mandataire. À défaut, il est tenu
d’exécuter les obligations que le
mandataire a contractées.

Art. 3029. The mandate and
the authority of the mandatary
terminate when he notifies the
principal of his resignation or
renunciation of his authority.
Art. 3030. The mandatary is
bound to complete an
undertaking he had commenced
at the time of the principal's
death if delay would cause
injury.
Art. 3031. If the mandatary
does not know that the mandate
or his authority has terminated
and enters into a contract with a

665

Art. 3029. Le mandat et les
pouvoirs du mandataire prennent
fin lorsque ce dernier avertit le
mandant de sa démission ou de
sa renonciation à ses pouvoirs.
Art. 3030. Dès lors que le
retard causerait un dommage, le
mandataire est tenu de mener à
son terme ce qu’il a commencé à
exécuter avant le décès du
mandant.
Art. 3031. Lorsque le
mandataire contracte avec un
tiers de bonne foi en ignorant
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third person who is in good faith,
the contract is enforceable.
Art. 3032. Upon termination
of the mandate, unless this
obligation has been expressly
dispensed with, the mandatary is
bound to account for his
performance to the principal.
Arts. 3033-3034. [Blank]
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que son mandat ou ses pouvoirs
ont pris fin, le contrat est
exécutoire.
Art. 3032. A moins qu’il
n’ait été expressément dispensé
de cette obligation, le
mandataire doit à la fin du
mandat rendre compte de son
exécution au mandant.
Art. 3033-3034. [Blanc]

TITLE XVI. SURETYSHIP
[Acts 1987, No. 409, §1, eff. Jan.
1, 1988]

TITRE XVI. DU
CAUTIONNEMENT
[Loi de 1987, n°409, § 1, entrée
en vigueur le 1er janvier 1988]

CHAPTER 1. NATURE AND
EXTENT OF SURETYSHIP

CHAPITRE 1. DE LA NATURE
ET DE L’ETENDUE DU
CAUTIONNEMENT

Art. 3035. Suretyship is an
accessory contract by which a
person binds himself to a creditor
to fulfill the obligation of another
upon the failure of the latter to do
so.

Art. 3035. Le cautionnement
est un contrat accessoire par
lequel une personne s’engage
vis-à-vis d’un créancier à
satisfaire à l’obligation d’une
autre personne si cette dernière
n’y satisfait pas.

Art. 3036. Suretyship may be
established for any lawful
obligation, which, with respect to
the suretyship, is the principal
obligation.
The principal obligation may
be subject to a term or condition,
may be presently existing, or
may arise in the future.
Art. 3037. One who
ostensibly binds himself as a
principal obligor to satisfy the

Art. 3036. Le cautionnement
peut être établi pour toute
obligation licite qui, par rapport
au cautionnement, constitue
l’obligation principale.
L’obligation principale peut
faire l’objet d’un terme ou d’une
condition, être déjà existante ou
n’apparaître que dans le futur.
Art. 3037. Celui qui s’engage
en apparence comme créancier
principal à satisfaire à
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present or future obligations of
another is nonetheless considered
a surety if the principal cause of
the contract with the creditor is
to guarantee performance of such
obligations.
A creditor in whose favor a
surety and principal obligor are
bound together as principal
obligors in solido may presume
they are equally concerned in the
matter until he clearly knows of
their true relationship.
Art. 3038. Suretyship must
be express and in writing.
Art. 3039. Suretyship is
established upon receipt by the
creditor of the writing evidencing
the surety's obligation. The
creditor's acceptance is presumed
and no notice of acceptance is
required.
Art. 3040. Suretyship may be
qualified, conditioned, or limited
in any lawful manner.
CHAPTER 2. KINDS OF
SURETYSHIP

667

l’obligation présente ou future
d’une autre personne est
toutefois considéré comme
caution si la raison principale du
contrat avec le créancier est de
garantir de telles obligations.
Un créancier en faveur
duquel une caution et un débiteur
principal se sont engagés
solidairement comme débiteurs
principaux peut présumer qu’ils
se sont engagés tous deux de
cette manière jusqu’à ce qu’il ait
connaissance de leur véritable
relation.
Art. 3038. Le cautionnement
doit être exprès et écrit.
Art. 3039. Le cautionnement
est établi à réception, par le
créancier, de l’écrit attestant de
l’obligation de la caution.
L’acceptation du créancier est
présumée et aucune notification
d’acceptation n’est requise.
Art. 3040. Le cautionnement
peut être restreint, conditionnel
ou limité de toutes les manières
que la loi autorise.
CHAPITRE 2. DES
DIFFÉRENTES SORTES DE
CAUTIONNEMENT

Art. 3041. There are three
kinds of suretyship: commercial
suretyship, legal suretyship, and
ordinary suretyship.

Art. 3041. Il y a trois sortes
de cautionnement : le
cautionnement commercial, le
cautionnement légal et le
cautionnement ordinaire.

Art. 3042. A commercial
suretyship is one in which:
(1) The surety is engaged in

Art. 3042. Le cautionnement
commercial est celui dans lequel,
au choix :
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a surety business;
(2) The principal obligor or
the surety is a business
corporation, partnership, or other
business entity;
(3) The principal obligation
arises out of a commercial
transaction of the principal
obligor; or
(4) The suretyship arises out
of a commercial transaction of
the surety.
Art. 3043. A legal suretyship
is one given pursuant to
legislation, administrative act or
regulation, or court order.
Art. 3044. An ordinary
suretyship is one that is neither a
commercial suretyship nor a
legal suretyship.
An ordinary suretyship must
be strictly construed in favor of
the surety.
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(1) La caution est un
professionnel du cautionnement;
(2) Le débiteur principal ou
la caution est une société
commerciale, une société en nom
collectif, ou toute autre
organisation commerciale ;
(3) L’obligation principale
provient d’une transaction
commerciale du débiteur
principal;
(4) Le cautionnement prend
sa source dans une transaction
commerciale de la caution.
Art. 3043. Le cautionnement
légal est celui créé en vertu de la
loi, d’un acte administratif ou
réglementaire, ou d’une
ordonnance judiciaire.
Art. 3044. Le cautionnement
ordinaire est celui qui n’est ni
commercial ni légal. Ce
cautionnement doit être
interprété strictement en faveur
de la caution.

CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS
OF SURETYSHIP BETWEEN
THE SURETY AND
CREDITOR

CHAPITRE 3. DES EFFETS DU
CAUTIONNEMENT ENTRE LA
CAUTION ET LE CRÉANCIER

Art. 3045. A surety, or each
surety when there is more than
one, is liable to the creditor in
accordance with the provisions
of this Chapter, for the full
performance of the obligation of
the principal obligor, without
benefit of division or discussion,
even in the absence of an express

Art. 3045. Une caution, ou
chaque caution lorsqu’elles sont
plusieurs, est responsable envers
le créancier, dans les termes du
présent chapitre, de l’exécution
pleine et entière de l’obligation
du débiteur principal, sans
bénéfice de division ou de
discussion, même en l’absence
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agreement of solidarity.

d’un accord exprès de solidarité.

Art. 3046. The surety may
assert against the creditor any
defense to the principal
obligation that the principal
obligor could assert except lack
of capacity or discharge in
bankruptcy of the principal
obligor.

Art. 3046. La caution peut
opposer à l’encontre du
créancier tout moyen de défense
que le débiteur principal
pourrait lui-même opposer, à
l’exception de l’incapacité ou de
la libération de la dette suite à la
faillite du débiteur principal.
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CHAPTER 4. THE EFFECTS
OF SURETYSHIP BETWEEN
THE SURETY AND
PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR

CHAPITRE 4. DES EFFETS DU
CAUTIONNEMENT ENTRE LA
CAUTION ET LE DÉBITEUR
PRINCIPAL

Art. 3047. A surety has the
right of subrogation, the right of
reimbursement, and the right to
require security from the
principal obligor.

Art. 3047. La caution
bénéficie du recours
subrogatoire, de l’action en
répétition et du droit d’exiger
une sûreté du débiteur principal.

Art. 3048. The surety who
Art. 3048. La caution qui
pays the principal obligation is
paie l’obligation principale est
subrogated by operation of law to subrogée, de plein droit, dans
the rights of the creditor.
tous les droits du créancier.
Art. 3049. A surety who pays
the creditor is entitled to
reimbursement from the principal
obligor. He may not recover
reimbursement until the principal
obligation is due and exigible.
A surety for multiple
solidary obligors may recover
from any of them reimbursement
of the whole amount he has paid
the creditor.
Art. 3050. A surety who in
good faith pays the creditor when
the principal obligation is
extinguished, or when the
principal obligor had the means

Art. 3049. La caution qui
paie le créancier a une action en
répétition contre le débiteur
principal. Elle ne peut pas
exercer cette action avant que
l’obligation principale ne soit
échue et exigible.
La caution de plusieurs
débiteurs solidaires peut exiger
de chacun d’eux l’intégralité de
la somme qu’elle a payée au
créancier.
Art. 3050. La caution qui, de
bonne foi, paie le créancier
lorsque l’obligation principale
est éteinte ou lorsque le débiteur
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of defeating it, is nevertheless
entitled to reimbursement from
the principal obligor if the surety
made a reasonable effort to
notify the principal obligor that
the creditor was insisting on
payment or if the principal
obligor was apprised that the
creditor was insisting on
payment.
The surety's rights against
the creditor are not thereby
excluded.
Art. 3051. A surety may not
recover from the principal
obligor, by way of subrogation or
reimbursement, the amount paid
the creditor if the principal
obligor also pays the creditor for
want of being warned by the
surety of the previous payment.
In these circumstances, the
surety may recover from the
creditor.

[Vol. 6

principal avait les moyens de la
tenir en échec, a néanmoins une
action en répétition contre le
débiteur principal. Cette action
est ouverte lorsque la caution a
fait un effort raisonnable pour
avertir le débiteur principal que
le créancier exigeait le paiement,
ou lorsque le débiteur principal
savait que le créancier exigeait
le paiement.
Les droits de la caution à
l’encontre du créancier ne sont
pas pour autant exclus.
Art. 3051. La caution ne peut
obtenir du débiteur principal,
par le biais de la subrogation ou
de l’action en répétition,
l’intégralité de la somme qu’elle
a payée au créancier lorsque le
débiteur principal paie
également le créancier, faute
d’avoir été averti par la caution
du paiement précédent.
En de telles circonstances, la
caution peut exercer un recours
contre le créancier.

Art. 3052. A surety may not
recover from the principal
obligor more than he paid to
secure a discharge, but he may
recover by subrogation such
attorney's fees and interest as are
owed with respect to the
principal obligation.

Art. 3052. La caution ne peut
exercer de recours contre le
débiteur principal pour ce
qu’elle a payé en plus pour se
libérer, mais elle peut recouvrer
par subrogation les frais
d’avocat et les intérêts liés à
l’obligation principale.

Art. 3053. A surety, before
making payment, may demand
security from the principal
obligor to guarantee his
reimbursement when:

Art. 3053. Avant de faire le
paiement, la caution peut
demander une sûreté au débiteur
principal afin de garantir son
remboursement, dans l’un des
cas suivants :
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(1) The surety is sued by the
creditor;
(2) The principal obligor is
insolvent, unless the principal
obligation is such that its
performance does not require his
solvency;
(3) The principal obligor
fails to perform an act promised
in return for the suretyship; or
(4) The principal obligation
is due or would be due but for an
extension of its term not
consented to by the surety.
The principal obligor may
refuse to give security if the
principal obligation is
extinguished or if he has a
defense against it.
Art. 3054. If, within ten days
after the delivery of a written
demand for the security, the
principal obligor fails to provide
the required security or fails to
secure the discharge of the
surety, the surety has an action to
require the principal obligor to
deposit into the registry of the
court funds sufficient to satisfy
the surety's obligation to the
creditor as a pledge for the
principal obligor's duty to
reimburse the surety.
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(1) La caution est poursuivie
par le créancier ;
(2) Le débiteur principal est
insolvable, à moins que
l’obligation principale soit telle
que son exécution ne requière
pas sa solvabilité ;
(3) Le débiteur principal n’a
pas exécuté l’acte promis en
retour du cautionnement ;
(4) L’obligation principale
n’est échue ou ne serait échue
qu’en raison de la prorogation
du terme accordée sans le
consentement de la caution.
Le débiteur principal peut
refuser d’octroyer une sûreté si
l’obligation principale est éteinte
ou s’il dispose d’un moyen de
défense.
Art. 3054. Lorsque, dans un
délai de dix jours après la
délivrance d’une demande écrite
de constitution de sûreté, le
débiteur principal échoue à
fournir celle-ci ou échoue à
garantir la libération de la
caution, la caution a une action
pour exiger du débiteur principal
de consigner au tribunal les
fonds suffisants afin d’exécuter
l’obligation de la caution envers
le créancier, en gage de
l’exécution du devoir du débiteur
principal de rembourser la
caution.
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CHAPTER 5. THE EFFECTS
OF SURETYSHIP AMONG
SEVERAL SURETIES

CHAPITRE 5. DES EFFETS DU
CAUTIONNEMENT ENTRE
LES COFIDEJUSSEURS

Art. 3055. Co-sureties are
those who are sureties for the
same obligation of the same
obligor. They are presumed to
share the burden of the principal
obligation in proportion to their
number unless the parties agreed
otherwise or contemplated that
he who bound himself first
would bear the entire burden of
the obligation regardless of
others who thereafter bind
themselves independently of and
in reliance upon the obligation of
the former.

Art. 3055. Les cofidéjusseurs
sont ceux qui cautionnent un
même débiteur pour une même
obligation. Ils sont présumés
partager la charge de
l’obligation principale à
proportion de leur nombre. Il est
fait exception lorsque les parties
se sont entendues autrement ou
ont envisagé que celui qui s’était
engagé en premier aurait la
charge totale de l’obligation,
sans tenir compte de ceux qui
viendraient s’engager par la
suite de manière indépendante et
en se fiant à l’obligation du
premier.

Art. 3056. A surety who pays
the creditor may proceed directly
or by way of subrogation to
recover from his co-sureties the
share of the principal obligation
each is to bear. If a co-surety
becomes insolvent, his share is to
be borne by those who would
have borne it in his absence.
Art. 3057. A surety who pays
the creditor more than his share
may recover the excess from his
co-sureties in proportion to the
amount of the obligation each is
to bear as to him. If a surety
obtains the conventional
discharge of other co-sureties by
paying the creditor, any

Art. 3056. La caution qui
paie le créancier peut exercer un
recours direct ou par voie de
subrogation afin d’obtenir des
autres cautions la part de
l’obligation principale que
chacune doit prendre en charge.
Lorsque l’une des cautions
devient insolvable, sa part est
assumée par celles qui doivent la
prendre en charge en son
absence.
Art. 3057. La caution qui
paie le créancier pour plus que
sa part peut exercer un recours
pour le trop versé contre les
autres cautions, à proportion du
montant de l’obligation que
chacune prend en charge.
Lorsqu’en payant le créancier,
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reduction in the amount owed by
those released benefits them
proportionately.

CHAPTER 6. TERMINATION
OR EXTINCTION OF
SURETYSHIP
Art. 3058. The obligations of
a surety are extinguished by the
different manners in which
conventional obligations are
extinguished, subject to the
following modifications.
Art. 3059. The extinction of
the principal obligation
extinguishes the suretyship.
Art. 3060. Prescription of the
principal obligation extinguishes
the obligation of the surety. A
surety's action for contribution
from his co-sureties and his
action for reimbursement from
the principal obligor prescribe in
ten years.
The interruption of
prescription against a surety is
effective against the principal
obligor and other sureties only
when such parties have mutually
agreed to be bound together with
the surety against whom
prescription was interrupted.
Art. 3061. A surety may
terminate the suretyship by
notice to the creditor. The
termination does not affect the

l’une des cautions obtient la
libération conventionnelle des
autres, toute réduction dans le
total pris en charge par les
cautions ainsi libérées leur
bénéficie de manière
proportionnelle.
CHAPITRE 6. DE LA FIN OU
DE L’EXTINCTION DU
CAUTIONNEMENT
Art. 3058. Les obligations
d’une caution s’éteignent des
différentes manières dont
s’éteignent les obligations
conventionnelles, sous réserve
des dispositions suivantes.
Art. 3059. L’extinction de
l’obligation principale entraîne
celle du cautionnement.
Art. 3060. La prescription de
l’obligation principale éteint
l’obligation de la caution.
L’action de la caution en
contribution des autres cautions
et son action en répétition contre
le débiteur principal se
prescrivent par dix ans.
L’interruption de
prescription contre une caution
ne produit effet à l’encontre du
débiteur principal et des autres
cautions que lorsque ces parties
ont accepté d’être engagées avec
la caution contre laquelle la
prescription a été interrompue.
Art. 3061. La caution peut
mettre fin au cautionnement par
une notification faite au
créancier. Cette résiliation
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surety's liability for obligations
incurred by the principal obligor,
or obligations the creditor is
bound to permit the principal
obligor to incur at the time the
notice is received, nor may it
prejudice the creditor or principal
obligor who has changed his
position in reliance on the
suretyship.
Knowledge of the death of a
surety has the same effect on a
creditor as would a notice of
termination received from the
surety. A termination resulting
from notice of the surety's death
does not affect a universal
successor of the surety who
thereafter unequivocally
confirms his willingness to
continue to be bound thereby.
The confirmation need not be in
writing to be enforceable.

n’affecte pas la responsabilité de
la caution pour les obligations
encourues par le débiteur
principal ou pour les obligations
que le créancier est tenu de
permettre au débiteur principal
d’assumer au moment de la
réception de la notification. Elle
ne peut pas non plus préjudicier
à celui du créancier ou du
débiteur principal qui a changé
sa position en se fondant sur le
cautionnement.
La connaissance du décès de
la caution produit le même effet
pour le créancier que la
notification de résiliation
provenant de la caution. La
résiliation résultant d’une
notification du décès de la
caution n’affecte pas la situation
de son successeur universel qui
confirmerait par la suite sans
équivoque sa volonté de
continuer à être engagé. Cette
confirmation ne nécessite pas un
écrit pour être exécutoire.

Art. 3062. The modification
or amendment of the principal
obligation, or the impairment of
real security held for it, by the
creditor, in any material manner
and without the consent of the
surety, has the following effects.
An ordinary suretyship is
extinguished.
A commercial suretyship is
extinguished to the extent the
surety is prejudiced by the action
of the creditor, unless the
principal obligation is one other

Art. 3062. Lorsque du fait du
créancier, d’une manière
significative et en l’absence de
consentement de la caution,
l’obligation principale est
modifiée ou révisée, ou la sûreté
réelle qui la garantit perd son
effectivité, les effets suivants se
produisent.
Lorsque le cautionnement est
ordinaire, il est éteint.
Lorsque le cautionnement est
commercial, il est éteint dans la
mesure où la caution est affectée
par l’action du créancier. Il n’y a
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than for the payment of money,
and the surety should have
contemplated that the creditor
might take such action in the
ordinary course of performance
of the obligation. The creditor
has the burden of proving that
the surety has not been
prejudiced or that the extent of
the prejudice is less than the full
amount of the surety's obligation.

pas extinction lorsque
l’obligation principale n’est pas
relative au paiement d’une
somme d’argent, et que la
caution aurait dû envisager que
le créancier puisse agir de la
sorte dans le cadre normal de
l’exécution de l’obligation. Il
appartient au créancier de
prouver que la caution n’est pas
affectée ou ne l’est que dans une
proportion inférieure au montant
total de son obligation.

CHAPTER 7. LEGAL
SURETYSHIP

CHAPITRE 7. DE LA
CAUTION LEGALE

Art. 3063. The provisions
governing commercial suretyship
contained in this Title apply to
legal suretyship except as
otherwise provided in this
Chapter.

Art. 3063. En l’absence de
dispositions contraires dans ce
chapitre, les règles du
cautionnement commercial du
présent titre s’appliquent au
cautionnement légal.

Art. 3064. The provisions of
this Chapter apply to the extent
they are not contrary to special
laws governing particular kinds
of legal suretyship.

Art. 3064. Les dispositions
de ce chapitre s’appliquent dans
la mesure où elles ne sont pas
contraires aux lois spéciales
relatives aux différentes
catégories du cautionnement
légal.

Art. 3065. Legal suretyship
may be given only by a person
authorized to conduct a surety
business in Louisiana or by a
natural person domiciled in this
state who owns property in this
state that is subject to seizure and
is of sufficient value to satisfy
the obligation of the surety.
The qualification of a natural
person to act as legal surety must

Art. 3065. Le cautionnement
légal ne peut être donné que par
une personne habilitée à
conclure un cautionnement
commercial en Louisiane ou par
une personne physique
domiciliée dans cet état où elle
est propriétaire de biens
susceptibles d’être saisis et dont
la valeur est suffisante pour
satisfaire à l’obligation de la
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be evidenced by his affidavit and
the affidavit of the principal
obligor.
A legal surety may not raise
his lack of qualification as a
defense to an action on his
contract.

caution.
La qualité d’une personne
physique à agir comme caution
légale doit être établie par sa
déclaration écrite et celle du
débiteur principal.
Une caution légale ne peut
invoquer son manque de qualité
comme moyen de défense à une
action fondée sur son
engagement.

Art. 3066. A legal suretyship
is deemed to conform to the
requirements of the law or order
pursuant to which it is given,
except as provided by Article
3067.

Art. 3066. Sauf disposition
contraire de l’article 3067, le
cautionnement légal doit être
conforme aux exigences de la loi
ou de l’ordonnance en vertu de
laquelle il est donné.

Art. 3067. A surety is not
liable for a sum in excess of that
expressly stated in his contract.
A legal suretyship may contain
terms more favorable to the
creditor than those required by
the law or order pursuant to
which it is given, but it may not
provide for a time longer than is
provided by law for bringing an
action against the surety.

Art. 3067. La caution n’est
pas tenue au-delà de son
engagement exprès. Le
cautionnement légal peut prévoir
des conditions plus avantageuses
pour le créancier que celles
prévues par la loi ou
l’ordonnance en vertu de
laquelle il est donné. En
revanche, ce cautionnement ne
peut pas prolonger la période
légale durant laquelle la caution
est exposée à un recours.

Art. 3068. Legal suretyship
may be given whenever the law
requires or permits a person to
give security for an obligation.
The principal obligor may in lieu
of legal suretyship deposit a sum
equal to the amount for which he
is to furnish security to be held in
pledge as security for his
obligation.

Art. 3068. Le cautionnement
légal peut être donné chaque fois
que la loi impose ou permet à
une personne de garantir une
obligation. A la place de ce
cautionnement et en gage de
l’exécution de son obligation, le
débiteur principal peut déposer
une somme équivalente à celle
pour laquelle il doit fournir une
sûreté.
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Art. 3069. No judgment shall
be rendered against a legal surety
unless the creditor obtains
judgment against the principal
obligor fixing the amount of the
latter's liability to the creditor or
unless the amount of that liability
has otherwise been fixed. The
creditor may join the surety and
principal obligor in the same
action.

Art. 3069. Aucun jugement
ne peut être rendu contre une
caution légale. Il en va
autrement lorsque le créancier a
lui-même obtenu un jugement
contre le débiteur principal
déterminant le montant de sa
responsabilité ou lorsque ce
montant a été autrement fixé. Le
créancier peut associer la
caution et le débiteur principal
dans la même action.

Art. 3070. If a legal surety
ceases to possess required
qualifications or becomes
insolvent or bankrupt, any
interested person may demand
that the principal obligor furnish
additional security in the same
amount and upon the same terms
as those given by the existing
surety for the performance of the
obligation.

Art. 3070. Lorsqu’une
caution légale n’a plus les
qualités requises ou lorsqu’elle
devient insolvable ou est mise en
faillite, toute personne intéressée
peut demander que le débiteur
principal fournisse une garantie
supplémentaire du même
montant et aux mêmes conditions
que celles données par la
caution.
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MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER:
A CIVILIAN PERSPECTIVE ON RELIANCE-BASED
THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Bogdan Buta ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Martin v. A-1 Home, 1 an apparently mundane case
of personal injury (in which the victim sought to trigger the
liability of a company that allegedly was in a master-servant 2
relationship with the tortfeasor) puts into question the practice of
importing common law principles into matters governed by the
Louisiana Civil Code.
Should a Louisiana court be able to look to established
common law principles to render a final decision when there is no
direct and clear norm from the Civil Code nor a direct line of
jurisprudence constante on the issue? Does this equate to the
legislative gap contemplated by article 4 of the Louisiana Civil
Code? 3 Is the equity mentioned in article 4 enough for a judge in

∗ LL.M. Candidate (2014), Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hébert
Law Center. Research Assistant to Professor Christine Corcos. The author
would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his guidance throughout
writing this note. Also, special thanks are owed to Alexandru-Daniel On,
Professor Grace Barry, and Jennifer Lane.
1. Martin v. A-1 Home Appliance Ctr., Inc., 12-784 (La. App. 5 Cir.
5/30/13), 117 So. 3d 281 [hereinafter Martin].
2. Though largely used in American literature, the language of “master”
and “servant” should be replaced by the dichotomy “employer-employee,” thus
also following the European trend in Tort Law. An example of such a transition
can be seen in a recent Louisiana Tort Law casebook: JOHN M. CHURCH,
WILLIAM R. CORBETT & THOMAS E. RICHARD, TORT LAW: THE AMERICAN AND
LOUISIANA PERSPECTIVES 515-51 (Vandeplas Publ’g 2008).
3. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages.”

680

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Louisiana to immediately look at the Restatement of the Law in
order to find a solution? 4
Apart from what may seem just a purely theoretical debate, a
better understanding of existing civilian concepts could provide
answers to these questions. This case note scrutinizes, in its first
part, the flow of arguments used by the court, and, in its second
part, offers an alternative theoretical system, consistent with the
civil code, but with a different outcome from the decision rendered
by the court in Martin.
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Mr. Martin, bought a refrigerator from one of the
defendants, A-1 Home Appliance Center, Inc. (hereinafter A-1). 5
After purchasing the refrigerator, the defendant’s employee told
Mr. Martin that, in exchange for a $75 fee, they would deliver the
product to the customer's home. The plaintiff agreed and paid this
additional service. A couple of days later, Mr. Martin was called
and informed that the refrigerator would be delivered the next day.
That next day, the plaintiff was called again by a representative of
A-1, indicating that they were in the area, ready to deliver the
refrigerator. While trying to lift the refrigerator over the kitchen
counter inside Mr. Martin's house, the deliverymen appeared to be
losing control of the appliance. According to Mr. Martin's
testimony, he voluntarily and uninvitedly stepped in and grabbed
one side of the refrigerator, trying to rebalance the refrigerator and
prevent it from falling over the counter. Once the plaintiff got hold
of the refrigerator, its entire weight fell upon him and resulted in
the tearing of his right bicep muscle. 6 This arm injury required

4. Alain Levasseur, Civilian Methodology: On the Structure of a Civil
Code, 44 TUL. L. REV. 693, 699 (1970). Addressing this issue, the author
concluded that “in a codified system of law, whatever is not explicitly laid down
in the articles will of necessity lie in the domain of uncertainty and controversy.”
5. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 282.
6. Id.
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several surgeries and a prolonged period of rehabilitation, and Mr.
Martin sought to recover the cost of the damages incurred.
The plaintiff found out that the deliverymen were not A-1’s
employees as he initially thought, 7 but that they were working for
another company, Johnson Delivery Service (hereinafter Johnson);
A-1 contracted with Johnson in order to make deliveries of its
appliances. The plaintiff filed a personal injury action against both
A-1 and Johnson, and their insurance companies.
III. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
At trial, before the verdict was delivered, Mr. Martin settled
with Johnson and its insurer for the amount of $100,000.
Additionally, the jury returned a verdict exonerating A-1, and
finding only Johnson liable for the injury. The reasoning behind
this decision originated from the fact that there was no indication
of an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson,
the latter being an independent contractor. 8 Following the denial of
Martin's motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed the decision. 9
Mr. Martin argued that the trial judge erred in not instructing
the jury that A-1 could be jointly liable for the acts of Johnson
under the theory of “apparent authority.” 10 The plaintiff contended
in his appeal that this is a second theory of recovery, distinct from
the theory of vicarious liability. 11
The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal, reiterating the lack of
any relationship between A-1 and Johnson, which would otherwise
fall under article 2320, and also by distinguishing the fact pattern
7. Id.
8. Id. at 283.
9. Id. at 282.
10. Id.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2320:
Masters and employers are answerable for the damage occasioned by
their servants and overseers, in the exercise of the functions in which
they are employed. . . .
In the above cases, responsibility only attaches, when the masters or
employers, teachers and artisans, might have prevented the act which
caused the damage, and have not done it.

682

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

in the present case from a Louisiana Supreme Court case,
Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Able Moving and Storage
Company, Inc. 12 The court found that the “apparent authority”
theory was not applicable to the facts of Martin, 13 and reaffirmed
the challenged judgment.
IV. COMMENTARY
This commentary is divided in two parts. The first part follows
the court’s reasoning in trying to establish whether A-1 is liable.
The second part of the commentary suggests an alternative way of
analyzing Martin, by using a reliance-based theory of liability
derived from the Louisiana Civil Code (la théorie de l’apparence).
This theory provides a different result for Martin, and, through its
generality, might prove useful in establishing up a framework
grounded in the Civil Code for future cases.
A. Re-Analyzing Martin Through the Lens of General Tort Law
Principles
1. General Methodology
As a matter of principle, for every wrong done by a person to
another, outside a contractual relationship, there is a private action
with which the victim can recover the damages incurred. 14
However, what the law designates as a “wrong”, and whether or
not a victim has a cause of action, are questions dependent upon
the existence of certain grounds, or foundations, for liability. 15 It is
a matter of “elementary justice” to recognize that, as a default rule,
12. 650 So. 2d. 750 (La. 1995) [hereinafter Able].
13. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 285.
14. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A
GLOBAL CONTEXT. THE BASICS 440 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
15. Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law in WALTER VAN GERVEN,
JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 17 (Hart Publ’g
2000; published as part of the IUS COMMUNE CASEBOOKS FOR THE COMMON
LAW OF EUROPE series).
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everyone should “bear the ‘general risk associated with
existence’” 16 and that risk cannot simply pass to other
individuals. 17 Liability is an exception to this rule, and, therefore,
without legal grounds, or a legal norm that sets out a certain
conduct as being unlawful, 18 a victim must bear her own loss.19
Hence, tort regulation involves a constant tension between
protecting the legal interest of society at a given moment and the
freedom of action of each individual. 20 This tension is incorporated
in the normative process. It illustrates, or at least should illustrate,
societal views on the kind of conduct generally considered to be
unlawful at a given moment in time, and how such conduct ought
to be deterred. 21
The usual grounds for liability, fault-based liability and strict
liability, would not have served the victim in Martin. A-1
committed no fault of its own when the acts of Johnson’s
employee caused damage, therefore fault-based liability would not
apply.
Things are not necessarily as straightforward when it comes to
strict liability, and that is why the court focused in its discussion on
one such heading of liability: vicarious liability. 22
2. Is A-1 Liable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2320?
In Martin, the plaintiff raised the question of whether there was
an employer-employee relationship between A-1 and Johnson.
During the trial, the jury was duly instructed to answer this
16. Karl Larenz & Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts in
note 15, at 15.
17. Id.
18. “Although every tort is a wrong, not every wrong is a tort.” JOHN C. P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 1 (Dennis Patterson series ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
19. Cane, supra note 15, at 17.
20. Larenz & Canaris, supra note 16, at 15.
21. VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 330.
22. CHURCH ET AL., supra note 2, at 515-17. Also called imputed fault,
vicarious liability “imposes liability upon one person for the fault of another.”
Id.

VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra
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question, having in mind the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code
article 2320, 23 and the factors used by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in determining the existence of such a relationship. 24 The
jury established that Johnson was an independent contractor, and,
therefore, that no liability should be imposed on A-1 for the
tortious acts of Johnson, under this theory of recovery. 25 In the
assignments of errors, the plaintiff did not dispute this finding. 26
Under article 2320, a victim has to prove two cumulative
elements: (1) that there is an employer-employee relationship, and
(2) that the negligent act of the employee could have been
prevented by the employer. 27 Because the first element was not
present, the court’s analysis stopped there.
3. Is A-1 Liable under the “Apparent Authority” Theory?
Mr. Martin alleged that there was an “apparent authority” with
which Johnson was clothed to act on behalf and in the name of A1. He argued that the conversations he had on the phone were with
A-1 representatives, and that he relied on the fact that A-1 would
deliver his refrigerator to his home, in his decision to purchase the
refrigerator. The plaintiff used the arguments from Able, 28 to
support his assertion.

23. Id. at 530. In Louisiana, an employer is liable for the damages produced
by her employee while in the exercise of the functions of said employment.
24. Amyx v. Henry & Hall, 79 So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1955). The Fifth Circuit
listed the factors, but did not use Amyx as a reference. However, analyzing the
factors is not the purpose of the present note.
25. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 283.
26. Id.
27. WILLIAM CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: TORT LAW
186 (2d ed., West 2009). Although the codal provision requires the second
condition, the courts in Louisiana have consistently ignored it, and do not
require the proof of negligence. Considering the doctrinal and jurisprudential
dispute in this matter, it is of little importance for the study of Martin whether
the liability under article 2320 falls under fault or no-fault liability. See also Cox
v. Gaylord Container Corp., 897 So. 2d 1 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004) and Doe
v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 978 So. 2d 426 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2007).
28. Able, 650 So. 2d 750 (1995).

2013]

MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER

685

Before looking at the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning with regard to
this aspect, this commentary will make a short comparative review
of agency law and the contract of mandate.
a. The Contract of Mandate
The contract of mandate is different from the concept of
agency. 29 The concept of agency encompasses a larger pallet of
legal effects than the contract of mandate does. 30 Louisiana’s
provisions regarding the contract of mandate were initially drafted
in a manner similar to the provisions of the French Civil Code.31
Likewise, after the 1997 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, the
conceptual and functional essence of the contract of mandate did
not change. 32
The French Civil Code did not create a institution such as the
common law’s agency. 33 It defined the institution of mandate as a
contract whereby one person (the principal 34) gives to another (the
mandatary) the power to conclude, on his behalf, one or more
juridical acts. 35 The mandatary represents the interests of the
principal. Given the specifics of some activities (e.g., some acts of
commerce), the mandatary will have to execute not only juridical
acts, but also material acts. 36 This distinction bears a great
29. PHILIPPE MALAURIE & LAURENT AYNES, 8 COURS DE DROIT CIVIL. LES
CONTRATS SPÉCIAUX CIVILS ET COMMERCIAUX 268 (8th ed., Ed. Cujas 1994).
30. Jana L. Grauberger, From Mere Intrusion to General Confusion:
Agency and Mandate in Louisiana, 72 TUL. L. REV. 257, 265 (1997).
31. A. N. Yiannapoulos, Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 19 LA. L. REV. 777, 780 (1959).
32. Wendell Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate,
and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087,
1158 (1999). Speaking about the changes that occurred in 1997, the authors
conclude that “while being faithful to Louisiana’s civil heritage, the new law
recognizes the realities of contemporary transactional practice as well as the
need for some uniformity with the law of the surrounding common law states.”
33. Yiannapoulos, supra note 31, at 783.
34. Mandant, in French.
35. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, 2.2 TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW
286 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1939). The same
definition can be found in MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 277.
36. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 272.
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importance when it comes to liability. The French Civil Code
chose to not expressly regulate the liability of the mandatary with
respect to the material acts, opening the ground for the Court of
Cassation to extend the interpretation and applicability of service
contracts in this context (contrat d’entreprise). 37 In this regard, as
a result of business practices, often times the contract of mandate
becomes a mixed contract, creating ancillary obligations which do
not stem from the traditional notion of mandate. 38 This is the legal
technique by which the service contract is incorporated into the
bigger and complex contract of mandate. Hence, the mandatary
shall be held liable for the juridical acts according to the terms of
the contract of mandate, and shall be liable towards the principal
for the material acts according to the terms of the service contract.
The principal is liable to third parties only according to the general
theory of liability.
The borderline between these two concepts might be blurred,
but no arguments can be offered to stand for the proposition that
they are similar. Louisiana Civil Code article 2989 provides that “a
mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers
authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more
affairs for the principal.” 39 The departure from the French Civil
Code stands in that the notion of “affairs” encompasses both
juridical and material acts. However, the Revision Comments for
article 2989 warn the reader that most of the provisions regarding
the contract of mandate have been construed with the juridical acts
in mind. 40 Louisiana did not import ad litteram the concept of
contract of mandate as prescribed by the French Civil Code.
37. Id. at 272 n.7, citing the decision of the Commercial Section of the
French Court of Cassation. An equivalent English translation would be “service
contract.” A definition of “contrat d'entreprise” could provide that it is a
convention in which the contractor undertakes an obligation to make his talent
available to the client through a compensation previously agreed with the other
party. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 357 (5th ed., Quadrige/PUF
2004).
38. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 273.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (d) (1997).
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989, cmt. (e) (1997).

2013]

MARTIN V. A-1 HOME APPLIANCE CENTER

687

Instead, the drafters might have thought that the problem regarding
material acts could be simplified if they use the concept of “affair”
to encompass the inclusion of both juridical and material acts. 41
b. Agency
The attempt to find a satisfactory definition of agency is a
rather difficult task. 42 The basic hallmark of agency law is that the
principal bears the consequences created by the fact that she chose
to run her business through an agent. 43 This view embraced by the
Restatement (Third) of Agency points out a rather minor difference
between agency and the contract of mandate. That is, the right of
the principal to control the agent’s behavior and to prevent any
wrongdoing by the agent. 44 In a more complicated manner, but to
serve the same purpose, the contract of mandate incorporates a
service contract (contrat d'entreprise). This way, the Civil Code
contemplates a method by which the principal has “control” over
her mandatary’s behavior with respect to material acts. This design
comes close to the control which agency law entails, but no degree
of equivalence can be seen between the methods of how the
41. For further reading about the influence of the French Civil Code and
doctrine, see Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of
1823: A General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5, 22-24. See also
Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 11-12. For a different perspective, see
Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46
TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972). See also ALAIN LEVASSEUR, LOUIS CASIMIR
ELISABETH MOREAU-LISLET: FOSTER FATHER OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW (LSU
Law Center Pubs. Inst. 1996).
42. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES 105 (Dalloz 2000).
See also Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 495
(2011), for brief considerations regarding the attempts to find a proper
definition.
43. The law of agency:
[E]ncompasses the legal consequences of consensual relationships in
which one person (the principal) manifests assent that another person
(the agent) shall, subject to the agent's acts and on the principal's right
of control, have the power to affect the principal's legal relations
through the agent's acts and on the principal's behalf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst. 2006).
44. Dalley, supra note 42, at 513.
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control is exerted. 45 The principal’s control in a contract of
mandate is limited to contractual obligations, while agency law
assumes that the principal is empowered to control the facts
concerning the agent’s behavior, contractual or non-contractual.
This apparent theoretical distinction is important in cases
where the agency relationship looks much like an employment
relationship or projects an image that causes a third party to rely on
the fact that the agent is working for the principal, because in such
a case it might give rise to liability of the principal for the acts of
the agent. 46 In agency law, by default, the principal has a broader
authority to control the behavior of the agent.
The Louisiana Civil Code cannot contemplate such an
interpretation, because the only available means of control the
principal has over the mandatary are contractual in nature, and the
mandatary enjoys more freedom than an agent in common law.
The higher degree of control allowed to the principal over the
agent in common law jurisdictions comes with heightened
responsibility towards third parties. Despite the lower level of
control a principal has over the mandatary, in Louisiana there have
been cases where courts had to find a basis for imposing liability
on a principal, when the equity of the case demanded it. Is the
resort to the doctrine of “apparent authority” a solution?
4. A Short History of Agency Law Intrusion in Louisiana Law
This tendency of departing from the codal provisions with
regards to contract of mandate is not new. 47 In accordance with the
traditional view of the code, the courts have long supported the
idea that vicarious liability and contract of mandate are

45. MALAURIE & AYNES, supra note 29, at 276.
46. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1097.
47. Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852, 855 (La. 1947). In interpreting the
former language of article 2985, which provided the definition of the contract of
mandate, the Louisiana Supreme Court decreed that the words “‘and in his
name’ are not essential to the definition of a procuration or power of attorney.”
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incompatible, 48 unless there is an employer-employee relationship.
The first decision in which a court imposed liability on a principal
for the negligent act of an agent was in Blanchard v. Ogima. 49 The
Louisiana Supreme Court simplified the analysis to find out
whether there is an employer-employee relationship. Following
this decision, a federal court 50 dealt with the same question that
was raised in Martin, related to “apparent authority.” 51 The court
acknowledged that it wasn't very clear whether it is possible under
Louisiana law to impose vicarious liability on the principal for the
negligent acts of his agent, but argued that as a federal court, they
assume the future position of the courts, which should adopt this
“apparent authority” theory. 52
In Rowell v. Carter Mobile Homes, Inc., 53 in an opinion
delivered by Justice Dennis, the issue was whether a bank (a
principal), that authorized a mobile home dealer to act as an
undisclosed agent 54 was liable for the injuries that were suffered by
48. Wendell Holmes, Ruminations on Independent Fire Insurance Co. v.
Able Moving and Storage Co.: Principal's Vicarious Tort Liability for Negligent
Acts of an Agent's Servant, 56 LA. L. REV. 571 (1996) [hereinafter Holmes,
Ruminations].
49. 215 So. 2d 902 (La. 1968) “A master or employer is liable for the
tortious conduct of a servant or employee which is within the scope of authority
or employment.” Id. at 902.
50. Arceneaux v. Texaco, 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
Arceneaux].
51. The definition provided by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8
(Am. Law Inst. 1958): Apparent authority represents “the power to affect the
legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly
as agent for the other, arising from and in accordance with the other's
manifestations to such third persons.” Apparent authority is different from actual
authority, in the sense that it is created by written or spoken words or any other
conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes the third person to
believe that the principal consents to have the act done on his behalf by the
person purporting to act for him. Id. § 27.
52. “Louisiana courts have drawn freely from the common law and the
Restatements of the Law in developing both tort and agency doctrine. We may
assume for present purposes, without deciding, that they would proceed along
the Restatement path and adopt the rule of apparent authority in tort cases.”
Arceneaux, 623 F.2d at 926.
53. 500 So. 2d 748 (1987) [hereinafter Rowell].
54. Note that for an accurate use of legal terminology when discussing
about the contract of mandate, the parlance involves the principal and the
mandatary. See LA. CIV. CODE Title XV. Representation and Mandate. On the
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the buyer of the mobile home, due to the negligent repair of the
floor (which was performed by the bank's agent). 55 The court again
simplified the legal analysis, to the extent of whether the agent was
an employee for the principal or not, concluding that absent any
physical control of the agent's activity within the scope of the
mandate given, the principal was not liable for the tortious act of
its agent. 56 This decision recited passages from Blanchard, but its
approach remained faithful to the civilian doctrine.
5. Louisiana Supreme Court and “Apparent Authority”
In Able, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, in the event
that there is no employer-employee relationship, a principal could
become vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its “agent”,
relying on the doctrine of “apparent authority.” 57
The facts in Able are strikingly similar to those in Martin. The
plaintiff used the yellow pages to find a transporter for her
furniture. She found an advertisement for a national mover, called
“Bekins”. However, at the bottom of the advertisement there was a
disclaimer informing the potential customers that the local operator
of “Bekins” was a company called “Able Moving & Storage Co.”
According to the testimony heard during the trial, the plaintiff was
under the impression that she had hired Bekins, and had no
knowledge at any point that she had contracted with Able. The
moving operations were conducted by two workmen. The plaintiff
handed them a check indicating that the recipient of the payment
was “Bekins.” After Able’s employees left, a fire consumed the
plaintiff’s house. It was later established that the fire was caused

other hand, in agency law the mandatary is referred as agent. Unfortunately,
legal scholars, judges and lawyers are using agent and mandatary
interchangeably, though they have different meanings.
55. Rowell, 500 So. 2d at 749.
56. Id. at 751. As a side note, the court tangentially touched on the issue of
“control.”
57. For a short exposé of the facts, see Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48,
at 572.
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by a cigarette butt left there by one of the workmen. 58 While it was
clear that the workman and Able were liable, the plaintiff raised
the question of whether Bekins was liable, for creating the
impression that she was dealing with Bekins.
The court resorted to the common law Restatement (Second) of
Agency to motivate the application of apparent authority to a noncontractual relationship between the principal and the victim.59
The court also distinguished Able from Rowell, and held that when
a principal makes a representation to a third party, there is an
agency relationship between said principal and the agent and,
because of this representation, the third person justifiably relies
upon the care or skill of such apparent agent, the principal is
subject to liability to the third party for harm caused by the lack of
care or skill of the party appearing to be her agent. 60
The language from the decision suggests that the court read the
applicable provisions from the Civil Code, found no explicit rule to
apply to the facts sub judice, and borrowed the doctrine of
“apparent authority” from the Restatement, 61 in order to create a
legal basis for imposing liability on the principal for the acts of the
agent. Nonetheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court confused the
concept of “apparent authority” with the concept of “agency by
estoppel.” In a previous case also decided by the Supreme Court, 62
the court emphasized that the doctrine of “apparent authority” is
based on a contract theory which says that a party ought to be
bound by what she says and manifests, rather than by what she
intends, and, therefore, the third party who contracts with the agent
need only prove reliance on the appearance of authority
58. Abel, 650 So. 2d at 751.
59. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 572. See also supra note 51.
60. Id.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958):
One who represents that another is his servant or other agent and
thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm
caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant
or other agent as if he were such.
62. Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960 (1989).
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manifested. 63 Agency by estoppel is based on tort principles of
preventing loss by an innocent person. The third party has to prove
reliance and a change in position, 64 which damaged the third party,
and that it would be unjust to allow the principal to deny the
existence of agency relationship.
Although there is no explicit language in the decision, 65 the
rationale behind this solution could stem from Louisiana Civil
Code article 4. Equally important to determine why the court
resorted to this solution is the fact that an element of emotional
sympathy could have weighed decisively in rendering the decision.
Shortly after this incident, Able’s headquarter was also destroyed
in a fire, leaving the plaintiff without any possibility of recovering
the damages. 66
6. Applying Able to the Facts in Martin
In Louisiana, matters pertaining to civil law which are not
clearly resolved by the Code should not be solved by the courts
with the doctrine of precedents, but rather resort to an established
jurisprudence constante. 67
In Martin, the plaintiff based his entire theory of recovery on
the rule established in Able. The court narrowed the spectrum of
Able, focusing on the reliance element of the claim. The court
essentially asked whether the victim’s change of position was
determined by her reliance on the representation made by A-1.
Conversely, in order to trigger the liability of the principal, the
victim needed to have changed her position because of her
63. Id. at 963-64.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8B (Am. Law Inst. 1958),
defines a change in position as “payment of money, expenditure of labor,
suffering a loss or subjection to legal liability.”
65. Nor in the previously mentioned decisions, in supra section IV.A.4.
66. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752-53.
67. Olivier Moréteau, Francois-Xavier Martin Revisited: Louisiana Views
on Codification, Jurisprudence, Legal Education and Practice, 60 LA. BAR J.
475, 478. See also id. at 479 n.33 for a critique of the attempt to apply the theory
of binding precedents to cases regulated by the Civil Code.
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reasonable belief that she dealt with a “servant or other agent” 68 of
the principal. 69 In Martin, the court stated that there were no facts
to support the proposition that Mr. Martin relied on the apparent
authority when he made the decision to purchase the refrigerator,
or when he allowed the deliverymen to enter on his house. 70
Johnson’s truck had no sign on it, but the deliverymen were
wearing Johnson uniforms. Although the court acknowledged that
the rule in Able was correct, it distinguished Martin from Able in
the sense that in the former case, there was no evidence that the
plaintiff “would not have made the payment had he known the
facts of the delivery process.” 71 It is also possible that, since the
plaintiff already recovered $100,000 from Johnson, this might have
had some influence on the decision.
B. A Civilian Alternative to the Doctrine of “Apparent Authority”
1. Reanalyzing Able
One author suggested with regards to Able, that the court
“instead of looking to agency law and apparent authority . . . need
only have looked to the Civil Code articles.” 72 This approach is
equally applicable to Martin. This part first overviews the effects
of the rule stated in Able, and then proposes a theory of recovery
based on the Civil Code.
The rule affirmed in Able has been regarded as a wrong
decision by a small number of authors. 73 The scholarship on this

68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (Am. Law Inst. 1958).
69. Able, 650 So. 2d at 752.
70. Martin, 117 So. 3d at 284.
71. Id.
72. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 274.
73. Id. at 272-73. For an approach that salutes this step taken by the
Supreme Court, See Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 576-77, 581. The
author calls this decision “a potentially major expansion of the doctrine of
apparent authority by opening its application to the field of torts.” See also
Michael B. North, Comment: Qui Facit Per Alium, Facit Per Se:
Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the Turn of
the Twenty-First Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279 (1997).
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matter has drawn attention primarily upon the unintended
consequences on the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 74 It may
seem that, in Louisiana, 75 the franchisor should guard against any
negative outcome by extending their insurance policy to cover the
acts of a franchisee’s employees, as one author has suggested. 76
This uncertainty77 stems from the poor language used by the
Supreme Court, which comfortably reproduced the rule existing in
agency law.
In 1997 (two years after Able was decided), the Civil Code was
revised, and one of the changes involved Title XV, on the Contract
of Mandate. The Louisiana Civil Code does not mention at any
point “apparent authority” within Title XV (Representation and
Mandate), or anywhere else, for that matter. The legislature
probably intended to import the rule from the common law, and
similarly to Able, into a codal provision, and therefore adopted
article 3021 regarding the “putative mandatary.” 78 It seems it was
an attempt to introduce a reference to “apparent authority,” but
through a civilian-oriented approach and with civilian terminology.
Nonetheless, the new language from article 3021 does not offer a
solution to cases such as Martin or Able. Rather, it is an “old wine
in new bottle”, 79 because it does not apply to tort cases. Its
applicability is limited to contractual issues, and it regulates how
the principal is liable toward a third party in good faith.
74. Holmes, Ruminations, supra note 48, at 579. The author depicts a
common example, when a McDonald’s employee commits a tortious act. The
question under the rule in Able is whether the victim should prove that she chose
McDonald’s from Wendy’s or Burger King, relying on the skill and care of the
agents, as contemplated by Section 267.
75. Id. at 579. See also the line of cases cited at 579 n.49, id.
76. Id. at 580.
77. Grauberger, supra note 30, at 259. The author contemplates this path as
having “destructive effects of the introduction of common-law agency principles
into the Louisiana legal system.” Able also affects other business areas such as
hospitals, and large retail chains.
78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3021: “One who causes a third person to believe that
another person is his mandatary is bound to the third person who in good faith
contracts with the putative mandatary. ”
79. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 32, at 1151.
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In addition, the current language of article 3021 ought to be
read in conjunction with the general rules laid down in the general
law of obligations. 80 The second paragraph of article 1967 81 has
the character of a general norm, and article 3021 is a special
provision. Two rules of interpretation apply to such a situation.
First, specialia generalibus derrogant—the special provision is
applied with priority over the general rule, when the two come in
conflict. 82 Second, generalia specialibus non derogant—when the
special rule is silent, the gaps can be filled by resorting to the
general rule. 83
2. A Reliance-Based Theory of Liability
Seemingly, there is no direct and clear norm in the Civil Code
for a situation like the one presented in Martin. There is a gap 84 in
the legislation. In such a case, the court would have been entitled
to proceed according to article 4. Many pages have been written

80. See Book III, Title 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
81. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967:
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a
result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable.
82. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE AU DROIT 450 (7th ed.,
Dalloz 2006); BORIS STARCK, HENRI ROLAND & LAURENT BOYER,
INTRODUCTION AU DROIT 131 (3d ed., Litec 1991).
83. TERRÉ, supra note 82, at 450.
84. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1: “The sources of law are legislation and custom.”
Articles 2 and 3 define “legislation” and “custom”. Accordingly, LA. CIV. CODE
art. 2, provides that: “Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.” and
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3 states that: “Custom results from practice repeated of a
long time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law. Custom
may not abrogate legislation.” For the purpose of this commentary, “custom”
presents little interest because the confusion of treating the relationship between
principal and mandatary as a agency relationship does not meet the two
requirements of longa consuetudo and opinio juris. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3, cmt.
(b) (1987).
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with respect to this article. 85 Two lines of interpretation have been
particularly relevant.
On one hand, Justice Dennis extrapolated this provision by
setting up a methodology which would guide the judges who are
faced with this kind of situation. 86 The author compared the judge
to a “legislator's helpmate” 87 and advocated a constant devotion to
the civilian doctrine. 88 In this interpretation, the judge should first
try to deliver a solution according to the scope and meaning of the
Civil Code, and only after this fails, should the judge use the
liberty conferred by the “equity” of article 4. Regardless, the judge
should not automatically look to common law for guidance in such
circumstances.
On the other hand, Professor Palmer’s article argues that this
permanent guidance of the Code should be read less strictly, 89 and
that this legal provision leaves room for importing common law
rules. 90 Based on this interpretation, ruling on “equity” prevails

85. For an extensive discussion of “equity” as referred in Louisiana Civil
Code article 4, see Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed
Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7
(1994). See also Julio C. Cueto-Rua, The Civil Code of Louisiana is Alive and
Well, 64 TUL. L. REV. 147, 169 (1989).
86. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1 (1993).
87. Justice Dennis underlined the fact that “the judge does not have absolute
discretion but is required to return again and again to the Code seeking its
guiding values and adhering as closely to them as possible.” Id. at 17.
88. “When dealing with the civil law, the judge’s constitutional oath to
support the law requires that he recognize that the Civil Code is the primary
source of law.” Id. See also Grauberger, supra note 30, at 275. This author is of
opinion that the courts are not allowed to import common law principles in the
Louisiana Law because it is not consistent with the Constitution of Louisiana.
89. Palmer, supra note 85, at 19:
In a limited number of cases [the judges] proceed by analogy from the
Code's other provisions, as good civilian judges are thought to do. Yet
in others, they import and transplant concepts that have no analogy
within the Code or within the civilian vocabulary. In other instances,
they build from the prior precedents that they established in novel
cases.
90. “In Louisiana today, practitioners do not readily recognize civilian
connotations in the term 'equity,' but they rather easily associate that word with
particular common-law doctrines absorbed within the fabric of the law.” Palmer,
supra note 85, at 51.
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without any other intellectual debates, and justice should be served
regardless of the origin of the legal solution.
The Code as a system should not be treated as an “arbitrary and
spontaneous product,” 91 but rather as the result of the “labor of
reason in the past centuries.” 92 After reading the Louisiana Civil
Code, it may appear that it does not provide a theory of recovery
for the victim, with respect to the facts in Martin, but, after a closer
look, by correlating multiple articles of the code, a theory of
liability can be found within the spirit of the code.
In the common law, if a principal unreasonably fails to control
an unauthorized agent and a third party relies on the agent to her
detriment, the principal will be liable under the theory of agency
by estoppel. 93 Similarly, civilian jurisdictions like France and
Quebec have identified a new basis of liability in such situations
based on a theory called “la théorie de l’apparence.” 94 Based on
this theory, reasonable reliance can be a binding source of
obligations, very similar to a situation where the equitable remedy
of estoppel would apply. 95 Obligations are created for the benefit
of a third party, who legitimately relied on a situation created or
under the control of the obligor, and acted accordingly. 96 The
theory draws its origins from the Roman Law principle of error
communis facit jus, 97 but it is more developed and complex
nowadays. French doctrine 98 and jurisprudence 99 developed the
91. Levasseur, supra note 4, at 697.
92. Id.
93. Dalley, supra note 42, at 514.
94. Theory of appearance, in English.
95. About how the common law estoppel completes the théorie de
l'apparence, see Olivier Moréteau, Revisiting the Grey Zone Between Contract
and Tort: The Role of Estoppel and Reliance in Mapping out the Law of
Obligations in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2004 at 78-79 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara
C. Steininger eds., Springer 2005).
96. Jean-Francois Lerouge, Uniform Computer Information Transaction
Act: The Use of Electronic Agents Questioned under Contractual Law:
Suggested Solutions on a European and American Level, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 403, 411 (1999).
97. A common error is a source of law.
98. JACQUES GHESTIN & GILLES GOUBEAUX, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL.
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 757-96 (3d ed., L.G.D.J. 1990).
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theory starting from Geny’s liberal interpretation, 100 but without
resorting to “equity” or other rules not prescribed by the Code. It is
considered to be a theory contained in the French Civil Code,
despite the fact that it is not based on an explicit and clear norm.
This theory of liability can easily be fit into the framework of
Louisiana Civil Code, and the articles regarding tort law (23152322). The Civil Code already has expressions of reliance-based
theories of liability in contractual relations. Articles 1967 and 3021
create obligations in situations where an innocent victim relies on
an appearance of facts to her detriment. The French théorie de
l'apparence offers a framework for a more general basis for
liability.
In order to impose liability on someone based on the théorie de
l'apparence, there are two conditions that have to be met: (1) the
apparent situation should be different from the real, objective
situation; 101 and (2) the victim should legitimately rely on the fact
that the situation corresponds to reality–in other words the victim
must be in error. 102
In Martin, this theory is connected to the allegedly false
representation to the victim that Johnson was an “apparent
employee” of A-1. Under the test laid down above, and
considering the facts provided in the decision, A-1 should be

99. The French Court of Cassation has used the theory of appearance to lift
the corporate veil and impose liability on shareholders, who were abusing the
privilege of incorporation. William Tetley, Q.C., Arrest, Attachment, and
Related Maritime Law Procedures, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1895, 1944 (1999).
100. See FRANÇOIS GÉNY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN
DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF 20 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans., 2d ed., LSLI 1954) for
an extensive counterargument to the exegetic French school of thought.
101. GHESTIN, supra note 98, at 784.
102. The current trend in the French doctrine is that the error should be
legitimate, which regards the standard to be that a reasonable person, if they had
been in the same situation, would have regarded the situation as real. Prior
theories required error to be “common”. The main difference is important as a
practical matter, because with regard to legitimate error, the situation is analyzed
in concreto, whereas the common error is scrutinized in abstracto (therefore
more strictly). Id. at 771-74.
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liable, because both conditions are met. Mr. Martin was in a
legitimate error, mainly because he paid the delivery fee to A-1
and because at no point he did know he would have to deal with an
independent contractor. It does not matter whether the plaintiff
changed his position or not. Under the théorie de l'apparence, A-1
may be liable, and this approach also provides a better framework
to guide courts in their approach to future similar cases.
V. CONCLUSION
When talking about the process of drafting the French Civil
Code, Portalis said that it is virtually impossible to anticipate all
situations and regulate them. 103 To that extent, the Martin case
represents an exempli gratia.
In this author’s opinion, the court in Martin had enough legal
provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code to construct an argument in
accordance with principles grounded in the civilian tradition. The
resort to the common law concept of “apparent authority” was
unnecessary, and the implementation of this concept, without
taking into considerations the nuanced differences between the
contract of mandate and agency, may create confusion in Louisiana
jurisprudence.
Based on the théorie de l'apparence, the court may have
reached a different result in Martin. By introducing this theory, this
case note advocates for a civilian solution to the problems that
spring from cases such as Martin 104 and Able. 105
Probably a more serious problem, discussed in passing in this
note, can be identified in the treatment of the contract of
mandate—in particular, the confusion created from equating
mandate with agency. It has been argued that the codal provisions
are behind the present business realities, and there is a need for
103. Alain Levasseur, Code Napoléon or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REV.
762, 768 (1969).
104. 117 So. 3d 281 (2013).
105. 650 So. 2d. 750 (1995).
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harmonizing the rather complex doctrine of representation. 106 The
1997 revision of the law of representation tried to keep the civilian
terminology and conceptual framework intact, but cases like
Martin and Able show that, in order to respect this choice of the
legislature, one has to look at the Civil Code as a whole 107 and
interpret its provisions based on its spirit.

106. North, supra note 73, at 280.
107. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13.

BLOXOM V. CITY OF SHREVEPORT, BEHIND THE VEIL: A
PROXIMATE CAUSE CASE
Garrett M. Condon ∗
May the president of a company be held personally liable for
the criminal conduct of an employee he chose to hire? In a sharply
divided court on re-hearing, the Louisiana Second Circuit in
Bloxom v. City of Shreveport 1 recently held yes.
I. BACKGROUND
Brian Horn, a convicted and registered sex-offender, murdered
twelve-year-old Justin Bloxom. 2 Horn, a taxi driver, had been
posing as a young female in text messages to the boy. 3 These texts
tricked Justin into sneaking out of his parents’ house late at night
and getting into Horn’s taxi, believing the young girl had sent a
cab to him so they could rendezvous. 4 Horn had successfully lured
Justin into the trap, from which there was no escape from Horn’s
brutality. Justin’s mother filed survival and wrongful death actions
against a number of defendants, including the president of the taxi
company David McFarlin—in his personal capacity—for hiring
Horn as a taxi driver. 5
Prior to these events, Horn had been convicted of felony sexual
assault in Missouri.6 After being released from prison, he moved to
Louisiana and applied for a job as a taxi driver. 7 McFarlin
∗ J. D., Hofstra University (2001), LL.M. Candidate, LSU Law Center
(2013).
1. Bloxom v. City of Shreveport, 47,155 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/31/12); 103 So.
3d 383.
2. Id. at 384.
3. Id. at 384-85.
4. Vickie Welborn, Man indicted in death of Justin Bloxom, SHREVEPORT
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20100413/
NEWS03/4130319/Man-indicted-death-Justin-Bloxom.
5. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 385.
6. Id. at 384.
7. Id.
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interviewed Horn for the position, and chose to hire him while
having full knowledge of his prior conviction and registered sex
offender status. 8 While McFarlin made the hiring decision,
multiple layers of corporate and contractor entities separated
McFarlin from the driver employees. 9 McFarlin was the president
of Blue Phoenix Trading Company, which did business as Action
Taxi. Action Taxi used a subcontractor, Moore’s Consulting, to
employ the drivers. 10
McFarlin moved for summary judgment to dismiss him as a
defendant in his personal capacity. 11 In that motion, he admitted to
hiring Horn despite having knowledge of the conviction and
registered sex offender status, but argued that because he acted in
his capacity as president of Blue Phoenix Trading Company, the
company should hold the potential liability and not McFarlin
personally. 12 Ms. Bloxom argued that McFarlin owed a personal
duty to Justin and that his own fault caused the injury. 13 The trial
court granted McFarlin’s motion and Ms. Bloxom appealed. 14
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
On appeal with the Louisiana Second Circuit, a three-judge
panel originally decided the case in favor of McFarlin, with one
judge dissenting. 15 The majority held that McFarlin owed no
personal duty to Justin, stating “a corporate officer making a hiring
decision is primarily acting on behalf of his or her company [and]
owes a duty of reasonable care which does not extend to all torts
that all employees might commit.” 16 However, the Second Circuit
granted a re-hearing, and in a three-to-two decision vacated the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 384.
Id.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385.
Id.
Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 383.
Id. at 388.
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original opinion and reversed the trial court’s summary judgment
decision. The majority on re-hearing said the facts of the case were
a “perfect storm” that created personal liability on the part of
McFarlin. 17 All the written opinions (majority and dissent in both
the original hearing and the re-hearing) are based on Second
Circuit jurisprudence, viewing the issue as one of “piercing the
corporate veil.” In that vein, the analyses in the opinions strongly
integrate corporate limited liability policies in determining whether
McFarlin should be exposed to personal liability or not.
III. COMMENTARY
Bloxom is a recent example of the Second Circuit’s line of
confusing cases involving personal liability on the part of
corporate officers, specifically in cases where officers personally
act within the scope of their employment. 18 These cases appear to
mix two different theories of personal liability for corporate
officers, labeling any instance of personal liability as an issue of
“piercing the corporate veil.”
A corporation is a legal person, an entity distinct from the
individuals who comprise it. 19 Generally, the owners and officers
of a limited liability company are not personally liable for the
debts, obligations, or liabilities of the corporation. 20 The Louisiana
Supreme Court, in Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., Inc., 21 stated that
this protection is meant to encourage business growth because
individuals can invest in a company while insulating their personal
assets from liability. “Piercing the corporate veil” is an equitable
means by which a court can hold a shareholder or officer
personally liable for the liabilities of the company despite the
general protections of the corporate structure, generally when a
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 390.
See infra note 32.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 (2013).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:93, 12:1320 (2013).
590 So. 2d 1164, 1167-68 (La. 1991).
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corporation is in reality the alter ego of the owner or when the
entity is not truly operated as a corporation. 22 The opinions in
Bloxom recognize what the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated in
Riggins and elsewhere, all stating directly or in essence that
“Louisiana courts are reluctant to hold a shareholder, officer, or
director of a corporation personally liable for corporate
obligations, in the absence of fraud, malfeasance, or criminal
wrongdoing.” 23
A corporate bankruptcy scenario provides a good example of
this limited liability protection. Imagine a person has a business
idea. He incorporates, becomes the single shareholder, and hires
someone to be the president of the company to operate the
business. In an attempt to run the business legitimately, the owner
and president authorize several obligations on behalf of the
company, such as long-term contracts and loans. Unfortunately,
the business ultimately fails and its assets can only cover the
repayment of a small fraction of the total amount owed to its
creditors. Absent the existence of extraordinary circumstances as
outlined in Riggins, such as fraud or running a sham corporation,
the limited liability construct would protect both the shareholder
and the president from being personally liable for the remaining
debts of the failed corporation, despite the money still owed to the
business’ creditors. A court would only be authorized to pierce the
corporate veil (resulting in personal liability on the part of the
shareholder or officer) if the corporation was actually set up as a
sham to illegitimately try to protect the officers and shareholders.
22. Like in other jurisdictions, factors to consider when determining
whether to pierce the corporate veil include “1) commingling of corporate and
shareholder funds; 2) failure to follow statutory formalities for incorporating and
transacting corporate affairs; 3) undercapitalization; 4) failure to provide
separate bank accounts and bookkeeping records; and 5) failure to hold regular
shareholder and director meetings.” Id. at 1168. The Second Circuit previously
applied these factors in Cahn Electric Appliance Co., Inc. v. Harper, 430 So. 2d
143 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1983). The Cahn case involved a traditional “piercing the
corporate veil” issue of an attempt to reach the president and sole shareholder of
a company personally for the obligation of the company.
23. Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1168.
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The facts in the Bloxom case offer a wholly distinct form of
corporate officer personal liability, and really do not relate to the
notion of what commonly is referred to as piercing the corporate
veil. A corporate officer who takes a personal action, even if
undertaken as part of his or her duties to the corporation, is not
somehow shielded from personal liability because of the existence
of the corporation. The Louisiana statute on point specifically
excludes from the general corporate limited liability protection
situations where a third party has a legal right against an officer
who commits a negligent or wrongful act. 24 Further, this
distinction was made in Canter v. Koerhing Co., 25 where the
Louisiana Supreme Court explained that a corporate officer does
owe a duty of care under the general tort liability article 26 to third
persons when personally acting on behalf of the corporation. 27 This
distinction was actually emphasized in the law recitation within the
original Bloxom majority opinion, where it summarized the
holding in Canter by stating “[i]f an officer or agent of a
corporation through his fault injures another to whom he owes a
personal duty, whether or not the act culminating in the injury is
committed by or for the corporation, the officer or agent is liable
personally to the injured third person, and it does not matter that
liability might also attach to the corporation.” 28 Unfortunately, the
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1320(D) (2013).
25. 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973).
26. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2013).
27. See also Lytell v. Hushfield, 408 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1982) (holding
certain corporate officials personally liable for injury caused by forklift when
those officials were delegated the duty to provide a safe working environment
and personally knew of the forklift defects but did nothing to correct them).
28. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 386. The final phrase “it does not matter that
liability might also attach to the corporation” is in reference to the issue of
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Generally, a
corporation as an employer may be deemed vicariously liable for the actions of
its employees taken within the scope of their employment. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:3921 (2013). For instance, the taxi company may be liable if one of its
taxi drivers negligently causes a car accident. However, the corporate officer
will not be personally liable for the torts of corporate employees based on his
general administrative responsibility in the corporation. See Canter, 283 So. 2d
at 721. This theory would be inapplicable in this case because it requires a
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original majority did not apply this law in their analysis, and,
puzzlingly, the majority on re-hearing failed to cite to it at all, even
though it is directly on point and tends to support their holding.
These same general principles exist in other jurisdictions.
While not part of Louisiana jurisprudence, the distinction between
piercing the corporate veil and personal liability for personal
actions was succinctly made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
Where the court pierces the corporate veil, the owner is
liable because the corporation is not a bona fide
independent entity; therefore, its acts are truly his. Under
the participation theory, the court imposes liability on the
individual as an actor rather than as an owner. Such
liability is not predicated on a finding that the corporation
is a sham and a mere alter ego of the individual corporate
officer. Instead, liability attaches where the record
establishes the individual’s participation in the tortious
activity. 29
“Participation theory” is not a term of art used in Louisiana, but
its essence exists both in legislation and case law. 30
The Bloxom case follows a stream of Second Circuit cases that
mix these two concepts. For years, the conflated analysis has
extended Louisiana’s corporate limited liability protections to the
personal acts of corporate officials taken in the scope of
employment, despite the distinction made in Canter. The analysis
in each opinion in this line of cases cites to Riggins v. Dixie
Shoring Co., Inc., 31 despite the fact that Riggins was not a case
involving a corporate officer’s personal action. The cases citing

showing that the employee was acting in the scope of his employment, which
Horn was clearly not. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1037 (La. 1991).
29. Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90 (Pa. 1983).
30. For an excellent and in-depth review on both topics, see Glenn G.
Morris, Personal Liability for Corporate Participants without Corporate VeilPiercing, 54 LA. L. REV. 207 (1993) (discussing Louisiana law on personal
liability for tortious conduct of corporate officers) and Glenn G. Morris,
Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 271 (1991) (discussing
Louisiana law on piercing the corporate veil).
31. 590 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1991).
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Riggins incorrectly use the lack of “fraud, malfeasance or criminal
wrongdoing” as a factor in not finding personal liability, as those
factors are only relevant in determining whether to hold an officer
or shareholder personally liable for the liabilities of the
corporation. They are not relevant in cases like Bloxom. Further,
Second Circuit opinions discuss policy justifications for treating
corporations as separate entities to rationalize why corporate
officers should be shielded from personal liability for their acts on
behalf of the corporation. 32 Again, that rationale is only applicable
for traditional piercing-the-corporate-veil situations and not in
situations like Bloxom. Even the majority opinion on re-hearing in
Bloxom strains to keep intact the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on
limited liability generally for the personal actions of a corporate
officer taken within the scope of their duties. With tortured
reasoning, the opinion tries to separate McFarlin’s actions as
somehow extraordinarily unique compared to the personal acts of
most corporate officers.
Based on Canter, the analysis of whether McFarlin owed a
personal duty in this case should have been relatively
straightforward. The issue is whether he was negligent in hiring
Horn. Negligent hiring cases are based purely on the standard
negligence provision of article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code,33
32. In Kemper v. Don Coleman, Jr., Builder, Inc., 746 So. 2d 11 (La. App. 2
Cir. 1999), plaintiffs sued the president of a construction corporation for failing
to warn that their newly built houses were susceptible to flooding. The president
personally knew of the flooding concern and did nothing to disclose the
information. The Court held that the president was protected from personal
liability because he was acting in his capacity as corporate president and that the
sales were between the plaintiffs and the corporation. In Carter v. State, 46 So.
3d 787 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010), a plaintiff sued the president of a corporation in
his personal capacity after a car accident caused injury. The allegations were
that he “conducted a negligent inspection of the tractor-trailer and determined
that the vehicle was roadworthy when it was not, made the negligent decision to
instruct his employee to drive the vehicle from the auction yard to his wrecker
yard at night and negligently entrusted the vehicle to an unqualified driver,” all
of which were done in the scope of his employment. The Court held the
president could not be held personally liable because these actions were taken in
his “corporate capacity” rather than his “individual capacity.”
33. See Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992) (on re-hearing).
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which is cited in the Bloxom original opinion and the re-hearing
dissent, but again, strangely, is not cited by the majority on rehearing. The duty-risk analysis used under article 2315 “requires
proof by the plaintiff of five separate elements: (1) the defendant
had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty
element); (2) the defendant’s conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries
(the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of
liability or scope of protection element); and (5) the actual
damages (the damages element).” 34 Whether a duty exists is a
matter of law, in which courts must make a policy decision in light
of the unique facts and circumstances presented along with
reviewing laws (statutory, jurisprudential, or arising from general
principles of fault). 35 Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence does
not factor the benefits of the corporate structure as part of the duty
analysis, but rather declared them distinctly separate issues in
Canter. Other Louisiana appellate courts have applied this
distinction. 36
While not used in their analyses, both the original majority
opinion 37 and the majority opinion on re-hearing 38 cite the same
line of negligent hiring cases. 39 These cases all state that a duty
exists (although limited in scope, like all negligence cases) on the
part of an employer to exercise reasonable care in the hiring of an
employee who, in the performance of his duties, will have a unique
34. Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923 So. 2d 627 (La. 2006).
35. Id. at 633.
36. See Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler, Auctioneers and Appraisers v. Davis
Wholesale Electronics Supply Co., Inc., 516 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1987);
and Indest-Guidry, Ltd. v. Key Office Equipment, Inc., 997 So. 2d 796 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 2008).
37. Bloxom, 103 So. 3d at 387.
38. Id. at 392.
39. Both opinions cite the same three cases: Cote v. City of Shreveport, 73
So. 3d 435 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011); Kelley v. Dyson, 10 So. 3d 283 (La. App. 5
Cir. 2009); and Taylor v. Shoney’s Inc., 726 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1999).
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opportunity to commit a tort against a third party. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has also certainly acknowledged a general cause of
action against an employer for negligent hiring, analyzed using the
standard negligence test of article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
Code, such as in Roberts v. Benoit. 40 In Roberts, a sheriff
deputized a cook and gave general instructions to carry a firearm at
all times while off duty. Minimal training was given, but a manual
told the new deputy not to carry a firearm while drinking alcohol
and that the weapon should only be drawn if life is in danger. The
deputy later went to a social gathering where he drank alcohol and
engaged in horseplay with his firearm, during which he negligently
shot another person. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
despite the fact that the sheriff may have been negligent in
deputizing and arming the cook with insufficient training, the
scope of the duty did not extend to this particular harm because it
was too attenuated and too unforeseeable that the new deputy
would use the firearm in such a manner in clear violation of both
the manual and common sense.
The case of Jackson v. Ferrand 41 is remarkably similar to
Bloxom. The victim in Jackson had locked herself out of her hotel
room. A hotel worker assisted her by getting a master key and
letting her into her room. While doing so, he invited her to go on a
date with him and she agreed. While out, she alleged he drugged
and sexually assaulted her. The victim filed a cause of action
against the hotel for, among other things, the negligent hiring and
supervision of the alleged assailant, stating that the hotel knew the
assailant had a criminal history. The Court affirmed a summary
judgment in favor of the hotel, finding that even if the hotel knew
of his criminal history, hiring him was neither the cause-in-fact nor

40. 605 So. 2d 1032, 1041 (La. 1992) (on re-hearing). See the entire Roberts
opinion for an in-depth discussion of the differences between the respondeat
superior and negligent hiring theories of employer liability.
41. 658 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994).
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the legal cause of the damages because the hotel could not foresee
the sexual assault despite his criminal history. 42
Because it incorporated elements of “piercing the corporate
veil” doctrine, the final Bloxom majority opinion failed to use the
correct analysis in determining that McFarlin owed a personal
duty. Limited liability should have been relegated to nothing more
than a footnote to state that McFarlin’s personal conduct put him
personally at risk based on Section 12:1320(D) of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes and Canter. The true issue of the case is whether
McFarlin is liable under article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code
for negligently hiring Horn. The operative questions should have
been, first, whether McFarlin could reasonably have foreseen
Horn’s actions when he was hired such that McFarlin owed a duty
to Justin and his mother in this situation; and second, whether
McFarlin’s hiring of Horn was a proximate (or legal) cause of the
damages suffered by Justin and his mother.
While there may be many foreseeable risks in hiring a
convicted and registered sex offender as a taxi driver, it is a far
stretch to say that Horn’s murder of Justin was one of them.
Perhaps foreseeable would have been that Horn would recidivate
by either sexually assaulting a passenger he happened to pick up,
or noting a victim’s address in dropping them off and using that
information to come back later to commit a sexual crime. 43 But
using the taxi as part of a greater plan to murder someone? That
was not reasonably foreseeable. Moreover, even assuming a duty,
42. Id. at 702.
43. Close to this example is Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 540 So.
2d 363 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989). There, the employer pest control service (Orkin)
was found liable for the rape of a customer committed by an Orkin employee,
because the company failed to enforce its yearly polygraph requirements. The
employee had unlocked a window while treating the victim’s home, and later
entered through that window and raped the victim. The Court found Orkin
should have foreseen this kind of harm (which they actually did foresee because
they had a policy in place for annual polygraphs of employees), and thus had a
duty to protect this type of victim. However, had the assailant simply used his
Orkin truck to kidnap and kill some random person he picked up off the street, it
is hard to imagine the Court reaching the same result.
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the link between the hiring of Horn and the murder of Justin is so
attenuated that it is doubtful a reasonable jury could find that
McFarlin proximately caused these damages. From the facts
available, it seems to be an unfortunate truth that Horn was going
to prey on Justin regardless of his taxi driver status. The taxi
happened to be of convenient assistance in his horrible plan, but
Horn easily could have substituted this with any other means
imaginable—his job as a taxi driver was not a proximate cause of
the damages here.
IV. CONCLUSION
The majority decision on re-hearing, holding that McFarlin’s
duty extended to the harm Justin and his mother suffered, is of
dubious rationale as a matter of law. Of more widespread
relevance beyond this individual case, however, is that the Second
Circuit’s analysis follows a line of cases that incorrectly conflates
two distinct theories of personal liability and fails to follow the
Louisiana Supreme Court case of Canter. This jurisprudence
should be reviewed to align itself with Canter to state, generally,
that corporate officers should be protected from personal liability
for both the general obligations of the corporation as well as
vicariously for the actions of its employees, but should not be
protected when they commit personal torts in the scope of their
employment or personal torts committed in their “corporate
capacity.”

TRAHAN V. KINGREY: AN ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S
RELOCATION STATUTE
John H. Leech, Jr.*
I. BACKGROUND
Trahan v. Kingrey 1 involves the question of relocation of the
minor child, Devon, of Douglas Anthony Trahan and Elizabeth
Donald Kingrey Romero. Devon was born on January 3, 2005 in
Lafayette, Louisiana. Devon’s mother, Elizabeth Kingrey, was
unmarried at the time of Devon’s birth and paternity was in
question until DNA testing confirmed that Douglas Trahan was
Devon’s biological father. 2 After confirmation by DNA testing,
Trahan fully accepted the obligations and responsibilities of
parenthood. 3 Two months after Devon’s birth, Trahan and Kingrey
entered into a consent judgment which stated that they were to
share equal joint custody of Devon on a one-week rotating basis. 4
Kingrey was designated as the domiciliary parent. 5
Kingrey subsequently married Timothy Romero on July 21,
2005, who was her husband during the proceedings surrounding
this case. 6 Romero’s employer, The Wood Group, was in the
process of shutting down its facilities in Louisiana. 7 Romero was
offered a promotion to stay with The Wood Group, but that
promotion required his relocation to West Virginia. 8 Rather than
filing a “Notice of Relocation,” as required by Louisiana Revised
* J.D. Candidate, LSU Law Center (2014). The author would like to
provide a special thanks to Professor Elizabeth R. Carter for her assistance and
guidance in the production of this case note. A special thanks also to Jennifer
Lane and Alexandru-Daniel On of the JCLS.
1. Trahan v. Kingrey, 2011-1900 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/12), 98 So. 3d 347.
2. Id. at 349.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Statutes 9:355, et seq., Kingrey filed a “Rule for Custody” on July
15, 2009, stating that the move to West Virginia was required for
her husband (Romero) to keep his employment. 9 In her “Rule for
Custody,” Kingrey alleged that the move to West Virginia would
require a change to the shared custody arrangement. 10 Trahan filed
a “Rule for Change of Custody” in opposition to Kingrey’s request
for relocation of Devon, alleging that it was in the child’s best
interest that he be named domiciliary custodial parent rather than
Kingrey. 11 Trahan filed a subsequent pleading which alleged that
Kingrey failed to follow the statutory requirements of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq. because she failed to give him notice
of the proposed relocation and failed to provide the address,
telephone number, date of move, proposed revised schedule of
visitation, and a statement informing him that an objection to the
proposed relocation should be filed within thirty days of the receipt
of the notice. 12 While awaiting judgment, Trahan and Kingrey
entered into an interim consent judgment on September 4, 2009,
wherein they agreed that they would share custody of Devon on a
twenty-eight day rotating basis. 13
The trial court entered judgment granting the parties joint
custody of Devon with Kingrey designated as the domiciliary
parent, subject to visitation in favor of Trahan, pursuant to a Joint
Custody Plan confected by the trial court. 14 Devon was to reside
with Kingrey in West Virginia. 15 In written reasons for judgment,
the court stated that, because all prior judgments issued in
conjunction with this matter were by consent of the parties, and
that there had never been a “considered decree” rendered in the
case, “each party need only prove a change in circumstances
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.

2013]

TRAHAN V. KINGREY

715

materially affecting the welfare of Devon and that any proposed
changes to the previous child custody decree are in the best interest
of Devon.” 16 The court also stated that it had considered the factors
listed in Civil Code article 134 which are to be used to determine
the best interest of a child for custody purposes and that the court
came to its determination that Kingrey be the domiciliary custodial
parent of Devon, subject to visitation with Trahan, based on those
factors. 17
Trahan filed a motion for new trial with the trial court, which
was denied. 18 Appeal to the First Circuit subsequently followed. 19
II. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
A. Standard of Review
The Court determined that this case was to be reviewed de
novo. The Court proceeded with its determination that the trial
court ruling should be reviewed de novo by quoting from Evans v.
Lungrin: 20 “where one of more trial court legal errors interdict the
fact-finding process, the appellate court should then make its own
independent de novo review of the record.” 21 The legal error the
appellate court identified was the failure of the trial court to
analyze this case based on the relocation statutes (Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355 et seq.). 22 Instead, the trial court used the
“best interest” factors for awarding custody (Louisiana Civil Code
article 134). 23 The trial court may have reasoned that Civil Code
article 134 was the proper law to analyze this case due to the fact
that Kingrey’s rule only requested a modification of custody rather
16. Id. at 350.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 708 So. 2d 731, 735, citing Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1006
(La. 1993).
21. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 351.
22. Id. at 350.
23. Id.
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than a true relocation. The practical effect, however, of Kingrey’s
rule for modification of custody was to create a relocation. The
appellate court determined that the relocation factors should have
been analyzed by the trial court, despite the improper filing by
Kingrey. 24 Thus, legal error was committed because the trial court
applied the incorrect principles of law, and such errors were
prejudicial, which caused deprivation of substantial rights to
Trahan. 25
B. Burden of Proof
The appellate court made note that the burden of proof in this
case was different than what the trial court assumed. 26 In
relocation cases:
The relocating parent has the burden of proof that the
proposed relocation is made in good faith and is in the best
interest of the child. In determining the child’s best interest,
the court shall consider the benefits which the child will
derive either directly or indirectly from an enhancement in
the relocating parent’s general quality of life. 27
Therefore, the appellate court determined that Kingrey had to
not only show that the relocation was done in good faith, but that
such relocation was also in Devon’s best interest. 28
C. Good Faith
The party seeking relocation—in this case Kingrey—bears the
burden of showing that the relocation is made in good faith. 29 The
appellate court made the initial determination that Kingrey was in
good faith when she first relocated with her husband, Timothy

24. Id. at 350-51.
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 352.
27. Id. at 352, citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.13 (2010) (now La. Rev.
Stat. 9:355.10, with language revised by Acts 2012, No. 627, §1).
28. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 352.
29. Id.
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Romero. 30 However, the facts changed after the initial move.
Originally, Kingrey relocated to West Virginia because her
husband was forced to take a job there in order to retain his
employment with The Wood Group. 31 At the time of trial,
however, Romero no longer worked for The Wood Group. 32 He
had resigned his position in March of 2010, and accepted work
with a competitor, Seaboard International, located in West
Virginia. 33 There was no evidence that Romero attempted to find
comparable employment in Louisiana. 34 Therefore, the Court was
left questioning whether Kingrey remained in good faith. 35
D. Best Interest
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 36 lists twelve factors
which the court shall consider when evaluating whether a proposed
relocation is in the child’s best interests. 37 The twelve factors are
as follows: (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and
duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to
relocate and with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other
significant persons in the child’s life; (2) The age, developmental
stage, needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will
have on the child’s physical, educational, and emotional
development, taking into consideration any special needs of the
child; (3) The feasibility of preserving a good relationship between
the non-relocating parent and the child through suitable visitation
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances
30. Id.
31. Id. at 349.
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 352-53.
35. Id.
36. LA. REV. STAT. 9:355.14 is where the relocation factors are located as of
August 1, 2012. This case references the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT.
9:355.12, which is where the relocation factors were located at the time of this
case. This case note will refer to the relocation factors as LA. REV. STAT.
9:355.14.
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:355.14 (2012).
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of the parties; (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration
the child’s age and maturity level; (5) Whether there is an
established pattern of conduct of the parent seeking the relocation,
either to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the
non-relocating party; (6) Whether the relocation of the child will
enhance the general quality of life for both the custodial parent
seeking the relocation and the child, including but not limited to
financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity; (7) The
reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation; (8)
The current employment and economic circumstances of each
parent and whether or not the proposed relocation is necessary to
improve the circumstances of the parent seeking relocation of the
child; (9) The extent to which the objecting parent has fulfilled his
or her financial obligations to the parent seeking relocation,
including child support, spousal support, and community property
obligations; (10) The feasibility of a relocation by the objecting
parent; (11) Any history of substance abuse or violence by either
parent, including a consideration of the severity of such conduct
and the failure or success of any attempts at rehabilitation; and (12)
Any other factors affecting the best interest of the child. 38
The court is required to consider these factors, as opposed to
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 which lists factors that a court
may consider when determining a child’s best interests in custody
matters. 39
The Court weighed factors one, three, five, six, seven, eight,
and ten in favor of Trahan. 40
The first factor in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14
concerns the nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration of
the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and
with the non-relocating parent, siblings, and other significant

38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
39. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 353.
40. Trahan, 98 So. 3d 347 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2012).
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persons in the child’s life. 41 The Court found that the sheer
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would inhibit the
relationships between Devon and his numerous family members,
especially that of his grandparents. 42 The Court considered also
that while Trahan had no relatives in the West Virginia area,
Kingrey did have relatives in Louisiana in the form of her new
adoptive parents in Lafayette. 43 The presence of family in
Louisiana provided Kingrey with more opportunities to visit
Devon in Louisiana than it would Trahan in West Virginia. 44
The third factor concerns the feasibility of preserving a good
relationship between the non-relocating parent and the child
through suitable visitation arrangements, considering the logistics
and financial circumstances of the parties. 45 According to the
visitation schedule the trial court devised, Trahan was responsible
both for picking up Devon and returning him back to West
Virginia, and was to incur all of the associated costs. 46 The sheer
distance in miles and travel time from West Virginia to Louisiana
burdened Trahan to the point that the Court believed that even if
such travel was financially feasible, it would greatly decrease both
the frequency and the amount of time that Devon would be able to
see his father, his paternal grandparents, and other family. 47
The fifth factor concerns whether there is an established pattern
of conduct of the parent seeking relocation, either to promote or
thwart the relationship of the child and the non-relocating party. 48
The Court noted that Kingrey, in the past, had refused to disclose
Devon’s daycare/school names and locations to Trahan. 49 Kingrey
also would not put Trahan as an emergency contact for Devon’s
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355.
Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
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schools and instead placed her husband, Romero, as an emergency
contact. 50 The Court also took note of Kingrey’s hostility toward
Trahan and his parents during her testimony, and it stated that there
were concerns that she would attempt to thwart Trahan’s
relationship with Devon. 51
The sixth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14
considers whether the relocation of the child will enhance the
general quality of life for both the custodial parent seeking the
relocation and the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
emotional benefit or educational opportunity. 52 Because Kingrey is
the parent who relocated, she carried the burden of proof to show
that there was a benefit to the child, Devon, in this move. 53 Both
housing locations were suitable for Devon. 54 The schools available
to Devon in West Virginia and in Houma were seen as equal in the
Court’s eyes. 55 There was an assumption that the move to West
Virginia resulted in an increase in salary for Romero, but the Court
noted that there was nothing in the record indicating what he was
making in Louisiana and, therefore, there could not be a
calculation of any salary increase. 56 Kingrey did not claim that she
was unable to obtain any employment while in Louisiana. 57 Given
this information, the Court determined that Kingrey did not meet
her burden of proving that the move to West Virginia enhanced
Devon’s general quality of life and considered this factor to weight
against allowing relocation. 58
Factor seven of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 considers
the reasons for each parent in seeking or opposing the relocation.59
The Court stated that Kingrey’s request to relocate originally was
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.at 358.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 359.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
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in good faith, because it was due to the fact that her husband,
Romero, either had to make the move to West Virginia or lose his
job with his company, which was closing its business in
Louisiana. 60 However, that good faith was in question due to the
fact that Romero subsequently accepted another job in West
Virginia with another company and there was nothing to indicate
that he attempted to find employment in Louisiana. 61
Factor eight considers the current employment and economic
circumstances of each parent and whether or not the proposed
relocation is necessary to improve the circumstances of the parent
seeking relocation of the child. 62 Originally, the move to West
Virginia was due to the fact that the company that Romero worked
for 63 was closing its offices in Louisiana and told him that, in order
to keep his position with the company, he would need to transfer to
West Virginia. 64 Kingrey, herself, did not need to make the move
for her own employment. 65 Therefore, the Court determined that
Kingrey had failed in meeting her burden of proving that the
relocation was necessary to improve her circumstances. 66
The tenth factor requires the court to consider the feasibility of
a relocation by the objecting parent. 67 The Court speculated that
Trahan, who is a registered nurse, could likely obtain employment
in West Virginia. 68 However, the Court noted that Trahan also did
not wish to leave his family69 behind to move to West Virginia. 70

60. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 359.
61. Id.
62. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
63. The Wood Group.
64. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 349.
65. Id. at 359. It is important to remember that Romero had also ceased
working for The Wood Group and there was no evidence provided that he had
attempted to find employment in Louisiana before accepting another position in
West Virginia. Id.
66. Id.
67. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
68. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
69. Consisting of approximately ninety relatives in or around Houma.
70. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
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The Court found that factors two, four, nine, eleven, and twelve
weighed in favor of neither party. 71
The second factor considers the age, developmental stage,
needs of the child, and the likely impact the relocation will have on
the child’s physical, educational, and emotional development,
taking into consideration any special needs of the child. 72 The
Court determined that, as to Devon’s health and educational
concerns, there was no evidence that either West Virginia or
Louisiana was more beneficial than the other. 73
The fourth factor of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 is the
child’s preference, taking into consideration the child’s age and
maturity level. 74 Because of Devon’s young age and the fact that
both parents seem to have a good relationship with Devon, the
Court determined that this factor did not weigh in favor or either
Trahan or Kingrey. 75
Factor nine evaluates the extent to which the objecting parent
has fulfilled his or her financial obligations to the parent seeking
relocation, including child support, spousal support, and
community property obligations. 76 The Court noted that Trahan
had always timely paid his child support obligations and there was
no judgment or holding that Trahan had ever been in contempt for
failing to make child support payments. 77
Factor eleven considers any history of substance abuse or
violence by either parent, including a consideration of the severity
of such conduct and the failure or success of any attempts at
rehabilitation. 78 The parties in this case, in the past, had abused
drugs, and both alleged past instances of violence by the other. 79
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 347.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 356.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
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The Court also noted that since Devon’s birth, there were no
allegations of either drug abuse or violence by either party. 80 The
past custody agreement in which the parties split time with Devon
evenly indicated that Kingrey did not consider Trahan to be a
threat to Devon. 81 Therefore, the Court found that that factor did
not weigh in favor or either party. 82
The final factor, factor twelve, is a catch-all provision requiring
the court to evaluate any other factors affecting the best interest of
the child. 83 The Court here found no other factors affecting the best
interest of the child that had not already been covered. 84
The Court found none of the twelve factors in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 to weigh in favor of Kingrey. 85
E. Other Suggestive Factors
Louisiana Civil Code article 134 provides twelve factors that
are used in determining the custody of a child and were suggestive
in this relocation case. 86 The Court considered most of what is
provided for in Louisiana Civil Code article 134 by looking at the
mandatory factors in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, but the
Court evaluated some of the factors in article 134 that were not
explicitly covered. 87
Factor 1 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody
proceeding to consider “the love, affection, and other emotional
ties between each party and the child.” 88 Factor 2 of Civil Code
article 134 requires a court in a custody proceeding to consider
“the capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14 (2012).
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 360.
Id at 347.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
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rearing of the child.” 89 Factor 3 requires a court to consider “the
capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.” 90 The
Court compared the availability of each party for the care of Devon
and found that both parties were available to care for Devon, even
though both parties required the aid of others in their households
(Kingrey required help from Romero, and Trahan required the help
of his parents, with whom he lived). 91
Factor 4 of Civil Code article 134 requires a court in a custody
proceeding to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a
stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining
continuity of that environment. Factor 5 requires a court to
consider “the permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or
proposed custodial home or homes.” 92 The Court noted that
Kingrey was born in Seoul, South Korea, and subsequently moved
to California when she was adopted. 93 She then moved with her
adoptive family to Louisiana and lived in Morgan City, Lafayette,
Broussard, Youngsville, and Houma. 94 She then moved to West
Virginia with her husband, Romero, as part of his relocation for
work. 95 Trahan was born, raised, and still lived in Houma. 96 Devon
was also born in Louisiana (Lafayette) and had spent half of his
life either in Lafayette or Houma, up until the time his mother
moved to West Virginia, relocating with her prior to this case.97
The Court noted that Devon had a stable and supportive family
structure in Louisiana and was of the opinion that it would be
desirable to maintain that environment. 98

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134.
Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362.
Id.
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F. Holding
The Court concluded that Kingrey did not meet the burden of
proof required of her as the relocating parent in a relocation case. 99
In addition, the Court found that Trahan was more likely than
Kingrey to provide Devon with a “stable and permanent” residence
in Louisiana. 100 The Court further noted that both Trahan and
Kingrey were capable of being available for Devon as far as
custody was concerned. 101
The Court reversed the judgment of the 32nd Judicial District
Court and rendered judgment in favor of Trahan as domiciliary
parent of Devon. 102 The Court determined that the parties should
have joint custody of Devon and that visitation of Devon should be
awarded in favor of Kingrey. 103 The Court determined that the
previous visitation schedule devised by the trial court for Trahan
should stand, with Kingrey rather than Trahan as the visiting
parent. 104
III. COMMENTARY
The Court approached this decision very methodically and
provided an excellent framework for the way in which Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:355.14 and Louisiana Civil Code article 134
operate in conjunction with each other. The Court arrived at the
correct decision by the letter of the law, and it seems the judgment
is also equitable considering the facts and circumstances.
Nonetheless, there are a few areas of this decision that present an
opportunity to ask questions as to how the outcome could have
been improved.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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To begin with, it should be noted again that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:355.14 was revised in 2012, just after this case was
heard. 105 It was previously Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.12.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14 comment (a) states that the
revision changed the opening language of the statute to make it
clear that a court does not need to make a factual finding on every
factor. 106 Here, this Court made a finding as to each of the twelve
factors. Such analysis was not needed then, and certainly is clearly
not needed now, per comment (a). 107 Failure to analyze each factor
does not constitute an error of law triggering a de novo review. 108
The court is free to give whatever weight it deems appropriate to
any of the relocation factors. 109
Second, the visitation schedule that was assigned to Kingrey
was exactly the same as that was originally assigned to Trahan by
the trial court. The Court addresses that visitation plan while
analyzing factor three, 110 and expresses its concern that the sheer
distance between Louisiana and West Virginia would have led to a
substantial decrease in the amount of time Trahan could spend with
Devon because of the financial constraints of such travel. 111 The
assignment of that same visitation plan to Kingrey does not remove
the principal problem that the Court addressed. The Court merely
shifted the burden that Trahan bore in the visitation plan to
Kingrey. This action does not alleviate the problem created for the
child’s relationship with his non-domiciliary parent.
That being said, Factor 3 does concern the preservation of the
relationship of the non-relocating parent with the child, and that
“non-relocating” parent is not Kingrey. Therefore, the Court may
105. See supra note 36.
106. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, cmt. (a) (2012).
107. See Poe v. Stone, 118 So. 3d 1227, 1229 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2013), citing
Gathen v. Gathen, 66 So. 3d 1, 9 (mentioning that a court is not required to
expressly analyze each of the twelve relocation factors).
108. Id.
109. Poe, 118 So. 3d at 1229.
110. See supra Part II.D.
111. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
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not be concerned with the financial constraints that traveling from
West Virginia to Louisiana puts on Kingrey because she is the
relocating parent. Moreover, it is certainly understandable that it is
extremely difficult to devise a visitation schedule for two parents
separated by roughly a thousand miles that is both feasible
financially and fosters a good relationship between the nondomiciliary parent and the child.
The ultimate concern in cases such as this should be what is
best for the child. It is the author’s opinion that the visitation
schedule does not adequately help foster a good relationship
between Kingrey and the child. It does seem equitable that
Kingrey, as the relocating parent (taking into account also that
living in West Virginia is no longer required for Kingrey and
Romero), should incur the cost of travel for visitation. Kingrey is
only granted thirty-five days in the summer and, not including the
holiday rotation, thirty hours per month. The thirty hours per
month seems profoundly low. While devising a visitation schedule
that is fair and does not put the child in strenuous situations is
difficult, in these kinds of predicaments more could probably be
done. Even just providing an additional weekend per month in
which Kingrey could visit Devon if she were to travel to Louisiana
rather than have Devon travel to West Virginia might suffice.
Understandably, Kingrey may not have the ability to finance her or
Devon’s traveling from Louisiana to West Virginia, or vice versa,
but the option to do so should be there. Thirty hours per month,
which includes travel time, is just not enough to maintain a healthy
relationship between a parent and a child.
Third, Kingrey has a nuclear family structure that seemed to be
overlooked. Kingrey is married to Romero and Kingrey has two
other children, Jade and Noah, who visit during the summer and
holidays (the same time as Devon), and Romero has two children
that live in Lafayette. 112 Therefore, through his mother’s side of
112. Id. at 355.

728

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

the family, Devon has two half-brothers, a step-brother and a stepsister. While it is a very scattered family unit, the presence of a
married couple running a household and the connection with
siblings is valuable for a young child and seemed to be
overlooked. 113 Meanwhile, Trahan is not married, lives with his
parents, and has no other children (albeit he has a rather large
extended family). 114 This could have been a circumstance that
helped Kingrey’s case, had it been considered in either Factor 1 or
Factor 12 of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:355.14, or even in
Factor 5 of Louisiana Civil Code article 134. Perhaps, however,
the Court felt that preserving and cultivating Devon’s relationships
with his paternal extended family outweighed the need to do so
with his siblings. 115
Even had the Court addressed these two concerns, undoubtedly
the outcome would have been the same. The only change that may
have been warranted is minor tweaking to the visitation schedule in
order to better foster Devon’s relationship with his mother as long
as she continues to reside at such a distance from Devon.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this author’s opinion Trahan should have been named the
domiciliary parent, as the Court decided. However, the visitation
schedule is far too inadequate for the minor child. A mere thirtyfive days in the summer, rotating holidays, and a scant thirty hours
per month, which includes travel time for the child, is simply not
sufficient to foster a healthy relationship between Devon and his
mother.

113. See Cucchiara v. Cucchiara, 543 So. 2d 638, 640 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (evaluating custody and considering the fact that the child would live in a
nuclear family by residing with his mother).
114. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 355.
115. See Franklin v. Franklin, 763 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2000)
(considerating the child’s relationship with his siblings and also other significant
persons in the child’s life in evaluating custody).
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It seems as if the aim of the Court was simply to hand back to
Kingrey that which had been handed to Trahan by the trial court.
The Court even made reference to the fact that the visitation plan
the trial court gave to Trahan was inadequate to foster a
relationship between Devon and Trahan. 116 While it seems that
Kingrey may well have been trying to use the relocation, after her
husband no longer needed to reside in West Virginia for work, to
remove Trahan from Devon’s life as much as possible (and the
court points out the fact that she had attempted to do so in the
past 117) retaliation for such acts should not be the aim of a
visitation schedule. The main concern is, and always should be, the
child’s best interests. The author is of the opinion that, whenever
possible, and in the best interests of the child, having both parents’
influence in a child’s life is better than having just one or the other,
or a limited amount of one or the other. It does not seem that a full
effort was put into devising a visitation schedule here that would
be best for the child.
The fact that Kingrey is the relocating parent and that she (and
perhaps her husband) no longer has any good reason to remain in
West Virginia should be taken into consideration. But that
consideration should only be in regard to which parent becomes
the domiciliary parent and who bears the costs of transportation,
not as to how the visitation schedule breaks down.
The rigors of long distance travel on a young child must also be
considered. And perhaps this is why the Court stuck with the trial
court’s visitation schedule. For a young child, traveling from
Louisiana to West Virginia once every month can be extremely
stressful. Therefore, making the child travel every other weekend
to West Virginia would not be in the best interests of the child. But
visitation time with his mother is certainly in Devon’s best interest.
For that reason, it is the author’s opinion that an equitable solution
would have been to simply add to the visitation schedule that
116. Trahan, 98 So. 3d at 357.
117. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:355.14, Factor 5 (2012).
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Kingrey could also travel to Louisiana herself once per month, on a
weekend, and have an additional thirty hours of visitation with
Devon, with all costs to be incurred by her. While, financially, she
may not be able to afford such travel on a consistent basis, at least
the option would have been afforded her, and that would certainly
serve the best interests of Devon. While Kingrey may have been
conspiring the remove Trahan from Devon’s life, there was no
mention by the Court that Kingrey was an unfit mother and, thus,
there is no reason to deprive Devon of the influence, guidance, and
relationship with his mother any more than necessary to make this
custody plan work.
Besides the slight tweaking of the visitation plan, the author is
of the opinion that this case is a superb example of the way in
which the relocation factors (in Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:355.14) and the best interests factors (in Louisiana Civil Code
article 134) operate in conjunction with one another. The Court
does an excellent job of breaking down the case by each particular
issue and analyzing each in a very methodical manner. Moreover,
it serves as a stark reminder to attorneys that if the proper
procedure is not followed in relocation scenarios, the results can be
devastating for the client.

REED V. ST. ROMAIN:
EVERYDAY GIFT GIVING AND LEGAL TAXONOMY
Alexandru-Daniel On ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The facts of Reed v. St. Romain 1 are rather mundane. A man,
Alvin, gave his girlfriend at the time, Judy Ann, a diamond ring. 2
They later split up. Alvin contends that the ring was given in
contemplation of marriage, as an engagement ring, and since they
did not go through with the marriage, he wants the ring back. 3 Judy
Ann says that it was nothing of the sort, and contends that it is her
property. She argues that it was a “shut up” ring or an early
Christmas present. 4
Although the facts of this case are not very intricate, the law
that ought to be applied in circumstances such as those described
above is based on a taxonomy that is not easily navigable.
Taxonomy is a central element in civilian legal thinking, and much
of the civil law’s legal imaginarium is based on the intellectual
∗ Research Associate, Louisiana State University Law Center. The author
warmly thanks Professor Olivier Moréteau for his help and for the engaging
conversations on the subject treated herein; Professor Alain Levasseur for his
notes and comments; Professor Luz M. Martinez Velencoso, Professor Aniceto
Masferrer, Adrian Tamba and Shane Büchler for their edits and help; and
Jennifer Lane for the careful final editing of this piece.
1. Reed v. St. Romain, 2011-2207 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/12), 2012 WL
4335329.
2. Id. at 1.
3. In support of his claim, Alvin Reed testified that he got down on one
knee and asked Judy Ann to marry him, and she accepted. Id. He also introduced
as evidence a photograph of her wearing the diamond ring on the “ring finger”
and a copy of her address book where he was listed as her “fiancé.” Id.
4. Judy Ann St. Romain testified that Reed never asked her to marry him
and that the present was given to her a few days before Christmas as an early
Christmas present. Id. at 2. She added that they never called each other fiancées
and that she listed Reed in her address book as her fiancé because she had
always wished and hoped that one day they would be engaged. Id. Also, on
cross-examination, Reed acknowledged that they had never set a date for the
wedding. Id. Kristen Barnhardt, St. Romain’s daughter, also gave testimony
supporting her mother’s side of the story. Id.
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attempt to abstractly arrange the law into categories. The
Aristotelian division, into categories and subcategories, brings
logic, thoroughness and credibility to the system, but taxonomy
has its traps and challenges. Civilian methodology requires that the
facts of a case be placed inside the proper box or container in order
to correctly determine the juridical effects of the facts in question,
a process that can be relatively straightforward, but might also at
times look like opening a Russian Matryoshka doll. Of course,
things become even more challenging in borderline cases, when
finding the right box also entails discovering the reasoning behind
the categories (the ratio legis) and the boundaries between them.
The theoretical model for the law applicable to cases like Reed
is more complex, yet more fluid and flexible than one would
expect. The purpose of this case note is to go beyond the analysis
and critique of the Reed opinion, and explore some distinctions
that are essential to a better understanding of the law applicable in
similar cases.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Court of Appeals in Reed focused on the issues of fact, and
found that the trial court was not manifestly erroneous in deciding
that the ring was a “shut up” ring and not an engagement ring. 5
Accordingly, Judy Ann was allowed to keep it. In its analysis, the
court cited articles 1468 6 and 1556 7 of the Louisiana Civil Code
and decided that, based on these articles, as applied to the facts, the
parties entered into an “irrevocable donation.”

5. Id. at 2-3.
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468: “A donation inter vivos is a contract by which
a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at present and
irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of another, called the donee, who accepts
it.”
7. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556: “A donation inter vivos may be revoked
because of ingratitude of the donee or dissolved for the nonfulfillment of a
suspensive condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition. A donation
may also be dissolved for the nonperformance of other conditions or charges.”
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III. COMMENTARY
A. A Brief and Cryptic Opinion
One might reasonably wonder how the court arrived at this
result, because the opinion lacks a proper and convincing
demonstration. The main focus is on issues of fact, all the legal
issues being treated in a rather brief and cryptic manner in just one
paragraph at the beginning of the opinion. 8 The court simply cited
the above-mentioned civil code articles, as if their recitation would
automatically bring light as to how they apply to the facts of the
case.
Based on the opinion as a whole, it is evident that the court had
two possible legal rules in mind: on the one hand, if the ring was
an early Christmas present or a “shut up” gift (and this version of
the facts was found more plausible), this meant that the parties
entered into a definitive, non-conditional donation (the court used
the term “irrevocable”); 9 on the other hand, if the gift had been an
engagement ring, this court probably would have found that the
donation would have been subject to a resolutory condition. 10
The court in the end decided the case correctly. Indeed, if the
gift was not made in contemplation of marriage, as an engagement
present, the donee became the owner from the moment the
possession of the ring was exchanged (traditio), 11 and the donation
was not subject to any condition. 12
The facts from Reed present, however, an opportunity to
discuss a few fine distinctions that are rarely mentioned in the legal
literature. Placing a ring on a loved one’s finger can, according to
the circumstances, be an act having the nature of either a usual gift
8. Reed v. St. Romain, supra note 1, at 1.
9. “Non-conditional” and “irrevocable” are not synonyms. See infra Part
III.C.
10. Based on the fact that LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556 was cited by the court.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1543: “The donation inter vivos of a corporeal
movable may also be made by delivery of the thing to the donee without any
other formality.”
12. See infra Part III.C.
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or a donation, 13 and such an act can be either definitive or
conditional. 14 Surrounding circumstances such as the occasion
when the gift was made, the value of the gift, the fortune of the
donor, any accompanying words or gestures, and previous or
subsequent conduct, can lead to a different interpretation of the
facts, a different legal qualification of the act, and different
juridical effects.
In Reed, the first distinction, between donations and usual gifts,
was not even mentioned by the court, and it probably would not
have made any difference in the outcome of the case. In future
cases, however, this distinction might be quite important, and there
is very little guidance in Louisiana doctrine on this issue. 15 The
next section of this case note (section B) will analyze the
distinction between the two types of acts based on the general
theory of juridical acts, and section C will briefly discuss the
distinction between conditional and non-conditional gifts.
B. Donations and Usual Gifts
1. The General Theory of Juridical Acts—Basic Notions
Although the answer might, at first sight, seem obvious, the
first problem a court must consider in a case like Reed is whether
the act of giving a ring to a loved one is juridical or non-juridical in
nature.

13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. In Louisiana, the category of “usual gifts” is only briefly mentioned in
the legal literature, and their treatment is limited to identifying the different
requirements and effects of such acts in the law of successions or matrimonial
regimes. See KATHRYN VENTURATOS LORIO, 10 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE,
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 7:14, 10:6 (2d ed., West 2009-2011);
MAUNSEL W. HICKEY ET AL., 1 LA. PRAC. EST. PLAN. § 4:49, 4:85 (2013-2014
ed., West); KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, 16 LA. CIV. L.
TREATISE, MATRIMONIAL REGIMES § 1.10 (3d ed., West 2006-2012).
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A juridical act is an act of volition, a manifestation of will,
expressed with the intent to produce juridical effects. 16 An act of
volition can be unilateral, giving rise to a unilateral act, or it can
be bilateral, as it is most often the case, or multilateral, giving rise
to a contract (a bilateral or multilateral act).

16. ALAIN LEVASSEUR, RANDALL TRAHAN & SANDI VERNADO, LOUISIANA
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. A METHODOLOGICAL & COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3
(Carolina Academic Press 2013); FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE
AU DROIT 165 (7th ed., Dalloz 2006); JEAN CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL.
INTRODUCTION 268 (22d ed., PUF 1994); Claude Brenner, Acte juridique, at no.
10, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013). The
term declaration of will (déclaration de volonté) has also been used in the
literature. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, 2 LE DROIT DES
OBLIGATIONS. PARTIE DU DROIT ROMAIN ACTUEL 82 (T. Hippert trans., BruylantCristophe & Co. 1873). In Louisiana, the late Professor Saúl Litvinoff used the
term “declaration” of will when proposing a definition for juridical acts. SAÚL
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE. THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 12
(WEST 2001); and SAÚL LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL
TRANSACTIONS. THE CIVIL LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 105 (Claitor’s Publ’g
Division 1969). The Louisiana Civil Code also refers to “other declarations of
will” in article 1757, where the sources of obligations are enumerated. LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1757. The term “manifestation” is preferable because it is broader,
and encompasses all non-verbal communication. One might doubt, for instance,
whether some manual gifts would be seen as originating from “declarations” of
will, when all that the donor does is place a gift in the hands of the donee,
without a written act or without saying anything.
It is also worth mentioning other definitions of juridical acts that have been
proposed in doctrinal works. Some authors tried to improve the definition laid
down above by adding reference to the obligational contents of juridical acts.
See BORIS STARK, HENRI ROLAND & LAURENT BOYER, INTRODUCTION AU
DROIT 553 (3d ed., Litec 1991). Others have tried to offer definitions where the
subjective element (the will) is coupled with objective considerations, in order to
better distinguish juridical acts from juridical facts. See EMMANUEL GOUNOT, LE
PRINCIPE DE L’AUTONOMIE EN DROIT PRIVÉ. CONTRIBUTION À L’ÉTUDE CRITIQUE
DE L’INDIVIDUALISME JURIDIQUE (Rousseau 1912) 246-47 (arguing that a
juridical act is created only when the manifestation of will is aimed at
organizing the effects of the act, and not merely intending them, thus
(over)emphasizing the normative element of juridical acts); JACQUES MARTIN
DE LA MOUTTE, L’ACTE JURIDIQUE UNILATÉRAL; ESSAI SUR SA NOTION ET SA
TECHNIQUE EN DROIT CIVIL 26 (Bernard Frères 1951) (arguing that it is not
enough for the will to intend the juridical effects generated by the act; the
manifestation of will must also be “necessary” for the effects to be produced);
and JEAN HAUSER, OBJECTIVISME ET SUBJECTIVISME DANS L’ACTE JURIDIQUE
70, 322 (L.G.D.J. 1971) (arguing that the role of the will is limited to the
initiative to enter into an operation that has juridical content; in a view that
combines objective and subjective elements, the author considers that the effects
of the act spring exclusively from the law, but the actor’s initiative to enter into
such an act, while not a source, is a necessary trigger).
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A juridical act must cumulatively fulfill three conditions that
can be extracted from the above-mentioned definition: (1) it needs
to be a manifestation of will; (2) it must produce juridical effects;
and (3) the juridical effects must be intended by the author. 17
The latter condition is of special interest for the facts presented
in Reed. By placing the ring on Judy Ann’s finger, Alvin expressed
his will. 18 Also, the act produced legal effects, as ownership of the
ring was transferred to Judy Ann (the court later recognizing this
translative effect in its decision). However, not all intentional acts
of volition that produce juridical effects are juridical acts. Many
are classified as juridical facts, like intentional delicts, 19 or the
management of (another’s) affairs. 20 What differentiates juridical
acts from juridical facts is precisely the author’s intent for the act
to produce juridical effects. It is rather exotic to think, for instance,
that somebody would commit a battery with the intent to pay
reparation. 21 Also, in the case of a management of another’s
affairs, the specific intent is to help or act for the interest of
another, 22 but not necessarily to generate the obligations that arise
from this fact. 23

17. Brenner, supra note 16, at no. 10. The third condition need not be
understood in its most absolute meaning. It is enough for the author of the act to
understand and intend the principal effects of the act, and not every possible
legal consequence that comes with concluding a juridical act.
18. Judy Ann’s acceptance of the ring when placed on her finger makes the
juridical act bilateral, as her will joined Alvin’s to form a contract.
19. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
20. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2292.
21. Some French scholars adjusted the definition of juridical acts in order to
anticipate this sort of bizarre event, and argue that a juridical act is not simply an
act wherein the juridical effects are intended, but also where the effects
necessarily follow from that intent. MARTIN DE LA MOUTTE, supra note 16, at
26. For instance, if the actor commits a delict with the intent to pay reparation,
the act would still be a delict and not a unilateral juridical act, because if the
intent to pay reparation were missing, the act would produce effects anyway (as
a delict). Id.
22. The intent to be of service to another need not be the exclusive reason
why the gestor manages the affairs of another. A cause of action based on
management of affairs is recognized even if he also had selfish reasons for
rendering the performance. SAÚL LITVINOFF, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE: A COURSEBOOK 465 (6th ed., LSU Law Center
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More importantly, the intent to produce juridical effects also
differentiates juridical acts from what could be called “nonjuridical acts.” These acts take the form of agreements, which
apparently resemble juridical acts, but in fact are not intended to be
binding. The typical example is a gentlemen’s agreement, 24
practiced so often in commercial settings. Also, acts like helping,
or promising to help, a friend move some furniture or paint his
house, qualify as non-juridical manifestations of will. 25 If the
intent to be legally bound is missing, as a matter of principle, 26 the
manifestation of will cannot and will not produce juridical effects.

2008); and Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So. 2d
435, 439 n.9 (La. Ct. App. 1957).
23. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL.
LES OBLIGATIONS 991 (9th ed., Dalloz 2005).
24. See Bruno Oppetit, L’engagement d’honneur, D. 1979 Chron. 107.
However, the idea that gentlemen’s agreements are non-juridical acts needs to
be nuanced. While in some of these agreements the parties really intend to give
rise to mere moral obligations, there are many situations in which the intent is to
place the agreement outside of state law, but the effectivity of the agreement is
beyond doubt, and the parties do feel bound by their promisses. Id. at 108. See
also Cass Com., January 23, 2007, D. 2007 Act. Jurisp. 442, obs. Xavier
Delpech; RTD. Civ. 2007, at 340, obs. Jacques Mestre & Betrand Fages. With a
pluralist view on what the law is, one could argue that there are two types of
gentlemen’s agreements: on the one hand, if the parties of the agreement do not
want to be bound except in conscience, or otherwise said, the act shall not have
any binding effect, the gentlemen’s agreement would be a veritable non-juridical
act; on the other hand, if the gentlemen’s agreement is concluded with the intent
to apply a different law to the transaction, a law other than state law, either
created by the parties themselves, or chose by the parties from other non-etatic
regulatory sources (like, for instance, lex mercatoria), then it is a veritable
juridical act, because the parties do intend to be bound by their will and subject
the act to some form of normative background (law lato sensu).
25. For instance, if Primus promises to Secundus, his best friend, that he
will help him with some gardening work, he is not bound by this promise, unless
it is reasonable to think that the parties meant for the obligations resulting from
the agreement to be legally enforceable. Other examples of apparent
manifestations of will that are not intended to produce effects include:
manifestations of will that were intended as mere jokes or jests, the recitation of
a line in a theater play or on the set of a movie, the example a law professor
gives in class, etc.
26. The exceptions to this rule are based on theories of good faith and
reasonable reliance and are intended primarily to secure the setting for
commercial or civil transactions. For instance, if a person makes an offer which
apparently fulfills every condition of a valid offer, but does not really intend to
be bound, his real intentions being reserved solely within his own mind, and a
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Therefore, in order to determine whether or not the agreement
between Alvin and Judy Ann is a juridical act, and, to be more
exact, a contract, one would have to look into the specific intent of
the parties.
2. Gift-Giving—Always a Juridical Act?
Under the civil code, gift giving implies donative intent
(animus donandi). This intent usually is materialized into a
contract of donation, which is a recognized juridical act, 27 and,
more accurately, a nominate contract (its special rules regarding
formation and effects being laid down in Book 3, Title 2 of the
Louisiana Civil Code).
However, not all gifts necessarily fall within the scope of the
provisions from this title of the code. Low value and symbolic gifts
(like, for instance, Christmas or engagement presents), generically
named “usual or customary gifts” 28 (présents d’usage), 29 are not
subject to the codal provisions regarding donations. Some authors
even wonder whether usual gifts can be placed within the category
of juridical acts, 30 as they seem to have been exempted from many

good faith offeree accepts the offer, the former will be bound by his declaration
of will despite his real intent. LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 16, at 114. In
Germany, this principle has been codified in art. 116 of the BGB: “A declaration
of intent is not void by virtue of the fact that the person declaring has made a
mental reservation that he does not want the declaration made. The declaration
is void if it is to be made to another person who knows of the reservation”
(Translation by Langenscheidt Translation Service, available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468.
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2349: “The donation of community property to a
third person requires the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting alone
may make a usual or customary gift of a value commensurate with the economic
position of the spouses at the time of the donation” (emphasis added).
29. M. E.-H. Perreau, Courtoisie, complaisance et usages non obligatoires
devant la jurisprudence, 13 RTD Civ. 481, 512 (1914).
30. IONEL REGHINI, ȘERBAN DIACONESCU & PAUL VASILESCU,
INTRODUCERE ÎN DREPTUL CIVIL 429-30 (Hamangiu 2013); and Perreau, supra
note 29, at 512.
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of the prerequisites of juridical acts, and are deprived of many of
the usual effects of donations.
Usual gifts are exempted from capacity requirements. For
instance, a minor can validly make an ordinary gift (like a modest
Christmas present or a flower to a girlfriend), 31 although he does
not have the capacity to make liberalities (donations or a
testament). 32 Other legal restrictions also do not apply: usual gifts
are not subject to the requirement of mutual consent of the spouses
for the conclusion of gratuitous dispositions on community
property; 33 as to their effects, usual gifts are not subject to
collation, 34 and obviously, it would also be absurd to subject them
to reduction. Also, they are, of course, not subject to the authentic
form requirement. 35
A gift is considered a présent d’usage when two conditions are
fulfilled: (1) the value of the thing is low by comparison to the

31. PHILIPPE MALAURIE ET AL., DROIT CIVIL. LES SUCCESSIONS. LES
LIBÉRALITÉS 182 (Éditions Cujas 1998).
32. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1476:
A minor under the age of sixteen years does not have capacity to make
a donation either inter vivos or mortis causa, except in favor of his
spouse or children.
A minor who has attained the age of sixteen years has capacity to make
a donation, but only mortis causa. He may make a donation inter vivos
in favor of his spouse or children.
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2349. See André Colmer, Communauté, at no. 801,
in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013).
34. LORIO, supra note 15, at 7:14; Succession of Gomez, 67 So. 2d 156, 162
(La. 1953). See also, art. 852 of the French Civil Code: “The expenses of food,
support, education, apprenticeship, the ordinary costs of outfitting, those of
weddings and usual presents, shall not be collated.” The Louisiana equivalent of
the French article 852 is LA. CIV. CODE art. 1244, which is phrased differently:
“Neither the expenses of board, support, education and apprenticeship are
subject to collation, nor are marriage presents which do not exceed the
disposable portion.” Usual presents are not enumerated in art. 1244, but based
on the legislative history of this article, it must be interpreted as also excluding
usual gifts from collation. LORIO, supra note 15, at 7:14.
35. Ibrahim Najjar, Donations, at no. 85, in ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ.
RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013). The lack of authentic form is not
necessarily an exception to the general rules that apply to other donations,
because usual gifts are almost always made in the form of manual gifts.
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fortune of the donor; and (2) the present is made on the occasion of
a social event or in a family setting. 36
In order to explain this sui generis category of gifts, French
legal doctrine developed two main theories that attempt to explain
their nature.
The first theory places usual gifts somewhere in-between moral
and legal realms, by resorting to the mechanism of natural
obligations. 37 This theory is based on the argument that since these
gifts are made in social or family settings, the “donor” feels bound
in conscience before making the gift, and the making of the gift
relieves him of this moral duty. However, if the act of making
usual gifts is seen as the performance of a pre-existing natural
obligation, usual gifts are not, properly said, donations. 38 The
performance of an obligation is incompatible with the ideas of
“liberality” and “donative intent.” This onerous nature of usual
gifts would explain the difference as to the exemption from
collation, or from the rules regarding community property.
Moreover, if the volitional act is considered non-juridical, and only
the traditio (the performance) produces juridical effects, the rules
regarding capacity can also be justified by this theory.
That being said, even though the effects of usual gifts are
deduced very elegantly from the way natural obligations work, the
whole theoretical construct is based on two fictions that ignore or
distort the will of the parties. First, the role of the will as a basis for
transferring ownership is minimized, and the translative effect of
the act is linked to the transfer of possession alone (traditio).
Second, this theory presumes that the intent to extinguish a moral
duty is the cause of the act, and not the author’s liberal intent
(animus donandi). The moral circumstances and the social pressure
36. Id. at no. 86.
37. Perreau, supra note 29, at 512.
38. The performance of a natural obligation cannot be described as a
liberality, the same way a contract wherein the objective cause of one of the
obligations is a preexisting natural obligation cannot be a gratuitous act.
LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE…, supra note 16, at 33.
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that exist when making these presents can serve as a motive for
making the gift (the subjective cause of the act), but the liberal
intent is clearly present (the objective cause of the act is animus
donandi). 39 It is rather cynical to describe giving a Christmas
present as the fulfillment of a duty, and not gift-giving.
That is why the second theory, which describes usual gifts as
veritable donations, a sub-category of manual gifts, subject to a
different legal regime, 40 is more convincing. 41 When one makes an
ordinary gift, the specific intent is to transmit, gratuitously,
ownership of the object to the donee, and this intent is enough to
characterize the act as juridical and, consequently, a donation.
Custom and practical considerations justify the different legal
regime applicable to this category of manual gifts, and not the
mechanism of natural obligations: usual gifts are part of ordinary
social interaction, their rules are dictated by local social standards
(that might also vary in time), and are made on so many social
occasions that it might be excessively burdensome to keep track of
them in order to apply the full extent of consequences attached to
donations.

39. For a detailed presentation of the distinction between subjective cause
and objective cause, see Judith Rochfeld, Cause, at nos. 14-19, in
ENCYCLOPÉDIE DALLOZ. RÉPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2013).
40. See Najjar, supra note 35, at no. 84.
41. A Spanish author has developed an intermediary opinion, which
describes usual gifts as liberalities, and rejects the idea that such gifts are, in
fact, a way of performing a preexisting natural obligation, but considers them
some sort of sui generis liberalities, and not donations. Ramón M. Roca Sastre,
La donación remuneratoria, 31 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 823, 839-40
(1947). In support of this opinion, the author argues that the cause of usual gifts
is the intent to conform to a prevailing usage, and not animus donandi. Id. at
840. Liberal intent (animus donandi or animus testandi) is what distinguishes
liberalities from onerous acts, and to say that usual gifts are liberalities without
animus donandi is a contradiction in terms. Furthermore, the author seems to
reject the incidence of custom as the normative background for usual gifts and
emphasized the role of prevailing usages, and that might have given rise to
confusion between the cause of the act (an internal element) and the source of
law that applies to usual gifts (an external element). See id. at 839. Saying that
the cause of usual gifts is the intent to respect a prevailing usage is like saying
that the cause of a sale is to respect the civil code.
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Arguably, one could easily dismiss the hypothesis of usual gifts
in a case like Reed, because the present was a diamond ring.
Therefore, although the gift was made on the occasion of a social
event (in either hypothesis: a Christmas present or on the occasion
of the couple’s engagement), a strong argument can be made that
the gift is valuable enough to exclude any possibility of
characterizing it as a usual or customary gift. The value of the
diamond ring alone, however, is not enough. The relative value of
the ring, determined by comparison with the donor’s patrimonial
situation, will determine whether or not the gift falls within one
category or another, and not its objective value. 42
3. The Juridical Nature of Engagement Presents
The distinction between donations, as regulated in the code,
and usual gifts, is of particular significance in the context of
engagement presents. Based on previous jurisprudence, in
Louisiana engagement presents are considered to be conditional
donations, because they are made in contemplation of marriage. 43
This rule is of jurisprudential origin, and the question can come
up in the future whether low-value engagement presents that would
qualify as usual or customary gifts would be subject to the same
type of resolutory condition. According to the natural obligation
theory, 44 usual gifts could not be made conditional because they
are in fact the means of performing a pre-existing obligation, and
therefore, as soon as the gift is made, the obligation is

42. See Cass 1re Civ., December 30, 1952, D. 1953 161, JCP 1953 II. 7475
(Fr.) (the French Court of Cassation decided in this case that, given the vast
fortune of the donor, a sumptuous diamond bracelet was a usual or customary
gift, even though it was objectively very valuable). Contra, see HICKEY ET AL.,
supra note 15, at § 4:49.
43. Decuers v. Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So. 880 (1929); Daigle v.
Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1962); Glass v. Wiltz, 551 So. 2d 32 (La.
Ct. App. 1989); and Busse v. Lambert, 773 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2000).
44. See Perreau, supra note 29, at 512.
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extinguished. However, based on the donation theory, 45 at least
theoretically, even low-value gifts could be made conditional.
In France, low-value engagement presents are considered nonconditional, except for family heirlooms, 46 the resolutory condition
being implied in the latter case in order to keep these objects in the
family of the donor.
Seeing how the rules regarding engagement presents are deeply
grounded in custom 47 or usages, 48 their possible transplant into
Louisiana jurisprudence would need to be done with care. 49 Courts
have to be deferential to the parties will, their societal expectations,
and local customs or usages. There is no set recipe for determining
what the parties intend and expect when making engagement
presents, and U.S. jurisdictions give a powerful example in this
regard, as other states have adopted substantially different rules in
dealing with the issue of ownership of engagement presents when
engagements are broken. 50
45. See Najjar, supra note 35, at no. 84.
46. GÉRARD CORNU, DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE 272 (9th ed., Montchrestien
2006); PHILIPPE MALAURIE & HUGUES FULCHIRON, DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE
78 (2d ed., Defrénois 2006); DROIT DE LA FAMILLE 58-59 (Pierre Murat dir.,
Dalloz Action 2008-2009); and JEAN HAUSER & DANIÈLE HUET-WEILLER,
TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL. LA FAMILLE. FONDATION ET VIE DE LA FAMILLE 41-42
(Jacques Ghestin dir., L.G.D.J. 1993).
47. CORNU, supra note 46, at 272. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1: “The sources of
law are legislation and custom” (emphasis added).
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4: “When no rule for a particular situation can be
derived from legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to
equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice, reason, and prevailing
usages” (emphasis added).
49. To this author’s knowledge, so far, Louisiana courts have not decided
any case regarding low value engagement presents, especially based on the
distinction between usual gifts and family heirlooms.
50. Today, based on the foundation of the set of rules that determine the fate
of engagement presents after an engagement is broken, U.S. jurisdictions can be
divided into two major categories: (1) States that apply a fault-based test for
determining whether the donor can recover the ring (i.e., the donor can recover
only if he is not at fault for breaking the engagement); (2) States that consider
engagement presents conditional gifts, and recovery is not premised on fault
(i.e., if the parties do not go through with the marriage, the donor can recover
the ring even if he is at fault). See Brian L. Kruckenberg, “I don’t”:
Determining Ownership of the Engagement Ring When the Engagement
Terminates (note on Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631 (Kan. 1997)), 37
WASHBURN L.J. 425, 434 (1997-1998); Rebecca Tushnet, Rules of Engagement,
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C. Conditional and Non-Conditional Gifts
In determining whether or not a gift is conditional a court must
find the common intent of the parties. The intent of the parties is
usually deduced from the manifestation of will itself, which in
cases where this takes the form of a written document, is rather
straightforward by comparison to cases that involve manual gifts.
The mere fact of placing a ring on someone’s finger, like in the
Reed case, by itself, can hardly explain whether the parties wanted
to enter into a contract of donation, a loan, a sale, or some other
contract. It is even harder to find that the parties intended to
subject the rights or obligations from the act to a modality (a
condition or a term). However, the accompanying circumstances of
the act can shed light on the true intent of the parties, and based on
these extraneous elements, both the nature and the contents of the
act can be deduced. That is why the court in Reed focused so much
on whether or not the gift was given with the occasion of the
parties’ engagement, or for some other reason (as a Christmas
present, or a “shut up” present).
That being said, in its argument, the court made a serious
terminological and conceptual mistake, when it stated in dicta that
“if the ring was given in contemplation of marriage, it is a
revocable donation because marriage is the condition which was
not fulfilled.” 51 A donation subject to a condition should never be
confused with a revocable donation. The two concepts are different
in both nature and effects.

107 YALE L.J. 2583, 2591-2607 (1997-1998); Property Law—Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Holds That Engagement Rings Must Be Returned Regardless of
who Broke the Engagement—Lindh v. Surnam (case note), 742 A.2d 643 (Pa.
1999), 113 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1876 (1999-2000); Barbara Frazier, “But I
Can’t Marry You”: Who is Entitled to the Engagement Ring When the
Conditional Performance Falls Short of the Altar (comment), 17 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL L. 419, 426-38 (2001); and Brooke A. Blecher, Broken
Engagements: Who is Entitled to the Engagement Ring?, 34 FAM L. Q. 579, 583586 (2000-2001).
51. Reed, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
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By default, donations, whether of substantial value or merely
usual gifts, conditional or non-conditional, are irrevocable. The
Louisiana Civil Code defines the contract of donation as: “a
contract by which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests
himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of
another, called the donee, who accepts it.” 52 The irrevocability
prescribed by the civil code must be understood in the sense that
the donor cannot change his mind after making the donation. If the
donor reserves the possibility to take the gift back in any way that
would depend solely on his will, the existence of animus donandi
is in doubt (and a donation is not valid without a clear donative
intent). 53 That is why article 1530 of the Louisiana Civil Code
declares that a donation which is conditioned solely on the will of
the donor is null. 54
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1468 (emphasis added).
53. This is a very old rule in the civil law, being embodied in a general
maxim: “donner et retenir ne vaut.” The rule evolved from Roman law, where
donations in general were always regarded with suspicion, and therefore were
not considered binding until the corporeal possession of the donated thing was
exchanged (traditio). FRANÇOIS TERRÉ, YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL. LES
SUCCESSIONS. LES LIBÉRALITÉS 351 (3d ed., Dalloz 1997). In the Ancien Droit
(the French law that existed before the French revolution), the Roman rule was
reinterpreted to mean that the act of donation cannot allow the donor to reclaim
the alienated thing (in this form, the rule can be found in the Royal Ordinance of
1731 regarding donations). Id. Traditionally, the rule is said to be protective of
the donor, who, knowing that the donation is irrevocable, is made aware of the
significance of the act of donation, and is supposedly going to make donations
only after seriously considering whether the act is necessary and whether by
making the donation he is distributing his fortune fairly (particularly when
donations are used as means of succession planning). Id. at 352, n.1. Some
authors consider, however, that another, perhaps more important, reason behind
the “donner et retenir ne vaut” rule is to protect the donee, who is left
vulnerable, because the donor can revoke the gift at his whim. Id. at 352.
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 31, at 246. A different sanction for donations
subject to potestative conditions would be necessary, if the principal reason
would be the protection of the donee. Professor Philippe Malaurie proposed that
the potestative condition be deemed not written (a sort of partial nullity), with
the effect of making the donation definitive, instead of nullity of the entire act of
donation, which would have the effect of bringing the object of the donation
back into the patrimony of the donor. Id.
54. Article 1531 of the Louisiana Civil Code is an expression of the same
idea. If the donation is conditioned on the payment of future or unexpressed
debts and charges, the donor can eliminate the advantage conferred upon the
donee simply by taking on more debts.
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A conditional donation is perfectly valid, and remains
irrevocable, as long as the condition is not dependent solely on the
will of the donor. In the civil law, revocation implies the
intervention of someone’s will for the purpose of canceling out the
effects of an initial manifestation of will. 55 In other words, in case
of revocation two separate juridical acts are in play. The initial act
would have to be a contract (the donation), and the subsequent act,
the revocation, would be a unilateral act canceling the effects of
the donation. It is important to emphasize that the subsequent
unilateral act is the source for the effects on the rights or
obligations of the first act. That is because, as opposed to
revocation, when a condition is fulfilled, there is no second
manifestation of will aimed at canceling the effects of another,
initial, juridical act. The condition is a part of the initial act and its
fulfillment or non-fulfillment will generate effects which are
anticipated by the original act and flow from that original
manifestation of will.
Revocation can be non-judicial or judicial. Non-judicial
revocation operates only in special circumstances, like in cases of
donations mortis causa. 56 Judicial revocation operates for cases of
ingratitude. 57 A conditional donation is irrevocable, unless it falls
within one of the special circumstances of revocable donations
described above. 58
In article 1556, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly makes a
distinction between causes of revocation and causes of dissolution
55. GÉRARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 920-921 (9th ed., PUF
2011).
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1469. Before 1942, former Louisiana Civil Code
article 1749 provided that donations between spouses were revocable. Today, as
a rule, donations between spouses are irrevocable. However, a right of
revocation can be introduced by the parties by express stipulation in the act of
donation, but only if the donation is made by notarial act. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2351 (2005).
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 1557.
58. For instance, a donation subject to a condition can, of course, be
revoked for ingratitude by a court, but in that case the act of ingratitude, and not
the condition, is what makes the donation revocable.
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of a donation. 59 The ingratitude of the donee is a motive for
revocation, whereas the nonfulfillment of a suspensive condition or
the fulfillment of a resolutory condition leads to the dissolution of
the donation. 60
IV. CONCLUSION
This rather lengthy case note covers more than what would
generally be necessary when discussing a case like Reed. In itself,
the case is not very complex, and the decision of the court
followed Louisiana law. Still, there are a couple of reasons why
more ground is covered than what would generally be expected of
a standard case note and why some taxonomical issues are treated
at length.
First, a slight change in circumstances would have led the court
towards a completely different result. If Alvin had made a formal
engagement proposal when he gave the ring to Judy Ann, the
donation would have been most probably considered subject to a
resolutory condition. 61 Even then, things might have changed if the
court found that the contract between the parties was an usual or
customary gift, and not a conditional donation. And things might
not stop there, other distinctions becoming relevant within each
subcategory. That is why it is essential to clearly determine the
facts in cases like Reed, and applying the law to these facts
depends on a firm grasp on traditional distinctions of the civil law:
between juridical and non-juridical acts, between donations and
ordinary gifts, and between conditional and non-conditional gifts.
Second, the Civil Code does not have specific and detailed
rules for circumstances such as those of the Reed case. The degree
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1556: “A donation inter vivos may be revoked
because of ingratitude of the donee or dissolved for the nonfulfillment of a
suspensive condition or the occurrence of a resolutory condition. A donation
may also be dissolved for the nonperformance of other conditions or charges”
(emphasis added).
60. Dissolution in this case is not a sanction and should not be confused
with dissolution as it appears in Title 4, Chapter 9 of the same Book 3.
61. See supra note 43.
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of abstraction of the general theory of juridical acts is beyond what
is necessary in a regulatory instrument, 62 and such general theories
were developed after the Code Napoléon entered into force. 63
Also, while usual gifts are mentioned in the code, the distinction
between these gifts and donations is not made clear, either in the
code, the jurisprudence, or the existing Louisiana legal doctrine.
Moreover, while there is more than enough information in the code
regarding what a condition is and how conditions operate, the code
itself contains inconsistencies, 64 and, as proved by the Reed
opinion, courts, when discussing conditions, sometimes confuse
some of the concepts used by the code. 65
For these reasons, it was worth discussing at length the Reed v.
Saint Romain case, even though the opinion remains, to this day,
unpublished in the Southern Reporter. Beyond all practical
concerns, this case provided the perfect alibi for a discussion on
fundamental notions of private law and traditional civilian
62. The Code is not a mere regulatory instrument, but also an instrument of
liberty, as it creates a framework for the individual will to exert its normative
power freely. A contract is the law for its parties. Based on deference to
individual will, judges must devise the best methods of identifying and
enforcing the nomothetic will. In the civil law, the intent of the parties is the
criterion for the classification of an act and for determining its contents, and
ultimately, its effects.
63. Brenner, supra note 16, at no. 5.
64. Although it is not the purpose of this case note to also make de lege
ferenda propositions for the Louisiana Civil Code, one problem needs to be at
least mentioned. While the sections of the code that define conditional
obligations and describe their effects are relatively well written and modern (see
arts. 1767-1776), article 1562 of the code (in a section that, improperly, is
named “exceptions to the rule of the irrevocability of donations inter vivos”),
oddly distinguishes between suspensive and resolutory conditions as to their
effects. According to this article, resolutory conditions do not operate
automatically, like suspensive conditions. The code makes resolutory conditions
effective only (1) if the parties agree to “dissolve” the contract or (2) by way of
court action. This creates a hybrid type of resolutory conditions, specific only to
donations, which operate to some extent like the common law conditions
subsequent, instead of operating de iure and retroactively, like the resolutory
conditions described in articles 1767-1776 of the code. Louisiana jurisprudence
has interpreted art. 1562 to mean that an action for rescission is needed in order
to give effect to the resolutory condition, in the context of donations. See Busse
v. Lambert, 773 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 5 Cir.); and Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v.
City of New Orleans, 700 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 4 Cir.).
65. Supra Part III.C.
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categories. These concepts, and, of course, the taxonomy of
juridical acts, need to be properly understood before arguing or
deciding similar cases. But their study brings much more than just
guidance for future cases. The general theory of juridical acts is at
the height of abstraction, and more than anything, the structure, the
finesse, the logic, the coherence and symmetry of its taxonomy,
brings civilians closer to an ideal of order—a right order, for this
world of men. 66

66. “Good order” or “ontological order,” as Professor Emeritus Robert A.
Pascal would say. See Robert Anthony Pascal, Of the Civil Code and Us, 59 LA.
L. REV. 301, 304, 323 (1998).

BACK TO BASICS: DISTINGUISHING REAL AND
PERSONAL RIGHTS IN WAGONER V. CHEVRON USA
INCORPORATED II
Michael C. Wynne ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
No discussion of oil and gas operations in Louisiana would be
complete without the discussion of “legacy” litigation. In
Louisiana legacy suits have proliferated. A legacy lawsuit refers to
a suit by a landowner claiming that oil and gas operations caused
damage to his property through contamination or pollution.
Legacy suits impose substantial burdens on the oil and gas
operators allegedly responsible for damage to contaminated
property and production sites. Even before a legislative response
was made to these economically damaging suits, Louisiana courts
developed and refined a jurisprudential rule referred to as the
“Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.” This judicially-created doctrine
provides that a purchaser cannot recover from a third-party for
damage inflicted prior to the sale. 1 The distinction between real
and personal rights is fundamental for a proper understanding of
the doctrine. This paper will discuss the operation of the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, and the importance of the
distinction between real and personal rights, through the lens of the
influential Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated 2 (“Wagoner
II”) decision.

∗
J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2014) Paul M. Hébert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier
Moréteau and acknowledge the tireless efforts of the Journal of Civil Law
Studies’ staff.
1. Ashley M. Liuzza, Buyer Beware: How Purchasers are Left Holding
the Bag When it comes to Property Damages, 57 LOY. L. REV. 375, 381 (2011).
2. Wagoner v. Chevron USA, Inc., 48,119 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/24/13), 121
So. 3d 727 [hereinafter Wagoner II].
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner I”)
Understanding the breadth and purport of the Wagoner II
decision requires insight into the earlier related judgment,
Wagoner I. 3 In Wagoner I, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a surface owners’ claim for damages against
lessees for contamination of the land that took place prior to the
surface owners’ acquisition of the same. The court, articulating the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine stated:
The general rule, often referred to as the subsequent
purchaser doctrine, is that a purchaser cannot recover from
a third party for property damage inflicted prior to the sale.
It is the landowner at the time of the alleged damages who
has a real and actual interest to assert a claim. 4
More importantly, for the purposes of this note, the court
premised their decision on the following analysis:
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right,
not a property right . . . it does not pass to the new owners
of the land when there is no specific conveyance of that
right in the instrument of sale. 5
Relying upon the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, the court
ruled in favor of the defendant lessees, based on an exception of no
right of action. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not parties
to the mineral leases obtained by the operator who damaged the
land and the landowner who held the real right of ownership at the
time of the injury. 6 However, the court suggested, in dicta, that the
subsequent landowners could have brought a claim for these
damages if they had secured an express assignment of the right to

3. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated, 55 So. 3d 12 (La.App. 2 Cir.
2010) [hereinafter Wagoner I].
4. Id. at 22-23 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id.
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sue the mineral lessees for property damage that took place before
their purchase of the property. 7
B. Wagoner v. Chevron USA Incorporated (“Wagoner II”)
After the Wagoner I decision, the plaintiffs (“assignees”)
obtained an assignment of 99% of the rights from the owners of the
mineral servitudes (“assignors”), and for a second time brought
suit to recover for damages to the property caused by oil
exploration and production by the lessees. 8 Significantly, the
assignors, unlike the assignees, had a real right in the land at the
time the property was damaged by the lessees’ operations. The
assignors conveyed a personal right (the right to request damages)
through the assignments to their assignee, the subsequent surface
owners.
In Wagoner II, the primary issue before the court was whether
the assignees’ acquisition of the assignors’ right to sue for damages
to the property changed the capacity in which the subsequent
surface owners appeared, such that the assignee could defeat the
defendants’ claims of res judicata. At first blush, the question
before the court was purely procedural, and the court dispensed
with the issue concluding that in Wagoner II, the subsequent
surface owners, through the aforementioned assignments, “stepped
into the shoes” of the prior assignees who had a real interest in the
property at the time of the damage. 9 The court reasoned that in
Wagoner I the subsequent surface owners filed suit in their
capacity as present surface owners who acquired the property after
the damage occurred. However, in Wagoner II, the subsequent
surface owners sued in their capacity as assignees of the rights of
the prior mineral servitude owners. This change in capacity was
sufficient to defeat the defendants’ claims of res judicata.

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Wagoner II, 121 So. 3d at 727.
Id. at 729.
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The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s finding in favor of
the defendants’ exception of res judicata in relation to the claims
brought by the plaintiffs in their capacity as “surface owners” as
adjudicated in Wagoner I. 10 These claims were dismissed with
prejudice. However, the assignees’ claims brought in their capacity
as the mineral servitude owners’ assignees survived the
defendants’ exceptions of res judicata. The matter was remanded
for further proceedings on those claims. 11 Dispensing with the
procedural issue at hand, Wagoner II demonstrated the application
of the dicta from Wagoner I. The distinction between real and
personal rights was an outcome-determinative feature in the
Wagoner decisions.
III. COMMENTARY
A. Patrimonial Rights and their Subdivision
A patrimonial right is one susceptible to monetary evaluation.12
Patrimonial rights are further divided into real rights and personal
rights (credit rights), and it is this distinction that was
determinative in Wagoner II. 13 Real rights, unlike personal rights,
require only one subject, the holder of the right. 14 This holder
exerts “a direct and immediate power over the thing which is the
object of the right.” 15 In contrast, a personal right, such as a creditright, “presupposes an active subject, the creditor or obligee, and a
passive one, the debtor or obligor.” 16 Because a real right is
exerted directly over a thing, it is considered “absolute” (in the
sense that the holder of a real right can hold it against everyone). 17
10. Id. at 735-36.
11. Id. at 736.
12. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL:
A PRÉCIS 25 (LexisNexis 2006).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 8 (§1.5).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9.
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In contrast, a credit-right is relative because its holder may only
demand performance from a specific debtor. 18
The distinction between real and personal rights is muddled in
practical application. This distinction is particularly problematic
“when the performance relates to a thing, especially an immovable
thing.” 19 Professor Litvinoff provided an example of this difficulty
and set forth the proper analysis to navigate the problem. He
articulated:
Thus, the indemnity owed to an owner for the expropriation
of a part of his immovable property, and the damages owed
to the owner of a thing for its partial destruction or for an
interference with his rights in it, belong to the person who
was owner at the time of the expropriation, destruction, or
interference, as the right to demand indemnity or to demand
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together
with the thing. 20
In the case of ownership or other real rights the actor has direct
power over a thing, which may be held against the world; whereas,
in the case of personal rights, such as the right to damages arising
out of damage to an immovable, the actor’s right is relative (in the
sense that the actor is entitled to receive a performance from only
one or more persons in particular). In the instant case, the right to
claim damages arising out of the pollution of a landowner’s
immovable property is a personal right.
B. Application: Personal Rights in the Wagoner Decisions
The Wagoner decisions represent prominent examples of the
problem identified above: instances when the performance of an
obligation relates to a thing, especially an immovable thing.
Consequently, the determination of the nature of the rights in
Wagoner I and II is as essential as it is challenging. In the Wagoner
18.
19.

Id.
SAÚL LITVINOFF, 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE. THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS 46 (§3.3) (2d ed., West 2001).
20. Id., citing comment (e) to LA. CIV. CODE art. 1764 (emphasis added).
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decisions, the courts accurately concluded that the right to damages
arising out of the lease agreement between the lessee and the
original landowner was a personal right, not a real right. As
reproduced above, the Wagoner I court stated:
The right to damages conferred by a lease, whether arising
under a mineral lease or a predial lease, is a personal right,
not a property right; it does not pass to the new owners of
the land when there is no specific conveyance of that right
in the instrument of sale. 21
This holding is consistent with the nature of the right springing
from the damages to the land caused by the lessees’ conduct. As
noted in the example provided above, damages owed to the owner
of a thing for its partial destruction belong to the person who was
owner at the time of the destruction, as the right to demand
damages is a personal right that is not transferred together with
the thing. This is the very conclusion the court reached in Wagoner
I, when it determined that, absent a specific assignment of that
personal right to collect damages from the previous owners, the
subsequent landowners did not have a valid claim.
The determination that the rights to claim damages under the
lease were personal rather than real was significant. Namely, the
subsequent landowners did not acquire a right to the action through
their purchase of the land, as they would have if the right had been
deemed “real,” in the sense that it “runs with the land.” 22 As a
consequence of the personal nature of the right, the subsequent
owners needed to purchase the right to claim damages from the
original owners.
The right to sue for damages vested in the patrimony of the
original owners and was not transferred with the property, and that
is why an assignment of right to claim damages was necessary for
the subsequent owners to bring a suit. It also explains why the
plaintiffs sued in a different capacity after acquiring this right.
21.
22.

Wagoner I, 55 So. 3d at 23.
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1763 & 1764.
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Effectively, the subsequent landowners tested the dicta articulated
by the Wagoner I court to the effect that a specific conveyance of
that right would permit them to exercise the personal right to
damages against the lessees. The subsequent landowners’ efforts
were successful in that respect.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exploration of the characteristics of real and personal
rights is not a purely academic exercise; rather, this distinction can
have significant consequences. Principally, for landowners, the
lesson is that an act of conveyance should include a specific
conveyance of any and all personal rights arising out of the
ownership of the immovable. Prudent landowners who wish to
acquire personal rights are cautioned by the Wagoner decisions to
make these personal rights part and parcel to their bargain with the
original landowner. For oil and gas operators, this decision could
prove bothersome, as it demonstrates that a subsequent landowner,
through an assignment of the personal right to claim damages, can
acquire and effectively exercise that right even if the assignment
does not occur in the original act of conveyance. These
assignments do not increase an operator’s liability. However, they
may provide a right to sue for damages to a more litigious
landowner.
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This inaugural chronicle of French law will focus on tort law or
civil liability, to use civilian terminology. The first section presents
forthcoming legislative evolution, commenting on two draft
reforms that have not been debated in the National Assembly but
are receiving much doctrinal attention inside and outside the
country. The second section discusses a few recent cases. Both
sections place French recent developments in the light of European
Harmonization, particularly the Principles of European Tort Law,
published in 2005 by the European group on Tort Law, 1 of which
the author is a member, and the Draft Common Frame of
Reference (DCFR), compiled under the supervision of the
European Commission. 2
I. THE DRAFT REFORMS OF FRENCH TORT LAW
A. The Draft Revision of the French Civil Code Tort Provisions 3
At the Napoleonic time, French tort law was codified in five
Civil Code articles, articles 1382 to 1386 of a chapter entitled “Of
Delicts and Quasi-Delicts.” These articles contain general clauses
that have served as the basis for the development of a formidable
and abundant jurisprudence. Law teachers find in this short chapter
of Book III their best examples when they want to illustrate the
creativity of the courts and the interaction of law professors and
judges in the creation of the law. Legislative work has been very
limited in the 150 years that followed the enactment of the Code
civil des Français. Four of the five Code articles remain totally
1. EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW
(2005); PRINCIPES DU DROIT EUROPÉEN DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE, TEXTES
ET COMMENTAIRES (Olivier Moréteau ed., Michel Séjean Trans., Société de
législation comparée 2011).
2. DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR). FULL EDITION.
PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
(Sellier 2009).
3. This section was first published in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ULRICH MAGNUS
77 (Peter Mankowski & Wolfgang Wurmnest eds., Sellier 2014) under the title
The Draft Reforms of French Tort Law in the Light of European Harmonization.
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unchanged. Slight modifications were made to paragraphs 2 and
following of article 1384, whilst paragraph 1, still in its vintage
drafting, served as the unintended seat for the development of an
overreaching doctrine of strict liability for damage caused by the
act of a thing (fait des choses).
Few developments were made outside the Code, such as
workers’ compensation legislation. 4 Only in the second half of the
20th century did legislative production accelerate, yet not so much
to revise or complement the time-honored Civil Code articles, 5 but
to create specific regimes by special laws ancillary to the Civil
Code. The most noteworthy of these is the law of July 5, 1985
aiming at the improvement of the condition of road traffic accident
victims and the acceleration of the compensation process. 6 Other
special laws developed insurance coverage and created
compensation funds for special categories of victims. French law
moved from an individualistic system where victims had to bear
their own losses except where damage was caused by the fault of
another (neminem laedere), to a system where the victim occupies
a central place, with the development of strict liability and the
socialization of risks. Legal doctrine shifted from fault-based to
risk-based liability, and Boris Starck later developed a théorie de
la garantie 7 whereby law and society should guarantee
compensation to most if not all victims. Under the impulse of such
doctrines, judges and legislators raced to the bottom, pampering
French citizens and residents, and obscuring Civil Code principles
whilst mitigating the escalating cost of welfare by the allocation of
modest compensation. On a number of significant points, French
law strayed away from mainstream European ideas.
4. Law of 9 April 1898.
5. With the exception of arts. 1386-1 to 1386-18 implementing the
European directive of 1985 on product liability.
6. Alongside with the Civil Code articles, parts of it can be read in English
in Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW, BASIC TEXTS 85 (K.
Oliphant and B.C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2011).
7. On the evolution, see GENEVIÈVE VINEY, INTRODUCTION À LA
RESPONSABILITÉ, nos. 33 to 56 (3d ed., L.G.D.J. 2008).
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Whilst French tort law developed a victim friendly attitude,
much of the efforts to compensate victims were done through the
development of a welfare system combining social security,
compulsory insurance or compulsory insurance coverage of
otherwise uninsurable risks, together with reinsurance and the
development of compensation funds. Though solutions will often
differ, this did not cause the traditional framework of French tort
law to change: to a large extent, it remains conversant with
mainstream European solutions.
In recent years, a movement took place to promote a revision
of the French Civil Code regarding the law of obligations,
including tort law. This coincided more or less in time with the
final steps leading to the publication of major European projects
such as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (hereinafter
DCFR) and the Principles of European Tort Law (hereinafter
PETL), the latter being available when the reform drafts came to
be finalized. This paper offers a brief overview of these French
reform projects, checking their impact on the architecture of the
French Civil Code. It then considers to what extent they take into
account recent European developments, with a special focus on
their compatibility with the PETL.
B. The Rationale of the Draft Projects and their Impact on the
Civil Code
On September 22nd, 2005, a substantial report was submitted
to the French Minister of Justice to propose a comprehensive
reform of the general part of the law of obligations. 8 The project
leader was the much regretted Pierre Catala, Professor Emeritus at
8. AVANT-PROJET DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS ET DU DROIT
DE LA PRESCRIPTION (Documentation française, P. Catala ed., 2006). Available
in English at http://www.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/rapportcatatla0905-anglais.pdf
[hereinafter Oxford translation] and http://www.henricapitant.org/node/73
[hereinafter Capitant translation]; See Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN
TORT LAW 2005 270 nos. 1-11 (H. Koziol and B.C. Steininger eds., Springer
2006), and in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006 196 nos. 1-8 (H. Koziol and B.C.
Steininger eds., Springer 2008).
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Université Panthéon Assas Paris 2. It is the work of an impressive
team, including Professor Geneviève Viney (Université Panthéon
Sorbonne Paris 1), a former member of the European Group on
Tort Law, in charge of the provisions dealing with civil liability
(responsabilité civile) (hereinafter the Catala draft). This is a
document of 225 pages, consisting in draft Civil Code articles
preceded with explanatory preambles (at the beginning of each
title) and sentences (at the beginning of each chapter, section, or
paragraph), including a number of substantial footnotes.
In 2008 and 2011, another academic group proposed a reform
of the general part of the law of obligations. Together with a team
of some twenty distinguished scholars, François Terré, also
Professor Emeritus at Université Panthéon Assas Paris 2,
submitted two draft proposals, one to reform the law of contract
(2008, hereinafter the Terré draft on contract) 9 and the other to
reform the law of tort (2011, hereinafter the Terré draft). 10 Both
were prepared with the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice under
the aegis of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, of which
Professor Terré is a distinguished member. Each publication opens
with the draft Civil Code articles and continues with chapters
presenting the project in general and each subdivision in
particular. 11
In the meantime, a bill (proposition de loi) was introduced,
presented by Senator Laurent Béteille, limited to the responsabilité
civile or delictual liability. 12 The Béteille draft is based on the civil
9. POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS (F. Terré ed., Dalloz
2008).
10. POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE (F. Terré
ed., Dalloz 2011); See Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2011,
at 216, nos. 1-11 (K. Oliphant and B.C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2012), and in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2012, at 229, nos. 1-17 (K. Oliphant and B.C. Steininger
eds., de Gruyter 2013).
11. See Olivier Moréteau, François Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du droit
de la responsabilité civile, Collection: Thèmes & commentaires (Dalloz, 2011).
xiv +224 pages, 4 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW 342 (2013) (book review).
12. Proposition de loi portant réforme de la responsabilité civile, Sénat, no.
657 (9 July 2010).

764

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

liability part of the Catala draft, drafted under the leadership of
Professor Geneviève Viney. No further action was taken on this
bill, and no legislative action is scheduled for the months to come
regarding tort law.
1. The Catala Draft: A Revision Adulterating the Civil Code
The Catala draft is the first ambitious and comprehensive
attempt to reform the French Civil Code, since the post-war project
to reform the Civil Code, 13 which influenced Civil Code reform in
the 1960s and 70s, though in other domains. One may also mention
the French-Italian project of a Code of Obligations, published in
1927. 14 The Catala draft is not a revolution, but an attempt to
clarify the law, taking into account the impressive jurisprudential
work of the Court of Cassation. In that sense, it proposes a revision
rather than a recodification. 15 Civil Code article numbers are used
in the draft. Specific rules governing civil liability are left outside
the Civil Code with the exception of product liability, maintained
in the Code at articles 1386 to 1386-17 and compensation of
victims of road traffic accidents, moved to articles 1385 to 1385-5.
Fundamental questions are not left aside. The Group had to
decide whether liability in tort and contract had to be dealt with
separately, as in the present Code, or jointly, as recommended by
some scholars. The draft deals with contractual and extracontractual liability as a single question: all rules regarding
contractual and extra-contractual liability are presented in one
single section entitled Civil Liability (responsabilité civile). Tort
13. Commission de réforme du Code civil, created in 1945 by a decree of
General De Gaulle: Georges Ripert, Le bilan d’un demi-siècle de vie juridique,
D. 1950 Chron. 1.
14. See 8 MARIO ROTONDI, INCHIESTE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO, LE PROJET
FRANCO-ITALIEN DE CODE DES OBLIGATIONS (1980); VIII TRAVAUX DE
L’ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA CULTURE JURIDIQUE
FRANÇAISE, JOURNÉES ITALIENNES DE PAVIE ET MILAN (1953).
15. For an attempt to define these terms, see Olivier Moréteau & Agustín
Parise, Recodification in Louisiana and Latin America, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1103,
1104-1112 (2009).
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and contract are to sleep in the same bed, which purists may
describe as adultery. However, the Group refused to abandon the
time-honored règle du non-cumul whereby a plaintiff cannot opt
for tort liability where a contractual relationship may serve as a
cause of action. The justification is that in so doing, the plaintiff
may by-pass a contractual clause. This may be a sound argument,
yet it is very often trumped by mandatory rules preventing the
exclusion or limitation of some damages, especially physical harm.
The group opted for a reasonable compromise, allowing the victim
of physical harm to choose the most favorable regime. 16
2. The Terré Drafts: A Recodification Perfecting the Civil Code
Contrary to the Catala draft, dealing with contractual and extracontractual liability as a single question, 17 both Terré drafts keep
with the traditional architecture of the Code civil (though not using
Civil Code article numbers) and leave contract liability within the
law of contract: tort law aims at restoring the victim to what the
situation would be without the damage (negative or reliance
interest) whereas contractual damages have the additional purpose
of providing an equivalent to the expected benefit (positive or
expectation interest).
The 2011 draft is limited to the law of civil delicts, abandoning
the traditional distinction of delicts (intentional torts) and quasidelicts (non-intentional torts), recently described as inaccurate. 18
The draft is phrased in general provisions and avoids definitions, to
keep the Code flexible, as originally intended. In the overall
presentation of the responsabilité civile project, Philippe Remy and

16. Art. 1341(2) Catala Draft.
17. A position reflected in the Béteille draft (supra note 12), at arts. 138624.
18. E. DESCHEEMAEKER, THE DIVISION OF WRONGS, A HISTORICAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY 121-38 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
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Jean-Sébastien Borghetti 19 explain why the Terré Group prefers
the recodification option to a simple revision. The draft aims at
reconciling the apparently irreconcilable: rebuilding a consistent,
comprehensive code system, and making it compatible with
leading European options, illustrating how French law had strayed
away from both. Like in the Catala draft, general clauses are
maintained, despite the development of specific regimes. There is
no attempt to rewrite article 1382 (contrary to the Catala draft), and
yet a significant addition is made, indicating that the damage must
be “illicitly caused,” which is a major breakthrough. The draft
article 1 makes it clear that victims must bear their own losses and
may only recover where the damage is caused in an illicit manner,
which may cause Boris Starck to turn in his grave. 20
C. A Quick Glance at the Drafts and their Compatibility with the
PETL
1. Time Factors
Members of the Terré Group took into account both the
PETL21 and the DCFR. In a series of preliminary reflections
written before the group started working and published along with
the draft, Philippe Remy offers a critical appraisal of current
French law, 22 opening various options such as consolidation
(proposed in the Catala draft) or recodification, the latter being the
option favored by the Group. Of the proposed choice between
general clauses à la Française, a common law style catalogue of
19. Philippe Remy & Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Présentation du projet de
réforme de la responsabilité délictuelle, in POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 61 (F. Terré ed., Dalloz 2011).
20. The draft was described as a “bomb in the landscape of personal injury
law” by victims’ rights militants: Claudine Bernfeld, Rapport Terré, Feu la
réparation intégrale, JCP 2012, no. 30.
21. Not fully available in French at the time of publication. See PRINCIPES
DU DROIT EUROPÉEN DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE, TEXTES ET COMMENTAIRES,
supra note 1.
22. Philippe Remy, Réflexions préliminaires sur le chapitre Des délits, in
POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 61 (F. Terré ed.,
Dalloz 2011).
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specific torts or to German like selective and hierarchized
protected interests, the Group preferred the French option. In the
preliminary chapter, Philippe Remy reviews the DCFR and the
PETL like visiting a store or a catalogue, shopping for items that
may serve the improvement of the French system and leaving aside
those already abandoned by French jurisprudence, as being oldfashioned. 23 The draft, overall, aims at favoring European options
whenever compatible with French views. It comes as no surprise
that it is more European friendly than the Catala draft. Geneviève
Viney, in charge of the civil liability part of the Catala draft, had
left the European Group on Tort Law, and the author of the present
article, who joined the Group in 2002, was not a member of the
Catala taskforce nor of the Terré Group and had limited contacts
with members of both groups during the period of conception and
production. The PETL and DCFR were still in the making when
the Catala Group was working and published its report.
2. Scope of Civil Liability
As mentioned already, the Terré draft is closer to mainstream
European solutions than the Catala draft. The fact that it keeps the
traditional distinction between tort and contract liability, in line
with the DCFR, 24 rather than merging provisions on tort and
contract damages as proposed by the Catala Group, provides a
significant example. Except where otherwise provided, the
compensation of physical and psychological harm (atteintes à
l’intégrité physique et psychique de la personne) is to be
exclusively regulated by the law of delicts, though occasioned in
the context of contract performance (article 3). This is a useful
clarification, the compensation of such losses having nothing to do

23. Id. at 43-59.
24. Art. 6:101(1) and 3:702 DCFR. See Remy & Borghetti, supra note 19,
at 63 n.9.
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with contractual damages 25 that aim at satisfying by equivalent the
positive or expectation interest of the victim of non-performance.
Failure to perform contractual obligations is indeed governed by
the law of contract (article 4). The Terré Group insists on clear
boundaries between contractual and delictual liability, and the
unwritten principe du non-cumul remains a French signature.
Whether provisions on damages are gathered in one Code
chapter (articles 1340-1386 Catala draft) or kept separate (Terré
drafts) is not much of an issue, as long as distinct provisions exist
for the compensation of purely contractual losses (expectation
interest). The Catala draft, however, whilst making special
provisions for contract damages, may be blamed for not making
clear provisions directing to the award of expectation damages in
case of non-performance of contract (lucrum cessans), a drawback
if we compare with the clear wording of article 1149 of the French
Civil Code and article 118 of the Terré draft on contract.
The Terré draft makes room for prevention, article 2 enabling
the judge to order reasonable measures to prevent or stop the illicit
act that the claimant is facing. Though not expressly articulated in
the PETL, prevention is a purpose underlying art 2:104 PETL.
Compensation of preventive expenses is also to be found in article
1344 Catala draft and article 51 Terré draft. In her exposé des
motifs to the civil liability part of the Catala draft however,
Geneviève Viney insists that prevention is not a specific function
of tort law, although she refers to article 1369-1 Catala draft
dealing with reparation in kind, which allows the judge to order the
cessation of the illicit act. 26
Section I of the Terré draft (Du délit civil en général) offers
general provisions that apply not only to cases governed by the
25. Hence a recent shift from contract to tort liability in cases of medical
malpractice: Cass. Civ. 1, 3 June 2010, Bull. I no. 128; Olivier Moréteau,
France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2010, at 175, nos. 4-10 (H. Koziol and B.C.
Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2011).
26. Catala Draft, supra note 8. See also VINEY, supra note 7, at 155-58, no.
66-3.

2013]

FRANCE

769

general clause, but also in cases governed by the special regimes,
forming a droit commun in the French sense. It first deals with
fault (articles 5 to 7), offering a classical definition introducing the
concept of illicit act in the French Code, where it is so far only
implied (article 5), as opposed to article 1352 Catala draft, which
makes no reference to the illicit character of the act. 27 Damage
must be certain and is defined in a general clause as any harm to
“an interest recognized and protected by the law,” 28 without any
attempt to list such protected interests, although they are featured
as separate heads of damage in Section IV of the draft dealing with
compensation. One notes the recognition of collective interest such
as in case of damage to the environment, whenever provided by the
law (article 8 paragraph 2). Loss of a chance, though unnamed in
article 9, is identified as a separate head of damage, like in article
1346 Catala draft, confirming a well-established jurisprudence and
encompassing recent developments, here at variance from
mainstream European solutions.
3. Causation
Causation is dealt with in different ways in both projects. The
Catala draft deals with it in two short articles, with no attempt to
define causation or give guidance, but simply insisting that a
causal link must be proved (article 1347). The Terré draft defines
causation (article 10), describing the cause of damage as any fact
susceptible of producing it “according to the ordinary course of
things and without which it would not have occurred.” Article 10
also limits liability to immediate and direct consequences of the
author’s act. Causation may be established by all means, which
must be understood as including presumptions.

27. Though saying that the violation of a law or a regulation would be a
delict: art. 1352 para. 2 Catala draft.
28. Art. 8, para. 1 Terré draft; see also art. 1343 Catala draft; art. 2:101
PETL.
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Article 11 and 12 Terré draft deal with complex issues,
proposing rules that are more detailed than the DCFR, yet without
the fine-tuning of the PETL. The idea is to keep the system
flexible, while providing the courts with guidelines. Article 11
makes room for solidary liability in case of multiple tortfeasors,
with a solution similar to article 1348 Catala draft:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided, those who caused the same
damage are each answerable for the whole. If they all
committed a fault, they contribute among themselves in
proportion to the gravity of their respective fault. If none of
them committed a fault, they contribute in equal shares. If
only some of them committed a fault, they alone bear the
final onus of the damage.
Article 12 provides: “[W]hen damage is caused by an
undetermined member of a group of persons acting together, each
one is answerable for the whole, except where proving that he
could not have caused it.”
4. Liability for Others
Liability for others is dealt with in article 13 Terré draft,
providing an interesting structural change that was also discussed
by the European Group on Tort Law, though not implemented in
the PETL. Liability for others is not dealt with as a head of liability
like fault or liability for the fact of things (fait générateur); it deals
with imputation of compensation, shifting the onus to others.
Article 13 locks liability for others to cases provided for by the law
and to cases where there is a delict. This is a big change regarding
liability of parents for the acts of their children, which had been
stretched in scope beyond situations where a child was the author
of a delict, with infants made liable for “objective fault” etc. One
wonders whether the draft does not go too far when limiting the
liability of parents for “the act of the minor,” which seems to
exclude liability for the act of things, animals, or buildings, which
may be too restrictive (article 14), a restriction not to be found in
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article 1356 of the Catala draft which otherwise makes similar
provisions. Like the PETL, the Catala draft treats liability for
others like a separate head of liability (act of a third party, articles
1355-1360).
The Terré draft also rearranges the development of a general
doctrine of liability for others developed by the courts on the basis
of the present article 1384 paragraph 1, into more suitable subcategories: it adds to the strict liability of parents and tutors the
strict liability of legal or natural persons entrusted by judicial or
administrative decision or by contract with the task of organizing
or monitoring the life of a minor (article 14), making a similar
provision in the case of a major under protection (article 15). Other
persons professionally in charge of monitoring another person’s
life are also answerable, though under a simple presumption of
negligence (article 16). Similar provisions are to be found in
articles 1355 to 1358 Catala draft.
Article 17 defines the scope of the employer’s liability for the
fact of the employee using modern language (unlike in article 1359
Catala draft, the antiquated commettant and préposé are replaced
by employeur and salarié), yet with a dualistic approach,
depending upon whether or not employer and employee are bound
by a contract of employment. Where a contract exists, the
employer is liable except when proving an abuse of function (abus
de function) on the part of the employee, namely when acting
without authorization for a purpose unconnected with the
employment (article 17). Under the same article, the employee is
liable for the consequences of his intentional fault, which does not
mean that the employer will always be exonerated in such a case.
Article 17 paragraph 3 Terré draft and article 1359.1 Catala draft
exclude the liability of the employee acting within the limits of his
employment when having committed no intentional fault. The
Catala draft adds an exception for cases where the victim cannot
recover from the employer or from insurance. This latter point is
left open in article 6:102 PETL.
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In the absence of a contract of employment, the liability of the
employer is based on a simple presumption of negligence, the
employee being liable for his own fault (article 18 Terré draft).
Article 1360 Catala draft makes special provision allowing
victims to sue entities regulating or organizing the activity of
independent workers, or entities controlling the activity of others,
such as franchisors or parent companies.
5. Specific Regimes
Section II of the Terré draft deals with the main special delicts
(Des principaux délits spéciaux), making clear that fault liability
may be invoked in every circumstance (article 19 paragraph 1).
However, a victim may not ride on several special regimes (article
19 paragraph 2). The general provision on liability for the act of
things is maintained, though with a major qualification: it is
limited to physical and psychological harm, which is a substantial
reduction of the scope of the Jand’heur jurisprudence (article 20).
Additional detail restates well established jurisprudence: the
custodian is defined as the one having the use and the control of
the thing (article 1354-2 Catala draft has it in one word only: la
maîtrise de la chose), with a presumption that the owner has
custody; as to the fact of the thing, it may lie either in its defects, in
its abnormal position, its state, or its behavior. There is no
reference to the dangerousness of the thing, which keeps well alive
the French idiosyncrasy of strict liability for damages caused by
any sort of things, though with a limited scope if we compare it to
existing law and the Catala draft (article 1354 to 1354-4). No
change is to be noted regarding the fact of animals (article 21) and
buildings (article 22), the draft keeping the wording of article 1385
and 1386. Though the latter has been swallowed by article 1384 in
recent jurisprudence, 29 it would regain its lost autonomy for the
29. Cass. Civ. 2, 22 October 2009, Bull II no. 255; Olivier Moréteau,
France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2009, at 198, nos. 48-53 (H. Koziol and B.C.
Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2010).
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compensation of damage to property if excluded from the scope of
liability for the fact of things.
A new special regime appears under the name of classified
facilities, a substitute to liability for abnormally dangerous things
to be found at article 1362 Catala draft, which echoes article 5:101
PETL. Article 23 reads:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided, the operator of a facility
classified in accordance with the Environment Code is
answerable by operation of law for physical or
psychological harm to persons or damage to property
caused by its operation, when it is precisely the occurrence
of the risk that justified classification that caused the
damage.
Classification serves a preventive purpose. Liability is strict
and exoneration causes are limited to the inexcusable fault of the
victim or the intentional fact of a third party where such facts can
be characterized as force majeure, which fits the scenario of an act
of terrorism.
Another addition is codification of the doctrine of trouble du
voisinage, the French version of nuisance, thus far a purely
jurisprudential construct. Article 24 Terré draft does not differ
much from what is proposed in article 1361 Catala draft, also
setting normal inconvenience as the standard. Likewise, liability
for damages caused by motor vehicles is added to the Civil Code
(articles 25 to 28), yet with a few changes. Product liability
(articles 29 to 42 Terré draft; articles 1386 to 1386-17 Catala draft)
is of course based on the 1985 EU directive, with a few cosmetic
changes. Section II ends with article 43 on medical malpractice. It
makes health providers liable for damage caused by their fault,
regardless of the existence of a contract. Non-fault liability may
only prosper in those cases provided for in the Public Health Code.
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6. Exclusion and Exoneration
The Terré draft addresses exclusion and exoneration, clearly
distinguishing two concepts that are easily confused. Some
defences aim at excluding liability altogether when, due to certain
circumstances, there is no delictual conduct (article 45). Others
exonerate totally or partially the author of a delict when some
outside circumstances interfere with causation (articles 46 and 47).
The Catala draft does not confuse the two, dealing with
exoneration in articles 1349 to 1351-1, and justification or
exclusion (though none of these words is used) in article 1352. The
European Group on Tort Law preferred the use of the common law
word “defences,” using it as a generic title in the PETL (Title IV.
Defences). 30
a. Exclusion
On all accounts, both Catala and Terré drafts do not aim at
changing the law but bringing useful clarification, whilst
completing the Code civil with solutions that have been developed
by the courts.
Exclusion is dealt with in article 1352 Catala draft, stating that
there is no fault in situations provided for by articles 122-4 to 1227 of the Penal Code. The Terré Group preferred to list these
justifications in article 45: “as provided for by the Penal Code, no
liability stems from the damaging act, if it was prescribed by
legislative or regulatory provisions, imposed by a legitimate
authority, or ordered by the necessity of self-defence or of
safeguarding a higher interest.”
Safeguard of a higher interest is taken care of in article 122-7
of the Penal Code, excluding liability when the defendant faces
actual or imminent danger to herself, a stranger, or property, and
accomplishes an act necessary to safeguard such person or
30. The French translation of Title IV (Les causes limitatives et
exonératoires de responsabilité) reflects and amplifies the conceptual confusion
in that part of the PETL.
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property, except where the act is disproportionate. The Terré draft
adds a qualification in the final part of article 45: if the higher
interest to be safeguarded is not the victim’s interest, the victim
may claim “equitable” compensation. This may apply whenever it
is necessary to damage third-party property in order to assist a
person in a situation of imminent danger, such as breaking into a
room to rescue a suffocating child. The drafters seem anxious to
avoid a possible interplay with the law of unjustified enrichment,31
though one may find it more equitable to allow the third party to be
compensated by the safeguarded party on a de in rem verso basis
rather than by the Good Samaritan on the basis of the final
provision of article 45. The PETL are conducive of such a solution,
excluding liability in case of necessity (article 7:101(1)(b)), the
commentary explaining that restitution claims remain open in such
a case. 32 However, the wording of article 45 leaves room for a
claim against the enriched rather than against the Good Samaritan.
Last, but not least, volenti non fit injuria is reflected in the
second paragraph of article 45, excluding compensation to the
victim who consented to the damage, except in those cases where
the law does not allow the victim to renounce the protection of the
infringed interest, which echoes article 7:101(1) PETL. Likewise,
The Catala draft excludes compensation where the victim sought
the harm voluntarily (article 1350).
b. Exoneration
Exoneration is dealt with in articles 1349 to 1351-1 Catala draft
and articles 46 and 47 Terré draft. All articles address cases where
outside circumstances tamper with causation. Both drafts agree on
31. Clothilde Grare-Didier, Des causes d’exclusion ou d’exonération de la
responsabilité in POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE
185, 187 (F. Terré ed., Dalloz 2011). However, in the absence of a Civil Code
article, enrichissement sans cause does not obey to stringent requirements,
French jurisprudence making reference to equity: 2 MURIEL FABRE-MAGNAN,
DROIT DES OBLIGATIONS, RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE ET QUASI CONTRATS 447 et
seq. (2d ed., PUF 2010).
32. Art. 7:101 PETL cmt. 13.
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a generic use of force majeure that includes the act of a stranger or
the act of the victim and is distinguished from a fortuitous event
(cas fortuit), meant to be a sub-category (article 1349 Catala draft;
article 46 Terré draft). When they can be characterized as force
majeure, such acts exonerate the defendant, which reflects current
court practice, which is not fully in line with article 7:102 PETL. 33
The drafts differ on the definition of force majeure.
According to article 1349 paragraph 3 Catala draft, “Force
majeure is an unavoidable event that the actor could not foresee or
whose effects one could not avoid through appropriate
measures.” 34 In this definition, unforeseeability and irresistibility
are not cumulative conditions. Unforeseeability does not appear in
the Terré definition. Article 46 defines force majeure as an event
which, by itself or by its consequences, cannot be resisted through
appropriate measures. This definition is at variance with that used
in the context of contractual obligations, which does not generate
problems given the clear separation of tort and contract liability in
the Terré draft. 35
Partial exoneration may only exist in case of fault of the victim,
when it does not have the characteristics of force majeure (article
1351 Catala draft; article 47 Terré draft), which does not change
the law and reflects article 8:101 PETL. However, the Catala draft
requires the victim’s fault to be serious (faute grave) for partial
exoneration, when suffering physical harm. This solution is meant
to be protective of victims of physical injury but it may add useless
complexity. Both drafts exclude partial exoneration when the
victim is deprived of judgment, meaning that minors must receive

33. Art 7:102 PETL provides for full or partial exoneration and applies to
strict liability only.
34. Capitant translation, supra note 8.
35. Irresistibility is the sole factor insisted on these days in tort cases: See
GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES CONDITIONS DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ no. 396 (3rd ed., L.G.D.J. 2006). The Terré Group rightly
keeps a requirement of reasonable foreseeability when force majeure is used in
contractual obligations (art. 100 Terré draft on contract).
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full compensation even when acting negligently. 36 This latter
solution must be approved; it would have the effect of overruling a
much criticized jurisprudence. 37
7. Contract Clauses
Both drafts deal with contract clauses limiting or excluding
liability, with a scope limited to tort liability in the case of the
Terré draft. Liability for physical harm (to which the Terré draft
adds psychological harm) may not be excluded or limited by a
contract clause (article 1382-1 Catala draft; article 48 Terré draft).
Liability for fault cannot be limited or excluded by a contract
clause (article 1382-4 Catala draft; article 48 Terré draft). Unless
otherwise provided, under article 48 Terré draft, no-fault liability
may be limited or excluded by contract, but such limitation or
exclusion has no effect regarding physical and psychological harm,
in full accordance with the principle that “Life, bodily or mental
integrity . . . enjoy the most extensive protection” (article 2:102(2)
PETL). 38
8. Compensation
The French Civil Code makes no provision regarding
compensation. Rules have been developed by doctrine and
jurisprudence, often adapting Civil Code provisions applicable to
contract damages (articles 1146 to 1155). 39 This is therefore an
important area where the Code needs to be completed. Both drafts
36. Art. 1351-1 Catala draft; art. 47 Terré draft.
37. Cass. Plen. 9 May 1984, JCP 1984, II, 20255 (note N. Dejean de la
Bâtie, 20256, note P. Jourdain), D. 1984 Jurisp. 525 (note F. Chabas). See
Laurence Francoz-Terminal et al., Children as Victims under French Law, in
CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, PART II: CHILDREN AS VICTIMS 89, 97, no. 27 (M.
Martín-Casals ed., Springer 2007).
38. Christophe Quézel-Ambrunaz, La responsabilité civile et les droits du
Titre I du Livre I du Code civil, À la découverte d’une hiérarchisation des
intérêts protégés, RTDCiv 2012, 251.
39. GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES EFFETS DE LA
RESPONSABILITÉ no. 56 (2d ed., L.G.D.J. 2001).
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often make similar provisions, though the perspective may be
different at times, due to differences in scope: over-inclusive view
of civil liability in the Catala draft, encompassing contractual and
extra-contractual obligations compared to the exclusive, tort-only
approach of the Terré draft. Yet, as to what pertains to extracontractual liability, both aim at compensating damage unjustly
caused, thereby promoting prevention and cessation of illicit
disorder. This paragraph will focus on some novelties or
specificities of French law.
a. The Principle of Full Compensation
Full compensation of damage remains a cardinal principle,
subject to exceptions that will be discussed below. The chief idea
is to restore the victim to the position she would have been in if the
wrong had not been committed (article 1370 Catala draft; article 49
Terré draft; compare with article 10:101 PETL and article 6:101(1)
DCFR). According to article 1368 Catala draft and article 50 Terré
draft, the judge has complete discretion when it comes to choosing
between compensation by equivalent (damages) and restoration in
kind. On this point, both drafts reflect the French tradition and do
not follow the PETL. 40
Both drafts (articles 1379-5 to 1379-8 Catala draft; articles 61
and 62 Terré draft) make sure that the victim receives full
compensation, no more and no less, which is a key element in
orchestrating subrogatory action by third-party payers such as
welfare, social security, or insurance, in cases where the victim
received full or partial payments from such third-party payers. All
this is to be based on the interplay of Civil Code and special
legislation.
b. Restoration in Kind
Restoration in kind must aim at suppressing, reducing, or
compensating the damage (article 1369 Catala draft; article 51
40. Arts. 10:101 and 10:104 PETL favor damages over restoration in kind.
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Terré draft). According to article 51 Terré draft, it may be
supplemented with an allocation of damages, but may not interfere
with the defendant’s fundamental rights or impose an excessive
burden, which echoes article 10:104 PETL. Article 1369-1 Catala
draft and article 51 paragraph 2 Terré draft allow for self-help,
provided that it is judicially authorized. The defendant may offer
restoration in kind when damages are claimed (article 51
paragraph 3 Terré draft), which invites the judge to adopt the less
costly option.
c. Assessment and Itemization of Damages
Both drafts invite the court to assess damages on the day of the
judgment, taking into account the foreseeable evolution of the
damage (article 1372 Catala draft; article 52 paragraph 1 Terré
draft), in accordance with current jurisprudence. Additional
compensation may be reclaimed when the damage happens to
increase after judgment (article 1375 Catala draft; article 52
paragraph 1 Terré draft).
Article 1374 Catala draft and article 52 paragraph 2 Terré draft
force the judge to detail the heads of damage. This breaks with the
long-term Court of Cassation practice of accepting compensation
by way of a lump sum, on the pretense that assessment of damage
is a question of fact not to be reviewed by the highest court. 41 This
does not mean that all lower courts refrain from giving detailed
judgment: many decisions itemize heads of damage and assign
reasons. However, for the sake of good justice and in furtherance
of the principle of exact compensation, it is reasonable to request
itemization in all cases. As a rule, itemization of damages does not
restrict the victim’s right to use the moneys freely, with private
discretion, though the court may impose a particular appropriation
in exceptional cases (article 1377 Catala draft; article 55 Terré
draft).

41. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 39, at no. 62.
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d. Punitive Damages or Disgorgement of Illicit Profit
Article 1371 Catala draft makes provision for punitive
damages: where an obviously intentional fault becomes a source of
profit (faute lucrative), punitive damages may be awarded, in
addition to compensatory damages. The amount of punitive
damages must be clearly distinguished from compensatory
damages and part of them may be made payable to the Public
Treasury. Punitive damages may not be the object of insurance.
Naming this additional award “punitive damages” may be a
misnomer. It seems the purpose of the rule is not so much to
punish the tortfeasor but disgorging illicit profit, with a reasonable
allocation to the Public Treasury, to prevent or limit an unjustified
enrichment of the victim.
The Terré draft has a similar provision, though more carefully
drafted, since article 54 does not use the punitive damages
terminology. Article 54 allows the disgorgement of illicit profits as
a substitute to purely compensatory damages, provided there has
been intentional fault aimed towards illicit gains (faute
lucrative). 42 Under this rule, any amount exceeding pure
compensation cannot be covered by liability insurance. The Terré
Group carefully drafted article 54 so that it would be strictly
restitution-based, thereby avoiding any confusion with punitive
damages, which never was and should not be an option in French
tort law. This is a much-needed provision, preferable to its Catala
counterpart.
e. Mitigation of Damage
Both drafts plan to introduce a duty to mitigate damage into
French law. Article 1373 Catala draft provides that “[w]hen the
victim by sure, reasonable, and proportionate means might have
reduced the extent or the aggravation of the injury suffered, his
failure to do so will result in a reduction of his award, unless the
42. See Rodolphe Mésa, Précisions sur la notion de faute lucrative et son
régime, JCP 2012, no. 625.
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nature of the measures would be such as to violate his physical
integrity.” 43 Given the scope of the draft, this is meant to apply to
liability in tort and in contract. Article 53 of the Terré draft
introduces a similar duty though limited to tort law, 44 also saying it
does not apply to cases of physical and psychological harm. In
other cases, the judge may reduce the amount of damages awarded
to the victim for failure to take safe and reasonable steps to
mitigate the loss. Unlike the PECL, 45 the PETL make no provision
to this effect. This would be a significant change in French tort
law, though recent jurisprudence leans in this direction: 46
acceptable in the context of contracts, mitigation of damage is
more controversial in tort law, but reflects the standard of conduct
as articulated in article 4:102 PETL.
f. Physical Harm
Articles 1379 to 1379-3 Catala draft and articles 56 to 64 Terré
draft deal with the compensation of physical and psychological
harm, bringing much desirable clarification and certainty to the
matter. These rules will not be discussed in much detail. There was
considerable discussion on the subject at the time of the adoption
of the special law on road traffic accidents (1985) and the matter
received particular attention with a report by Professor LambertFaivre (2003) and the so-called nomenclature Dintilhac (2005),
triggering subsequent legislative action in 2006 and 2010. 47
Reference must be made to tables or schedules adopted by way of
regulation, in an itemized manner (article 1379-1 Catala draft;
43. Capitant translation, supra note 8.
44. A comparable duty appears in art. 121 Terré draft on contract, which
connects to the duty of good faith.
45. Art. 9:505 PECL.
46. Cass. Civ. 2, 24 November 2011, JCP 2012, no. 170 (note V. Rebeyrol);
RTDCiv 2012, 324 (obs. P. Jourdain): this confusing case seems to limit the
duty to damage to property, and to the prevention of additional damage that has
not been caused yet, rather than mitigation of existing damage. Id. at 326.
47. For details, see Pauline Remy-Corlay, De la réparation, in POUR UNE
RÉFORME DU DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 191, 203 et seq. (F. Terré ed.,
Dalloz 2011).
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articles 56 and 57 Terré draft). The victim’s pre-existing condition
is only to be taken into account to the extent that its adverse
consequences began manifesting themselves at the time the victim
was harmed (article 1379-2 Catala draft; article 57 Terré draft),
which reflects current jurisprudence. 48 Article 1379 Catala draft
and article 59 Terré draft define the scope of compensation,
including actual and future expenses, lost income and loss of
profits. Compensation of future losses can take the form of indexed
periodic payments, which can later be changed into capital (article
1379-3 Catala draft; article 60 Terré draft).
g. Indirect Victims
Both drafts (article 1379 Catala draft; article 63 and 64 Terré
draft) deal with the compensation of indirect victims (victimes par
ricochet), who appear to benefit from much larger compensation
awards compared to what they get in other jurisdictions. 49 The
victim’s dependents can be compensated for the loss of support.
The Terré draft specifically refers to the spouse, parents, children,
and special others living with the victim where the Catala draft
refers to them under the generic name of victimes par ricochet. The
Terré draft makes them eligible for compensation of moral
damage, and may cumulate such compensation with rights they
receive from the victim as successors in case of death (article 63).
Compensation of their indirect damage (dommage réfléchi) is
subjected to exoneration causes affecting the direct victim’s claim.
Indirect damage may not be compensated outside the scope of
article 63, except in exceptional cases and for very specific reasons
(article 64). These rules come close to articles 10:202(2),
10:301(1), and 8:101(2) PETL.
h. Damage to Property
Both drafts adopt classical solutions regarding compensation of
damage to property. When a corporeal thing is damaged, the victim
48. Id. at 204.
49. Id. at 218.
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is entitled to the cost of repair or the cost of a replacement,
whichever of the two is lower (article 65 Terré draft), or the cost of
replacement if repair is costing more (article 1380 Catala draft).
When none of these solutions is possible, compensation must
reflect the value of the thing at the time of the judgment, taking
into account its condition just before the damage occurred (article
1380-1 Catala draft; article 65 Terré draft). This looks slightly less
generous than article 10:203(1) PETL which allows compensation
to the extent of the upper bracket if the victim chooses the more
expensive option, “if it is reasonable to do so.” All related
economic losses must be compensated (article 1380-2 Catala draft;
article 66 Terré draft). In case of intentional harm causing serious
non-pecuniary loss, the latter may be compensated (article 67 Terré
draft). Article 1380-2 Catala draft is broad enough to support not
only compensation of such a loss but also of any damage caused by
loss of enjoyment.
i. Non-Pecuniary Damage
Pure non-pecuniary damage (dommage moral) is taken care of
in the last two articles of the Terré draft (articles 68 and 69). The
Catala draft mentions “non-economic and personal harm” at article
1379, listing psychological harm, pain and suffering,
disfigurement, deprivation of pleasure (préjudice d’agrément), and
sexual impairment.
Article 68 Terré draft opens a right to compensation for any
form of harm to “moral integrity, particularly dignity, honour,
reputation, or private life.” This echoes article 10:301(1) PETL.
Such a right is recognized not only to natural persons, but also to
juridical persons in case of serious fault. This latter provision may
seem rather odd, but finds some support in recent cases decided by
the Court of Cassation 50 and by the European Court of Human
50. Cass. Com., 15 May 2012, Bull. IV no. 101, Olivier Moréteau, France
in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2012, at 229, 247-49, nos. 43-47 (K. Oliphant and BC
Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2013).
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Rights. 51 Professor Terré himself wrote a plea for its adoption,
insisting that wrongful harm to the reputation of an enterprise may
have serious adverse economic consequences. This is certainly
true, but should we not characterize such harm as economic loss,
though admittedly, it is of a class difficult to assess? 52 It is a good
thing to have special provisions for pure non-pecuniary damage,
but we should not forget that French law also makes room for the
compensation of pure economic loss. 53
The final provision relies on vast judicial discretion regarding
the assessment of non-pecuniary harm, which cannot be tabled in
any manner. According to article 69 Terré draft, damages may be
nominal or exemplary when the harm was caused intentionally,
thereby opening a broad spectrum, which may stretch as far as
allowing a punitive element in the assessment of damages. Though
mental integrity and human dignity rank very high on the scale of
protected interests (article 2:102 PETL), this may not warrant such
a generous provision, especially when protection is not limited to
natural persons. This exemplary-damages provision does not
reflect the spirit of the draft, which aims at the exact assessment of
damage, full compensation, and avoidance of unjustified
enrichment. Such right is recognized not only to natural persons,
but also to juridical persons in case of serious fault, which is
controversial, especially in a system where tort law opens
51. See Association for European Integration and Human Rights and
Ekimdzhiev v. Bulgaria, 28.6.2007, (ECHR), recognizing that an association is
entitled to the protection of its correspondence. Remy-Corlay, supra note 47, at
221.
52. François Terré, Le préjudice moral, in POUR UNE RÉFORME DU DROIT DE
LA RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE 223 (F. Terré ed., Dalloz 2011). The author
recognizes that it is difficult in such cases to distinguish non-pecuniary and
economic damage. Id. at 224.
53. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 6 TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANÇAIS, OBLIGATIONS, PART I, at no. 552 (P. Esmein ed., 2d ed.,
L.G.D.J. 1952), wisely state that a juridical person cannot suffer and therefore
cannot be victim of non-pecuniary damage, adding that when courts offer such
compensation, either they want to compensate a pecuniary damage that they are
unable to assess, or they want to impose a non-criminal penalty, camouflaged
under the name of compensation of non-pecuniary damages.
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compensation for pure economic loss. Were this to pass into law, it
would be hoped that French judges will not use it as a gateway
towards punitive damages and will rather make sure that the spirit
of the whole reform prevails.
D. Conclusion
It is to be hoped that these remarkable projects will turn into a
legislative draft in the not too distant future, in order to rejuvenate
the French Code civil. We know of too many enlightened drafts
that, in other European countries, have not been turned into
legislation in this fertile area of the law. The fact that the
legislative process starts moving regarding contractual obligations
(Project de loi of November 27, 2013) is encouraging.
If a choice is to be expressed, the author has a strong
preference for the Terré draft, which is more in harmony not only
with the spirit of the French Civil Code, but also with current
European trends. It reflects a perfect understanding of the Code
dynamic and taxonomy. Its logic is flawless. Its style is
impeccable, making Francois Terré a worthy follower of Portalis’
philosophy. It may also be praised for leaving article 1382 intact,
not only because it is iconic, but because it expresses the essence
of the Civil Code.
The Catala attempt to rewrite art 1382 Civil Code is at best
questionable, if not iconoclast. It looks as vain as repainting
Delacroix’ La liberté guidant le peuple or re-sculpting
Michelangelo’s Moses. One may repaint the Eiffel Tower or
replace an elevator, but making it higher would change a marker of
French identity. Art 1382 is known the world over; it is the Mona
Lisa of the legal Louvre. It lives in the eye of the citizen and the
judge alike. Changing it is like tampering with the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen.
Let us fix the minor flaws in the final articles and have the
representatives of the French people vote the Terré draft into law,
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rather than moving it by delegated legislation as planned for
contractual obligations. The Civil Code will be more complete and
reflect more European harmony.
II. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE IN FRENCH TORT LAW
Over the past ten years, I have had the privilege of reporting on
French tort law for the European Yearbook of Tort law, published
by the Vienna based European Centre of Tort and Insurance
Law. 54 The following are selected cases commented in the five
most recent volumes. The first cases deal with the environmental
disaster caused by the sinking of the tanker Erika. A second series
of cases deals with proportional liability, showing how French
courts, whilst dealing with causation problems in a French
pragmatic way, happen to be in line with the Principles of
European Tort Law.
A. The Sinking of the Tanker Erika and the Advent of
Environmental Damage
The tanker Erika split in two off the French Atlantic coast in
severe weather on December 12, 1999 and spilled 15,000 tonnes of
her heavy fuel oil cargo. The entire crew of 26 was airlifted to
safety. The two sections, with a further 15,000 tonnes of fuel oil
remaining in the cargo tanks, sank in 120 metres of water about
100 km from the mouth of the River Loire. The spilt cargo was
blown east towards the coast and on December 25 the first oil
washed ashore. By early January various stretches along a 400 km
length of French coastline had been polluted, and thousands of
seabirds had been oiled. The State, a number of local authorities,
associations, and individuals had initiated criminal proceedings,
together with claims in damages (plaintes avec constitution de
partie civile), against Total, the French multinational oil company
54. Professor Michel Séjean (Université de Bretagne-Sud) has taken over as
of 2013.
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owning the cargo, the carrier, and other protagonists of the
catastrophe.
Criminal proceedings were initiated against the ship-owner, but
also against the owners of the cargo, the Total oil company. In a
judgment of January 2008, the Paris court of first instance found
them guilty of marine pollution, and sentenced them to fines
ranging from € 75,000 for individuals to € 375,000 for
corporations. In addition, the Paris court found all parties liable,
awarding a total of € 165 million to a wide range of victims,
including a sum to compensate “damage resulting from harm to the
environment.” 55
The carrier’s liability was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in
Paris in a judgment of March 30, 2010, increasing the total amount
of damages to over € 200 million. Criminal sentences were
confirmed, also against Total, who had inspected and vetted the
vessel. Total was found criminally guilty but not civilly liable, the
Paris Court of Appeal reversing the first judgment on this point.
Liability was based on the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage. The Convention places liability
on the carrier, and not on the owners of the cargo. 56
Appeal (pourvoi) was made to the Court of Cassation. In a
lengthy, very detailed judgment, the Criminal Chamber of the
Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Paris Court,
reversing on one point only: Total, as owner of the cargo, is also to
be found solidarily liable on the basis of the International
Convention, for having interfered with the carriage, and based on
the trial judge’s finding, the Court of Cassation agrees that Total’s
fault satisfies the requirement of recklessness (the Court uses the
55. TGI Paris, 16 January 2008, commented in Olivier Moréteau, France in
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, at 264, 278-80, nos. 48–55 (H. Koziol and B.C.
Steininger eds., Springer 2009).
56. CA Paris, 30 March 2010, no. 08-02278, JCP 2010, no. 432 (note K. Le
Couviour), commented in Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
2010, at 175, 192-95, nos. 48–58 (H. Koziol and B.C. Steininger eds., de
Gruyter 2011).
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term faute de témérité), meaning that liability can be extended
from the carrier to the charterer of the vessel.
The latest Court of Cassation judgment 57 is bringing a long
judicial story 58 to a happy end. There would be a lot to say on this
very lengthy decision, the longest the reporter has ever read from a
court known for the brevity of its judgments (107 pages in twocolumn fine print in the official Bulletin), but the present report
will only focus on the points having an impact on general tort law.
First, the concept of environmental or ecological harm
(préjudice écologique) is now officially recognized at the highest
level of the French judiciary, 59 a concept that will need to be
narrowed down in the years to come 60 and may also find
legislative recognition in the Civil Code. 61 This is a remarkable
achievement, especially as the Advocate General denied the
autonomy of environmental harm, arguing that it is not distinct
from the harm suffered by the environmental non-profit
associations, but rather merges within their non-pecuniary
damage. 62
The Paris Tribunal de grande instance 63 declared that
compensation of environmental harm was owed to “the local
authorities to whom the law grants a specific competence in matter
57. Cass. Crim., 25 September 2012, no. 10-82938, Bull. Crim. no. 198, D.
2012, at 2711 (note P. Delebecque); RTDCiv 2013, 119 (obs. P. Jourdain);
commented in Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2012, at 229,
249-52, nos. 48–55 (K. Oliphant & B.C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2013).
58. See also Cass. Civ. 3, 17 December 2008, D. 2009, at 701 (note M.
Boutonnet), commented in Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
2009, at 198, 210-213, nos. 35-42 (H. Koziol and B.C. Steininger eds., 2010),
decided on another claim generated by the same disaster.
59. It was first recognized by the Paris lower court in the first judgment. See
supra note 55 & Moréteau, supra note 57.
60. Valérie Ravit & Olivier Sutterlin, Réflexions sur le destin du préjudice
économique « pur », D. 2012, at 2675.
61. Proposition no. 546 du Sénateur Retailleau, proposing the addition of
article 1382-1: “Any act whatever of man that causes damage to the
environment obliges him by whose fault it occured to repair it.” As noted by
Philippe Delebecque (supra note 57, at 2712), this would need further
elaboration.
62. See Jourdain, supra note 57, at 120.
63. Supra note 55.
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of environment, conferring upon them a special responsibility in
the protection, management, and preservation of a territory.” 64
Only those authorities having proved effective harm to a sensitive
zone got compensation. 65 Given its object, the LPO (Ligue de
protection des oiseaux) is also eligible. The Paris Court noted the
large scope of the disaster on the thousands of birds hibernating in
the region, and also the very efficient role of LPO in taking care of
the birds during several months, in connecting with the local
authorities and population, as well as its national and international
representativeness. 66 Such harm appears to be considered
objectively rather than in consideration of the person of the
victim. 67 It had been recognized before but never with such high
scale compensation. 68
Second, Total had been found guilty of involuntary pollution,
and liable for the consequences thereof by the Paris Tribunal de
grande instance. The criminal part of the judgment had been
affirmed by the Paris Appeal Court, but liability was denied.
According to the appellate court, the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage places liability on the
carrier, and not on the owners of the cargo. As a charterer, the oil
company is not liable “unless the damage resulted from their
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such
damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would
probably result.” 69 The Paris Court of Appeal recognised that the
oil company had been negligent in chartering a tanker that was in
an advanced state of decay. Total had after all participated in the
vetting process; their representatives knew of the bad state of the
64. Par. 3.1.2.2.2.3. of the Judgment.
65. See supra note 55.
66. Par. 3.1.2.2.6. of the Judgment.
67. See Laurent Neyret, Naufrage de l’Erika: vers un droit commun de la
réparation des atteintes à l’environnement, D. 2008, 2681, 2685.
68. See id. at 2681, and Laurent Neyret, La réparation des atteintes à
l’environnement par le juge judiciaire, D. 2008, 170, 172.
69. Art III(4)(c) of the the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage.
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vessel. However, in the opinion of the Court, they did not act with
full awareness that by so acting, pollution damage was very likely
to ensue. Commenting this holding, the present reporter noted:
“This part of the judgment should not resist the Court of Cassation
scrutiny.” 70 Indeed it did not. The highest court wisely recognized
that the oil company had been reckless, a judgment found severe
by a distinguished scholar who also claims that the duty of Total to
control oil carriage is not a sufficient foundation for making the
company liable as a carrier. 71
It is difficult to contend however that the damage was not
caused by some omission on the part of the oil company whose
representatives participated in the vetting process. The first judges
had found Total negligent and not reckless, yet finding them liable.
This was wrong, the International Convention requesting
recklessness to make the charterer liable. According to the Court of
Cassation, rather than denying Total’s liability, the appellate court
should have characterized Total’s fault as a faute de témérité, in
other words recklessness. They were wrong in characterizing it as
excusable.
Interestingly, courts in the United States are facing a similar
challenge in the wake of the oil pollution in the Gulf of Mexico,
after the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon offshore oilrig on
April 20, 2010. Under the federal Oil Pollution Act, liability of the
polluter is limited to $ 75 million in the case of an offshore facility
such as the Deepwater Horizon oilrig. 72 However, limitations do
not apply against a defendant acting with “gross negligence or
wilful misconduct.” 73
Other competing provisions may apply, but the point is that the
commonplace concepts of “recklessness” or “gross negligence” are
central in the solving of major oil pollution cases. These apparently
70. Moréteau, supra note 56, at 193, no. 53.
71. Delebecque, supra note 57, at 2715. Professor Delebecque is president
of the Chambre arbitrale maritime de Paris.
72. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(a)(3).
73. 33 U.S.C.A. § 2704(c)(1)(A).
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simple words become the heart of the matter once the provision
that enshrines them is found applicable. How are they to be
interpreted? May each judge use his state or national standard?
Should there be a federal standard (in the case of the United States)
or an international one (when an international convention is
applicable)? The question is relatively simple when discussing the
liability of an individual, but becomes complex when applied to a
corporation or a multinational group.
Professor Patrick Martin, an expert in mineral law and scholar
in jurisprudence, looks at the matter with comparative law eyes,
encompassing the common law, Roman law, and the Louisiana
civil law. 74 His approach is primarily linguistic and philosophical.
He cites, on the one hand, judges and scholars who find it
impossible to identify shades of negligence and to classify it as
slight, ordinary, or gross negligence. On the other hand, he cites
other United States judges who claim that it is not even necessary
to instruct juries on the matter of distinguishing ordinary and gross
negligence, so much this distinction is common-sense. He finally
cites an 1822 case, Tracy v. Wood, where Supreme Court Justice
Story, sitting as circuit judge, noted:
If a bag of apples were left in a street for a short time
without a person to guard it, it would most certainly not be
more than ordinary neglect. But if the bag were of jewels or
of gold, such conduct would be gross negligence. In short
care and diligence are to be proportioned to the value of the
goods, and the temptation and facility of stealing them and
the danger of losing them. 75
Martin concludes: “the greater the degree of potential (or
actual) harm, the greater the degree of negligence.” 76 Transferring
this to the Erika oil spill, the first Paris judges were no doubt
wrong in holding Total liable without checking whether they had
74. Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross Negligence
or Wilful Misconduct,” 71 LA. L. REV. 957 (2011).
75. Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.R.I. 1822).
76. Martin, supra note 74, at 975.
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been reckless and not simply negligent: the Convention could not
be ignored. The Paris Appellate judges may be wrong in
characterizing Total’s fault as excusable in the circumstance. May
one reasonably imagine that crude oil can safely be carried in an
old and defective tanker around the hazardous coasts of Brittany,
without thinking of a possible disaster? Transporting two gallons
of oil in a defective container may be regarded as ordinary
negligence. Carrying thousands of tons in an old and defective
tanker is recklessness or gross negligence. It is good news that the
Court of Cassation agrees.
B. Proportional Liability: French and European Perspectives
Converge
Proportional liability is on the cutting edge of tort scholarship.
The Principles of European Tort Law have proposed proportional
liability as a response to causal uncertainty, an issue recently
revisited by members of the European Group on Tort Law. 77 In
particular cases where there are multiple tortfeasors or uncertainty
of causation, various doctrines are applied, where the causation
requirement is attenuated.
1. Multiple Tortfeasors, Concurrent and Alternative Causes
French jurisprudence does not accept that a victim may be
undercompensated just because one or several of the tortfeasors
may be unknown. For the sake of justice, it also wants to avoid
shifting the whole burden of compensation on those tortfeasors
who have been identified.

77. PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY: ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (Israel Gilead et al. eds., de Gruyter 2013). Some of the text that
follows reproduces verbatim paragraphs of Olivier Moréteau, Causal
Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in France, in PROPORTIONAL LIABILITY:
ANALYTICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 141 (Israel Gilead et al. eds., de
Gruyter 2013), more particularly nos. 9-15 and 18-25.
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a. The Hunters’ Cases
Some reverse engineering is needed to understand the law
pertaining to compensation of victims of hunting accidents.
Victims must be compensated and will be compensated. If no
tortfeasor is identified, this will be done by a compensation fund. 78
If one hunter has been shooting, he may be held liable unless he
can prove that his shotgun was pointed in another direction, shot
another type of bullet, or that it was defective at the time. Liability
may then fall on other identified hunters or an application for
compensation may be filed to the compensation fund. If several
hunters may have caused the damage, they can be made liable
under one of the following doctrines: fault based liability (faute
commune, faute collective), if acting as a group and guilty of a
collective fault; 79 custody of the bullets when two guns shot
simultaneously and at least two bullets hit the victim (gerbe
unique); 80 or collective or joint custody of the bullets, also
triggering strict liability for the fact of a thing under article 1384
paragraph 1. 81 The case where one hunter is identified and the
others are not is not discussed in standard books. This sole
identified hunter would most probably be made fully liable, and
this would not be regarded inequitable since every hunter must by
law carry third party insurance. If this hunter is uninsured or
insolvent, recourse can be made to the compensation fund.

78. A Compensation Fund was created in 1951 to compensate victims of
automobile accidents where the tortfeasor cannot be identified. A law of 11 July
1966 extended the benefit of this Fund to victims of hunting accidents where the
tortfeasor cannot be identified.
79. Old line of cases starting in 1950. See Cass. Civ. 2, 2 April 1997, Bull.
II, no. 112; see PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU ET AL., DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET
DES CONTRATS. RÉGIMES D’INDEMNISATION no. 1724 (Dalloz 2012-13).
80. Cass. Civ. 2, 5 February 1960, D. 1960, 365 (note H. Aberkane).
81. Cass. Civ. 2, 9 October 1957, JCP 1957, 10308 (note R. Savatier).
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b. The DES Cases
A scenario quite similar to the hunters’ case can be found in a
recent Distilbène case. 82 A woman suffered vaginal cancer
allegedly caused by the fact that her own mother had been
administered diethylstilboestrol or DES during pregnancy. No
evidence was found of the details of the treatment: no prescription,
no medical record (the doctor who treated the mother had died, and
the record had disappeared). However, experts ascertained that the
claimant’s pathology was the consequence of her mother taking
DES while pregnant. In addition, the victim’s parents certified that
the mother had taken Distilbène at that time, a fact corroborated by
other witnesses. The victim sued UCB Pharma and Novartis, two
companies that had produced and marketed diethylstilboestrol in
France at the time, one under the name of Distilbène, and the other
one under the generic name. However, everyone used the name
Distilbène at the time, even to describe the generic DES. The
victim could not prove which of the two companies had produced
the substance her mother had taken. The Court of Cassation ruled
that each of the two defendants had to prove that its product had
not caused the damage, thereby creating a rebuttable presumption
of causation. The two producers happened to supply the same
commodity at the same time, rather than forming a group such as
sport people or hunters in the typical cases. The judgment is based
on the probability that one or the other of the two defendants
caused the damage. It seems that the Court of Cassation decision is
conducive of a 50-50 judgment, which may not be fair in the
circumstances. At the time of the facts, UCB Pharma’s market
share was 80 to 90%, leaving only 10 to 20% to Novartis.
82. Cass. Civ. 1, 24 September 2009, Bull. I, no. 187, D. 2010, 49 (note Ph.
Brun), RTDCiv 2010, 111 (obs. P. Jourdain); commented in Olivier Moréteau,
France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2010, at 175, 185-87, nos. 29–37 (H. Koziol &
B.C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter 2011), largely reproduced (often verbatim) in
the present report.
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Solidarity is not to be excluded, but Novartis’s share should not
exceed 20%.
Interestingly, the case may fall under two different provisions
of the Principles of European Tort Law regarding causation. It may
be regarded as a situation of concurrent causes. According to
article 3:102, “In case of multiple activities, where each of them
alone would have caused the damage at the same time, each
activity is regarded as a cause of the victim’s damage.” This leads
to solidarity because we have multiple tortfeasors. 83
Article 3:103(2) (alternative causes) may be a better fit: 84
In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone
would have been sufficient to cause the damage, but it
remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each activity
is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the
likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s damage.
The European Group on Tort Law agreed that in cases of mass
torts the burden of proof should not be too heavy on the victim,85
which is precisely what the Court of Cassation is doing when
creating a presumption of causation. The Court did not rule
whether liability is joint or solidary. Logically, alternative
causation excludes solidarity. 86
We do not know whether in the present case the victim’s
mother took medication manufactured by one producer only,
which may be one or the other (alternative causes). She may have
been treated with the product of one, and then with that of the

83. The case falls under art. 9:101(b) PETL:
(1) Liability is solidary where the whole or a distinct part of the damage
suffered by the victim is attributable to two or more persons. Liability
is solidary where:
...
b) one person’s independent behaviour or activity causes damage to the
victim and the same damage is also attributable to another person.
84. See LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 79, at no. 1732-2 (discussing the
case under alternative causation).
85. Art. 3:103 PETL, cmt. J. Spier, 49 no. 9.
86. Solidarity implies plurality of causes: LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note
79, at no. 1736; see also art. 9:101(b) PETL.
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other, 87 during the time of the pregnancy, in which case we have
concurrent causes. The good news is that both articles lead to the
same solution, though the “alternative causes” provision is more
conducive of proportional liability, which looks like the best
solution in the present case. Additional good news is that the
French Court of Cassation ruled in compliance with the Principles
of European Tort Law, even before the publication of the French
edition by the Société de législation comparée. 88
Another case decided by the same first Civil Chamber of the
Court of Cassation, on June 17, 2010, 89 confirms the willingness of
the Court to rely on presumptions of causation. A man had
contracted a nosocomial infection after having spent time in two
different hospitals but it was impossible to prove in which hospital
he had actually contracted the infection. The Court ruled that
“where there is evidence of a nosocomial infection but the latter
may have been contracted in several health institutions, each of
those whose liability is sought has to prove that it did not cause the
infection.” Though the facts are different, this is exactly what the
Court ruled in the Distilbène case, in a case of alternative causes
under the PETL. 90
c. Asbestos Cases
Similar to hunting accidents, one must proceed by reverse
analysis. Asbestos related damage is covered by the national health
system (Sécurité sociale), with 100% coverage where the patient is
recognized as suffering from long term condition (longue
maladie). A compensation fund has been created by the law of
December 23, 2000, so that no asbestos victim may be left without

87. Doctors sometimes shift to the generic form to save costs.
88. See supra note 1.
89. Cass. Civ. 1, 17 June 2010, Bull. I no. 137, D. 2010, 1625 (note I.
Gallmeister); RTDCiv 2010, 567 (obs. P. Jourdain), JCP 2010, no. 1015, p. 1917
(obs. C. Bloch).
90. Art. 3:103 PETL.
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compensation, 91 making proportional liability a moot question.
Specific legislation has been adopted since 1975, 92 and tort law
might apply, if necessary. An appellate court held an employer
liable for damage suffered by the employee’s spouse who suffered
from lung disease as a consequence of the asbestos on her
husband’s clothing: the employer was held to have retained
custody of the asbestos particles, which were not under the
employee’s control. 93 Employees may also sue employers on the
basis of fault, and the Court of Cassation insists that this is an
inexcusable fault (manquement à une obligation de sécurité de
résultat), 94 thus triggering additional compensation by the Sécurité
sociale. 95
2. Uncertainty of Causation and Loss of a Chance
French courts routinely apply the doctrine of loss of a chance
(perte d’une chance) whenever of the opinion that the defendant’s
activity deprived the victim of the opportunity of a favorable event
when the victim can do nothing to remedy the situation. Loss of a
chance is regarded as direct and certain damage. The French find it
convenient to shift from causation to damage. 96 Rather than
admitting that causation is partial or uncertain and follow a path
similar to articles 3:101 to 3:106 of the Principles of European Tort
Law (PETL), French courts regard loss of a chance as a head of
damage that will be fully compensated. 97 As unorthodox as things
may look from a theoretical point of view, it serves very pragmatic

91. Law no. 2000-1257 of 23 December 2000, art. 53, creating the Fonds
d’indemnisation des victimes de l’amiante (FIVA), financed by the Sécurité
sociale (75%) and the State (25%). See, for more detail, LE TOURNEAU ET AL.,
supra note 79, nos. 8490–8494.
92. LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 79, at nos. 8486–8489.
93. CA Caen, 20 November 2001, JCP 2003, II, 10045 (note F.G. Trébulle).
94. Cass. Soc., 28 February 2002 (six cases), Bull. V, no. 81; RTDCiv
2002, 310 (obs. P. Jourdain).
95. LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 79, no. 8484.
96. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 35, at no. 370.
97. Moréteau, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in France,
supra note 77, at no. 2 .
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purposes and has spread to other countries, both in the Romanist
and Germanic branches of the civil law family. 98
Loss of chance is frequently applied in cases of medical
malpractice. Causation is tricky in medical malpractice cases due
to scientific uncertainty. In a recent case, 99 a child was born in a
clinic with severe and multiple handicaps caused by a neurological
disorder. The parents sued the general practitioner and the
gynecologist who monitored the pregnancy. They also sued the
clinic where the mother delivered the child, together with the
midwife, an employee of the clinic. All defendants were found
liable in solidum for fault or negligence during the pregnancy and
at the time of childbirth. They had proved that, unknown to the
doctors at the time of the facts, the mother had a pre-existing
condition that, in the opinion of experts, had a decisive but
immeasurable influence on the handicap. However, the Court of
Cassation concluded that the defendants’ faults had in part caused
the damage, which justify solidary liability for loss of a chance by
the child to experience a lesser degree of cerebral infirmity,
“regardless of the degree of uncertainty of the first origin of the
handicap.” Based on the judgment of the lower court, the victims
were therefore to receive 75% compensation.
This is a typical example where to some extent, but to an
unknown extent, the loss is in the victim’s sphere, since the mother
had been suffering from a pre-existing condition. The point was
discussed at length by the European Group on Tort Law.
According to article 3:106 of the Principles of European Tort Law,
“The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the
98. HELMUT KOZIOL, BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM A GERMANIC
PERSPECTIVE 152-53 (Jan Sramek Verlag 2012).
99. Cass. Civ. 1, 28 January 2010, Bull. I, no. 19, D. 2010, 947 (note G.
Maitre); JCP 2010, no. 474 (note S. Hocquet-Berg), RTDCiv 2010, 330 (obs. P.
Jourdain); commented in Olivier Moréteau, France in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
2010, at 175, 182-84, nos. 20–28 (H. Koziol & B.C. Steininger eds., de Gruyter
2011), largely reproduced (often verbatim) in the present text. See also
Moréteau, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in France, supra note
77, at nos. 23-25.
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likelihood that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence
or other circumstance within his own sphere.” The Comments give
the example of a medical malpractice case with a victim falling
seriously ill, where “the illness may well have a ‘natural’ cause.
The doctor is liable to the extent his malpractice may have caused
the illness.” 100
Applying the doctrine of the loss of a chance to our case leads
to a similar result. Rather than lamenting on an unorthodox use of
loss of a chance, 101 one cannot but trust judges to make a
reasonable assessment as to the percentage of liability to be placed
on the defendant, when challenged with inconclusive evidence. In
such doubtful cases, proportional liability is no doubt to be
preferred to an “all-or-nothing” approach.
French law only allows for the compensation of a loss that is
actual and certain. 102 The compensation of uncertain future loss is
not permissible unless regarded as a loss of a chance. 103 French
doctrine has identified two types of future losses. 104 The loss is
virtual (préjudice virtuel) where it potentially exists as a
consequence of the blameworthy conduct: all the conditions of its
existence in the future already exist at the time of the facts, much
like an embryo contains all the elements necessary for the
development of a human life. The loss is hypothetical (préjudice
éventuel) where its existence depends on events that may or may
100. Art. 3:106 PETL, cmt. J. Spier, 58 no. 13.
101. See Jourdain, supra note 99.
102. The following paragraphs reproduce Moréteau, Causal Uncertainty and
Proportional Liability in France, supra note 77, no. 26-31.
103. The Court of Cassation accepts, in certain circumstances, that
compensation be made conditional: a patient diagnosed with HIV after a faulty
blood transfusion was awarded conditional damages, with payment subject to
medical evidence that he developed AIDS as a consequence of contamination:
Cass. Civ. 2, 20 July 1993, Bull. Civ. II, no. 274, RTDCiv 1994, 107 (obs. P.
Jourdain). Likewise, where the sale of an immovable is nullified partly as a
consequence of the notary’s fault, the notary is under no obligation to
compensate the buyer unless the latter proves that he failed to obtain restitution
of the price from the seller, which again, makes compensation conditional: Cass.
Civ. 1, 29 February 2000, Bull. Civ. I, no. 72, RTDCiv 2000, 576 (obs. P.
Jourdain).
104. LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 79, at no. 1414.
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not occur, much like the eventuality of a human being to come to
exist in case two persons of the opposite sex and able to procreate
have intimate intercourse. If a CEO is prevented from concluding a
promising contract because of an accident, the loss of benefit is
regarded as hypothetical, since no-one knows whether the contract
would have been concluded had the CEO not been prevented from
conducting the negotiation. 105 The line is thin however, and one
may want to decide that the CEO was presently and certainly
deprived of a favourable opportunity, which is the test to decide
whether a loss of a chance exists according to the most recent
jurisprudence. 106
A loss has to be virtual, not hypothetical, in order to be
compensated as a loss of a chance. This may happen in cases
where the occurrence of any future harm is uncertain, but also
where the scope of the future harm is uncertain.
In the example of the CEO who was prevented from
concluding a promising contract due to an accident, the occurrence
of future harm is uncertain: nobody can tell for sure that the deal
would have been concluded. French law applies a form of
proportional liability whenever judges find that the plaintiff was
presently and certainly deprived of a favourable opportunity. As
explained above, compensation will be apportioned in the sense
that it will be calculated as a share of the plaintiff’s various heads
of damage.
The compensation of loss of a chance in such situations has
caused no unreasonable surge in litigation. The fact that damages
are likely to be quite low may help keep floodgates sufficiently
proof. On the other hand, compensation of loss of a chance has
caused no known over-deterrence in the exercise of professional
activity such as legal or medical practice. In dubious cases, courts
105. Cass. Civ. 2, 12 June 1987, Bull. II, no. 128, RTDCiv 1988, 103 (obs. J.
Mestre).
106. See the discussion of Cass. Civ. 1, 28 January 2010, supra note 99, and
accompanying text above.
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are more than likely to describe the loss as hypothetical and reject
the claim, as eventually happened in the CEO case.
Cases in which harm has already been caused but the scope of
this harm in the future is unknown are common. All cases where a
victim suffers personal injury causing some form of disability
seem to fall into this category. The loss of vision in an eye, the
limitation in the use of an arm, or the loss of the ability to
procreate, is no doubt existing harm. However, the scope of the
loss for the future is unknown. The young person losing the
opportunity to procreate may elect for a lifestyle where this causes
no impediment or may be deprived of the chance of raising a small
or larger family. Such unknown harm can be described as virtual
since the condition exists at the time of the harm. It may be
repaired as a loss of a chance.
However, French courts are likely to indemnify as préjudice
d’agrément. This may cover the loss of a precise activity such as
the possibility to do sports or to play the violin, in situations where
the victim had already some practice. 107 However, Geneviève
Viney voiced concern that such a narrow understanding of the
préjudice d’agrément would be “elitist,” 108 expressing support for
the extension to the general agreement of a normal life, as
sometimes defined by the courts. 109 This is a form of nonpecuniary damage, the assessment of which is of course
problematic, and will never be fully adequate in the parties’ eyes.

107. LE TOURNEAU ET AL., supra note 79, at no. 1586.
108. Geneviève Viney, Responsabilité civile (Chronique d’actualité), JCP
1995, I, 3853, at no. 22.
109. Cass. Crim. 2 June 1964, D. 1964, 629 (joies légitimes que l’on peut
attendre de l’existence); Cass. Crim. 5 March 1985, Bull. Crim., no. 105, D.
1986, 445 (note H. Groutel) (privation des agréments d’une vie normale).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Italian legal system is undergoing a development process
involving the traditional pillars of its legal framework. In addition
to the law of contracts, usually accustomed to dealing with new
legal tools autonomously developed by the contracting parties and
generally circulating from other legal systems, other significant
areas of law have been remarkably interested: for example, family
law, succession law, bankruptcy law, and the law of obligations, in
particular rules providing for debtor’s liability and creditor’s
rights. 1 This phenomenon has prompted a re-evaluation of the
approach to fundamental concepts as well as the limits traditionally
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Bologna School of Law; LL.M.,
Louisiana State University; Three-year doctorate in comparative law, University
of Milan.
1. See, for example, Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral
arrangements, entitling the collateral-taker, should an enforcement event occur,
to realize the collateral by appropriation (Directive, art. 4, 2002 O.J. (L168) 43.
The text of the directive is also available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/). The
Directive has been implemented in Italy through the Legislative Decree
170/2004: this provision, and in particular art. 4 of the same, introduced a
remarkable exception to art. 2744 of the Italian Civil Code which prohibits any
form of the collateral’s appropriation by the creditor.
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perceived as absolute (for example, the rule on the universal
liability of the debtor set forth in article 2740 of the Italian Civil
Code, that nowadays suffers so many exceptions that its
prescriptive value of intangible provision has been weakened). 2
The change seems mainly due—directly or indirectly—to the
entrance of the “trust” on the Italian scene: this occurrence induced
several reactions, in particular by Italian lawmakers, who aimed at
offering new and workable alternatives to trust. Although the
debate within the Italian arena did not exclusively focus on this
legal instrument and was enriched by suggestions coming from
different sources (for example, Italian society, as well as European
Institutions), nevertheless the increasing recourse to trust
undoubtedly played a major role in the process of the
reconsideration of traditional legal categories and the drafting new
legal tools. 3 In this sense, it can be said that the Italian legal
menu, 4 which used to offer potential customers a list of traditional
2. See, for example, Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, ord. of 14 May 2007,
according to which such prescription would be deprived of its function, in Guida
al diritto, 2007, n. 26, 50, commented by G. Finocchiaro.
3. The comparative literature grants specific attention to phenomena of
circulation of models, legal transplants, legal irritants, legal flows and other
events inducing reactions and change in the recipient country. Among the many
contributions, see, for example, ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Univ. Press of Virginia 1974) (the work has
then been followed by other essays by the same author, developing the theory
introduced therein); RODOLFO SACCO, INTRODUZIONE AL DIRITTO COMPARATO
(5th ed., Utet 1992) (focusing attention on the circulation of models and
highlighting two determining factors: force and prestige); Gunther Teubner,
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in
New Differences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (arguing that legal irritants explain
the transfer of legal rules from one country to another better than legal
transplants: while a transplant would induce either rejection or acceptance of the
alien organ, to the contrary, when a foreign rule is imposed on a domestic
culture, it is not transplanted into another organism, but rather works as a
fundamental irritation which triggers a whole series of new and unexpected
events); MAURIZIO LUPOI, SISTEMI GIURIDICI COMPARATI. TRACCIA DI UN
CORSO 60 (ESI 2001) (defining as legal flow any element of a legal system
operating in another system and introducing a situation of imbalance in the
latter). See also, recently, Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the
Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 723 (2009).
4. The title of the present work evokes the essay of Ian Ayres, Menus
Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006) (holding that lawmakers can affect
contractual equilibria by regulating contractual menus, assuming that a menu is

2013]

ITALY

805

dishes, has been enriched in order to take into account the
preferences of parties with heterogeneous tastes. 5
II. TRUST AND THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Italy was the first country to ratify the Hague Convention on
the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, 6 through
Law no. 364, of 16 October 1989, which came into force on
January 1, 1992 (“Convention”). 7
Although there had been precedents dealing with trusts, the
most significant case law—and the related attempts by the
legislative formant 8 to create competitive alternatives—occurred
after the implementation in Italy of the Convention. 9

a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than one type of
contract, and highlighting that the menu can consist of two simultaneous offers
that private parties make to each other and/or of offers that the state makes to
potential contractors themselves) in order to highlight how the Italian legal
sphere has been enriched with new legal instruments developed by private
parties and/or introduced by Italian lawmakers.
5. The offer has therefore been amended, revisiting traditional recipes
and/or adding new dishes to traditional ones like in the case of a menu listing at
the same time homemade cannelloni, cardamom-flavoured ragù and shrimptempura. On food and recipes as a metaphor of legal systems, see in particular
Olivier Moréteau, Mare Nostrum as the Cauldron of Western Legal Traditions:
Stirring the Broth, Making Sense of Legal Gumbo Whilst Understanding
Contamination, 4 J. CIV. L. STUD. 515 (2011).
6. The Hague, Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their
Recognition, July 1, 1985 [hereinafter Hague Trust Convention], available at
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59 (last visited
Feb. 20, 2014).
7. See generally Antonio Gambaro, Trust in DIGESTO DISCIPLINE
PRIVATISTICHE, SEZ. CIVILE, TURIN, XIX at 449 et seq. (1999).
8. See in particular Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach
to Comparative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991) and Sacco, Legal Formants:
A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law II, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343.
9. It has been noted that a significant contribution to the Italian reflection
over trusts was given by the enactment of the Law of the Republic of San
Marino of 17 March 2005, no. 37, on trust. Though the legal system of San
Marino and Italy are different (for example, because a main source of law in San
Marino is ius commune), the above-mentioned legislative provision is the first of
a civil law country drafted in Italian and providing for trust. See generally
Enrica Senini, La nuova Legislazione della Repubblica di San Marino sul Trust,
7:3 TRUSTS 368 (2006).
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Court rulings on trusts before such event generally either: (i)
denied recognition of the latter on the basis of the assumed
irreconcilable conflict between trusts and mandatory rules of the
Italian legal system (for example, the concept of double-ownership
allegedly related to trust against the uniqueness of the ownership
right as set forth in art. 832 of the Italian Civil Code (hereinafter
“C.C.”); the numerus clausus of the iura in re aliena, and the
limits imposed by article 2740 C.C. about debtor’s liability (which,
in paragraph 2, prevents any form of asset-segregation unless
expressly admitted by law); or (ii) recognized only limited effects
to trusts as long as they may be lead back, by analogy, to similar
provisions of the Italian law. 10
On the contrary, countries which ratified the Convention are
obliged to recognize the legal effects of trusts subject to the law of
a trust-country.
However, it has to be noted that the definition of trust under the
Convention does not match that pertaining to the English common
law. 11 Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 1 of the former, trust
includes “the legal relationship created, inter vivos or on death, by
a person, the settlor, when assets have been placed under the
control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a
specified purpose.” 12
Rather than properly defining trust, the Convention therefore
opts in favor of a functional approach by depicting the
characteristics of phenomena not necessarily falling under the
concept of “trust” as developed in the English legal system. In
addition, while English law recognizes both constructive and
resulting trusts, the Convention applies only to voluntary trusts.
10. See, for example, Tribunal of Oristano, 15 Maggio 1956, FORO
of Casale Monferrato, decr. 13 Aprile 1984, II

ITALIANO, 1956, I, 1019; Tribunal
RIV. NOT., 243 (1985).

11. With reference to trust within the common law system, see generally
GERAINT THOMAS & ALASTAIR HUDSON, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (Oxford Univ.
Press 2004); Geoffrey C. CHESHIRE, IL CONCETTO DEL TRUST SECONDO LA
COMMON LAW INGLESE (Diego Corapi intro., G. Giappichelli 1998).
12. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6.
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Second, the relationship between the trust fund and the trustee is
described by the Convention in terms of “control”, with no further
legal qualification. However, article 2, paragraph 2 of the same
provides a guideline requiring a trust for the purposes of the
Convention to have the following characteristics:
(a) the assets constitute a separate fund and are not a part of the
trustee’s own estate;
(b) title to the trust assets stands in the name of the trustee or in
the name of another person on behalf of the trustee;
(c) the trustee has the power and the duty, in respect of which
he is accountable, to manage, employ or dispose of the assets in
accordance with the terms of the trust and the special duties
imposed upon him by law. 13
Consequently, legal relationships meeting the requirements set
forth by the Convention will be recognized in Italy as “trusts”,
although under English law they would fall within different legal
categories. For this reason Professor Maurizio Lupoi refers to trust
pursuant to the Convention in terms of “shapeless trust”. 14
During the last twenty years, following the implementation of
the Convention, Italian courts faced an increasing number of cases
involving recognition of trusts, thus developing substantial body of
case law. 15
For example, in 1997 the Tribunal of Lucca ruled about a
succession dispute grounded on the alleged nullity of a will
providing for the appointment of a fiduciary executor who should
13. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6.
14. MAURIZIO LUPOI, TRUSTS 425 et seq. (Giuffrè 1997); LUPOI, TRUSTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Simon Dix trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
15. For a survey of Italian case-law on trusts, see in particular: La
Giurisprudenza Italiana sui Trust in TRUSTS: OPINIONI A CONFRONTO 207-96 (E.
Barla De Guglielmi ed., IPSOA 2006) (reporting several contributions of judges
and law professors highlighting that: (i) trusts and, in particular, “domestic
trusts” have become part of the Italian legal framework; (ii) trusts are broadly
applied within the field of corporate law, real estate law, bankruptcy law and
family law; (iii) Italian judges tend to disregard trusts when there is a clear
evidence of the abusive recourse to the trust-scheme, while, in opposite cases,
tend to grant full recognition to such scheme and its effects).
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have managed the hereditary asset on behalf of the daughter of the
de cuius. The daughter claimed the will should be declared null. To
the contrary, the Tribunal affirmed the full legitimacy and validity
of the latter, arguing that the legal relationship depicted therein
amounted to a trust, thus qualifying the fiduciary executor as
trustee and the daughter of the de cuius as beneficiary; 16 in
addition, the judge held that the trust-scheme ought to be
recognized and applied even within successions governed by
Italian law. Then, in two decisions in 2000 involving the purchase
of immovables, both the Tribunal of Bologna and Tribunal of
Chieti ruled in favor of registration of the purchase carried out by
the trustee in his specific capacity. 17 A different approach has been
taken by the Tribunal of Velletri, 18 according to which the socalled “domestic trust” (namely, a trust in which the sole foreign
element is the governing law), although not falling within the
provisions of the Convention and therefore not recognizable under
the latter, nevertheless is enforceable in Italy pursuant to article
1322 C.C. Such a provision grants parties the right to create
atypical contracts provided that they are aimed at satisfying
interests worthy of legal protection. With reference to such an
approach, it has to be highlighted that sometimes a tendency to
assimilate trust to contracts may be inferred, although, as is known,
the law of trusts and the law of contracts are different. 19
The Tribunal of Milan has, for example, approved a voluntary
separation agreement providing for the creation of a trust aimed to
protect the interests of the minor child of the parties; 20 the Tribunal
of Parma has approved a pre-bankruptcy agreement submitted by a
16. Tribunal of Lucca, judgment of 23 September 1997, FORO ITALIANO
2007 (1998).
17. Tribunal of Bologna, decr. of 18 April 2000, TRUSTS 372 (2000); Trib.
of Chieti, ord. of 10 March 2000, id.
18. Tribunal of Velletri, ord. of 7 March 2005, TRUSTS 407 (2005).
19. See Michele Graziadei, Trusts in Italian law: a matter of property or of
obligation?, in Italian national Reports to the XVth International Congress of
comparative law 189 (Milan, 1998).
20. Tribunal of Milan, decr. of 23 February 2005, RIV. NOT. 851 (2005);
Tribunal of Parma, judgment of 3 March 2005, id.
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limited company, providing for the immovable assets owned by the
company’s director to be included in a trust fund, together with the
appointment of the judicial executor of the agreement as trustee. 21
In spite of such an increase in judicial recognition of trusts,
perplexities arose, especially among scholars. In particular, whilst
a significant part of the Italian doctrine argues in favour of trusts,
deeming that they have become part of the Italian scenario, other
authors show a more critical approach, highlighting the unsolved
conflicts between trusts and the Italian legal system. The issue
nowadays seems overtaken by recent and significant

21. The Italian case law on trusts is quite substantial (LF: in the sense of
large quantity); for a comprehensive collection see LA GIURISPRUDENZA
ITALIANA SUI TRUSTS (4th ed., IPSOA 2011) (collecting judgments on trusts up
to 2011). Among the recent decisions of the Italian Supreme Court, see, for
example, Cass. civ. Sez. VI - 1, Ord. of 18 July 2013, n. 17621 (ruling about a
conflict of competence between two Tribunals originated by the plaintiff’s
request to be entitled to allot some assets within a trust fund on behalf of her
minor children); Cass. civ. Sez. I, judg. of 26 July 2013, n. 18138 and Cass. civ.
Sez. I, judg. of 11 July 2013, n. 17208 and Cass. civ. Sez. I, judg. of 30 May
2013, n. 13659 (not specifically addressing trust issues, but assuming the
existence of a trust for a company’s liquidation purposes); Cass. civ. Labor
Section, judg. of 3 December 2012, n. 21607 (not specifically addressing trust
issues, but assuming the existence of a trust created by the employer); Cass. civ.
Plenary Session, Ord. of 15 March 2012, n. 4132 (affirming Italian jurisdiction
in a succession dispute involving three trusts created by the de cuius during his
life); Cass. civ. Sez. II, judg. of 22 December 2011, n. 28363 (pointing out the
specific featuring elements of trusts in order to reject the claimant’s recourse).
For a judgment specifically addressing the issue at hand, see Cass. civ. Sez. I,
judg. of 13 June 2008, n. 16022. The controversy at issue involved the case of
former husband and wife (both Italian citizens, but residing in England) who
entered into a divorce agreement setting forth a trust. The trust fund involved an
apartment to be managed on behalf of their minor children and both former
spouses were appointed as joint-trustees. The agreement granted the gratuitous
right of habitation to the mother and expressly provided for the duty to rent the
apartment should the mother move elsewhere. When the mother had to move to
Italy with the children for professional reasons, the apartment was not rented
and nobody took care of it. The former husband then brought a civil suit in the
Tribunal of Milan petitioning for the judicial substitution of the ex-wife and the
appointment of a new trustee. The Italian judge deemed the trust subject to
English law in compliance with art. 7 of the Convention, and substituted both
the plaintiff and the defendant, alleging breach of the trustee’s duties by both,
and appointed two new joint-trustees. The Milan Court of Appeal affirmed the
decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, too, disregarding the pleas of both
parties and agreeing with the reasoning of the lower court.
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developments; however, it is a notable aspect of the Italian
experience with particular reference to the doctrinal formant.
The debate mainly focused on the “domestic trust”; namely, a
trust in which the sole foreign element is the governing law, while
all the other elements call for the application of the Italian law. 22
Pursuant to a minority doctrine, internal trusts are
irreconcilable both with the provisions of the Convention (in
particular, with art. 13) and those of the Italian system, specifically
with the above-mentioned article 2740, paragraph 2 C.C., requiring
exceptions to the rule on debtor’s liability to be introduced only
through an express legislative provision, whilst the Convention
does not have such an effect. 23 Namely, since the Convention
provides for conflict of law rules, it is prevented from introducing
uniform rules of substantial law and therefore cannot have the
effect to allow recognition or creation of new categories of trusts,
such as the “domestic” one. 24 To further support the negative
approach to domestic trust, reference has traditionally been made

22. Literature on recognition of trusts in Italy, and in particular of the
domestic trust, is really copious. With reference to this issue, see specifically
Maurizio Lupoi, I trust nel diritto civile in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE 263 et
seq. (Rodolfo Sacco dir., Utet 2004) (summing up arguments on behalf and
against the recognition of domestic trusts and concluding in favor of its positive
recognition under the Convention). See also infra, note 25.
23. See, for example, Gerardo Broggini, Il trust nel diritto internazionale
privato italiano in I TRUSTS IN ITALIA OGGI 11 (Ilaria Beneventi ed., Giuffrè
1996); Gerardo Broggini, Trust e fiducia nel diritto internazionale privato,
EUROPA E DIRITTO PRIVATO 410 (1998); Francesco Gazzoni, Tentativo
dell’impossibile (osservazioni di un giurista non vivente su trust e trascrizione),
RIV. NOT. 11 (2001); Francesco Gazzoni, In Italia tutto è permesso, anche quel
che è vietato (lettera aperta a Maurizio Lupoi sul trust e su altre bagattelle),
RIV. NOT. 1247 (2001); Carlo Castronovo, Trust e diritto civile italiano, VITA
NOT. 1323 (1998); Luca Ragazzini, Trust interno e ordinamento giuridico
italiano, RIV. NOT. 279 (1999); Vincenzo Mariconda, Contrastanti decisioni sul
trust interno: nuovi interventi a favore, ma sono nettamente prevalenti gli
argomenti contro l’ammissibilità, CORRIERE GIUR. 76 et seq. (2004); ARNALDO
MORACE PINELLI, ATTI DI DESTINAZIONE, TRUST E RESPONSABILITÀ DEL
DEBITORE 121 et seq. (Giuffrè 2007).
24. See, for example, Salvatore Mazzamuto, Il trust nell’ordinamento
italiano dopo la Convenzione dell’Aja, VITA NOT. 754 (1998) (stating that
recognition of internal trust would not be allowed under the Convention because
its conflict of law rules provide for recognition of foreign trusts).
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to the numerus clausus of iura in re aliena and the uniqueness of
the right of ownership.
According to the prevalent doctrine, domestic trusts shall be
recognized in Italy, as well as any other trust under the
Convention, namely because: (i) article 6 of the Convention grants
the settlor freedom to choose the governing law of trust (although
within the limit set forth by article 2 of the same); (ii) the
Convention does not require the trust to include foreign elements
in addition to the governing law; 25 and, (iii) article 13 of the
same 26 must be interpreted as allowing judges to assess quam in
concreto, on a case-by-case basis, the real purposes of the specific
trust at stake. Article 13 would therefore leave judges a sort of
residual power of control for those cases in which the recourse to
trust appears merely instrumental. 27 Consequently, internal trust
25. Pursuant to art. 11 of the Convention, a trust created in compliance with
the law chosen by the settlor will have to be recognized as well as any other trust
under the same Convention. In addition, art. 11 draws a distinction between
necessary and further effects of the recognition of the shapeless trust. The
necessary effects amount to segregation and the entitlement of the trustee to act
on behalf of the trust and appear in this capacity before a court and/or any other
public authority; further effects occur in so far as the governing law of the trust
requires or provides for them. In particular:
a) that personal creditors of the trustee shall have no recourse against
the trust assets; b) that the trust assets shall not form part of the
trustee’s estate upon his insolvency or bankruptcy; c) that the trust
assets shall not form part of the matrimonial property of the trustee or
his spouse nor part of the trustee’s estate upon his death; d) that the
trust assets may be recovered when the trustee, in breach of trust, has
mingled trust assets with his own property or has alienated trust assets
(Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6, at art. 11, para. 2).
26. Hague Trust Convention, supra note 6, at art. 13:
No State shall be bound to recognise a trust the significant elements of
which, except for the choice of the applicable law, the place of
administration and the habitual residence of the trustee, are more
closely connected with States which do not have the institution of the
trust or the category of trust involved.
27. Favorable to the recognition of domestic trust, for example, is Umberto
Morello, Fiducia e trust: due esperienze a confronto in FIDUCIA, TRUST,
MANDATO ED AGENCY 97 et seq. (Giuffré 1991); Alessia Busato, La figura del
trust negli ordinamenti di common law e di diritto continentale, II RIV. DIR. CIV.
341 (1992); Paulo Piccoli, Possibilità operative del trust nell’ordinamento
italiano. L’operatività del trustee dopo la Convenzione dell’Aja, RIV. NOT. 66
(1995); Nicolò Lipari, Fiducia statica e trusts in I TRUSTS IN ITALIA OGGI 75
(Ilaria Beneventi ed., Giuffrè 1996); Maurizio Lupoi, Lettera a un notaio
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shall be deemed in compliance with both the Convention and the
relevant national provisions, and therefore deserve to be fully
recognized within the Italian legal system.
Italian Courts adopted heterogeneous approaches: besides
judgments denying recognition of internal trust, there are several
decisions allowing it. 28 However, the judicial denial of trusts does

curioso di trusts, RIV. NOT. 348 (1996); Paulo Piccoli & Nicola Raiti, Atto di
costituzione di trust, RIV. NOT. 236 (1996); Raffaele Lener & Giovanni B.
Bisogni, Omologa di prestito obbligazionario, LE SOCIETÀ 586 (1997); MicolEloise D’Orio, Un trust a garanzia di un prestito obbligazionario. Percorsi e
tendenze nella dottrina sui trusts, in II GIUR. COMM. 239 (1998); Pasquale Amati
& Paulo Piccoli, Trascritto un immobile in trust, NOT. 593 (1999); ALESSANDRO
DE DONATO, VALENTINA DE DONATO & MAURIZIO D’ERRICO, TRUST
CONVENZIONALE. LINEAMENTI DI TEORIA E PRATICA 80 et seq. (Stamperia
Nazionale 1999); Francesco Di Ciommo, Per una teoria negoziale del trust
(ovvero perché non possiamo farne a meno), CORRIERE GIUR. 786 (1999); Paulo
Piccoli, Il trust: questo (sempre meno) sconosciuto, CORRIERE GIUR. 391 (1996);
Alexandra Braun, Trusts interni, RIV. DIR. CIV., 577 et seq. (2000); Stefano di
Buttà, Effetti diretti della Convenzione dell’Aja nell’ordinamento italiano,
TRUSTS E ATTIVITÀ FIDUCIARIE 557 (2000); NICOLA CANESSA, I TRUSTS
AMMISSIBILITA DEL TRUST E APPLICAZIONI PRATICHE
INTERNI.
NELL’ORDINAMENTO ITALIANO 3 et seq., 17 et seq. (Il Sole 24 Ore 2001); Sergio
M. Carbone, Autonomia privata, scelta della legge regolatrice del trust e
riconoscimento dei suoi effetti nella Convenzione dell’Aja del 1985, TRUSTS E
ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 145 (2000); Augusto Chizzini, Revoca del trustee e
legittimazione all’azione possessoria, TRUSTS E ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 47 (2000);
Giovanni Iudica, Trust e stock option, TRUSTS E ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 511
(2000); Riccardo Luzzatto, Legge applicabile e riconoscimento di trusts secondo
la Convenzione dell’Aja, TRUST 14 (2000); Luigi F. Risso, Il libro degli eventi
del trust, TRUST 127 (2000); Lorenzo Salvatore, Il trend favorevole
all’operatività del trust in Italia: esame ragionato di alcuni trusts compatibili in
un’ottica notarile, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 644 (2000); SAVERIO BARTOLI, IL
TRUST, 597 ( Giuffrè 2001); Maurizio Lupoi, Lettera ad un notaio conoscitore
dei trust, RIV. NOT. 1159 (2001); LUPOI, TRUSTS (2d ed., Giuffrè 2001); Luigi F.
Risso, Dibattito sulla legge regolatrice del trust e ruolo del notaro, TRUSTS E
ATTIVITA FIDUCIARIE 333 et seq. (2001).; Antonio Gambaro, Un argomento a
due gobbe in tema di trascrizione del trustee in base alla Convenzione dell’Aja,
I RIV. DIR. CIV. 919 (2002); Francesco Di Ciommo, Ammissibilità del trust
interno e giustificazione causale dell’effetto traslativo, FORO ITALIANO 1295
(2004); LUPOI, I TRUST NEL DIRITTO CIVILE, supra note 22. On behalf of the
positive recognition of the domestic trust, see the study published by the
Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato, approved on February 10, 2006: Daniele
Muritano & Luigi F. Risso, Il trust: diritto interno e Convenzione dell’Aja.
Ruolo e responsabilità del notaio, available at www.notariato.it. Recently, on
behalf of internal trust, see also Lucilla Gatt, Il trust c.d. interno: una questione
ancora aperta, 3 NOT. 280 (2011).
28. See, for example, supra note 15.

2013]

ITALY

813

not seem due to a rejection of trust ex se, but rather to the abusive
use of the trust scheme: for example, when a substantial reason for
segregation of the assets is absent and the recourse to trust and its
effects is neither supported nor justified by a worthwhile
purpose. 29
Regardless, trusts undoubtedly are present and operate within
the Italian arena, thus testifying to their success and appeal in
fulfilling the parties’ needs in different areas of law: 30 in fact, they
have been utilized within family relationships (both during the
marriage and in case of separation and divorce), for succession and
will purposes, and within business context (both in the on-going
activity phase and in the event of insolvency, in particular with
reference to bankruptcy—or alternative to bankruptcy—
proceedings 31).
With specific regard to the relationship between trusts and
bankruptcy issues, a significant contribution has been made by
Law of 27 January 2012, n. 3—in particular articles 6-14—
providing for cases of over-indebtment not subject to current
bankruptcy proceedings, and allowing the debtor to enter into a
debt-reorganization agreement with creditors on the basis of a plan
29. See, inter alia, Lorenzo Salvatore, Atto di Destinazione e Crisi di
Impresa: Strumento a Tutela o contro le Procedure Concorsuali?, 5 RIV. NOT.
1085 (2012) (further highlighting the need to draw a distinction between: (i) the
act establishing a trust, which is neutral in itself and therefore cannot be held ex
se unlawful, and (ii) the specific acts of disposition of the trust assets, which are
subject to a case by case assessment).
30. See, for example, Maurizio Lupoi, Il Contratto di Affidamento
Fiduciario, 3 RIV. NOT. 513 (2012). See also Elisabetta Corapi, Sul Trust
Interno Autodichiarato, 6 BANCA, BORSA, TITOLI DI CREDITO 801 (2010)
(commenting on the judgment of Tribunal of Cagliari, of 4 August 2008 and
highlighting that the trend of the financial market toward the internationalization
of law, the increasing value of lex mercatoria, and the phenomenon of forumshopping, fostered the recourse to trust within the Italian legal system).
31. For an in-depth comparative analysis of trust within the business
context, see in particular COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
(Michele Graziadei, Ugo Mattei & Lionel Smith eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2005). The book is part of the COMMON CORE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
series and includes contributions from several countries. The Italian contributors
to the case studies are Professor Antonio Gambaro and Professor Michele
Graziadei.
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aimed at ensuring the regular payment of creditors not taking part
in the plan. The plan may provide for collaterals, liquidation of
certain assets and—for the purposes of the present analysis—the
fiduciary entrustment (“affidamento fiduciario”) of the debtor’s
estate to a trustee (“fiduciario”) for purposes of liquidation,
preservation, and distribution of the proceeds among creditors. In
particular, it has been noted that the above mentioned agreement,
which has been referred to in terms of “contratto di affidamento
fiduciario”, would be the civilian alternative to trusts 32:
accordingly, that would mark a notable development in the
relationships between trusts and the Italian legal framework, as
well as other previous legislative attempts to provide for an Italian
response to issues usually dealt with by means of a trust, although
the outcome of such previous attempts did not always seem to gain
the same success.
III. THE REACTION OF ITALIAN LAWMAKERS: ARTICLE 2645-TER OF
THE CODICE CIVILE....
The reaction of Italian lawmakers to the increasing recourse to
trusts by private parties, together with the increasing demand for
new tools able to meet the heterogeneous needs of Italian society
(for example within family, business, succession context), ended
up with the introduction in the Italian Civil Code of new provisions
aimed to operate as alternatives to trusts and, moreover, governed
by Italian law.
In particular, in 2005 the Civil Code was amended by the
insertion of article 2645-ter C.C., which allows the registration in
public records of acts in public form whereby immovable goods
and/or registered movable goods are destined, up to ninety years or
up to the duration of the life of the natural person beneficiary, to
fulfill protection-deserving interests, referring to people with a
disability, to public administrations, or to other legal entities or
32. Lupoi, Il Contratto di Affidamento Fiduciario, supra note 30.
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natural persons in compliance with article 1322, paragraph 2
C.C. 33 The registration makes the bond effective toward third
parties. 34 The relevant goods and their fruits can be used only to
achieve the specifically stated aim, and they can be seized only for
debts incurred for such aim.
This provision has been inserted in the sixth book of the Code,
generally dealing with protection of rights, and in particular in the
section providing for registration of acts and their effects toward
third parties. Pursuant to article 2645-ter C.C., parties are entitled
to register acts aimed at fulfilling interest worthy of legal
protection. Namely, it is allowed to create a bond of purpose upon
certain kind of goods—i.e., registered movables or immovables—
preventing any action by third parties against them. Article 2645ter therefore disregards article 2740 C.C. on a debtor’s liability
because it introduces, as a consequence of an express legislative
provision, a limit to the general asset-liability of the debtor.
Although included in a set of provisions dealing with
registration formalities, this article provides for certain substantial
aspects, too.
In particular, it seems to introduce a new category of separate
assets in addition to the other cases already provided for in the civil
code: (i) inheritance with benefit of inventory; (ii) bankruptcy
assets; (iii) the so-called “fondo patrimoniale” as set forth in
articles 169 and following (a separate asset of goods bound to
fulfill family’s needs); and (iv) the company’s separate assets for a
33. Art. 1322 C.C. provides for parties’ autonomy and its second paragraph
entitles the creation of atypical contracts to the extent that such contracts pursue
“protection-deserving interests”. This assessment will be carried out on an expost basis by the judge and, according to the dominant doctrine, it ends up
verifying whether the atypical contract is lawful or not. See infra note 45.
34. Although a notable portion of Italian scholars argues that the
registration has a constitutive effect, because, absent it, the bond would not exist
(as well as the constitutive effect of the mortgage’s registration), the majority
opinion deems that the registration allows enforceability of the bond against
third parties. According to the latter opinion, therefore, the origin of the bond
will be the act providing for the bond, its purpose, duration, etc. For an overview
of this debate see Andrea Ghironi, La Destinazione di Beni ad uno Scopo nel
Prisma dell’Art. 2645ter c.c., 5 Riv. NOT. 1085 (2011), in particular paragraph 4.
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specific deal pursuant to article 2447-bis C.C. However, the
provision was quite incomplete and gave rise to criticism and
uncertainties, especially among scholars.
Before dealing with this issue, it seems appropriate to briefly
address a traditional legal instrument set forth in the Civil Code in
order to meet the needs of married couples and their children: the
above-mentioned “fondo patrimoniale”, as provided for by article
167 and following. 35
Pursuant to the same, the spouses, through a public act, a third
party, or even by will, are entitled to designate registered
movables, immovables and/or negotiable instruments to fulfill the
needs of the family. The fund can even be created during the
marriage and, absent different provisions, the ownership of the
involved assets belongs to both spouses. In particular, the natural
or civil fruits of such assets will be used for the family’s needs.
The involved goods can neither be sold nor can be subject to
pledge, encumbrance or any other lien unless agreed to by both
spouses and, in the event of minor children, without the previous
authorization of the competent Tribunal. Creditors cannot seize the
assets and/or their fruits if they knew that the relevant debts were
incurred for needs different than those of the family. 36
Accordingly, such a legal instrument represents a form of
segregation of assets explicitly allowed by Italian lawmakers.
35. See generally Luca Domenici, Il fondo patrimoniale: negozio di
protezione dei beni familiari, 5 NOT. 549 et seq. (2011); Andrea Fusaro,
Commento all’art. 167 c.c., in DELLA FAMIGLIA, I, ARTT. 74 - 176 C.C. at 1048
(Luigi Balestra ed., Utet 2010), part of the COMMENTARIO DEL CODICE CIVILE
series (Enrico Gabrielli dir.).
36. Art. 170 C.C. deals with the relationship between creditors and the legal
instrument at stake by providing for three categories of debts: (1) debts incurred
to fulfill the family’s needs; (2) debts incurred to fulfill interests outside the
family’s needs, when such circumstance is unknown to the creditor; and (3)
debts incurred to fulfill interests outside the family’s needs, when such
circumstance is known to the creditor. Only the first two categories of debts
entitle the enforcement against the assets of the fund. On the relationship
between the “fondo patrimoniale” and creditors, see generally ARNALDO
MORACE PINELLI, INTERESSE DELLA FAMIGLIA E TUTELA DEI CREDITORI (Giuffrè
2003).

2013]

ITALY

817

Nevertheless, so far it has had limited application. 37 Moreover, two
elements currently seem to further limit its development: on one
side, the competition of alternative instruments—in particular
trusts—coupling a broader flexibility and range of application
together with a more efficient segregation effect and, on the other
side, the judicial approach aimed to increase the cases in which
credit enforcement against the assets of the fund is allowed, thanks
to an extensive construction of the concept of “debts incurred for
the needs of the family.” 38 In addition, as a consequence of the
black letter of article 167 and following, and of its specific
insertion in the section aimed to provide for the patrimonial regime
of spouses, the present legal instrument applies only to married
couples. 39
A possible Italian response to the limits of this kind of legal
tool has therefore been identified in article 2645-ter C.C., which,
because of its wording, can be also used by unmarried couples in
order to provide for their interests, both between partners and/or on
behalf of their children. 40

37. See, for example, Giovanni Gabrielli, Patrimonio familiare e fondo
patrimoniale, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 293-95 (Giuffrè 1982);
Tommaso Auletta, Il fondo patrimoniale in IL CODICE CIVILE. COMMENTARIO 15
et seq. (Piero Schlesinger ed., Giuffrè 1992); Biagio Grasso, Il regime in
generale e il fondo patrimoniale in 3 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 420 ( Pietro
Rescigno ed., Utet 1996).
38. The judicial disfavour seems due in part to the fear of a fraudulent use
of such instrument against the creditors’ legitimate expectations and in part to a
cultural heritage more favourable to creditor’s rights. In particular, courts
rendering decisions about “fondo patrimoniale” mostly ruled on the application
to the same of the paulian action, both ordinary and within bankruptcy
proceedings. See in particular Francesco Gazzoni, Tentativo dell’impossibile,
supra note 23; Andrea Ferrari, Fondo patrimoniale e debiti erariali o d’impresa,
3 FAM. DIR. 303 (2011); Tommaso Auletta, Riflessioni sul fondo patrimoniale, 5
FAMIGLIA, PERSONE, SUCCESSIONI 326 (2012).
39. See, for example, GIACOMO OBERTO, I REGIMI PATRIMONIALI DELLA
FAMIGLIA DI FATTO (Giuffrè 1991) and Oberto, Famiglia di fatto e convivenze:
tutela dei soggetti interessati e regolamentazione dei rapporti patrimoniali in
vista della successione, FAMIGLIA E DIRITTO 661 (2006).
40. See generally Barbara Mastropietro, L’Atto di Destinazione tra Codice
Civile Italiano e Modelli Europei di Articolazione del Patrimonio, 2 RIV. NOT.
319 (2012).
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The broad wording of article 2645ter C.C. and its segregative
effect can also be applied within the business context, especially
for bankruptcy proceedings or other default proceedings (for
example, pre-bankruptcy agreements, business-reorganization
plans, etc.). 41
However, as mentioned above, the wording of article 2645-ter
C.C. and its insertion among provisions dealing with registration
formalities combined to increase criticism and doubts about its
proper meaning, function and range of application. 42
The doctrinal debate mainly focused on the nature of such an
article, namely whether it is aimed to provide only for the effects
of the registration of the bond or whether it implies substantial
aspects, too, thus providing for some featuring elements of the
open-ended category of “acts of destination”. Following the second
interpretation, article 2645-ter C.C. would therefore be the
legislative recognition of such an open-ended category, in spite of
its improper insertion and poor formulation.
Scholars adhering to the first opinion highlight that the
substantial aspects introduced by the article (form and duration)
are so limited as to prevent any further legal consequence of the
article itself, but for the regulation of the public registration’s

41. See, for example, Salvatore, Atto di destinazione e crisi di impresa,
supra note 29.
42. See generally Francesco Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter c.c., II
GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 165 et seq. (2006); Giovanni Gabrielli, Vincoli di destinazione
importanti separazione patrimoniale e pubblicità nei registri immobiliari, RIV.
DIR. CIV. 327 (2007); Gaetano Petrelli, La trascrizione degli atti di destinazione,
RIV. DIR. CIV. 162 (2006), (criticizing the legislative trend of law reforming
through inconsistent and piecemeal amendments to the civil code); Giuseppe
Tucci, Fiducie, trust e atti di destinazione ex art. 2645-ter c.c. in 2 STUDI IN
ONORE DI NICOLÒ LIPARI 2919, 2960 (Vincenzo Cuffaro & Giovanni di Rosa
coords., Giffrè 2008) (stressing the obscurity of the legislative provision);
Renato Clarizia, L’art. 2645 ter e gli interessi meritevoli di tutela in 1 STUDI IN
ONORE DI GIORGIO CIAN 545 (Giovanni De Cristofaro & Stefano Delle Monache
eds., CEDAM 2010); Arturo Picciotto, Brevi note sull’art. 2645 ter: il trust e
l’araba fenice, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1317 (2006) (highlighting the low quality
of the legislative intervention).
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effects; and the insertion of the same among provisions dealing
with registration formalities would confirm such interpretation. 43
On the contrary, scholars following the second approach 44
argue that: (i) the specific mention of substantial aspects (like
form, duration, kind of goods involved, beneficiares and parties
entitled to act on behalf and for the purposes of the bond), and (ii)
the express reference to article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C. would
therefore demonstrate legislative recognition of the open-ended
category of acts of destination, entitling parties to fill the gap of
such scarce legal framework with autonomous provisions to the
extent that the relevant juridical act (even when unilateral) fulfills
the judicial test set forth in article 1322, paragraph 2. 45
43. See, for example, Paola Manes, La norma sulla trascrizione di atti di
destinazione è, dunque, norma sugli effetti, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 626, 630 et
seq. (2006) (highlighting that the new article has been inserted among those
providing for registration formalities and their effects toward third parties). See
also Raffaele Lenzi, Le destinazioni atipiche e l’art. 2645 ter c.c., CONTRATTO E
IMPRESA 229 et seq. (2007); Picciotto, Brevi note sull’art. 2645 ter, supra note
42, at 1318. Among the case law see, for example, Tribunal of Reggio Emilia, of
22 June 2012; Tribunal of Trieste, of 7 April 2006, RIV. NOT. 367 (2007).
44. See, for example, Lucilla Gatt, Il trust c.d. interno: una questione
ancora aperta, 3 NOT. 280, 291 et seq. (2011) (highlighting, in contrast with the
aforementioned opinion—see supra note 43 and the corresponding text—the
proper choice of the lawmaker in setting forth the minimum legal requirements
of the provision at stake and enhancing the role of each party’s autonomy in
tailoring such an instrument to the respective interests and expectations);
Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter c.c., supra note 42, at 165; Mario
Nuzzo, Atto di destinazione e interessi meritevoli di tutela in LA TRASCRIZIONE
DELL’ATTO NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE. L’ART. 2645 TER DEL CODICE CIVILE
60 ( Bianca Mirzia ed., Giuffrè 2007); BIANCA MIRZIA, MAURIZIO D’ERRICO,
ALESSANDRO DE DONATO & CONCETTA PRIORE, L’ATTO NOTARILE DI
DESTINAZIONE. L’ART. 2645-TER DEL CODICE CIVILE (Giuffrè 2006); Bianca
Mirzia, Il nuovo art. 2645 ter c.c. Notazioni a margine di un provvedimento del
giudice tavolare di Trieste, II GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 189 (2006); Bianca Mirzia,
L’atto di destinazione: problemi applicativi, RIV. NOT. 1176 (2006); Arnaldo
Morace Pinelli, Tipicità dell’atto di destinazione e alcuni aspetti della sua
disciplina, RIV. DIR. CIV. 451, 468 (2008); Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, Il rapporto
tra l’art. 2645-ter c.c. e l’art. 2740 c.c.: un’analisi economica della nuova
disciplina, BANCA, BORSA, TITOLI DI CREDITO 203 (2007); Giorgio Rispoli,
Riflessioni in tema di meritevolezza degli atti di destinazione, 8-9 CORRIERE DI
MERITO 806, 808 (2011); Mastropietro, supra note 40.
45. Initially, the test under art. 1322, para. 2 C.C. used to be interpreted in
light of a super-eminent and overriding principle of public interest (see in
particular EMILIO BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE DEL NEGOZIO GIURIDICO 191 et seq.
(reprint, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 1994); subsequently this approach
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A second main issue dealt with the proper meaning of
“interests worthy of protection” as provided for by the article
2645-ter C.C. with regard to the purpose of the relevant bond.
According to a minority opinion, such a requirement and the
reference to article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C. overlap, both requiring
that the act and the relevant bond be lawful. 46 The wording of
article 2345-ter C.C. would consequently be redundant because of
the double reference to the lawfulness requirement. This approach
has been criticized by those who deem that the reference to
“interests worthy of protection” cannot be intended as a mere
duplication of the lawfulness test under article 1322, paragraph 2
C.C. 47 However, scholars disagree about the proper meaning of
this requirement.
According to a different opinion, the requirement implies a
selection of interests: the bond under article 2345-ter C.C. may
therefore operate only if aimed at pursuing high-value interests, for
example, those encompassed in the Constitution (especially in its
first part). Such interpretation lies on (and it is aimed to highlight)
the value of the specific reference in the black letter of the article
to people with a disability or public entities. 48 Adherents to the

changed, and currently such provisions are interpreted as requiring the the
contract be lawful. See in particular Giovanni B. Ferri, Meritevolezza
dell’interesse e utilità sociale, II RIV. DIR. COMM. 81 (1971); Ferri, Ancora in
tema di meritevolezza dell’interesse, I RIV. DIR. COMM. 1 (1979); Attilo
Guarneri, Meritevolezza dell’interesse e utilità sociale del contratto, I RIV. DIR.
CIV. 799 (1994); Vincenzo Roppo, Il contratto in 5 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO
PRIVATO 402-03 (Giovanni Iudica & Paolo Zatti eds., Giuffrè 2001).
46. Gianfranco Palermo, Configurazione dello scopo, opponibilità del
vincolo, realizzazione dell’assetto di interessi in LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 77; Giuseppe Vettori, Atto di
destinazione e trascrizione. L’art. 2645ter, LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 176; Aurelio Gentili,
Destinazioni patrimoniali, trust e tutela del disponente in LE NUOVE FORME DI
ORGANIZZAZIONE DEL PATRIMONIO (Giovanni Doria ed., Giappichelli 2010);
RISPOLI, Riflessioni, supra note 44, at 810 (arguing in favor of a full overlapping
of the two tests).
47. See infra note 50 and the corresponding text.
48. Such an interpretation has been criticized by scholars adhering to the
previous opinion insofar as it would require public notaries and officials of the
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present approach, indeed, stress that such a reference has been
generally neglected as the by-product of a previous draft of the
article, later modified at the moment of its enactment, but not
properly amended; 49 on the contrary, in their opinion, since this
reference has been maintained in the currently-in-force version of
the article, the same cannot be neglected or disregarded.
Consequently, article 2645-ter C.C. may work as long as the
relevant bond is intended to pursue a peculiar kind of interest,
implying high-quality values of social solidarity. 50
Finally, according to the majority opinion: 51 (i) the article at
stake has recognized the category of “destination acts”, thus
enhancing the role of each party’s autonomy in providing the
content of such an atypical category; 52 (ii) reference to article
1322, paragraph 2 C.C. shall therefore be intended as the
requirement to be met for the specific destination act to be legally
enforceable; (iii) the mention of “interests worthy of protection”
shall not be intended as a mere duplicate of the test set forth by
article 1322, paragraph 2 C.C., but rather has to be interpreted as
requiring that the bond is created to fulfill a qualified interest to be
assessed quam in concreto; and (iv) finally, reference to people

Register of immovables to assess whether the juridical act imposing the bond is
aimed at pursuing worthwhile interests or not. For bibliographic references, see
supra note 46.
49. This aspect has been specifically highlighted by Rispoli, Riflessioni,
supra note 44, at 810.
50. See, for example, Gazzoni, Osservazioni sull’art. 2645-ter, supra note
42, at 165; Paolo Spada, Conclusioni to LA TRASCRIZIONE DELL’ATTO
NEGOZIALE DI DESTINAZIONE, supra note 44, at 201, 203.
51. See generally Nuzzo, Atto di destinazione e interessi meritevoli di
tutela, supra note 44, at 68; Rolando Quadri, L’art. 2645-ter e la nuova
disciplina degli atti di destinazione, CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 1729 (2006);
Petrelli, La trascrizione degli atti di destinazione, supra note 42, at 179.
52. See also Antonio Gambaro, Appunti sulla Proprietà nell’Interesse
Altrui, 2 TRUSTS 169 (2007) (arguing that art. 2645-ter C.C. has officially
marked the legislative recognition of “property on behalf of another party.”
Accordingly, such a mechanism implies a distinction between the ownership in
itself and the economic interest pertaining to a different party, so that the owner
will have to exercise her right in order to pursue such interest and the relevant
bond will be effective toward third parties.
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with disabilities and/or public entities has an exemplificative but
non-exhaustive role, since the wording of the article explicitly
mentions, in addition to the those former, interests related to
private parties as well. Consequently, the requirement of a
qualified interest does not imply a selection among relevant and
non-relevant public interests, but rather the need to verify the
presence of a specific (and lawful) interest. Specifically, reference
to the qualified interest is aimed at excluding cases in which the
interest is lacking or is unlawful and, at the same time, to stress
that the bond (and the consequent segregation effect) is not a value
ex se. 53 Accordingly, courts should disregard bonds created merely
to prevent enforcement of the creditor’s rights, as well as those
lacking interest or pursuing an unlawful result. Following such an
approach, it has been argued that a bond in which the settlor is at
the same time the beneficiary should not be recognized while a
doubt still persists when the settlor is included among other
beneficiaries (for example, when the bond created by the husband
is aimed to fulfill the interests of the family members). 54
Anyway, it has been highlighted that article 2645-ter C.C.
might imply a new interpretation of the “fiducia cum amico”
scheme: traditionally, in civil law systems, the fiduciary bond may
be invoked only inter partes and cannot be enforced against third
parties, leaving the former owner of the goods with the sole
remedy to make a claim for compensation of damages in the event
of breach of the fiduciary agreement by the counter-party. On the
contrary, should the fiduciary agreement (and therefore the
fiduciary bond over the relevant goods) be registered pursuant to
article 2645-ter C.C., the fiduciary obligation and the consequent
bond would be effective toward third parties. 55
53. Id., passim.
54. Id., passim.
55. See, for example, GIOVANNI IUDICA & PAOLO ZATTI, LINGUAGGIO E
REGOLE DEL DIRITTO PRIVATO 345 (14th ed., CEDAM 2013); PAOLO ZATTI &
VITTORIO COLUSSI, LINEAMENTI DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 477 (14th ed., CEDAM
2013).
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On the other side, scholars who had adopted a critical approach
to the recognition of trusts in Italy believe that article 2645-ter is
the means by which to recognize and register trusts in Italy (even
domestic ones) over registered movables and immovables since, in
this case, the previous legislative gap has been filled. 56 However, it
has to be noted that there was no need of such an article to
recognize and register trusts in Italy because these effects are a
direct consequence of the Convention, as mentioned above.
Indeed, trusts were recognized and registered before the
introduction of article 2645-ter C.C. In addition, it would be
difficult to argue as to why internal trusts may be recognized
insofar as they can be registered pursuant to article 2645-ter C.C.
(and therefore to the extent that they include only registered
movables or immovables), while internal trusts involving only
movables goods (and therefore not subject to registration) may not.
Such an assumption would create an unequal treatment difficult to
be reconciled. Furthermore, trusts and article 2645-ter C.C. do not
overlap, except in partial aspects, and therefore they remain
different. 57 Accordingly, it would be improper to qualify article
2645-ter C.C. in terms of the legal framework granted by Italian
lawmakers to internal trusts.
Namely, trusts show a broader range of application in terms of
interests to be fulfilled; furthermore, they imply the presence of a
trustee with all the powers and duties related to such a capacity, as
well as all the features of the governing law, including the relevant
remedies, too.

56. For an overview of such an approach, see generally Valentina Bellomia,
La Tutela dei Bisogni della Famiglia tra Fondo Patrimoniale e Atto di
Destinazione, 2 DIR. FAM. 698 (2013).
57. For a comparison between trust and art. 2645-ter C.C., see, for example,
AMELIA C. DILANDRO, TRUSTS E SEPARAZIONE PATRIMONIALE NEI RAPPORTI
FAMILIARI E PERSONALI (Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane 2010) (highlighting the
broader range of the application of trusts). See also Maurizio Lupoi, Gli “Atti di
Destinazione” nel Nuovo Art. 2645-ter Cod. Civ. Quale Frammento di Trust,
TRUSTS 169 (2006).
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On the contrary, it may be true that article 2645-ter, since
subject to Italian law, might appear more familiar to Italian parties
and might raise less operative difficulties than having to deal with
a foreign law, as in the case of trusts. However, this is not an
argument which seems to have played a significant role within the
Italian scenario since private parties, professional advisors and
Italian judges did not give the impression of being discouraged by
such alleged inconvenience, as testified to by the broad recourse to
trusts and by their broad judicial recognition. 58
However, article 2645-ter C.C., in spite of its incomplete
formulation, seems to be a further opportunity offered to Italian
parties when assessing which legal tool would better meet their
needs: an additional item in the Italian menu (although the relevant
recipe has not yet been definitively developed). 59
IV. ....AND THE “PATTO DI FAMIGLIA”
The Italian menu has been also enriched with the introduction
of article 768-bis–768-octies C.C., providing for the “Patto di
famiglia”. 60
“Patto di famiglia” (hereinafter “family agreement”) is a
contract whereby the entrepreneur carrying on a business activity,
58. In this regard, an important role is played by the business community
together with private institutions like, for example, “Il Trust in Italia”
(http://www.il-trust-in-italia.it), President Professor Maurizio Lupoi, promoting
education on trusts through conferences, seminars and a specific post-graduate
program, and hosting a worldwide web database on trusts. In addition, among
the Italian law reviews, two deal specifically with trusts: TRUSTS AND ATTIVITÀ
FIDUCIARIE and TRUSTS.
59. See Gambaro, Appunti, supra note 52 (noting that the law of trusts is the
result of centuries of experience grounded on the property on behalf of another
person. Similarly, with the introduction of art. 2645-ter C.C. being a recent
event, the process of developing a proper set of rules and knowledge to deal
with such new concept within the Italian legal system is only at the beginning).
60. The above-mentioned provisions have been introduced by art. 2 of Law
14 February 2006, n. 55. The insertion of the family agreement as a tool to
provide for the family buy-out has been the Italian response to the guidelines of
the European Institutions requiring State members to deal with such issue: see
the Recommendation of the EU Commission 94/1069/EC of 7 February 1994,
1994 O. J. (L385), together with Communication of the EU Commissions of 28
March 1998, 1998 J.O. (C093) 2.
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on his own or by means of a company, grants the business assets or
the shares to the person who, among his descendants, appears more
able to continue the family business. The grant may be in favor of
more descendants, too. Pursuant to the contract, the grantee is
bound to pay to the grantor’ spouse and to the other descendants a
sum equivalent to what they would be entitled to receive as forced
heirs under article 536 C.C., should the grantor’s succession occur
at the date of the agreement. The sum received as the equivalent of
the business assets or of the company’s quotas would count as part
of the overall quota of forced inheritance respectively owed to the
spouse and to each descendant. 61
Similarly, the goods received by the grantee under the family
agreement will count as quota of the forced inheritance owed to the
same. Should the value of the grant be higher than the amount to
be paid as respective forced heirship, the exceeding part will be
qualified as part of the disposable portion of the grantor’s estate,
and the grantee will be the beneficiary of this exceeding part. 62 The
grant and the payment made as consequence of the family
agreement will not be subject to collation or reduction. 63
The aim of the family agreement is therefore the anticipation,
by means of an inter vivos act, of the succession effects as defined
and crystallized at the date of the agreement. This implies the risk
of a possible sacrifice to the credit-rights of the other descendants
should the value of the business assets or of the quotas assigned to
the grantee be accrued at the death of the grantor, rather than at the
date of the agreement. Vice versa, such anticipatory effect will
61. Art. 768-quater C.C. The Italian civil code refers to this concept in term
of “quota di legittima”; the Louisiana civil refers to “legitimate portion” or
“legitime”: see, for example, art. 1234 (Reduction of donations exceeding
disposable portions; calculation of legitime) or Title II (Of donations inter vivos
and mortis causa) – Chapter 1 (Louisiana Trust Code) – Subpart I (Arts. 18411847) dealing with “The Legitime in Trust”. Please note that the legislative
decree 154/2013 has repealed any residual distinction between natural children
and legitimate children.
62. See, for example, IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA (Ubaldo La Porta ed., Utet
2007).
63. Art. 768-ter C.C.
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imply a sacrifice of the grantee’s rights in the event the value of
such goods at the death of the grantor is lower than the amount the
grantee paid to the other descendants under the family
agreement. 64
The purpose of the agreement is therefore to fulfill the family
buy-out. Such aim is perceived as very important within Italian
society since the majority of Italian enterprises are small-medium
ones, family-run, and therefore generally managed by the founder,
together with members of his family. 65 Accordingly, the intuitu
personae element and the proper management of the family buyout through the identification of the descendant most capable of
carrying on the family-business has always been one of the major
concerns of Italian entrepreneurs, as well as the need to preserve
the business value from any potential conflict among the family
members. However, such an expectation mostly clashed with the
right of each descendant to receive a quota of the non-disposable
portion of the succession estate in those cases in which the relevant
estate includes the ownership of a family-business and/or the
family-run company. In order to balance these opposing interests,
Italian lawmakers tried to reach a compromise through the family
agreement mechanism. Accordingly, the elected descendant will be
granted the family business, thus ensuring the positive outcome of
the family buy-out, but, at the same time, he will have to pay-off
the right of credits of the forced heirs, 66 thus ensuring compliance
with the mandatory provisions of Italian law on legitime. The
introduction of the family agreement induced several comments
about its nature and legal effects. In particular, it has been pointed
out that such legal instrument would be a multilateral contract,
64. IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA, supra note 62, passim.
65. See generally Paolo Manes, Prime Considerazioni sul Patto di Famiglia
nella Gestione del Passaggio Generazionale della Ricchezza Familiare, 2
CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 539 (2006).
66. Such an obligation of payment has therefore been intended as counterperformance of the grant: see in particular Francesco Gazzoni, Appunti e spunti
in tema di patto di famiglia, II GIUSTIZIA CIVILE 219, 221 (2006).
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although it would not amount to a partnership or to an association
agreement. 67 Accordingly, lack of adhesion by any of the
descendant renders the agreement null. 68 In the opinion of some
authors, in a such case the agreement would be valid, but not
effective towards the non-adhering party, who will therefore be
entitled to claim for collation, 69 while other authors deem the
agreement as falling within the category of contracts in favour of
third parties. 70
With reference to this kind of legal instrument, the debate
within the Italian arena mainly focused on its nature, the role of
non-adhering descendants and the consequences of such nonadhesion, and on possible remedies and the proper relationship
with mandatory succession provisions. The common opinion
within the Italian sphere is that such a legal instrument
encompasses interesting potentialities, but nevertheless needs to be
improved—especially in its formulation. 71
67. Id.
68. IL PATTO DI FAMIGLIA. NEGOZIABILITA DEL DIRITTO SUCCESSORIO CON
LA LEGGE 14 FEBBRAIO 2006, N. 55 at 244 (Bruno Inzitari ed., G. Giappichelli
2006); Federico Tassinari, Il patto di Famiglia: Presupposti Soggettivi,
Oggettivi e Requisiti Formali in PATTI DI FAMIGLIA PER L’IMPRESA 150, 159
(Fondazione italiana per il notariato coord., Il Sole 24 Ore 2006); Andrea
Zoppini, L’Emersione della Categoria della Successione Anticipata (Note sul
Patto di Famiglia) in PATTI DI FAMIGLIA PER L’IMPRESA 277 (Fondazione
italiana per il notariato coord., Il Sole 24 Ore 2006); Giuseppe Amadio, Patto di
Famiglia e Funzione Divisionale, RIV. NOT. 867, 884 (2006); Nicola Di Mauro,
I Necessari Partecipanti al Patto di Famiglia, FAMIGLIA PERSONE SOCIETA 534
(2006); G. BONILINI, MANUALE DI DIRITTO EREDITARIO E DELLE DONAZIONI 168
(4th ed., Utet 2006); Luigi Balestra, Prime Osservazioni sul Patto di Famiglia,
II NUOVA GIUR. CIV. COMM. 376 (2006).
69. See in particular Giorgio Oppo, Patto di Famiglia e Diritti della
Famiglia, 4 RIV. DIR. CIV. 441 (2006).
70. See, for example, Dario Restuccia, Patto di famiglia e strumenti
tradizionali di trasmissione della ricchezza in PATTO DI FAMIGLIA 94 et seq.,
supra note 62.
71. A first legislative attempt was made during the draft of decree n.
70/2011 (the “development decree”, providing for incentives for the smallmedium enterprises), then converted in Law 106 of 12 July 2011: a preliminary
version of such text included provisions aimed to significantly amend the whole
scheme of the “patto di famiglia”, both from the legal and tax perspective.
However, in the enacted version of the above-mentioned decree, any reference
to such reform has been erased. While some commentators deem it a “lost
opportunity”, others believe that it grants more time for appropriate reflection
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Italian legal framework reveals a complex and heterogeneous
set of different legal tools aimed at meeting the different needs of
Italian society. In particular, rather than a list of dishes, the Italian
menu seems to offer a list of ingredients—some traditional, other
of recent creation or mostly unknown since not long ago, some
autochthonous (although clearly inspired by other experiences),
other imported—which can be combined by customers in light of
their taste and preferences. However, the process is still developing
and seems to demand greater confidence and some improvements.
Nevertheless, a notable element of such a caldron is the on-going
dialogue among the different formants, which is progressively
changing the Italian scene. Accordingly, at the end of 2013 the
words used by a scholar in 2004 to describe the reactions induced
by trust within the Italian legal system appear still up-to-date:
It is impossible not to listen to Italian academics and
practitioners discussing everything from the structuring of a
trust to trustee liability and the beneficiary’s remedies
without reflecting that this was how things must have been
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in
England. The difference, of course, is the twist given to
Italian discussions by the fact that they are taking place
against the backdrop of the modern sophisticated common
law trust reaching into every corner of segregated private
and public investment, asset securitisation, creditor
security, and asset holding and management. The whole
Italian trust scene is fascinating, and for the practitioners
and academic involved evidently exciting. 72
At that time, the author expressed disappointment for not
having the opportunity to turn the page and see what was going to

over the issue. See, for example, Roberto Siclari, La Riforma Mancata del Patto
di Famiglia: Occasione Persa o Viatico per una più Attenta Riflessione?, 1 RIV.
NOT. 17 (2012).
72. Donovan Waters, The Hague Trust Convention Twenty Years On in
COMMERCIAL TRUSTS IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 31, at 56, 92.
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happen in the “Mediterranean saga”. 73 In this sense, the
Mediterranean saga goes on.

73. Id.

